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
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Miroslav Marcovich

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Doctor of Humane Letters, Honoris Causa  
The University of Illinois  
15 May 1994





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Miroslav Marcovich:

Addenda to List of Publications

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I. BOOKS

24. *Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone*. Ed. M. M., Patristische Texte und Studien (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1995) sub prelo
25. *Clementis Alexandrini Protrepticus*. Ed. M. M. (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1995) sub prelo



## The Name of Achilles: Questions of Etymology and “Folk-Etymology”

GREGORY NAGY

In his book on the language of the Linear B tablets, Leonard R. Palmer explained the etymology of the name of Achilles, Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς, as a shortened variant of a compound formation \*Akhīlāwos, built from the roots of ἄχος, “grief,” and of λαός, “host of fighting men, folk,” morphologically parallel to such “Caland” compounds as Homeric κυδιάνειρα and Οἰδιπόδης.<sup>1</sup> The posited morphological shortening from \*Akhīlāwos to Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς, with optional doubling of the last consonant in the shortened variant, is paralleled by such forms as Χαρί-λαος and Χάριλλος (cf. also Φιλεύς vs. Φιλλεύς).<sup>2</sup> What follows is a brief reassessment of Palmer’s explanation, in the wake of over thirty years of intermittent debate.

In my own work on the name of Achilles, I agreed with Palmer’s reconstruction of \*Akhīlāwos, offering further evidence on the two distinct levels of linguistics and poetics.<sup>3</sup> The linguistic evidence was primarily morphological, with a few additions to the examples already adduced by Palmer.<sup>4</sup> The poetic evidence came mainly from the formulaic system attested in the *Dichtersprache* of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

<sup>1</sup> L. R. Palmer, *The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts* (Oxford 1963) 78–79. The original formulation for this kind of compound: W. Caland, “Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Avesta: Adjectiva auf -ra in der composition,” *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 32 (1893) 592; cf. E. Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1974) 218–19.

<sup>2</sup> Palmer (previous note) 79. On the morphology of -εύς, as in Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς, see Palmer 78; cf. J.-L. Perpillou, *Les substantifs grecs en -εύς* (Paris 1973) 167–299. See also in general J. Schindler, “On the Greek Type ἱπτεύς,” in A. Morpurgo Davies and W. Meid (eds.), *Studies in Greek, Italic, and Indo-European Linguistics Offered to Leonard R. Palmer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday*, Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Sprachwissenschaft 16 (Innsbruck 1976) 349–52, who demonstrates that this type of suffix is not a borrowing from a non-Indo-European language and that *ev*-stems are in general secondary formations derived from *o*-stems.

<sup>3</sup> G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979) 69–93; for the original formulation of the argument, see Nagy, “The Name of Achilles: Etymology and Epic,” in Morpurgo Davies and Meid (previous note) 209–37.

<sup>4</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (previous note) 70; cf. “The Name of Achilles” (previous note) 209–10.

First of all, we may note that the noun ἄχος, "grief," is a functional synonym of πένθος, "grief," in the Homeric *Dichtersprache*; for example, the personal grief of Achilles over Briseis is ἄχος at *Il.* 1. 188, 16. 52, 55 and πένθος at 1. 362; his grief over Patroklos is ἄχος at 18. 22, 23. 47 and πένθος at 18. 73; likewise, the collective grief of the Achaeans is ἄχος at 16. 22 and πένθος at 9. 3.<sup>5</sup> This thematic parallelism between ἄχος and πένθος is pertinent, I argued, to the morphological parallelism between Palmer's reconstructed "Caland" compounds \*Akhí-lāyos and \*Penthí-lāyos, matching respectively the shortened "Caland" forms Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς and Πένθιλος.<sup>6</sup> Second, I argued at length that the poetic evidence of the Homeric *Dichtersprache* reveals "a pervasive nexus" between ἄχος and Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς, which is "integrated in the inherited formulaic system and hence deeply rooted in the epic tradition."<sup>7</sup>

This statement is quoted, with approval, by Gary B. Holland, who then goes on to summarize my overall interpretation of the *Iliad* along the lines of this etymology:

It also seems clear that Achilles' actions (or lack of action) lead to ἄχος for the host of fighting men. In Nagy's formula, Achilles' ἄχος leads to Achilles' μῆνις leads to ἄχος of the Achaeans. Furthermore, while the Trojans appear to be winning, that is, while they have the κράτος "power," the Achaeans have ἄχος. . . Thus, the thematic associations of ἄχος and λαός with the name of Achilles provide further corroboration for the etymology proposed by Palmer.<sup>8</sup>

Despite his agreement on the level of poetics, Holland has two objections on the level of linguistics. First, he suggests that the thematic nexus between ἄχος and Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς may be a matter of "folk-etymology," not etymology: "The preponderance of ἄχος and its derivatives may simply be due to a *folk-etymological* association of the word with the name of Achilles on the part of the epic poet(s), and not to an *actual etymological connection*" (emphasis mine).<sup>9</sup> Second, he suggests that my translation of the "Caland" compound \*Akhí-lāyos, "whose λαός has ἄχος," "seems wrong for this compound type," because "dependent noun compounds are

<sup>5</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 94; cf. "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 221.

<sup>6</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 72; cf. "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 210.

<sup>7</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 79.

<sup>8</sup> G. B. Holland, "The Name of Achilles: A Revised Etymology," *Glotta* 71 (1993) 17–27, at 22. For the original version of the formulation paraphrased here, see Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 216.

<sup>9</sup> Holland (previous note) 22–23.

used very infrequently as the basis for bahuvrīhi or possessive adjective compounds.”<sup>10</sup>

It is easier to begin with the second objection, if I am right in thinking that it is based on a misunderstanding. All along, I interpreted the reconstructed “Caland” compound \*Akhí-lāyos as “whose host of fighting men is sorrowful [= grieving],” where the syntactical function of the first component is indeed that of an adjective.<sup>11</sup> Intending to convey a diathetical neutrality in the adjectival component, which I am here rendering as “sorrowful [= grieving],” I devised the translation, “whose lāyos [λαός] has ákhos [ἄχος = sorrow, grief].”<sup>12</sup> Similar translations can be applied to other “Caland” compounds, as with κυδι-άνειρα, “whose men are κυδροί,” that is, “whose men have κυδος”; also, Οἰδι-πόδης, “whose feet are swollen,” that is, “whose feet have swelling = οἶδος” (in this case, the “Caland” simplex with suffix -ρός, alternate of the compound formant οἶδι-, is not attested).

Holland’s second objection raises a more important question, which is central to this presentation: how to distinguish an etymology from a “folk-etymology.” The latter term is misleading, I suggest, if it leads to the assumption that the only “genuine” etymology in comparative linguistics is one where a given reconstructed form can be traced all the way back to the parent language of the given languages being compared. According to such an assumption, a reconstruction like \*Akhí-lāyos would be a “false” etymology if it cannot be traced back to “proto-Indo-European.”

The term “folk-etymology” implies another, even more misleading, assumption: that any etymologically “wrong” derivation of one given form from another is purely a synchronic phenomenon. True, a functioning or living connection between a given set of forms that had once been unconnected must be assumed to have a starting point at some given synchrony. Still, any synchrony is destined to become, moving forward in time, simply a cross-section in the diachrony of language. As we reconstruct a given language forward in time, what may count as a “wrong” connection in an earlier cross-section can become a “right” connection in a later cross-section, from the standpoint of the evolving structure of that language. Here I refer to the classic work of Emile Benveniste on the necessity of combining synchronic with diachronic methods in the establishment of etymologies.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Holland (above, note 8) 23, with reference to Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 69–70.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 78, “he who has the host of fighting men grieving.”

<sup>12</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 69–70. By “diathetical neutrality,” I mean that the opposition between active and passive is neutralized.

<sup>13</sup> E. Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris 1966) 289–307. Cf. F. W. Householder and G. Nagy, *Greek: A Survey of Recent Work* (The Hague 1972) 48–58.

In the case of a form like Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς, the question is not whether it had *always* been connected with the forms ἄχος and λαός. What matters instead is whether this connection is “deeply rooted,” as I have described it, in the formulaic system of Homeric *Dichtersprache* and whether it can be traced far back enough in time to reach the remote stage when “Caland” formations were still a productive mechanism in the Greek language.

Moving diachronically forward, by the time we reach even the earliest attestations of the Greek language, we find that the “Caland” mechanism is already residual, clearly no longer productive: Only such vestiges as κυδιάνειρα vs. κυδρός are left.<sup>14</sup> What remains productive, however, as I argued, is the actual *Dichtersprache* that had preserved “Caland” formations like \*Akhí-lāuos vs. Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς and \*Penthí-lāuos vs. Πένθιλος.

Such a *Dichtersprache*, however, can be considered a system in its own right, capable of generating, analogically, such non-“Caland” formations as Χαρί-λαος vs. Χάριλλος, Σθενέ-λαος vs. Σθένελος, Νείλεως (Ionic, from \*Nehélāuos, apparently attested in the Linear B tablets as *ne-e-ra-wo*) vs. Νηλεύς (non-Ionic, from \*Neheleús), Ἰόλαος vs. Ἰόλη and Ἰόλεια (implying a corresponding \*Ἰολεύς), Περίλαος vs. Πέριλλος.<sup>15</sup> Still other non-“Caland” types that could have been generated by the *Dichtersprache* along the lines of \*Akhí-lāuos and \*Penthí-lāuos include Πρωτεσί-λαος (Il. 2. 698, etc.), Χαίρεσί-λαος, Πενθεσί-λεια.<sup>16</sup>

With reference to Πενθεσί-λεια, Holland remarks: “Although πένθος means ‘pain’ synchronically in Greek, further connections within Indo-European are semantically difficult.”<sup>17</sup> I draw attention to his use here of “synchronically,” since his purpose is to argue that seemingly related forms, such as πενθερός, “relative by marriage,” are to be derived from the Common Greek root \**penth-*, “bind” (as in πείσμα, “rope”; the Indo-European root is \**bhendh-*, as in Sanskrit *bandh-*), so that Πενθεσί-λεια should mean “binding the λαός” rather than “paining the λαός.”<sup>18</sup>

The problem is, Holland’s use here of “synchronically” implies that there is just one level of synchrony for the meaning of “grief” or “pain”—as if any previous level would default diachronically to the meaning of “bind.” And yet, the possibility of reconstructing earlier levels of synchronicity for πένθος in the sense of “pain” becomes open-ended if the root is derived

<sup>14</sup> Cf. E. Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1974) 218–19.

<sup>15</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 71.

<sup>16</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 71. On the capabilities of Homeric *Dichtersprache* to generate new morphological categories, see e.g. C. P. Roth, “Mixed Aorists” in *Homeric Greek* (New York and London 1990).

<sup>17</sup> Holland (above, note 8) 24.

<sup>18</sup> Holland (above, note 8) 24.



from Common Greek \**k<sup>h</sup>enth-*, "suffer" (cf. Lithuanian *kenčiù*, Irish *cēssaim*), as opposed to Common Greek \**penth-*, "bind."<sup>19</sup>

It would be preferable in this case, I suggest, to keep in mind not the diachrony of the root πένθ- but also the synchronicity of a *Dichtersprache* that could generate, along with a morphological and thematic parallelism of ἄχος vs. πένθος, a morphological and thematic parallelism of \*Akh(es)í-lāuos vs. \*Penth(es)í-lāu<sub>ia</sub>. These parallelisms converge in the epic tradition of a mortal combat between the male warrior Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς and the female warrior Πενθεσί-λεια, as reflected in the *Aithiopsis* (Proclus, summary p. 105.22 Allen).

My argument remains, then, that Palmer's explanation of Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς "will not carry conviction unless we can show that the meaning of \*Akhí-lāuos is intrinsic to the function of Achilles in myth and epic."<sup>20</sup> In a later work, Palmer himself quoted and gave his approval to this formulation.<sup>21</sup> He goes on to summarize my argument:

This poses the question of the function of ἄχος and λᾶός in the poetical tradition. His searching study brings out that the Leitmotiv "pain, grief, distress" recurs at key points of the developing tragedy as the μῆνις of Akhilleus brought ἄλγεα on the Achaeans, as foreshadowed in the first lines of the poem. As C. H. Whitman [*Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, MA 1958) 182] has written, Homer handles his material in a "profoundly organic" way, "subordinating all characters to Achilles, and all incidents of the Trojan war to the Wrath." He adds that "the Wrath of Achilles had probably been an epic subject for generations when Homer found it" [ibid.].<sup>22</sup>

To restate my original formulation: "The ἄχος of Achilles leads to the μῆνις of Achilles leads to the ἄχος of the Achaeans."<sup>23</sup> As I also argued,

<sup>19</sup> The possibility of this derivation is raised by P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* III (Paris 1974) 862.

<sup>20</sup> Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 210. For a similar approach to the etymology of Ἀπόλλων / Ἀπέλλων, see Nagy, "The Name of Apollo: Etymology and Essence," in J. Solomon (ed.), *Apollo: Origins and Influences* (Tucson 1994) 3–7.

<sup>21</sup> L. R. Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" in R. Muth and G. Pfohl (eds.), *Serta Philologica Aenipontana* III (Innsbruck 1979) 255–61, at 258. Also Palmer, *The Greek Language* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1980) 37 and 98. Neither work is mentioned by Holland (above, note 8).

<sup>22</sup> Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" (previous note) 258.

<sup>23</sup> Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 216. This article includes a thematic analysis of μῆνις in the Homeric *Iliad*, where I argued that "the theme of Achilles's anger is singled out by the composition as the most central and hence most pervasive in the Iliadic tradition" (211) and that the Homeric deployment of μῆνις indicates "a distinctive Iliadic association of this word with all the epic events that resulted from Achilles' anger against Agamemnon, the most central of which is the devastation [ἄλγεα] suffered by the Achaeans" (211–12). When I rewrote my arguments about Homeric μῆνις in *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 72–74, I adduced the important etymological and thematic observations of C. Watkins, "A propos de ΜΗΝΙΣ," *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* 72 (1977) 187–209

the ἄχος experienced by warriors in the epic *Dichtersprache* is formulaically the converse of κράτος; that is, the λαός, or "host of fighting men," is conventionally described as having κράτος when they win, ἄχος when they lose.<sup>24</sup> It is crucial to note in this context Benveniste's demonstration that the semantics of κράτος are driven by a "zero-sum" mentality: The very fact that one of two sides gets κράτος necessitates that this side is thereby the winner and the other side the loser.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the thematic polarity of κράτος / ἄχος is mirrored by the morphological parallelism of Ἀχαιοίς / κραταιός, embedded in the formulaic system of the Homeric *Dichtersprache*, and the very name of the λαός, that is, the Ἀχαιοί, is synchronically derived from ἄχος—at least, within the framework of this *Dichtersprache*.<sup>26</sup>

How, then, could it happen that the naming of this host of fighting men was driven by a negative concept, as encoded in the word ἄχος? My answer centered on both the ritual and the mythological aspects of warfare, as viewed within the epic tradition.<sup>27</sup> Palmer asks a similar question about the naming of a hero like Achilles: It can only happen, he answers, if the very idea of \*Akhī-lāuos, "whose λαός has ἄχος," had been generated by the themes of myth.<sup>28</sup>

And yet the name of Achilles is "attractively identified," as Palmer puts it, in the Linear B tablets: In the text of Pylos tablet Fn 70. 2, a list of names in the dative includes *a-ki-re-we*, to be read as *Akhil(l)ēwei*.<sup>29</sup> As I commented on this attestation, "we must be ready to assume that the mythopoeic name of Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς inspired the naming of historical figures called Ἀχιλ(λ)εύς."<sup>30</sup> Palmer comments on my comment: "In fact, it is at the very least unlikely that any parent would have bestowed such a name on his son unless its inauspicious overtones had been masked by its occurrence as a heroic name in a famous story."<sup>31</sup> If Palmer's "chain of reasoning," as he calls it, is correct, "then the Pylian record may be construed as implying

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(which article does not mention the relevant thematic observations in Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" [above, note 3] 211–12, 215–17).

<sup>24</sup> Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 216–32. Expanded version in Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 69–93.

<sup>25</sup> E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes* II: *Pouvoir, droit, religion* (Paris 1969) 76–77; cf. Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 79–83.

<sup>26</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 83–93.

<sup>27</sup> Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* (above, note 3) 83–93. Cf. also 94–117 on the Homeric use of ἄχος and πένθος, both meaning "grief," as programmatic indicators of ritual songs of lament (especially 99–100 on *Od.* 4. 220).

<sup>28</sup> Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" (above, note 21) 258.

<sup>29</sup> Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" (above, note 21) 258.

<sup>30</sup> Nagy, "The Name of Achilles" (above, note 3) 210.

<sup>31</sup> Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" (above, note 21) 258.

that a version of the 'Wrath of Akhilleus' was current at the time of the destruction of Pylos."<sup>32</sup>

All this is not to rule out an etymological connection, proposed by Holland, between the intermediate reconstructed Greek form \*'Αχιλος and "proto-Germanic" \**Agilaz*, from which the Old Norse name *Egill* can be derived.<sup>33</sup> Still, even though Holland allows for the possibility of an earlier reconstructed Greek form \**Akhí-lāuos*, the acceptance of a Germanic cognate \**Agilaz* leaves us with morphological as well as semantic problems that are unresolved.<sup>34</sup> In another connection, Palmer once called attention to "the first rule of etymology," attributed to Franz Skutsch: "Look for Latin etymologies first on the Tiber."<sup>35</sup> That "rule" is applicable to the name of Achilles.

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<sup>32</sup> Palmer, "A Mycenaean 'Akhilleid'?" (above, note 21) 258–59. Moreover, there is an attestation of *a-ki-re-u*, to be read as *Akhilleus*, in Knossos-tablet Vc 106.

<sup>33</sup> Holland (above, note 8) 25.

<sup>34</sup> I am not persuaded by Holland's argument (above, note 8) 26, that ἄχος at *Il.* 13. 86 and 417 is to be interpreted as "fear," not "grief."

<sup>35</sup> L. R. Palmer, "The Language of Homer," in A. J. B. Wace and F. H. Stubbings (eds.), *A Companion to Homer* (London 1963) 90–91; cf. Palmer (above, note 1) 187.



Heraclitus on Old and New Months: *P.Oxy.* 3710

DAVID SIDER

While one recently published papyrus has given us a join of two hitherto separate Heraclitean fragments,<sup>1</sup> another offers an altogether new fragment, some would say two new fragments, of Heraclitus: *P.Oxy.* LIII (1986) 3710, ed. by M. W. Haslam, a second-century commentary on *Odyssey* 20.<sup>2</sup> An attempt to clarify yet another riddle from antiquity's notorious puzzler would seem a proper (however insufficient) tribute to a scholar who has done so much to shed light on ὁ σκοτεινός.<sup>3</sup>

The passage in question occurs in the course of a commentary on *Od.* 20. 156, ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἤρι νέονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶσιν ἑορτή, where Eurycleia tells the maids to get the palace ready for the suitors, who "are arriving early, since there is a festival for all." This festival had already been identified by Philochorus (apud Σ ad loc.) as that of Apollo Noumenios, the celebration of the new month, whose significance for the *Odyssey* has been ably elaborated by Norman Austin.<sup>4</sup> Now we have our newly published

<sup>1</sup> The Derveni Papyrus makes it highly likely that Heraclitus 57 Marcovich (22 B 3 D-K) was followed immediately by 52 M (B 94). Cf. my "Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus" (forthcoming); W. Burkert, "Eralito nel Papiro di Derveni: Due nuove testimonianze," in L. Rossetti (ed.), *Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981* (Rome 1983) 37-42; S. N. Mouraviev, "The Heraclitean Fragment of the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 61 (1985) 131-32; D. Sider, "Heraclitus B3 and 94 in the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 69 (1987) 225-28; K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parássoglou, "Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus," in *Studi e testi per il Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* III (Florence 1988) 125-33; eidem, "PDerveni, col. II 1-11," in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* I.1\*\* (Florence 1992) 221-26; A. Lebedev, "Heraclitus in P.Derveni," *ZPE* 79 (1989) 39-47; L. Schoenbeck, "Heraclitus Revisited," *ZPE* 95 (1993) 7-22.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. M. L. West, "A New Fragment of Heraclitus," *ZPE* 67 (1987) 16; S. N. Mouraviev, "P. Oxy. LIII 3710: Les nouveaux fragments d'Héraclite," *ZPE* 71 (1988) 32-34; idem, "Heraclitus 4T," in *Corpus* (previous note) 229-42; W. Burkert, "Heraclitus and the Moon: The New Fragment in *P.Oxy.* 3710," *ICS* 18 (1993) 49-55.

<sup>3</sup> For Miroslav Marcovich's contributions to the study of Heraclitus, see the bibliography in the first part of this Festschrift (*ICS* 18 [1993] 1-17), books nos. 4-9; articles nos. 14, 38, 43, 53, 56, 70-71, 83, 86, 89-90, 93, 96, 133, 138, 154, 198; reviews nos. 2, 5-9, 16-17, 21.

<sup>4</sup> *FGrHist* 328 F 88 τοῦ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος ταύτην εἶναι νομίζειν τὴν ἡμέραν εἰκότως τὸ πρῶτον φῶς τῷ αἰτιωτάτῳ τοῦ πυρός, ἐκάλουν τε αὐτὸν καὶ Νεομήνιον. ἡ ἱστορία παρὰ Φιλοχόρῳ. Philochorus wrote *Περὶ ἡμερῶν Ἑλίου καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος* (Σ Hes. *Op.* 768). Cf. also Σ Pi. N. 3. 4 αἱ τῶν μηνῶν ἀρχαὶ ἱεραὶ εἰσι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος; Haslam, *P.Oxy.* LIII (1986) 106 f.; N. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* (Berkeley 1975) 245-52. See also J. Russo's commentary ad *Od.* 20. 156 and Mouraviev, *Corpus* (above, note 2) 232 f.

commentary, apparently agreeing that the festival is indeed that of Apollo Noumenios, using *Od.* 20. 156 as an occasion to cite sources on solar eclipses apparently tangential to Homer, since they can occur only at times of a new moon:<sup>5</sup>

*P.Oxy.* 3710, col. ii. 34–47<sup>6</sup>

Ἀριστόνικος φησιν ὅτι νομηνία ἦν τότε,  
 ὅθεν Ἀπόλλωνος, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἥλιος. 35  
 ὅτι ἐν νομηνία αἱ ἐκλείψεις δηλοῖ  
 Ἀρίσταρχος ὁ Σάμιος γράφων· ἔφη τε  
 ὁ μὲν Θαλῆς ὅτι ἐκλείπειν τὸν ἥλι-  
 ον σελήνης ἐπίπροσθεν αὐτῷ γενο-  
 μένης, σημειουμέ[νης ±6 ] . . . τῆς 40  
 ἡμέρας ἐν ᾗ ποιεῖται τὴν ἔγλειψιν,  
 ἦν οἱ μὲν τριακάδα καλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ νο-  
 μηνίαν. Ἡράκλειτος·

συνιόντων  
 τῶν μηνῶν ἡμέρας ἐξ [ὅ]του φαί-  
 νεται, προτέρην νομηνίην δευ- 45  
 τέρην, ἄλλοτ' ἐλάσσονας μεταβάλλε-  
 ται ἄλλοτε πλεῦνας.

38 [ὅτι] Lebedev || 40 σημειουμέ[νης τῇ κρύ]ψει τῆς sugg. Haslam:  
 σημειούμ[ε]νος (Haslam) ἐκ τῆς] ῥητῆς dubitanter Rea apud Haslam:  
 σημειούμ[ε]νος τοῦτο] ἀπὸ Lebedev: σημειούμ[ε]νος τοὺς ὄρ]ους τῆς  
 Burkert || 44 ἐξ [ὅ]του Haslam (approb. West): ἐξ[ῆς] γ' οὐ (γ' Merkelbach)  
 Mouraviev || 45–46 προτέρην νομηνίην (seu νεο-) <ἐς> δευτέρην West ||  
 46–47 fort. leg. μεταβάλλεσθαι

The commentary up to the point where Heraclitus' words begin may be rendered as follows:

Aristonicus says that it was then the new moon, hence (the festival) of Apollo, since he is the same as the sun. Aristarchus of Samos makes it clear that (sc. solar) eclipses occur during new moon when he writes; and

<sup>5</sup> References to solar eclipses are not as irrelevant to Homer as they might at first appear, for Theoclymenus' depiction of the day of Odysseus' return as one when ἥλιος δὲ / οὐρανοῦ ἐξάπόλωλε (20. 356–57) was understood to refer to a solar eclipse; Heraclitus, *Alleg.* 75. And since Homer seems to have set this day at the new moon closest to the shortest day of the year, he may indeed also have hinted at a solar eclipse, which would have added to the day's darkness. The first unambiguous reference to solar eclipses occurring only at new moon is found in Thuc. 2. 27. 2 τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους νομηνία κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίνεσθαι δύνατον, ὁ ἥλιος ἐξέλιπε.

<sup>6</sup> The text being quite secure, I dispense with most papyrological restorations and editorial signs, which can be found in the ed. pr. and articles cited above. What follows is Haslam's text with an abbreviated apparatus.

Thales said that the sun is eclipsed<sup>7</sup> when the moon comes in front of it, the day being marked (by occultation?),<sup>8</sup> in which (*sc.* day) the (solar) eclipse occurs, which some call the thirtieth and others the new moon.<sup>9</sup>

What follows calls for further discussion. Haslam ([above, note 4] 106) offers the following: "When the moons/months meet, it changes days—day before, new-moon, second (?)—sometimes fewer, sometimes more, from the moment it appears." What the two "it"s refer to remains cloudy. West prefers to emend προτέρην νουμηνίην to προτέρη νουμηνή and to supply ἐξ before δευτέρην: "As the monthly conjunctions (*sc.* of moon with sun) occur, it changes (or: there is a change in) the number of days from the appearance of one new moon to the next, (so that there are) sometimes fewer, sometimes more." West thus agrees with Haslam that the fragment refers to the differing number of days from one month to the next, but, as we shall see, the words προτέρη and δευτέρη together in a context such as this almost certainly refer to individual days rather than months (although it is true that Ar. *Eq.* 43 τῇ προτέρᾳ νουμηνίᾳ means "at the last νουμηνία," i.e. "on the first of this month"). Idiomatic Greek, moreover, would prefer to use two forms of ἕτερος rather than "former" and "second" to express what West finds in these words.

Mouraviev, convinced by Merkelbach that the lacuna in line 44 contained two letters,<sup>10</sup> translates first in French (1988) and then in Italian (1992), with no difference in meaning, as follows: "All'incontro dei mesi (il corno lunare) non appare per tre giorni di seguito: la vigilia, la neomenia, l'indomani. Talora si trasforma in meno giorni, talaltra in più giorni." With "corno lunare" Mouraviev refers to the near-universal custom among those who adhere to strict lunar months of waiting to see the first lunar crescent after a new moon before declaring that evening the start of the next month, whose first day is called νουμηνία. Mouraviev thus makes the point of the

<sup>7</sup> The unanswered μέν and ἔφη τε . . . ὅτι ἐκλείπειν suggest that our commentator has crudely excerpted from his source, perhaps Aristonicus; cf. L. Cohn, "Aristonikos 17," *RE* II.1 (1895) 964–66; G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary I* (Cambridge 1985) 38–41. For Thales in this commentary, see A. Lebedev, "Aristarchus of Samos on Thales' Theory of Eclipses," *Apeiron* 23 (1990) 77–85; D. Panchenko, "Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning," *Configurations* 1 (1993) 387–414, esp. 394–404.

<sup>8</sup> "The day being marked" seems to fit the context better than "(Thales) inferring . . . from the day." Traces of iota before τῆς are clear, so that a third-declension dative noun is very likely. For Haslam's suggested κρύψει, note this same papyrus column, lines 48–49 ἀποκρύπτεται μὲν ἡ σελήνη, and cf. LSJ s.v. κρύψω and Archil. fr. 122. 2–4 W Ζεὺς . . . / ἐκ μεσαμβρίας ἔθηκε νύκτ', ἀποκρύψας φάος / ἡλίου. Also fitting the traces is τι. In either case, Burkert's and Lebedev's restorations cannot work.

<sup>9</sup> Does Aristarchus' knowledge of Thales' statement derive from Heraclitus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius 1. 23, credited Thales with being the first astronomer?

<sup>10</sup> The accompanying plate in *P.Oxy.* seems to favor Haslam's reading over Merkelbach's. Not only does the letter look more like a tau than a gamma, there is no trace of the bar over the letter which would mark it as a numeral, as is found elsewhere in this papyrus.



fragment not the shifting number of days per month, but the varying number of days during which the moon is dark.<sup>11</sup>

Haslam's translation is (as West points out) not clear; Mouraviev's version, however, although a straightforward rendering of his text, presents a more scientifically minded Heraclitus than we find anywhere in his fragments. It is true that Heraclitus in his indisputable remains does discuss various meteorological and cosmological phenomena, but always, it seems, in the service of some larger epistemological or political purpose. (The river fragment is not intended to further the study of potamology.) More particularly, one misses in both Haslam's and Mouraviev's versions any hint of Heraclitus' riddling style, which pervades the extant fragments.<sup>12</sup>

Retaining Haslam's [ὅ]του, then, I would like to argue for an interpretation of this new fragment which views its style and point as typically Heraclitean. To begin, we should note that the fragment seems concerned with alteration and the ambiguity of naming, two pervasive concerns of Heraclitus elsewhere.<sup>13</sup> In this case, Heraclitus exploits the inherent potential for confusion in naming days towards one month's end and the beginning of the next. Possible sources of confusion are: (i) One could never be absolutely sure at the beginning of a true lunar month how many days it would contain. Although there tends to be a regular alternation of 29- and 30-day months, two or more consecutive 29-day or 30-day months are possible.<sup>14</sup> (ii) A cloudy 29th night of a month following a 29-day month will induce people to assume that there is still one more day before the next month—mistakenly so in the case of two 29-day months (Samuel *ibid.*). (iii) The nomenclature of the days of the month's last decad, which is almost universally a backward count after day 21, produces a skipped day almost every other month. That is, day 21 = day 10 of the waning month, day 22 = day 9 of the waning month . . . day 28 = day 3 of

<sup>11</sup> Cf. A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 14 f.; O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*, corrected 2nd ed. (New York 1969) 106–10; W. K. Pritchett, *The Choiseul Marble* (Berkeley 1970) 66–73; *idem*, "The Calendar of the Gibbous Moon," *ZPE* 49 (1982) 243–66; J. A. Walsh, "The Omitted Date in the Athenian Hollow Month," *ZPE* 41 (1981) 107–24.

<sup>12</sup> Still less of Heraclitus' style is to be found in col. iii. 7–11 of this papyrus, which West, on the basis of Ionic forms alone, tentatively suggested was a second quotation: *μεις τριταῖος* (*τριτή* Mouraviev) *φαινόμενος ἑκαίδ[ε]κάτη πασσέληνος φαίνεται ἐν ἡμέρ[η]σι* *τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα· ἀπολιμπάνει τὸ[ν] ὑπόμετρον ἐν ἡμέρ[η]σι ιγ'*. Mouraviev, *Corpus* (above, note 2) prints this as a continuation of Heraclitus' words in col. ii, and Burkert too considers it Heraclitean, but in a lemma in which the commentator seems to quote a new authority with each new sentence, there is no pressing reason to believe that yet another citation pertaining to months and days derives from Heraclitus. There are too many authors who wrote in Ionic on scientific matters for dialect alone to count for much. Moreover, this sentence is more concerned with particular numbers than Heraclitus shows himself elsewhere: "The moon, appearing on the third day, appears as a full moon on the 16th, within 14 days; it leaves the rest (to change) in 13 days" (*tr.* Burkert [above, note 2] 52).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. e.g. 39 M = B 48, 45 M = B 23, 50 M = B 15, 84 M = B32, 92b M = B 82.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel (above, note 11) 14 f. Consider e.g. the year 1994, in which the number of days between new moons is as follows: 30, 30, 29, 30, 30, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 30.



Day                      Full Month                      Hollow Month

28	τρίτη φθίνοντος	
29	δευτέρα φθίνοντος	ἔνη καὶ νέα
30	ἔνη καὶ νέα	
1	νουμηνία	
2	δευτέρα	

## ATHENS

28	τρίτη ἀπιόντος	
29	προτριάκας	τριάκας
30	τριάκας	
1	νευμεινία	
2	δευτέρα	

## BOEOTIA

28	λοιπῶν τριῶν	
29	λοιπῶν δύο	—
30	ὑστέρα, ὑστέρα ἓνα καὶ νέα, ὑστερομεινία	
1	νουμηνία	
2	δευτέρα	

## THESSALY

28	τρίτη ἀπιόντος	
29	δευτέρα ἀπιόντος	ἔνη καὶ νέα
30	ἔνη καὶ νέα	
1	νουμηνία	
2	δευτέρα	

## DELOS

28	τρίτα ἐξ ἱκάδος	
29	προτριάκας	τριάκας
30	τριάκας	
1	νουμηνία	
2	δευτέρα	

## RHODES

Table 1

Ends and Beginnings of Representative Greek Months

See further A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 59–61, 69, 86–87, 100–01, 110.

the waning month. The next day, however, is either day 2 of the waning month (in a full, i.e. 30-day month), followed by (in Athens, e.g.) old-and-new day or (in a hollow, i.e. 29-day month) day 28 is followed immediately by old-and-new day. See Table 1.

Thus, the uncertainty as to the number of days in a month mentioned above comes to a head on day 29. You and I can wake up towards the end of a month not thinking or even caring about whether this particular month has 30 or 31 days; at least we know that today is the 30th and will remain so until midnight. And if it is a 30-day month, we do not feel that a day is missing. A Greek, on the other hand, wakes up on the 29th not knowing whether by sunset, when official watchers look for the crescent of the new moon, the day will have changed names from (however it is expressed in his particular city) "the day before the last day of the month" to "the last day of the month." And because of the prevalent Greek custom of counting days backward after the twentieth, with the countdown aimed at the thirtieth day, a 29-day month was strongly felt to be curtailed, or rather "hollow," κοῖλος (Geminus 8. 3).

This situation is ripe for exploitation by either a comic poet or a philosopher interested in alteration and underlying *logos*. We see the former in Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1178 ff., where Pheidippides instructs his father in the absurdity of naming one day as though it were two, *sc.* old-and-new day. Since this was the day debts became due, Strepsiades would be especially anxious waking up, as indeed he does as the play opens, on the day after the 28th (cf. lines 1–3, 16 ff.).<sup>15</sup> We see the latter in our new Heraclitus fragment, with the further complication that he also considers those months in which the moon is not only new but falls directly between earth and sun to produce a solar eclipse. Why he would do so has been hinted at above and expressed more clearly by Burkert ([above, note 2] 54), when he says that "what is specifically Heraclitean is that both should be in view, the change [*sc.* in the number of days] and the *logos*," and goes on aptly to compare the river fragment, where Heraclitus alludes to the simultaneous constant alteration and underlying unity which is most easily seen in rivers but which characterizes all else in the cosmos.

I agree with Burkert in his overall assessment of the meaning of our new fragment. There may be, moreover, yet another way in which it may be said to be specifically Heraclitean; that is, its peculiar style, more specifically its word order, seems designed to reproduce the very alteration which it describes. Let us begin by noting that in every epigraphic count of days known to us there is no *calendric* confusion between τριακάς (or however the last day of the month is designated) and νομηνία, the first day of the next month. The shift in days' names toward the end of the month as

<sup>15</sup> Walsh (above, note 11) argues that in Athens the omitted date was the 21st (δεκάτη φθίνοντος) rather than (as Samuel and Pritchett argue) the 29th, but—even if he is correct—the ambiguity of ἔνη καὶ νέα remains.

described above is only part of the story, for not only can the second day from month's end come to be called the last day, but the last day itself, in both hollow and full months, since the evening's crescent moon signals a new month, shares in both months. As Aristarchus says, there is a day-long period of time called both *τριακάς* and *νουμηνία*. To be more precise, the last day becomes *νουμηνία* at sunset, as spelled out by Σ Ar. Nu. 1179β ἔφη μὲν ἡ τριακάς, νέα δὲ ἡ νουμηνία.<sup>16</sup> It may be that the exceptional circumstance of a solar eclipse advanced the change in names by several hours. But in any case, a day could begin as *τριακάς* and then be declared a "new moon" day. The new calendar month, however, would begin the next day, and it too would be called, as usual, *νουμηνία*. In evidence of which Aristarchus cites Heraclitus, understanding him, I believe, to be referring to the existence of two successive days called *νουμηνία* (more precisely, part of one day after sunset and all of the next day).

Before we apply these facts to the new fragment, we should also remind ourselves that Heraclitus several times uses an ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction to reinforce his philosophical point. As I argued in an earlier article,<sup>17</sup> the following fragments should be read with the underlined words taken ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with what precedes and what follows:

1 M (B 1) τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀζύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι κτλ.

40 M (B 12) ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν ἀντοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.

86 M (B 5) καθαίρονται δ' αἵματι μαινώμενοι.

94 M (B 119) ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων.

These examples suggest a complex way of reading the three words at the center of the new fragment. First, as an asyndetic listing of three days which end one month and begin the next:

(i) *προτέρη*, a generic term to describe the day before the end of the month; cf. the terms *προτριακάς* (Boeotia, Rhodes, Cos) and, even more telling, *πρὸ νεομηνίας* (Thasos).<sup>18</sup> This term, as illustrated in Table 1, not only differs from city to city; it can itself undergo alteration within a 24-hour period during a hollow month.

(ii) *νεομηνία*, the first day of the new month.

(iii) *δευτέρα*, the second day of the new month.

Simultaneously the same three words, with the middle term taken ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, can refer to the two successive days called *νουμηνία*:

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also Σ Ar. Nu. 1134c ἔφη τε καὶ νέα· ἡ νουμηνία; Σ Demosth. 21. 297 τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν . . . , ἣν τινες ἔφη καὶ νέαν, τινὲς δὲ νουμηνίαν ὀνομάζουσιν; Plut. Sol. 25.

<sup>17</sup> "Word Order and Sense in Heraclitus: Fragment One and the River Fragment," in K. Boudouris (ed.), *Ionian Philosophy* (Athens 1989) 363–68.

<sup>18</sup> *JG XII Suppl.* 347. 2; Samuel (above, note 11) 130.

- (i) προτέρη νουμηνία.
- (ii) νουμηνία δευτέρη.<sup>19</sup>

Read thus, the sentence effectively mirrors the situation it describes as the names for days overlap and shift in meaning and number just as the days themselves do. The overlapping boundaries between months may make for difficulties in observation and nomenclature, but the underlying pattern of day following day remains, even when disrupted by a solar eclipse. With Burkert, we can note how this fragment fits in with other astronomical fragments pertaining to boundaries between day and night (52 M = B 94 [see above, note 1], 60 M = B 99, 62 M = B 120); equally suggestive, especially given its first word (συνιόντων), is its similarity to 25 M = B 10: συλλάψεις· ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον διᾶδον· ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.

Translation of the new fragment still presents difficulties, perhaps, as Haslam suggests, because of faulty transmission; a minimal change would be to read μεταβάλλεσθαι for μεταβάλλεται, which could have been written by the scribe under the influence of the nearby φαίνεται. Or the text may be sound but the subject of φαίνεται has been obscured by the fragment's being wrenched out of context. The sense seems to be something like the following:<sup>20</sup> "When months come together the days since it (*sc.* the moon) appears—prior νουμηνία (and) second—sometimes changes (to) fewer, sometimes (to) more."

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<sup>19</sup> This seems preferable to regarding δευτέρην as an example of "expressive asyndeton" (Burkert [above, note 2] 52 n. 18).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 581e ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου, which may be an echo of Heracl. 56ab M (B 84ab), where the sources mention Heraclitus' ἄνω κάτω road along with his words μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται.

This article has benefited from discussions with Dirk Obbink and Dmitri Panchenko, and from comments received from Michael Haslam.

## A propos d'Iphigénie dans l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle

JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY

Iphigénie n'a pas de chance, même littérairement: Homère ignore son existence; Eschyle et Sophocle lui ont consacré chacun une tragédie; et les deux oeuvres sont perdues, au point que l'on n'est guère d'accord sur leur reconstitution. Il se trouve néanmoins qu'à deux moments bien différents de l'histoire de la tragédie, nous avons deux images de la jeune fille et de son immolation, qui sont, en tout, antithétiques. L'évocation du sacrifice dans l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle est d'une violence inégalable:<sup>1</sup> Iphigénie est immolée brutalement comme une bête, alors qu'elle se défend. Dans *Iphigénie à Aulis* d'Euripide, cinquante ans plus tard, elle est devenue une héroïne, qui accepte de mourir, avec noblesse . . . et ne meurt pas. Le contraste donne un relief accru à la scène terrible d'Eschyle.

Il est inutile d'en rappeler les détails littéraires abondamment commentés par tous. On a relevé les supplications inutiles, la comparaison avec la chèvre, l'effort pour s'attacher à la terre, le bâillon. On a relevé aussi l'extraordinaire rejet du mot βίᾱ, quand la phrase enjambe la séparation entre l'antistrophe 4 et la strophe 5, comme pour suivre la résistance même de la jeune fille, menant au geste qui l'abat sur l'autel.<sup>2</sup> On a relevé enfin l'appel à la pitié qui suit, rehaussé par le souvenir des tendresses d'antan. C'est un des textes les plus beaux de la langue grecque, et des plus forts. C'est aussi un des plus étudiés. Et nous ne voudrions pas ici nous lancer dans une nouvelle analyse savante, ni même confronter toutes les hypothèses, les interprétations, les suggestions. Nous voudrions simplement nous demander pourquoi un tel relief et une telle insistance.

Sans doute le sacrifice d'Iphigénie est-il essentiel à l'action: il sera la cause directe du meurtre d'Agamemnon par Clytemnestre. Mais le relief du texte est trop exceptionnel pour ne pas correspondre à une inspiration et à des idées propres à Eschyle. Et nous aimerions, en une relecture toute littéraire, nous attacher à deux d'entre elles qui nous semblent s'inscrire avec évidence dans le texte lui-même.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. la formule de A. Moreau (*Eschyle: La Violence et le Chaos* [Paris 1985] 92): "Un des moments culminants de la violence eschyléenne."

<sup>2</sup> Cette audace est si grande que P. Maas, en 1915, avait jugé un tel enjambement inadmissible (*Kl. Schr.* [München 1973] 35).

\* \* \*

Le premier trait relie le récit du sacrifice à la *parodos* dans son ensemble; il consiste en un tour d'esprit religieux, tendant à rattacher le récit à toute une série d'images, d'actions et de signes qui le préparent ou le rehaussent, lui donnant ainsi valeur de symbole.

Dans la *parodos*, cela commence avec une simple comparaison: les deux Atrides sont semblables à des vautours furieux (49 sqq.). Ce ne serait rien sans le motif de cette fureur: ce motif est qu'on leur a tué leurs petits. Hélène n'est pas la fille des Atrides, mais déjà se dessine l'idée du meurtre de l'enfant, qui va peu à peu s'amplifier. Et sans doute l'image est-elle plus ou moins traditionnelle, puisqu'elle est dans l'*Odyssée* (16. 216 sqq.); mais Eschyle eût pu simplifier, ne pas préciser. Or il insiste: il parle du "deuil de leurs petits," employant même pour ces "petits" le mot très humain de παίδων.<sup>3</sup>

Après cette image surgit, plus précis et plus solennel, un signe prophétique. Deux aigles apparaissent dans le ciel—deux aigles où Calchas reconnaîtra sans peine les deux Atrides; et que font-ils? Ils dévorent une hase pleine: le sacrifice, ici encore, de la vie à venir. Calchas interprète cette hase comme représentant Troie (126) qui sera prise, mais en faisant peser une menace sur ceux qui l'auront ainsi bridée. Car Artémis ne peut qu'être irritée contre les "chiens ailés de son père, qui ont immolé avant sa délivrance la malheureuse hase avec sa portée" (136).

Le mot "immolé" à lui seul (θυομένοισιν en grec) rapproche le présage et le sacrifice. De fait, ce que réclamera Artémis (et qui n'est évoqué ici qu'en termes mystérieux) sera l'exacte contrepartie du massacre de la hase pleine—le sacrifice de la jeune fille.<sup>4</sup> Cette notion de sacrifice monstrueux commande toute la pièce; et le fait a été bien commenté par les philologues.<sup>5</sup> Mais il est, à nos yeux, plus important encore de constater comment, par ces formules, s'opère une totale identification entre le signe et ce à quoi il correspond—ici, entre la hase, la jeune fille, et la ville qui sera conquise.

Résultat: un débat s'est élevé entre savants pour savoir si la hase préfigurait Iphigénie ou bien Troie. Hugh Lloyd-Jones a insisté sur l'idée qu'Artémis était irritée à cause des morts de la guerre, préfigurés par les petits de la hase, selon l'interprétation même de Calchas, et conformément aux mots mêmes qui diront, par exemple, à 527, que le vainqueur a anéanti le σπέρμα de tout le pays. Au contraire, Kevin Clinton insiste sur le fait

<sup>3</sup> Voir Fraenkel, ad loc., reprenant cette remarque à Verrall.

<sup>4</sup> J. Bollack (*L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle* I [Lille 1981] 163) parle, à juste titre, de "répliques," de "signes compensatoires" et de "contre-signes."

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Fraenkel, ad loc., mais surtout F. Zeitlin, "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *TAPhA* 96 (1965) 463-508 et A. Moreau (ci-dessus, note 1) 86-99.



qu'Artémis, qui est une déesse sans pitié pour les hommes, ne songe qu'à l'animal massacré.<sup>6</sup>

Ce dissitement est révélateur: il montre qu'il y a ambiguïté, parce que, pour une pensée religieuse comme celle qui domine ici, la hase, la jeune fille, la ville, c'est tout un. Le présage et l'avenir, comme la faute et la compensation, se correspondent et s'identifient.

D'ailleurs, là aussi, les mots le confirment. On a vu au passage le "mors" qui doit brider Troie et qui fait penser au "bâillon" qui est imposé à Iphigénie.<sup>7</sup> Ces identifications peuvent même expliquer des détails qui ont arrêté les critiques. Le sacrifice est désigné, lorsqu'il est enfin mentionné, par les mots *θυσίαν ἑτέραν* (150) et, dans l'interprétation de Calchas, par les mots *ἄλλο μῆχαρ* (199); l'adjectif, à chaque fois, évoque le premier sacrifice qui sera ici répété.<sup>8</sup> Ici encore, d'ailleurs, on a parfois pensé (pour le premier exemple) aux autres morts de la série: Eschyle lui-même invite à ces identifications diverses.

Aussi bien la série continuera-t-elle avec l'image du lionceau et de son festin de brebis massacrées (730), puis avec l'assassinat d'Agamemnon et de Cassandra, et plus encore avec le rappel par cette dernière du festin de Thyeste, et de ces enfants (ici encore) dévorés par leur père.<sup>9</sup> Chaque fois, la faute et le châtement sont conçus sur le même modèle et se prolongent l'un l'autre en une série monstrueuse, que l'*Orestie* aura pour sens d'arrêter.

Ce premier crime (le festin de Thyeste) n'est pas mentionné dans la *parodos*; peut-être plane-t-il obscurément dans la conscience des spectateurs. Mais il est ici remplacé par le présage, qui rend le péril plus immédiat et laisse tout l'éclat à l'audacieuse nouveauté du sacrifice.

Ces échos, ces signes, ces préfigurations, si bien multipliés dans la *parodos*, sont un trait remarquable de l'esprit d'Eschyle et de son art. Nous avions il y a longtemps tenté de le montrer à propos de ce tapis de pourpre par lequel Agamemnon accepte de rentrer chez lui.<sup>10</sup> Tapis d'orgueil, tapis de sang versé, il devient symbole—comme si le fait d'accepter ce geste décidait de la mort du roi. Mais de même les noms sont des signes—témoin celui d'Hélène dans *Agamemnon* 687 où l'on y lit la racine de la destruction: *ἑλένας, ἑλάνδρος, ἑλέπτολις*. Même les mots à double entente prennent cette valeur sinistre de présage—comme lorsque Clytemnestre traite son époux d'homme "achevé" (972). Une malédiction devient

<sup>6</sup> Voir H. Lloyd-Jones, "Artemis and Iphigeneia," *JHS* 103 (1983) 87–102 et K. Clinton "Artemis and the Sacrifice of Iphigeneia in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*," dans P. Pucci (éd.), *Language and the Tragic Hero* (Mél. Kirkwood) (Atlanta 1988) 1–24.

<sup>7</sup> Alors que l'on dira ailleurs, pour Troie, aussi bien le filet (358) ou le joug (529).

<sup>8</sup> Cette interprétation n'est nulle part acceptée. Evidente, à nos yeux, pour le vers 150, elle vaut ici aussi, où *μῆχαρ* désigne, avec une réserve allusive, le second sacrifice (quelque chose comme, "une nouvelle action réparatrice").

<sup>9</sup> On retrouvera à 1505 le mot *ἐπιθύσας*.

<sup>10</sup> "Ombres sacrées dans le Théâtre d'Eschyle" dans J. Jacquot (éd.), *Le Théâtre tragique* (Paris 1962) 19–28.

vivante, agit; et voici que d'autres échos verbaux la confirment comme dans les *Sept*, où les deux frères "se partagent leur héritage le fer à la main" (vers 787, puis 815 et 912, avec des reprises de mots rares). D'autre part, chez Eschyle, on glisse souvent, de façon révélatrice, d'un mal à celui qui lui correspond. Dans *Agamemnon*, par exemple, la solitude de Ménélas, quitté par sa femme, entraîne un élargissement que l'on pourrait dire compensatoire, lorsque le choeur passe aux deuils multiples qu'à provoqués la guerre (427-29).

Certes, il y a des présages et des signes ailleurs que dans Eschyle; et toujours on "reconnait" en eux des éléments de la réalité. Cela est vrai dans *Antigone*, mais déjà dans l'*Odyssée* et encore chez nos modernes tireuses de cartes qui, montrant une reine de carreau, déclarent "vous voici!" Mais chez Eschyle, la force visionnaire entraîne une identification complète et vivante, qui s'étend à plus d'un fait et couvre de longues séries, où s'entrevoit, toujours active, l'action de l'Erinye et celle des dieux.

D'ailleurs, on le sait, les êtres humains sont comme des incarnations de l'Erinye. Hélène en est une ("Erinye dotée de pleurs" à 749) et Clytemnestre aussi; si bien que le choeur dira de ces deux femmes: "Génie qui t'abats sur la maison et les têtes des deux petits-fils de Tantale, tu te sers de femmes aux âmes pareilles . . ." (1468-69). Entre le divin et l'humain se fait la même identification mystérieuse.

Toute cette terreur ainsi accumulée contribue à donner une dimension de plus au sacrifice d'Iphigénie, symbole et préfiguration de toutes les violences et de tous les désastres à venir.

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Pourtant le second trait vient compléter le premier et en corriger l'effet. Car cette chaîne de signes dans laquelle s'inscrit le sacrifice accompli par Agamemnon n'atténue en rien la responsabilité du roi, ni l'aspect libre et décisif de l'acte par lequel se marque sa culpabilité.<sup>11</sup> Et, lorsque l'on relit à loisir le passage, on ne peut qu'admirer l'art avec lequel tout est ménagé pour la mettre en relief.

Rien que l'hésitation, pour commencer! Elle pourrait suggérer des circonstances atténuantes: au contraire! Elle souligne un moment décisif et un choix. L'exigence d'Artémis était comme un marché; Agamemnon en pèse les termes; et il l'accepte: "Sous son front une fois ployé au joug du destin, un revirement se fait, impur, impie, sacrilège: il est prêt à tout oser, sa résolution désormais est prise": le τόθεν du vers 220 marque ce moment avec une force rare.

D'autre part, alors que les auteurs parleront volontiers du rôle d'Ulysse ou de Ménélas, Agamemnon, dans Eschyle, intervient seul et semble n'avoir

<sup>11</sup> On reconnaît là la double causalité, divine et humaine, si bien analysée par A. Lesky, tant à propos des tragiques qu'à propos d'Homère.



pris conseil de personne ("l'aîné des chefs de la flotte . . . se faisait le complice . . ." à 184, ou "L'aîné des rois parle ainsi . . ." à 205).<sup>12</sup> Il se demande bien s'il peut "manquer à ses alliés"; mais ceux-ci n'ont pas d'autre avocat que lui.

Les circonstances mêmes qui entourent le sacrifice sont également aggravées. On ne retiendra pas à cet égard le simple fait qu'il ait bel et bien lieu et qu'Iphigénie ne soit pas, au dernier moment, remplacée par une biche. Cet aspect de la légende aurait ôté tout sens à la pièce. Remarquons, toutefois, qu'il était déjà dans les *Chants Cypriens* et qu'Eschyle s'en écarte.

Un autre silence est déjà plus intéressant: entre le présage et le verdict d'Artémis, le texte ne donne aucune explication. Or, les auteurs anciens ont, dans l'ensemble, été moins discrets. Dans les *Chants Cypriens*, Agamemnon aurait irrité Artémis en tuant une biche; chez Callimaque, il y aurait ajouté de la vantardise à l'égard d'Artémis; chez Sophocle, il aurait tué cette biche dans un enclos sacré; Apollodore invoque la faute ancienne d'Atrée.<sup>13</sup> On raisonne, on humanise, on enrichit: Eschyle, lui, ne dit rien. Et l'on passe du présage au sacrifice, comme si son attitude conquérante et sanguinaire était seule en cause—ce qui en rehausse l'importance.

Mais surtout les détails concrets sont accablants. On a signalé plus haut l'existence du bâillon, qui, avec un mot plus rude,<sup>14</sup> est lié au mors imposé à Troie: ce bâillon ne semble pas appartenir à la tradition. On se souviendra même que, si Iphigénie est muette chez Lucrèce, c'est seulement de crainte.<sup>15</sup> La comparaison avec la chèvre va dans le même sens; elle rend la chose plus nettement bestiale. Or on a remarqué<sup>16</sup> qu'elle venait dans la phrase par une sorte de licence et d'extension: Agamemnon fait un signe (φράσεν à 231) pour que l'on sacrifie Iphigénie, non pas pour qu'on la sacrifie "telle une chèvre." Il en est de même de tout ce qui suit, de ses efforts, du geste brutal qui la soulève: ces détails entrent de force dans la phrase, qui tourne au récit horrifié.

Toute cette phrase, enfin, aboutit au fameux enjambement du mot βίᾱ. Le terme qui désigne la violence est ainsi mis dans un relief extraordinaire, au sommet de cette description de violence. Il nous donne le motif même d'un autre relief—celui que donne Eschyle à cette faute d'Agamemnon. Eschyle peint avec force la violence, parce qu'il entend la condamner, également avec force.

<sup>12</sup> J. Bollack (ci-dessus, note 4) ad loc. considère qu'il ne s'agit pas d'âge, mais de dignité officielle: l'effacement de Ménélas n'en serait pas moins sensible et la responsabilité d'Agamemnon serait, au contraire, comme officialisée.

<sup>13</sup> Les références sont connues: la première et la dernière (les *Chants Cypriens* d'après Proclus et l'*Electre* de Sophocle) suggèrent que ces légendes étaient connues à l'époque de l'*Agamemnon*.

<sup>14</sup> Χαλινός s'emploie souvent pour les chevaux (ainsi *Perses* 196, *Sept* 207).

<sup>15</sup> l. 92: muta metu.

<sup>16</sup> Fraenkel, ad loc.

Le mot βία se rencontre près de cinquante fois dans les tragédies conservées (sans compter le verbe, l'adjectif ou l'adverbe). Et l'on remarquera qu'ici encore il fait le lien entre le sacrifice et la guerre, puisque l'on trouve τὸ βίαιον pour le sac de Troie, dans la même *parodos*, au vers 130. Il est le mot de toutes les violences et les relie entre elles. Dans *Agamemnon* même, le verbe est employé pour Arès faisant couler le sang familial. Personnifiée, Βία est un des deux ministres de Zeus chargés de supplicier Prométhée. Et Eschyle semble bien l'entendre au sens où βία s'oppose à la loi, et, surtout, à la persuasion—qui triomphera à la fin de l'*Orestie*.

Sans reprendre ici toute une analyse, qui a été faite par d'autres, sur ce rôle de la violence, on peut présenter à cet égard trois remarques qui concernent directement notre texte et son interprétation:

La première a trait à la guerre—et à la condamnation portée contre celle qu'entreprend Agamemnon: elle confirme l'identification de la jeune fille immolée et des guerriers tués.<sup>17</sup> Elle réunit tous les aspects les plus fâcheux. C'est une guerre entreprise "pour une femme qui fut à plus d'un homme" (62). Elle coûte des quantités de morts (65 sqq.). Le chœur insiste avec force sur ces morts (431–65) et conclut en disant: "Le renom est lourd que vous fait le courroux de tout un peuple," mais aussi: "Qui a versé des flots de sang retient le regard des dieux" (461); il redira, lors du retour du roi, qu'il l'avait blâmé: "sacrifie-t-on des guerriers pour ramener une impudique, partie de son plein gré?" (803–04). Enfin, circonstance aggravante, la violence, ici, s'étend jusqu'aux sanctuaires et aux autels des dieux (526–27).

Cela ne veut pas dire que la guerre soit toujours condamnée. L'entreprise conquérante de Xerxès l'est, bien évidemment; et, là aussi, la pensée des morts est fortement mise en relief par Eschyle. Mais, les combattants grecs de Salamine ou bien les défenseurs de Thèbes, en répondant à la violence par la violence, servent un idéal et obéissent à la justice. Si Artémis ne pense pas aux morts que va causer la guerre, Eschyle y pense et nous oblige à y penser.

Les deux autres remarques concernent d'assez étonnantes formules de notre *parodos*, où la violence intervient:

Dans la première, βία et πειθώ sont associées. Quand Agamemnon cède à la tentation et décide de sacrifier Iphigénie, le texte dit (385): "Il subit la violence d'une funeste persuasion," βιάται δ' ἅ τάλαινα πειθώ. Superbe oxymoron!<sup>18</sup> Va-t-il contre ce que l'on vient de voir? Certes non, car il s'agit d'une mauvaise persuasion, exercée, non par la raison et des

<sup>17</sup> L'assimilation de la mort à la guerre et au sacrifice est d'ailleurs naturelle. Ainsi *Perses* 816–17: "La libation de sang que fera couler sur le sol de Platées la lance argienne" (πελανὸς αἵματοςφαγῆς).

<sup>18</sup> Il est amusant de constater que, pour un vers où se rencontre un tel choc de mots, les principaux commentateurs (Fraenkel, Bollack) ne s'attachent qu'à l'adjectif τάλαινα.

arguments, mais par le seul désir. Le texte précise que cette *πειθώ*-là est "filie de l'égarement." C'est parce qu'elle est une fausse *πειθώ* qu'elle peut faire violence. Et Agamemnon reste, même là, du côté de la violence.

Au contraire, le second exemple présente un oxymoron non moins remarquable, mais menant plus loin. Car la violence, cette fois, vient des dieux, et peut être bienfaisante. A vrai dire, le texte est incertain. Les manuscrits donnent l'adverbe *βιάίως*, difficile à construire: on l'a, après Turnèbe, souvent corrigé en *βίαιος*, ce qui donne (au vers 182) le sens suivant: Zeus a imposé aux hommes la loi "souffrir pour comprendre"; avec le regret, pénètre en eux la sagesse. Et c'est là "violence bienfaisante des dieux assis à la barre céleste." Pour notre propos, le fait que l'on ait *βίαιος* ou *βιάίως* importe peu.<sup>19</sup> En revanche, l'existence d'une "bonne violence" est grave. On admettra cette possibilité volontiers, parce qu'il s'agit de Zeus,<sup>20</sup> et de châtiments qui font souffrir pour instruire.

Nous ne dirions donc pas qu'il y a ambivalence à propos de la violence:<sup>21</sup> il y a une condamnation rigoureuse de toute violence, qui ne vient pas de Zeus ou ne s'exerce pas pour le triomphe de la justice.

Tel n'est pas le cas pour Agamemnon. Son acte devait donc être présenté sous son jour le plus terrible, et entraîner d'autres violences en série, jusqu'au moment où Athéna, à la fin des *Euménides*, ferait cesser la chaîne des haines et, instaurant une justice humaine, prononcerait l'éloge de la Persuasion sainte, "qui donne à [sa] parole sa magique douceur" (886).

Le premier trait nous montrait un Eschyle animé de croyances presque magiques: le second nous mène aux découvertes morales de l'Athènes du cinquième siècle. Mais les deux se combinent pour rehausser l'horreur du sacrifice, tel qu'il l'a évoqué.

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Cet exposé était parti d'un contraste. Il est frappant d'en mesurer l'étendue. Plus tard, Agamemnon hésitera vraiment. Plus tard, il n'acceptera qu'à contre-cœur. Plus tard, Artémis sera clémente et se contentera d'une biche. Plus tard, enfin, Iphigénie comprendra, acceptera, ira de son plein gré vers la mort. Cette dernière transformation s'amorce dans *Iphigénie en Tauride*, où Iphigénie déclare qu'elle ne veut pas "garder rancune à qui voulut [s]a mort" (992); elle prend un éclat extraordinaire dans le fameux revirement d'*Iphigénie à Aulis*.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 76 (1956) 62.

<sup>20</sup> On trouve des formules comparables pour la *βία* "aux douceurs puissantes" de Zeus par rapport à Io (*Suppliants* 576) ou pour sa *βία* bienveillante, dans le même contexte (ibid. 1066-68); ces deux emplois nous aident à comprendre celui d'*Agamemnon*, mais restent particuliers.

<sup>21</sup> A. Moreau (ci-dessus, note 1) 246 sqq. Nous pensons également que J. Bollack cherche trop à couper entre Zeus et la violence (ad loc.).

Pourquoi cette évolution? Euripide verrait-il le monde sous un jour plus optimiste qu'Eschyle? Certes non! Mais les choses ont changé. Le mal a perdu de son sens et de sa gravité. De plus, vivant dans un univers moral moins énergique et moins pénétré de foi, Euripide a tendance à considérer plutôt les sentiments et les réactions des victimes: c'est ce que nous avons jadis tenté de montrer dans *L'évolution du pathétique, d'Eschyle à Euripide*. Enfin Iphigénie est comme toutes les jeunes filles de son théâtre, qui acceptent de mourir en un sacrifice volontaire: elle fait preuve d'un héroïsme juvénile et tendre, féminin et élégant, qui n'a plus rien d'épique. Le progrès de l'idéal de douceur vient ainsi colorer l'ancien idéal. C'est là un argument que nous n'avions pas songé à invoquer dans notre étude sur la douceur:<sup>22</sup> la violence eschyléenne est donc l'occasion de combler une lacune, en même temps qu'elle nous a permis d'évoquer, pour honorer un collègue, un texte qui est parmi les plus beaux de la littérature grecque.

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<sup>22</sup> Les deux livres auxquels je fais allusion ici sont *L'évolution du pathétique, d'Eschyle à Euripide* (Paris 1961) et *La douceur dans la pensée grecque* (Paris 1979).

## Anonymity and Polarity: Unknown Gods and Nameless Altars at the Areopagos

ALBERT HENRICHs

In the course of the past twenty-five years, his own scholarly inclinations and the chance discoveries of new texts have induced Miroslav Marcovich time and again to revisit the study of Mediterranean religions. On more than one occasion, he has crossed the line that separates and, in some ways, links pagan belief with Christianity.<sup>1</sup> Nearly a decade ago, he produced a new edition of the *Elenchos* attributed to the schismatic Roman bishop Hippolytos. Although a "reckless plagiarist" himself, Hippolytos attacked Christian heretics and Gnostic sectarians alike and accused them of plagiarizing Greek philosophers and Greek religious writings.<sup>2</sup> In Book 6, Hippolytos cites a mysterious Pythagorean dictum: "If you go abroad from your native land, do not look back. Otherwise the Erinyes, the instruments of Justice, will pursue you."<sup>3</sup> The role assigned here to the Erinyes, that of Δίκης ἐπίκουροι, unmistakably recalls a fragment of Herakleitos long known from Plutarch, although a more complete and authentic version of it is now preserved in the Derveni papyrus.<sup>4</sup> This latter text associates the Erinyes, as well as the Eumenides, with the souls of the deceased.<sup>5</sup> But, in his commentary on the saying ascribed to Pythagoras, Hippolytos departs

<sup>1</sup> For a collection of fifteen related papers, see M. Marcovich, *Studies in Graeco-Roman Religions and Gnosticism*, Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 4 (Leiden 1988). He comments in the preface: "Each study concentrates on a religious key-text, trying to interpret it, to discover its sources, and to assess its value." In this paper, I have tried to observe this principle.

<sup>2</sup> M. Marcovich (ed.), *Hippolytus. Refutatio omnium haeresium*, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (Berlin and New York 1986) 120 f.

<sup>3</sup> Hipp. Ref. 6. 26. 1 "ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐὰν ἀποδημῆς, μὴ ἐπιστρέφου· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες Δίκης ἐπίκουροι σε μετελεύσονται," ἰδίην καλὸν τὸ σῶμα, Ἑρινύας δὲ τὰ πάθη. As Marcovich notes, the closest parallel is Iambl. *Protr.* 21 (pp. 107.14 f. and 114.29–15.1 Pistelli) ἀποδημῶν τῆς οἰκείας μὴ ἐπιστρέφου· Ἑρινύες γὰρ μετέρχονται.

<sup>4</sup> Herakleitos fr. 94 Diels–Kranz = 52 Marcovich, on the path of the sun: "Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν. The Derveni papyrus offers a superior version of this fragment, making it a continuous text with fr. 3 Diels–Kranz = 57 Marcovich. Cf. K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parássoglou, "Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus," in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* III (Florence 1988) 125–33.

<sup>5</sup> On this association, see below, at note 144.



not only from Herakleitos but also from the mainstream of Greek tradition when he allegorizes the native land as the body (σῶμα) and the Erinyes as the passions (πάθη).<sup>6</sup>

Nothing could be further from the Greek understanding of the Erinyes. As we shall see, Erinyes ("Angry Ones") and Eumenides ("Kindly Ones") are the two names for the polar identities of the same group of powerful divinities who dwell beneath the earth.<sup>7</sup> These names express these goddesses' opposite, yet mutually reinforcing, aspects—one sinister, the other benign. In the prevailing Greek view, the subterranean world was not only the common destination for all departed souls, regardless of their moral conduct on earth, but was also the realm of powerful chthonian deities who were invoked by a variety of regional names and who had the dual power to bless and to curse the living. Other forms of Greek religion recognized an afterlife that assigned separate destinations to the body and to the soul, or different fates to the pious and to the wicked.<sup>8</sup>

None of the pagan beliefs corresponds to the hell, or to the devil, embraced by Christian belief. Derived from Jewish and Iranian tradition, the Christian underworld is a place of punishment, inhabited by sinners and ruled by the Prince of Darkness—the embodiment of evil. Apart from their mutual association with the depths of the earth, the Greek Erinyes and the Christian devil share nothing in common.<sup>9</sup> And since the Erinyes ultimately serve the cause of justice, despite their methods they must be viewed as essentially different from, even morally superior to, the Christian devil. But the ancients appear to have felt that the Erinyes' menacing aspects, chiefly their gruesome appearance and their power to do harm, rendered the goddesses virtually unmentionable under certain circumstances. This being the case, the Erinyes would be best addressed by euphemisms intended to appease their collective appetite for the dark side of justice—revenge. Commencing with St. Paul's Areopagos speech, and proceeding from Athenian altars dedicated to "unknown gods" and from the "nameless

<sup>6</sup> As far as I can see, this moralizing interpretation of the Erinyes, which treats them as human passions (above, note 3), is unparalleled elsewhere. The Platonizing context in which it appears suggests that Hippolytos followed a middle-Platonic or Gnosticizing source. Unlike Hippolytos, Iamblichos in his interpretation of the same Pythagorean "symbol" (see note 3) allegorizes the Erinyes not as passions, but as the "change of mind" (μετάνοια) associated with the soul's progression from the material world to the metaphysical realm.

<sup>7</sup> H. Lloyd-Jones, "Erinyes, Semnai Theai, Eumenides," in E. M. Craik (ed.), *Owls to Athens?: Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford 1990) 203–11; A. Henrichs, "Namenlosigkeit und Euphemismus: Zur Ambivalenz der chthonischen Mächte im attischen Drama," in H. Hofmann and A. Harder (eds.), *Fragmenta dramatica: Beiträge zur Interpretation der griechischen Tragikerfragmente und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte* (Göttingen 1991) 161–201.

<sup>8</sup> W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford 1985) 190–99, 289, and 293–95; R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana 1942) 21–59, esp. 31 f.

<sup>9</sup> A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford 1972; corr. ed. 1986) II 601: "The Greeks have no category of divinities generally recognized as essentially malignant, no real Devil or devils such as Ahriman came to be." Cf. J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle: Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe* (Leipzig and Berlin 1932; repr. Darmstadt 1963).

goddesses" as a designation for the Athenian Semnai Theai, I propose to explore some of the apparatus—linguistic, ritual, and conceptual—through which the Greeks tried to address and to manage the anxiety associated with the divinities of the underworld and with the powerful presence of the dead.

# I. Anonymity: Unknown Gods, Nameless Altars, and Nameless Goddesses

Many places in the Mediterranean world witnessed exchanges of opinion or encounters of one sort or another between the first missionaries of the new Christian religion and the established representatives of the traditional pagan cults. But no single place would have been as famous as Athens, the cultural capital of the Greek-speaking world; no meeting of the minds would have been so significant as Paul's alleged attempt to convert the Athenians, culminating in the celebrated speech ascribed to him in Acts (17. 22–31).<sup>10</sup> Supposedly delivered "in the middle of the Areios Pagos," the speech was cast in a bronze plaque erected at the site in 1938.<sup>11</sup> While we need not doubt the historicity of Paul's Athenian visit, which can be tentatively dated to the spring or summer of 50 B.C.E., the speech as we have it was composed by the author of Acts—Luke—who had no recourse to Paul's actual words.<sup>12</sup> Luke's account accurately captures some of the cultural features of Roman Athens—the city is described as being "full of idols" (κατείδωλος) and frequented by philosophers<sup>13</sup>—but it also creates certain ambiguities, which have given rise to complex questions concerning the location as well as the circumstances of Paul's speech. In particular, what does Luke mean when he says that the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers "took hold of him [Paul] and led him to the Areios Pagos"

<sup>10</sup> In the course of this century, New Testament scholars and classicists have vied with each other to elucidate the circumstances, genre, and theology of Paul's speech. Apart from Eduard Norden's *Agnostos Theos* (below, note 21), I found the following discussions particularly useful for the purposes of this paper: O. Weinreich, "De dis ignotis observationes selectae," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 18 (1915) 1–52, esp. 27–33 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I (Amsterdam 1969) 250–97, esp. 275–80; M. Dibelius, "Paulus auf dem Areopag" (1939) and "Paulus in Athen" (1939), in *Aufsätze zur Apostelgeschichte*, 4th ed. (Göttingen 1961) 29–70 and 71–75 (Eng. trans., *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* [New York 1956]); and E. Haenchen, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, 6th ed. (Göttingen 1968) 453–68 (Eng. trans., *The Acts of the Apostles* [Philadelphia 1971]).

<sup>11</sup> On the Areopagos as a pagan and Christian cult site, see E. Vanderpool, "The Apostle Paul in Athens," *Archaeology* 3 (1950) 34–37. For more detailed studies of its topography, see below, note 58.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. H. Köster, *Einführung in das Neue Testament im Rahmen der Religionsgeschichte und Kulturgeschichte der hellenistischen und römischen Zeit* (Berlin and New York 1980) 543 = H. Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament II: History and Literature of Early Christianity* (Philadelphia 1982) 109. M. Dibelius, "Die Reden der Apostelgeschichte und die antike Geschichtsschreibung" (1949), in *Aufsätze* (above, note 10) 120–62 has shown that the speeches in Acts reflect literary rather than historical intentions. On Acts as a work of fiction, "a historical novel" designed to entertain as well as instruct, see R. I. Pervo, *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia 1987), who characterizes the Areopagos speech as Luke's "best rhetorical effort" (45).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. R. E. Wycherley, "St. Paul at Athens," *JTS* 19 (1968) 619 f.

(Acts 17. 19)?<sup>14</sup> Does he imply that Paul was hauled before the Areopagos Council to defend his “new teaching” (Acts 17. 19 *καινή διδασχή*), perhaps in the course of a formal trial?<sup>15</sup> And if so, did the Council meet on the hillside of the Areios Pagos on this occasion or, as generations of commentators have suggested on extremely slender evidence, in the Stoa Basileios?<sup>16</sup> Or does Luke use the term Areios Pagos in an exclusively local sense—but not without an awareness of its religious connotations—to conjure an august setting for Paul’s missionary speech?<sup>17</sup> Happily we avoid these problems here. Nor shall we ponder the unorthodox, Hellenizing message attributed to Paul—that of humanity’s natural knowledge of, and kinship with, God—which has no parallel in the Pauline corpus and which comes perilously close to neglecting the Christian doctrine of salvation.<sup>18</sup>

The two details that are relevant to our present purposes are less controversial, concerning, as they do, the locale of the speech as well as its immediate point of departure, which Luke reports as follows:

Standing in the middle of the Areios Pagos, Paul said: “Men of Athens, I can see that you are very religious in every way. For as I was touring the city and visiting your places of worship, I found also an altar with this inscription: ‘To the unknown god.’ That which you worship without knowing, this I proclaim to you.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Nock (above, note 9) II 831 f. and T. D. Barnes, “An Apostle on Trial,” *JTS* 20 (1969) 407–19, at 414, among others, insisted that ἐπιλαβόμενοι suggests some form of coercion and that Luke’s Paul does not voluntarily go to, or before, the Areopagos. Contra H. Conzelmann, “The Address of Paul on the Areopagus,” in L. E. Keck and J. L. Martyn (eds.), *Studies in Luke–Acts* (Nashville and New York 1966; repr. Philadelphia 1980) 217–30, at 219. The verb can describe either hostile or friendly touch, in Acts as well as elsewhere (cf. Haenchen [above, note 10] ad loc.).

<sup>15</sup> A number of Christian Apologists and Church Fathers from Justin Martyr to Augustine came to the conclusion that Paul was tried before the Areopagos Council because certain Athenian philosophers had accused him of introducing “new gods” (Acts 17. 18), a theory supported by Barnes (previous note). On the authority the Areopagos had in religious matters, see R. W. Wallace, *The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C.* (Baltimore and London 1989) 106–12 and 204 f., with 272 n. 88 on Acts 17. 16–21.

<sup>16</sup> On this controversy, see Dibelius (above, note 10) 62–64, who emphasizes rightly that the Lukan narrative implies a change of scenery from the agora (Acts 17. 17) to the Areios Pagos (17. 19). Cf. C. J. Hemer, “Paul at Athens,” *New Testament Studies* 20 (1974) 341–50 (“Paul made his defence to a court meeting in or before a colonnade of the Agora,” 349) versus Barnes (above, note 14) 407–11 (“Paul was taken before the Areopagus, i.e. before the council sitting on the hill,” 410). I have no doubt that Luke is referring to the Hill of Ares, and probably also to the Council of the Areopagos convening on that hill; but I do not believe that Paul stood trial for impiety before the Areopagos.

<sup>17</sup> Dibelius (above, note 10) 73; Conzelmann (above, note 14) 219 f.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Dibelius (above, note 10) 30, 45–58, and 73 f.; M. Pohlenz, “Paulus und die Stoa,” *ZNTW* 42 (1949) 69–104, at 96 f. = *Paulus und die Stoa* (Darmstadt 1964) 37 f.; B. Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (Uppsala 1955); Conzelmann (above, note 14) 220–25; D. Wyrwa, “Über die Begegnung des biblischen Glaubens mit dem griechischen Geist,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 88 (1991) 29–67, esp. 51–53.

<sup>19</sup> Acts 17. 22–23 σταθείς δὲ Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ Ἀρείου Πάγου ἔφη· ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ πάντα ὥς δεισδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ. διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν



The "unknown god" of the Athenians, who epitomizes their piety and whose altar inspires Paul's message, is hardly less remote today than he was in antiquity.<sup>20</sup> He received close scrutiny in 1913, when the German classicist Eduard Norden named one of his best-known books after him, *Agnostos Theos*.<sup>21</sup> Norden's book is mainly concerned with forms of religious discourse in pagan, Jewish, and Christian traditions—a perspective that proved seminal in the development of New Testament form criticism. The idea of a Greek god whose name was unknown and whose true nature was beyond the reach of human comprehension posed a considerable challenge to the curiosity of scholars during the early decades of this century, when the origins of Gnosticism and the very concept of γνῶσις, or secret religious knowledge, received more attention than ever before. Given this intellectual climate, it is not surprising that Norden would devote a whole chapter of his book to the enigma of the unknown god and his altar and to the concept of "knowing god" (γινώσκειν θεόν and γνῶσις θεοῦ). Norden concludes that the dedication to the unknown god (in the singular) reveals the hand of a monotheistic redactor, perhaps Luke himself, and that the original pagan altar, provided it really existed, must have been dedicated "to (the) unknown gods" (ἀγνώστοις θεοῖς).<sup>22</sup>

As Norden pointed out, the actual existence of such altars, each dedicated to a plurality of unknown gods, is confirmed by Pausanias, the ancient traveler and expert on Greek sanctuaries.<sup>23</sup> Touring Greece around the middle of the second century C.E., Pausanias saw "an altar of unknown gods" next to the great altar of Olympian Zeus in Olympia (5. 14. 8 πρὸς αὐτῷ δέ ἐστιν ἀγνώστων θεῶν βωμός). Pausanias is referring

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τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὖρον καὶ βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεεγράπτο· ἀγνώστωι θεῷ. δ' οὖν ἀνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἔγωγ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν.

<sup>20</sup> Ἀγνώστος means that something is unknown or unknowable. Even Olympian gods were hard to recognize (II. 20. 131, *Od.* 7. 201, 16. 161), which explains why the chorus of Sophokles' *Aias* asks Apollo "to come as a god easy to recognize" (704 εὐγνώστος). Cf. R. L. Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (New York 1987) 102–67 on divine epiphany, gods in disguise, and the hazards of "seeing the gods." The identity of the so-called ἀγνώστοι θεοί was far from uniform. P. W. van der Horst, "The Unknown God (Acts 17:23)," in R. van den Broek, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World*, EPRO 112 (Leiden and New York 1988) 19–42 discusses three categories of "unknown gods": foreign gods whose names are unknown; unidentified gods who might otherwise be ignored; and chthonian gods (below, note 150). Two of these categories overlap with the anonymous gods. Foreign gods who lacked proper names often ranked as "nameless" (see E. Bickerman, "Anonymous Gods," in *Studies in Jewish and Christian History III* [Leiden 1986] 270–81). According to Strabo 3. 4. 16, for instance, an ἀνώνυμός τις θεός was worshiped by Celtiberian tribes (H. Usener, *Götternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung* [Bonn 1896] 277; van der Horst 41 n. 97). Chthonian powers, too, could be described as "anonymous" (below, section IV).

<sup>21</sup> E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (Leipzig and Berlin 1913; repr. Darmstadt 1956). The fullest treatment since Norden is by van der Horst (previous note).

<sup>22</sup> Norden (previous note) 31–124, esp. 55–58 and 121–24; cf. Dibelius (above, note 10) 39–41.

<sup>23</sup> Norden (above, note 21) 55 f.

unambiguously to a single altar dedicated to a number of unknown gods. In his description of Phaleron, one of several harbors that provided Athens with access to the sea, he mentions "altars of so-called unknown gods, of heroes, of the children of Theseus, and of Phaleros" (1. 1. 4 βωμοὶ δὲ θεῶν τε ὀνομαζομένων ἀγνώστων καὶ ἡρώων καὶ παίδων τῶν Θησέως καὶ Φαλήρου).<sup>24</sup> There can be little doubt that Pausanias saw four different altars at Phaleron, one of which had been dedicated to the unknown gods.<sup>25</sup> James G. Frazer surely exaggerates the ambiguity of the Greek when he comments: "It is impossible from Pausanias's expression to determine whether there was one altar or several altars of Unknown Gods at Phalerum; and, supposing there were several, we cannot tell whether each altar was dedicated to the Unknown God (in the singular) or to Unknown Gods (in the plural)."<sup>26</sup> Unable to escape the spell of Acts 17. 23 and of the single altar dedicated to "the unknown god" (to which he refers), Frazer was prepared to ascribe this unlikely worship of a single unknown god to the Athenian contemporaries of Pausanias.<sup>27</sup>

An inconspicuous piece of information, overlooked by Frazer as well as by Norden, confirms that a plurality of unknown gods was indeed worshiped at Phaleron. According to an entry in the lexicon of Hesychios (ca. 6th century C.E.), a group of Argive heroes tried to land at Phaleron upon their return from the Trojan War. The heroes were killed by the Athenians and, once buried in Attic soil, received cultic honors as "unknown gods" (ἀγνώτες θεοί).<sup>28</sup> Although the entry in Hesychios is heavily abbreviated and breaks off in mid-sentence, it is the only version of

<sup>24</sup> On Phaleros, Theseus, and the other heroes worshiped at Phaleron, see E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica*, BICS Suppl. 57 (London 1989) 38–41, who does not discuss the unknown gods.

<sup>25</sup> C. Robert, *Hermes* 20 (1885) 356 reduced the number of these altars to three—one dedicated to the unknown gods, another to "the heroes and youths who accompanied Theseus" (Robert read καὶ ἡρώων καὶ παίδων τῶν (μετὰ) Θησέως, which he took as a single phrase), and the third to Phaleros, the local eponym. But as U. Kron, *Die zehn attischen Phylenheroen: Geschichte, Mythos, Kult und Darstellungen*, MDAI(A) Beiheft 5 (Berlin 1976) 145 n. 666 and Kearns (previous note) 40 point out, the text of Pausanias is correct as it stands.

<sup>26</sup> J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* (London 1898) II 33. Weinreich (above, note 10) 28 = 276 replied that the proper designation for altars dedicated to the unknown god (in the singular) would have been βωμοὶ ἀγνώστων θεῶν.

<sup>27</sup> The arguments that have been adduced in favor of an Athenian altar dedicated to an unknown god—in the singular—are unconvincing. (1) Ps.-Lucian, *Philopatris* refers twice to "the unknown (god) in Athens" (9 ἡ τὸν ἀγνώστον τὸν ἐν Ἀθῆναις, 29 τὸν ἐν Ἀθῆναις ἀγνώστον ἐφευρόντες καὶ προσκυνήσαντες). Like Luke's ἀγνώστος θεός, however, this unknown god, too, is a literary construct and does not qualify as evidence of actual cult. (2) The Jewish god was anonymous (cf. Bickerman [above, note 20] 279 f.) as well as ἀγνώστος (Jos. Ap. 2. 167). Therefore the altar in question may have been a private altar dedicated by a Judaizing gentile to the Jewish god, a possibility discussed by van der Horst (above, note 20) 35–38. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Paul of Acts would have ascribed worship of the Jewish god to the Athenians.

<sup>28</sup> Hesych. α 682 Latte ἀγνώτες θεοί· οὕτω λέγεσθαι φασὶ τοὺς μετὰ τὸν τῆς Ἰλίου πλοῦν Φαληροὶ προσσχόντας καὶ ἀνααιρεθέντας ὑπὸ Δημοφώντος, ταφῆναι (lacuna). The longer versions preserved in the Atticist lexica of Pollux and Pausanias (below, notes 30 and 32) suggest that Hesychios' entry, too, derives from an Atticist source.

this myth that records the full cult name of the Argive heroes, viz. ἄγνωτες θεοί, who must be the same as the θεοὶ ἄγνωστοι attested at Phaleron by Pausanias in the passage discussed earlier.<sup>29</sup>

The Atticist lexicographer Pollux (2nd century C.E.) offers a more complete version of the same myth and connects it aetiologically with the foundation of the Athenian homicide court at the Palladion.<sup>30</sup> In the Atticist tradition represented by Pollux, the Palladion myth attempts to explain two seemingly unrelated institutions at once—the cult of the unknown gods at Phaleron and the jurisdiction of the Palladion court, which treated cases of unintentional homicide and of Athenian citizens killing non-Athenians.<sup>31</sup> This tour de force is accomplished with the help of a tedious wordplay on “not knowing” and “unknown.” As Pollux has it, the Argives “were killed by the locals in ignorance (ἀγνοίαι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγωρίων ἀναιρεθέντας) and (their corpses) were cast out (unburied).” After the intervention of the Delphic oracle, “they were buried and given the name ‘Unknown Ones’ (ἄγνωτες προσηγορεύθησαν).” Closely related versions can be found in two monuments of Byzantine erudition, the *Suda* and the Homeric commentary of Eustathios.<sup>32</sup> All three versions reproduce information that derives ultimately from the Attidographer Phanodemos (4th century B.C.E.).<sup>33</sup> It is difficult to tell whether Phanodemos was more concerned with the origins of the Palladion court or with the name of the ἄγνωτες θεοί at Phaleron. Apparently he explained both. If so, a cult of “unknown gods”—in the plural—presumably with an altar dedicated to them, existed at Phaleron as early as the 4th century B.C.E.

<sup>29</sup> In his discussion of the Palladion myth, Norden (above, note 21) 55 n. 1 failed to consider Hesychios. Not realizing that Hesychios refers to the dead Argives as ἄγνωτες θεοί, Norden concluded that they were worshiped as unknown heroes rather than unknown gods and rejected this entire tradition as irrelevant to the Athenian cult of the ἄγνωστοι θεοί.

<sup>30</sup> Pollux 8. 118 f. On the Palladion court, see D. M. MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators* (Manchester 1963) 58–69 and P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 642–44, who discuss its function but not its mythical origins.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. O. Jessen, “‘Ἀγνωστοὶ θεοί,’” in *RE Suppl.* I (1903) 28–30, at 29.

<sup>32</sup> *Suda* ε 2505 Adler = Eust. *Od.* 1. 321 ff., p. 1419.53 ff. Stallbaum. The two versions are virtually identical and share a common source, the lost Atticist lexicon of Pausanias (2nd century C.E.), whom Eustathios identifies by name (Pausanias fr. 53 in H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika*, Abh. Berlin, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1949.2 [Berlin 1950] 179). Pausanias in turn used Phanodemos (next note). In the versions of *Suda* and Eustathios, the *aition* concerning the unknown gods is abbreviated beyond recognition: “The Argives . . . were killed by the Athenians, who failed to recognize them (ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἀγνωσοῦμενοι ἀνηρέθησαν).” Even though the ἄγνωτες θεοί are not explicitly mentioned, the use of ἀγνωσοῦμενοι suggests strongly that they also occurred in Phanodemos’ version.

<sup>33</sup> Phanodemos’ *Atthis* is lost. His version of the Palladion myth can be partially reconstructed from Eustathios and the *Suda* (previous note), the only source that cites Phanodemos by name (*FGrHist* 325 F 16). F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* IIb (Supplement): A Commentary on the Ancient Historians of Athens (Nos. 323a–334). Volume I: Text (Leiden 1954) 79–81 comments on Phanodemos F 16 in connection with Kleidemos’ version of the same myth (*FGrHist* 323 F 20).

A Pergamene inscription, discovered in 1909, confirms that the worship of unknown gods—again in the plural—was especially popular in the 2nd century C.E., even though it appears much older in origin. One of numerous altars found in the precinct of Demeter at Pergamon and dating from the second half of the 2nd century C.E. bears a fragmentary dedication that has been convincingly restored to read “to the unknown gods” (θεοῖς ἀγνώστοις).<sup>34</sup> As in the case of Pausanias’ ἀγνώστων θεῶν βωμός at Olympia, this is a clear reference to a single altar dedicated to a plurality of unknown gods in one of the major cult centers of the Greek-speaking world. In the later 2nd century C.E., speculation on the incomprehensibility and ineffability of the divine was growing and renewed efforts were being made to reach and placate “all gods” (πάντες θεοί), especially those divinities who lacked conventional names.<sup>35</sup>

More germane to the genre of Acts than Pausanias or the inscription from Pergamon, and equally elusive as evidence for actual altars, is an episode in Philostratos’ fictional *Life of Apollonios of Tyana*, the itinerant Neopythagorean sage and charismatic figure whose travels led him to Mesopotamia and India during the reigns of Nero and the Flavian emperors. While on a visit to “the confines of Ethiopia and Egypt” Apollonios remarks upon the appropriateness of “speaking well of all the gods” (περὶ πάντων θεῶν εὖ λέγειν) and praises Athens in particular as a place “where altars are erected in honor even of unknown divinities” (οὐ καὶ ἀγνώστων δαιμόνων βωμοὶ ἱδρύνται).<sup>36</sup> Philostratos thus agrees with Pausanias that one or several altars dedicated to unknown gods—yet again in the plural—actually existed at Athens. But unlike Pausanias, who describes the Athens of his own time, Philostratos implies, as does Luke, that altars of this type already

<sup>34</sup> Shortly after its erection, however, the altar was rededicated to the winds personified (“Ἄνεμοι”). See H. Hepding, *MDAI(A)* 35 (1910) 454–57, no. 39; Weinreich (above, note 10) 29–33 = 277–80, who defended Hepding’s supplement with compelling arguments against the skepticism of Norden (above, note 21) 56 n. 1; E. Ohlmutz, *Die Kulte und Heiligtümer der Götter in Pergamon* (Würzburg 1940; repr. Darmstadt 1968) 219 and 280; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*. Zweiter Band: Die hellenistische und römische Zeit, 2nd ed. (Munich 1961) 355; F. R. Adrados (ed.), *Diccionario griego-español I* (Madrid 1980) 30, s.v. ἀγνώστος I.1; van der Horst (above, note 20) 25 f.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Usener (above, note 20) 344 f.; Norden (above, note 21) 56–83; O. Weinreich, review of Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 34 (1913) 2949–64, at 2958–60 = *Ausgew. Schr.* I (above, note 10) 221–36, at 230–32; Ohlmutz (previous note) 219 and 280–84; Nilsson (previous note) 337 f., 357, and 574 f.; C. Habicht, *Allertümer von Pergamon* VIII.3: Die Inschriften des Asklepieions (Berlin 1969) 12 f.; van der Horst (above, note 20) 27 (with additional bibliogr.).

<sup>36</sup> Philostr. *VA* 6. 3. Philostratos’ reference to a plurality of altars, βωμοί, of unknown gods has been rejected as a rhetorical exaggeration (Weinreich [above, note 10] 28 f. = 276), but ultimately there is no way of telling whether two or more such altars ever existed in Athens simultaneously (above, notes 25–26). Tertullian, too, refers to (an) Athenian altar(s) inscribed “to the unknown gods” (*Ad nat.* 2. 9. 4 *nam et Athenis ara est inscripta “ignotis deis”*; cf. *Adv. Marc.* 1. 9. 2 *invenio plane ignotis deis aras prostitutas, sed Attica idololatria est*). It is noteworthy that Tertullian speaks of a plurality of unknown gods (*ignoti dei*), but it is impossible to tell whether he is merely offering a polytheistic reinterpretation of Acts 17. 23 or whether he had access to independent information like Pausanias and Philostratos.



existed in the city of Athens or in the rural demes of Attica, or both, around 50 C.E.<sup>37</sup>

A group of similarly elusive altars in Athens are the so-called "nameless altars" (ἀνώνυμοι βωμοί). Like the altars of unknown gods, the anonymous altars did not survive and are known to us by literary attestation alone. The story of their foundation is recorded by Diogenes Laertios in connection with Epimenides, a legendary seer from Crete whose expertise was ritual purification.<sup>38</sup> This story takes place in the same location as Paul's speech, namely the Areopagos. When Athens was visited by a plague, Epimenides is said to have put an end to it by purifying the city in the following way. He turned a number of sheep loose on the Areopagos and gave orders that these sheep be followed. Wherever any one of them happened to lie down, that animal was to be sacrificed "to the appropriate god" (θύειν τῷ προσήκοντι θεῷ). The ritual remedy was successful and the plague was driven off. "Whence," adds Diogenes, "you may find to this day nameless altars (βωμοὶ ἀνώνυμοι) throughout the demes of the Athenians, a memorial of the expiation which was then accomplished."<sup>39</sup> The phrasing, especially the keyword "whence," shows that the story was aetiological, designed to explain the existence of "anonymous altars" not only at the Areopagos but even more so in various parts of Athens or Attica.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, none of these altars has come to light so far, nor are they referred to by any author other than Diogenes, whose source remains unknown.

Norden insisted, rightly, that the Athenian altars for the unknown gods must be differentiated from the anonymous altars.<sup>41</sup> He also assumed that the latter were termed "nameless" because they did not have the name of any deity inscribed on them. But what would have been the point of drawing attention to the fact that these altars lacked inscriptions? As a

<sup>37</sup> Norden (above, note 21) 41–55 speculated that Philostratos and the author of Acts depended for their Athenian altar(s) to the unknown god(s) on an identical source, viz. an authentic report of Apollonios' visit to Athens and of the sermon he gave there—which, according to Norden, was similar to Paul's—concerning the worship of unknown gods. Norden's hypothetical source is too good to be true (cf. Haenchen [above, note 10] 461 n. 5), but it illustrates the problems we encounter when the apparatus of actual cult is transposed into the world of fiction.

<sup>38</sup> D.L. 1. 110 = Epimenides 3 A 1 Diels–Kranz = *FGrHist* 457 T 1. On Epimenides, see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) 141–46; F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* IIIb: Kommentar zu Nr. 297–607 (Text) (Leiden 1955) 308–15; W. Burkert, *Law and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, MA 1972) 150–52; Rhodes (above, note 30) 81–84.

<sup>39</sup> D.L. 1. 110 ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν εὐρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς δήμους τῶν Ἀθηναίων βωμοὺς ἀνωνύμους, ὑπόμνημα τῆς τότε γενομένης ἐξιλάσεως. The translation is by Frazer (above, note 26) II 34.

<sup>40</sup> On "the syntax of aetiology" and its features, including the aetiological use of ὅθεν and (ἐτι) καὶ νῦν, see H. Pelliccia, *HSCP* 92 (1989) 71–101.

<sup>41</sup> Norden (above, note 21) 57 n. 1. Norden implicitly rejects the view of Frazer (above, note 26) II 33 f. and J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge 1922) 241, who regarded the two categories of altars as identical, even though they are attested for different periods and dedicated to different groups of divinities.

general rule, Greek altars were dedicated to the worship of one or more particular deities whose identity, or identities, would have been known to worshippers regardless of whether the altar bore any inscription. Furthermore, uninscribed altars were commonly found throughout the Greek world.<sup>42</sup> It seems infinitely more likely, therefore, that these "nameless" altars would have been explicitly dedicated to nameless divinities, male or female (θεοὶ or θεαὶ ἀνόνομοι), whose distinctive epithet—ἀνόνομοι—was transferred to their altars.<sup>43</sup>

These "anonymous altars," named after anonymous divinities, were by no means the only altars in classical Athens whose official designation recalled a characteristic feature, if not an epithet, of the deities to whom they were dedicated. A similar nomenclature applied to altars dedicated to gods or goddesses who received "sober" or wineless libations (νηφάλια, sc. ἱερά). In Attica alone, "wineless" (ἄσιννοι) gods included Zeus Hypatos, Helios, Selene, Eos, Mnemosyne, the Muses, the Nymphs, and the Eumenides.<sup>44</sup> Worshiped in Athens under the cult name of Semnai Theai ("Revered Goddesses"),<sup>45</sup> their altars were officially known as "sober

<sup>42</sup> Cf. C. G. Yavis, *Greek Altars: Origins and Typology* (St. Louis 1949).

<sup>43</sup> E. Rohde, *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 2nd ed. (Freiburg i.B., Leipzig, and Tübingen 1898; repr. Darmstadt 1961) I 174 n. 1 = *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks* (London 1925; repr. New York 1972) 148 n. 62; O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen*. Erster Band: Von den Anfängen bis Hesiod (Berlin 1926) 125 f.; Henrichs (above, note 7) 176 f.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. A. Henrichs, "The 'Sobriety' of Oedipus: Sophocles *OC* 100 Misunderstood," *HSCP* 87 (1983) 87–100, esp. 95–99, and "The Eumenides and Wineless Libations in the Derveni Papyrus," in *Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia* (Naples 1984) II 255–68, esp. 259 f. On νηφάλια in general, see P. Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen* (Leipzig 1910) 180–86 and *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*, 3rd ed. (Munich 1920) 104 f.; L. Ziehen, "Νηφάλια," in *RE* XVI (1935) 2481–89; F. Graf, "Milch, Honig und Wein. Zum Verständnis der Libation im griechischen Ritual," in *Perennitas: Studi in onore di Angelo Brelich* (Rome 1980) 209–21 and esp. *Nordionische Kulte: Religionsgeschichtliche und epigraphische Untersuchungen zu den Kulte von Chios, Erythrai, Klazomenai und Phokaia*, Bibliotheca Helvetica Romana 21 (Rome 1985) 26–29; M. H. Jameson, D. R. Jordan, and R. D. Kotansky, *A Lex Sacra from Selinous*, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Monographs 11 (Durham 1993) 70–73, 108 f. Cf. below, at notes 71 and 81.

<sup>45</sup> Attic prose authors and inscriptions invariably refer to them as Semnai Theai, never as Semnai, a point made emphatically (if for questionable reasons) by Harrison (above, note 41) 239 f.; cf. A. H. Sommerstein, *Aeschylus. Eumenides* (Cambridge 1989) 10 n. 36 and 284, on *Eum.* 1041 f. The most recent find is an Athenian roof tile stamped with the phrase "property of the Semnai Theai" (below, at note 108). In tragedy, the predicative adjective σεμνός is occasionally used as a veiled reference to the goddesses and their cult (Aisch. *Eum.* 383, *Eur. El.* 1272 and *Or.* 410 [below, note 120], *Soph. OK* 41, 100). "Semnai" alone is merely modern shorthand that obscures the explicit divinity of the Revered Goddesses (as in R. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State* [Oxford 1994] 94 f., who renders "Semnai" as "Solemn females" and treats them as synonymous with the Furies [see below, notes 48, 50, and 119]). So far I have not come across the simple designation "Semnai," as opposed to the usual "Semnai Theai," in any Greek author. A. L. Brown, "Eumenides in Greek Tragedy," *CQ* 34 (1984) 260–81, at 262 n. 16 cites *Diog. Laert.* 1. 112 to support his claim that "the ellipse of the noun does occur in Greek"; actually *Diogenes Laertius* speaks of the Athenian ἱερὸν τῶν Σεμνῶν θεῶν.

altars" (νηφάλιοι βωμοί), and were thus named for the ritual anomaly that characterized these deities and their cult.<sup>46</sup>

The designation "anonymous altars" can thus be understood on the analogy of "sober altars." Whereas the latter were dedicated to gods who were "wineless" because the use of wine was prohibited in their worship, the former were named after gods who were anonymous because their names were considered "unspeakable" and enshrouded by ritual taboo.<sup>47</sup> As far as we know, only one group of gods in Athens was called "anonymous," namely the divine consortium of the Erinyes/Semnai Theai on the Areopagos, who appear as "nameless goddesses" (θεαὶ ἀνώνυμοι) in two plays by Euripides. In the *Iphigeneia among the Taurians*, probably performed in 414 or 413 B.C.E., Orestes recalls the matricide, his pursuit by the Erinyes, and his eventual trial and acquittal before the Athenian homicide court on the Areopagos. As he relates them, these proceedings correspond intertextually to the trial scene in Aischylos' *Eumenides*, in which the Erinyes act as Orestes' opponents while Apollo and Athena come to his defense. Describing the events, the Euripidean Orestes refers to the Erinyes of his erstwhile Areopagos trial as "anonymous goddesses" (IT 944 δίκην παρασχεῖν ταῖς ἀνώνυμοις θεαῖς).<sup>48</sup> A papyrus fragment of Euripides' *Melanippe Captive* contains a catalog of cults in which women played prominent roles. Reference is made to the oracles of Delphi and Dodona—both of which employed inspired women as mouthpieces of divine will—and to "the holy rites performed for the Moirai and the nameless goddesses" (ἃ δ' εἰς τε Μοῖρας τάς τ' ἀνώνυμους θεὰς / ἱερὰ τελεῖται).<sup>49</sup> Although Euripides does not identify them explicitly, these goddesses cannot be the same as the Erinyes.

While the nameless goddesses had rituals performed in their honor (ἱερὰ τελεῖται), the Erinyes are among the few divinities who received no

<sup>46</sup> Νηφάλιοι βωμοί are attested in Hesych. v 545 Latte and in IG II<sup>2</sup> 4962.27–32 (Athens, 4th century B.C.E.) = L. Ziehen, *Leges Graecorum sacrae e titulis collectae*. Pars II: *Leges Graeciae et insularum* (Leipzig 1906) 70 ff., no. 18 = L. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969) 50 ff., no. 21. Ziehen 76 took νηφάλιοι τρεῖς βωμοί in IG II<sup>2</sup> 4962 figuratively as referring to three wineless libations rather than to wineless altars; Stengel (above, note 44) *Kultusaltertümer* 104 n. 7 and *Opferbräuche* 181 followed suit. Both scholars overlooked the explanation in Hesychios, which is unambiguous: "altars on which no wine libations are poured" (βωμοί ἐφ' ὃν οἶνος οὐ σπένδεται). Cf. Henrichs (above, note 44) "Sobriety" 91 f. and "Eumenides" 258 n. 11.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. E. Rohde, *Kleine Schriften* (Tübingen and Leipzig 1901) II 243 f.; Henrichs (above, note 7) 163, 176–78; Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 207, 209. The "anonymity" of the chthonian divinities is, of course, a cautionary construct. Since downright avoidance of their names was impracticable, euphemistic names often served as substitutes for appellations that addressed their "dark" side.

<sup>48</sup> At IT 941, 963, and 970, they are called Erinyes. Cf. Henrichs (above, note 7) 169–79. In the *Orestes*, Euripides refers to the Erinyes as Eumenides and Semnai Theai; see below, at note 120.

<sup>49</sup> P. Berlin inv. 9772, col. 4.8 f., edited by W. Schubart and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Berliner Klassikertexte* V.2 (Berlin 1907) 125 f. and D. L. Page, *Select Papyri* III: *Literary Papyri* (London and Cambridge, MA 1942) 112 f., no. 13.

cult anywhere in Greece.<sup>50</sup> The cult of Demeter Erinys in Arcadia and that of the Erinyes of Laïos and Oidipous at Sparta and on Thera are clearly special cases in which the Erinyes piggyback on ordinary recipients of divine cult or hero cult.<sup>51</sup> When experts of the caliber of Erwin Rohde and Carl Robert, or of the thoroughness of Ernst Wüst, represent the Erinyes as recipients of cult, such scholars are in fact referring to the various local cults of the Eumenides and Semnai Theai.<sup>52</sup> Although these names refer to opposite aspects of the same group of divinities, these goddesses were worshiped solely in their positive aspect and not in their negative one.

Euripides' anonymous cult-mates of the Moirai must have been the Semnai Theai/Eumenides, who were associated with the cult of the Moirai and who address them as "sisters by the same mother"—Night—in the *Eumenides*.<sup>53</sup> By subsuming both the negative (Erinyes) and the positive (Eumenides) as well as the mythical and the cultic articulations of the Semnai Theai under the single value-neutral appellation of "anonymous goddesses," Euripides exploited the fact that they lacked a proper name. At the same time, he also paved the way for a more drastic innovation. As we shall see, Euripides was the first tragedian who fully assimilated the Erinyes with the Eumenides and used the two name-epithets interchangeably.<sup>54</sup>

The two Euripidean passages provide a possible link between the Semnai Theai of the Areopagos, here addressed as "nameless goddesses," on the one hand and the "nameless altars" allegedly founded by Epimenides on the other hand. It can hardly be fortuitous that the same Diogenes Laertios who connects Epimenides with the story of the "nameless altars"—

<sup>50</sup> The important point—which is too often ignored—that the Erinyes *qua* Erinyes, and as distinct from the Eumenides/Semnai Theai, were divinities without cult has been made by O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Munich 1906) II 763; Harrison (above, note 41) 238 f.; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin 1931–32) I 404–06; L. Robert, "Malédiction funéraires grecques," *CRAI* (1978) 241–89 = *Opera minora selecta* V (Amsterdam 1989) 697–745, at 247 f. = 703 f.; J. D. Mikalson, *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy* (Chapel Hill and London 1991) 13 f. and 214–17; and Sommerstein (above, note 45) 10, who adds: "It is a waste of effort and resources to offer prayer and sacrifice to beings who are by their nature implacable."

<sup>51</sup> On Demeter Erinys (Paus. 8. 25. 4–11), see E. Wüst, "Erinyes," in *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 82–166, at 94–101. On the Erinyes of Laïos and Oidipous (Herod. 4. 149. 2), see C. Robert, *Oidipus: Geschichte eines poetischen Stoffs im griechischen Altertum* (Berlin 1915) I 12–14; L. Edmunds, "The Cults and the Legend of Oedipus," *HSCP* 85 (1981) 221–38, at 225 f.

<sup>52</sup> Rohde (above, note 47) II 243; C. Robert, *Griechische Mythologie. Erster Band: Theogonie und Götter*, 4th ed. (Berlin 1894) 836–38; Wüst (previous note) 128–36.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 50) I 406; H. Petersmann, "Die Moiren in Aischylos' *Eumeniden* 956–967," *WS* 13 (1979) 37–51; Henrichs (above, note 7) 174 f. A joint cult of the Moirai and Eumenides, implied by *Eum.* 961 f. and the Euripides fragment (above, note 49), is attested for Sikyon by Paus. 2. 11. 4 (quoted below, at note 69). For the related association of Erinyes and Moirai, see *Il.* 19. 87; M. L. West on Hes. *Th.* 217; Epimenides 3 B 19 Diels–Kranz; Aisch. *Th.* 975 ff. = 986 ff., *Prom.* 516; Dodds (above, note 38) 7 f. The two groups are conflated in schol. vet. Aisch. *Ag.* 70: "[The phrase 'unburnt offerings' refers to] the sacrifices for the Moirai and Erinyes, which were also called 'sober offerings' (νηφάλια; cf. notes 44 and 46)." Whereas the Moirai and the Semnai Theai/Eumenides were recipients of cult, the Erinyes were not, as I argue above.

<sup>54</sup> Below, at note 120.



which has its beginnings on the Areopagos—also makes him the legendary founding father of the sanctuary of the Semnai Theai (τὸ ἱερὸν τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν) in the same location.<sup>55</sup> Yet it remains unclear whether the Semnai Theai or Nameless Goddesses of the Areopagos ever had any altars that were called “nameless.”<sup>56</sup> In any event, their own ritual namelessness cannot be doubted. Equally beyond doubt is the fact that their altars occupied a prominent place on their cult site at the Areopagos. It is to these two features of their worship, their cult location at the Areopagos and their nomenclature, that we shall now turn.

## II. Areopagos and Semnai Theai

What we call “Greek religion” was a conglomerate of countless regional cults, each of which bore the unmistakable marks of its physical and cultural environment. The Athenian precinct of the Semnai Theai—their “underground abode”<sup>57</sup>—was located near a cleft in the rocks on the northeast side of the Areopagos, towards the depression that separates that hill from the Akropolis.<sup>58</sup> To better understand the traditions surrounding this sacred site, we rely on Pausanias to guide us once again. In his brief description of the Areopagos, he refers to two aetiological myths that explain the name of the locality and its role in Athenian society.<sup>59</sup>

The Areios Pagos, or “Hill of Ares,” bears the name of the defendant in the first murder trial recorded in Athenian mythology. In the distant mythical past, Halirrhothios, the son of Poseidon, had raped Ares’ daughter Alkippe. Ares killed the offender, was accused by Poseidon, and then was tried on a hill in Athens before the twelve gods. The god was acquitted and the hill acquired his name. Pausanias (1. 28. 5) adds, surely with Aischylos’ *Eumenides* in mind, that at some later time Orestes was tried in the same location for the murder of his own mother.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>55</sup> D.L. 1. 112 = Lobon of Argos fr. 16 (W. Crönert, “De Lobone Argivo,” in XAPITEΣ Friedrich Leo [Berlin 1911] 123–45, at 138).

<sup>56</sup> According to Harrison (above, note 41) 241, “such an altar [one of the nameless altars] may have become associated with the Semnae, who like many other underworld beings were Nameless Ones.” Kern (above, note 43) 125 f. reserves judgment.

<sup>57</sup> Sommerstein (above, note 45) 244, on Aisch. *Eum.* 805 ἔδρας τε καὶ κευθμῶνας. The Semnai Theai ranked as θεοὶ ὑπόγαιοι (Paus. 1. 28. 6 (quoted below, at note 65), and likewise the proper realm of the Erinyes was “underground” (ὑπὸ γαίαν, *Il.* 19. 259, with the note of M. E. Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary* V [Cambridge 1991] 265 f.).

<sup>58</sup> On the topography of the Areopagos and the location of the precinct of the Semnai Theai, see Frazer (above, note 26) II 365, on Paus. 1. 28. 6 (quoted below, at note 65); Robert (above, note 51) I 38–43, with fig. 12; Vanderpool (above, note 11); Wallace (above, note 15) 215–18.

<sup>59</sup> Paus. 1. 21. 4 (the myth of Ares and Halirrhothios and the trial of Ares) and 1. 28. 5 (explanation of the name Areopagos; cross-reference to the earlier discussion of the trial of Ares; the homicide trial of Ares as a precedent for that of Orestes).

<sup>60</sup> The above summary of this myth is based on Pausanias (previous note) and Apollod. *Bibl.* 3. 14. 2. Additional sources include Eur. *El.* 1258–72 and *IT* 940–46, Hellanikos *FGrHist* 4 F 38 and 169 = 323a F 1 and 22, and Philochoros 328 F 3. Euripides, Hellanikos, and Pausanias refer to the trial of Ares as a precedent for the trial of Orestes, and so do Demosthenes (23. 66;

Historically, the Areopagos was the seat of the so-called Council of the Areopagos, which had been established in the archaic period to decide cases of deliberate homicide. Like its mythical ancestor in Aischylos' play, the real Areopagos court could not completely escape the dark shadow cast by the Erinyes.<sup>61</sup> The judges convened on the three interlunar days at the end of each month, days considered impure and unlucky (ἀποφράδες), and apparently sacred to the Erinyes/Semnai Theai.<sup>62</sup> If Lucian is right, the meetings took place, appropriately, at night.<sup>63</sup> As a homicide court, the Areopagos had mythical connections with the Erinyes and cultic connections with the Semnai Theai. Some of these associations are dramatized in Aischylos' *Eumenides*.

The play reenacts Orestes' flight from the Erinyes, his trial and acquittal before the Areopagos court, and the foundation of the Athenian cult of the Semnai Theai. As long as Orestes is on stage, the dread goddesses appear in their most frightful aspect, as Erinyes (1–777). After Orestes exits, the polarity of the Erinyes/Eumenides is played out in the alternation of the curses and blessings they pronounce (778–1020). The curses of the Erinyes are more powerful versions of the imprecations called down upon themselves by both parties in homicide cases tried by the Areopagos.<sup>64</sup> Their blessings may not correspond to any known step in the proceedings of the Areopagos court, but by expressing the hope that Athenians not kill one another in reciprocal bloodshed (976–87) the blessings of the Erinyes-turned-Eumenides do address the concerns of that court. It is in these blessings, and in the closing scene which follows, that the benevolent side of the dread goddesses finally prevails.

As Pausanias turns from the Areopagos proper to the cult site of the Semnai Theai, like most students of Greek cult he, too, shows more interest in the goddesses' benevolent aspect than in the terrible one they equally embody:

And near is a sanctuary of the goddesses whom the Athenians call Semnai, but Hesiod in the *Theogony* calls Erinyes (πλησίον δὲ ἱερὸν θεῶν ἔστιν ἃς καλοῦσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Σεμνάς, Ἡσίοδος δὲ Ἑρινῦς ἐν Θεογονίᾳ).

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see below, note 121) and Deinarchos 1. 87. On the two mythical trials and their aetiological function as foundation myths for the homicide court on the Areopagos, see Wallace (above, note 15) 9 f.

<sup>61</sup> For connections between the Areopagos court and the Erinyes/Semnai Theai, see Rohde (above, note 43) I 268 f. (Eng. trans. 178 f.), whose preoccupation with the vengeful souls of murder victims, however, darkens the picture even more than the evidence warrants.

<sup>62</sup> Wallace (above, note 15) 122 f. and 257 f. nn. 105–06. On the meetings of the Areopagos as a homicide court on the last three days of each month, see J. D. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton 1975) 22 f. and the response by W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*. Part III: Religion (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1979) 209–29, esp. 210, 216, and 224; cf. R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford 1983) 158 f.

<sup>63</sup> Lucian, *Dom.* 18 and *Herm.* 64. Wallace (above, note 15) 122 doubts that the Areopagos ever met at night.

<sup>64</sup> Below, at note 88.

Aischylos was the first to represent them with snakes in their hair, but in their images there is nothing frightful, nor in the other images of the underworld gods (θεῶν τῶν ὑπογίων) that are set up. There is a Plouton also and a Hermes and an image of Ge. And there those who have been acquitted in a suit before the Areopagos sacrifice (θύουσι). And others besides sacrifice (θύουσι), both foreigners and citizens, and within the enclosure there is the tomb of Oidipous.<sup>65</sup>

Pausanias is the only ancient author who comments on the Athenian precinct of the Semnai Theai. Brief though it is, his report touches upon many important aspects of their worship, such as their names, their iconography, the sacrifices they receive, and the close connection between the cult of the Semnai Theai and the homicide cases tried before the Areopagos court. Although the tomb of Oidipous is placed within the precinct of the Semnai Theai only by Pausanias and in the first century C.E. by Valerius Maximus (5. 3. 3), its situation there points to a close kinship between the wrathful Oidipous, who curses his sons, and the "angry" Erinyes, who are associated with oaths and curses.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the tomb's location highlights a more general affinity between the polar nature of the Erinyes/Eumenides and the dual power to bless and to curse invested in the cultic heroes. It will be helpful to discuss some of these matters before we examine the conceptual link between the Semnai Theai and the Erinyes, which lies at the heart of the modern discussion of this cluster of traditions.

Pausanias does not comment on the exact nature of the sacrifices for the Semnai Theai, but in another passage he quotes the following four hexameters from an oracle purportedly given by the Dodonian Zeus to the Athenians:

Beware of the Hill of Ares and the altars, rich in incense, / of the Eumenides (βωμούς τε θυώδεις Εὐμενίδων), where it is fated that the Lakedaimonians become your suppliants / when hard pressed by the spear. Do not slay them with steel / nor treat the suppliants wrongfully: for suppliants are holy and sacred.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Paus. 1. 28. 6 f., trans. Harrison (above, note 41) 241 (adapted).

<sup>66</sup> On the competing tombs of Oidipous—two in Athens, on the Areopagos and at Kolonos, and others in Eteonon and Thebes—see Robert (above, note 51) I 1–47 and Edmunds (above, note 51) 222–25. The affinity between Oidipous and the Erinyes/Eumenides is particularly close in Sophokles' *Oidipous at Kolonos*; see Edmunds 227–29; Henrichs, "Sobriety" (above, note 44) 93–95, 100; esp. M. W. Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge 1989) 253–59 and *Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus*, Translated with Introduction, Notes and Interpretive Essay (Newburyport 1990) 92.

<sup>67</sup> Paus. 7. 25. 1. Cf. H. W. Parke, *The Oracles of Zeus: Dodona, Olympia, Ammon* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA 1967) 131, who attempts to elucidate the background of this forgery (132–34). The oracle calls these goddesses by their Panhellenic name, Eumenides, whereas Pausanias identifies them more specifically as the Athenian Semnai Theai of the Areopagos (7. 25. 2).

According to Pausanias the oracle refers to the mythical past—"when Kodros the son of Melanthos was king of the Athenians"—and to "the altars of the so-called Semnai Theai," located between the Akropolis and the Areopagos, as a place of asylum for suppliants, a function familiar from other sources and shared by many other Greek sanctuaries.<sup>68</sup> It confirms the existence of altars at the cult site, and thus lends a measure of support to our suggestion that the "nameless altars" would have been dedicated to the Semnai Theai. What is more, the oracle calls the Semnai Theai of the Areopagos not by their official name but by an alternate name, Eumenides or the "Kindly Ones." Under this name, the Revered Goddesses were worshiped in other parts of Greece, especially in the vicinity of Sikyon in the northeastern Peloponnese, as we learn from Pausanias:

If you cross the Asopos river to your left there is a grove of holmoak and a shrine of the goddesses called Venerable Ones (Semnai) by the Athenians, but Kindly Ones (Eumenides) by the Sikyonians. Each year they hold a one-day festival for them, slaughtering pregnant ewes, and making ritual use of a mixture of milk and honey, and of flowers instead of wreaths (μελικράτῳ δὲ σπονδῇ καὶ ἄνθεσιν ἀντὶ στεφάνων χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν). They make offerings in much the same way on the altar of the Fates (Moirai), which is in the same grove in the open air.<sup>69</sup>

No other text provides such detailed information on the cult of these goddesses, who were interchangeably, and locally, called Semnai Theai or Eumenides. The pregnant animals,<sup>70</sup> the wineless libations,<sup>71</sup> the absence of wreaths,<sup>72</sup> and the offerings of flowers<sup>73</sup> all mark the sacrifice to the

<sup>68</sup> Cf. M. Blech, *Studien zum Kranz bei den Griechen*, RGVV 38 (Berlin and New York 1982) 368–70 and Wallace (above, note 15) 230 n. 25, who refers to Thuk. 1. 126. 11, *Ar. Knights* 1311 f., *Thesm.* 224, and Plut. *Solon* 12. In general see J. Gould, "Hiketeia," *JHS* 93 (1973) 74–103 and Parker (above, note 62) 180–86.

<sup>69</sup> Paus. 2. 11. 4, trans. P. Levi, *Pausanias. Guide to Greece*, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth 1979) I 156 (adapted).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Stengel, *Opferbräuche* (above, note 44) 26 f.; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*. Erster Band: Die Religion Griechenlands bis auf die griechische Weltherrschaft, 3rd ed. (Munich 1967) 151 f.; Graf, *Nordionische Kulte* (above, note 44) 27 n. 61.

<sup>71</sup> Μελικράτα—a mixture of honey and milk or honey and water—was the most common wineless libation (Graf, "Milch, Honig und Wein" [above, note 44] 212). Cf. Harrison (above, note 41) 92 f.; Stengel (above, note 44) *Kultusaltertümer* 100, 104 and *Opferbräuche* 180–86; Ziehen (above, note 44) 2483 f.; Graf, *Nordionische Kulte* (above, note 44) 27 n. 60; Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky (above, note 44) 14 f. and 72 (new sacrificial *lex sacra* from Selinous, ca. 450 B.C.E., col. A 13 f. μελικράτα ὑπολείβων, "performing a libation of honey mixture," and A 15 μελικράτα ἐν καιναῖς ποτηρίδ[ε]σιν, "honey mixture in new cups"). On wineless libations in general, see above, note 44.

<sup>72</sup> Participants in animal sacrifice would normally wear wreaths; wreathless sacrificers were the exception. Cf. Blech (above, note 68) 361–64; Graf (above, note 44) "Milch, Honig und Wein" 218 n. 51 and *Nordionische Kulte* 28 n. 62.

<sup>73</sup> On the use of flowers—especially narcissus—in various local cults of the Eumenides, see Blech (above, note 68) 254, 296, and 318 f. A. 3a.

Eumenides as anomalous.<sup>74</sup> At the same time, these anomalies are consistent with what is conventionally known as the "chthonian" type of ritual. Chthonian cult was ritually marked and sharply differentiated from the unmarked cult of the Olympian gods, even though some Olympians—like Demeter, Hermes, and Dionysos—were also recipients of chthonian rites in certain cults where their connections with the underworld and the realm of the dead were emphasized.<sup>75</sup>

The cult of the Athenian Semnai Theai was not very different from that of their Sikyonian counterparts. In addition to wineless libations, especially of milk, offerings to the Semnai Theai of the Areopagos included honey cakes.<sup>76</sup> Similar sacrificial cakes were typically offered in regional cults of the Eumenides, and of other chthonian divinities as well.<sup>77</sup> Significantly, the Athenian Eumenides were worshiped in complete silence (ἡσυχία or εὐφημία)—another mark of their anomalous ritual status.<sup>78</sup> In charge of the polis cult of the Semnai Theai was the Athenian *genos* of the Hesychidai, suitably named after the eponymous cult hero Hesychos, "The Silent One," to whom a "sacred ram" (κρίος ἱερός) was offered as a preliminary sacrifice prior to the official sacrifice to the Semnai Theai, and whose name euphemistically epitomizes the silence paid to these goddesses in their

<sup>74</sup> Graf (above, note 44) "Milch, Honig und Wein" 218 and *Nordionische Kulte* 27 f. has emphasized the marked nature of the Sikyonian ritual, as opposed to the unmarked worship of the Olympian gods. According to Graf, wineless libations accompanied "marginal" rituals relating to death, magic, and purification from bloodshed; such anomalies had more to do with the "inner logic of the ritual" than with the chthonian status of the divinities. But divinities did matter more to the Greeks than to modern historians of Greek religion. In the Sikyonian cult of the Eumenides as well as in many other cases discussed by Graf, the Greeks did not separate the recipients of the libations from the ritual process.

<sup>75</sup> On this distinction, see Burkert (above, note 8) 199–208 and S. Scullion, "Olympian and Chthonian," *ClAnt* 13 (1994) 75–119.

<sup>76</sup> Female members of the Hesychidai (below, note 79), appointed to serve as priestesses of the Semnai Theai, pour wineless libations over honey cakes (Kallim. fr. 681 Pfeiffer); the Semnai Theai receive sacrificial cakes and milk poured from clay pitchers (schol. Aischin. 1. 188); ephebes from distinguished families (the Hesychidai?) prepare cakes (πέμματα) for the Semnai Theai (Philo, *Prob.* 140); triple libations of water and honey are poured for the Eumenides of Kolonos (Soph. *OK* 481). On the ritual details, see Rohde (above, note 47) II 243; Stengel, *Kultusaltertümer* (above, note 44) 125 f.; Harrison (above, note 41) 239–53; L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 214; Henrichs (above, note 44) "Sobriety" 88–93 and "Eumenides" 259 nn. 14–15; Graf, *Nordionische Kulte* (above, note 44) 218.

<sup>77</sup> According to the Derveni papyrus, sacrificial cakes (πόπανα) were offered to the Eumenides (below, at note 142). Cf. Stengel (above, note 44) *Kultusaltertümer* 100 and *Opferbräuche* 181; Henrichs (above, note 44) "Sobriety" 92 f., 96 and "Eumenides" 258–61; Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky (above, note 44) 14 f. and 69. On sacrificial cakes in general, consult the bibliography in Henrichs, "Eumenides" 260 n. 20 as well as J.-M. Dentzer, *Le motif du banquet couché dans le proche-orient et le monde grec du VII<sup>e</sup> au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C.*, BEFAR 246 (Rome 1982) 519–24.

<sup>78</sup> Ritual silence observed in the cult of the Athenian Semnai Theai: schol. Soph. *OK* 489 de Marco μετὰ γὰρ ἡσυχίας τὰ ἱερὰ δῶσι, and διὰ γὰρ εὐφημίαν (followed by a lacuna) = Polemon of Ilion, *Against Eratosthenes* fr. 49 Preller; Soph. *OK* 125 ff. (132 εὐφήμου), 156 ff., 489 f. Cf. Graf, "Milch, Honig und Wein" (above, note 44) 218; Henrichs (above, note 7) 168–70, on Aisch. *Ch.* 96 ff. and Soph. *OK* 129.



cult.<sup>79</sup> The same silence that characterized the dread goddesses and their worshipers also surrounded their potential victims. In Athens and elsewhere, suspected murderers were enjoined from speaking, and no one was allowed to talk to them.<sup>80</sup>

That the Semnai Theai, like other chthonian divinities, were indeed recipients of wineless libations and holocaust sacrifices is suitably confirmed by another inhabitant of the nether realm, the ghost of Klytaimnestra in the *Eumenides*. The slaughtered mother of Orestes appears on stage and urges the Erinyes to wake up from their sleep and to turn against Orestes, who has taken refuge at the altar of the Delphic Apollo. She reminds the Erinyes of her past worship of them and lends force to her point by detailing the rites she once performed while she was still among the living:

Full many an offering of mine have you lapped up;  
libations without wine, sober appeasements,  
and solemn feasts by night upon the hearth that housed the fire  
I burned, at an hour not shared by any of the gods.<sup>81</sup>

The cultic record contradicts Klytaimnestra's claim. Unlike the *Eumenides* and Semnai Theai, who were prominent in cult but had no myths, the Erinyes were mythical figures who received no cultic honors.<sup>82</sup> Anticipating the transposition of the wrathful spirits of vengeance into kindly figures of cult in the second half of the play, Aischylos ascribes the Athenian rites of the Semnai Theai to the Erinyes.<sup>83</sup> Far from offering evidence for a cult of the Erinyes, this passage provides the earliest extant description of the Athenian cult of the Semnai. Its language confirms that the cultic ambience was entirely chthonian, characterized by nocturnal rites consisting of wineless libations and holocaust sacrifices rendered over hearth-like altars of the chthonian type (*Eum.* 108 ἐπ' ἐσχάραι πυρός and 806 ἐσχάραι).<sup>84</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Usener (above, note 20) 265 f.; Robert (above, note 51) I 42 f.; Harrison (above, note 41) 247 f.; Kearns (above, note 24) 167 f. The bulk of our information on Hesychos/Hesychides derives from the scholiast on Soph. *OK* 489 (previous note), who quotes Kallim. fr. 681 Pfeiffer and Apollodoros of Athens, *FGrHist* 244 F 101.

<sup>80</sup> Aisch. *Eum.* 448; schol. vet. *Eum.* 276 = Eur. fr. 1008 N<sup>2</sup>; Eur. *IT* 951 f. and *Or.* 75; cf. *HF* 1219. Cf. Parker (above, note 62) 350, 371, and 390 f.; Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky (above, note 44) 43, on col. B 6 f. ποταγορείσθω.

<sup>81</sup> *Eum.* 106–09 ἡ πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐλείξατε / χράς τ' αἰόνους, νηφάλια μελίγματα, / καὶ νυκτίσεμνα δεῖπν' ἐπ' ἐσχάραι πυρός / ἔθουον, ὥραν οὐδενὸς κοινὴν θεῶν (trans. H. Lloyd-Jones, *Aeschylus. The Oresteia* [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993] 216).

<sup>82</sup> Above, note 50.

<sup>83</sup> Harrison (above, note 41) 239; Sommerstein (above, note 45) 11.

<sup>84</sup> Altars for the Semnai Theai/*Eumenides* are referred to as βωμοί by Thukydides (1. 126. 11) and Pausanias (1. 31. 4), as well as in the oracle quoted above (at note 67). Although "altars properly of Olympian type could be used for chthonic deities" (Yavis [above, note 42] 94), it is equally possible that the unmarked term βωμός was occasionally used for *eschara*-like altars.

The Erinyes' Homeric, and post-Homeric, role as ministers of vengeance comprised two functions that are directly relevant to the proceedings of the Areopagos court: to punish homicides (especially kin-murderers) and to act as divine guarantors of solemn oaths and curses.<sup>85</sup> By the 4th century B.C.E., belief in personified curses as agents of homicide victims—a possible source of this particular aspect of the Erinyes—had largely disappeared from the religion as practiced, although it enjoyed a long life in myth, especially in tragedy.<sup>86</sup> But belief in the efficacy of oaths and curses continued to be strong. In the most serious oaths, the swearer called utter destruction upon himself and his children, should he violate his own oath.<sup>87</sup> Both the solemn gravity of such oaths and the dire consequences of breaking them are illustrated by the elaborate oath formula paraphrased by Demosthenes in a speech delivered in 352 B.C.E.:

On the Areopagos, where the law allows and orders trials for homicide to be held, first the man who accuses someone of such a deed will swear an oath invoking destruction (ἐξώλεια) on himself and his family and his house, and no ordinary oath either, but one which no one swears on any other subject, standing over the cut pieces of a boar, a ram and a bull (στὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τομίων κάπρου καὶ κριοῦ καὶ ταύρου), which have been slaughtered by the right persons and on the proper days, so that every religious requirement has been fulfilled both as regards the time and as regards the executants.<sup>88</sup>

Demosthenes, who had close ties to the Areopagos and the cult of the Semnai Theai, does not say which divinities witnessed this oath, which was taken by both parties at the beginning of each murder trial before the Areopagos.<sup>89</sup> It is hard to imagine, however, that this extraordinary oath could have been unrelated to the Erinyes/Semnai Theai, who are mentioned by Demosthenes in the same context, albeit under a more auspicious

<sup>85</sup> Rohde (above, note 47) II 229–44; Wüst (above, note 51) 112–17; Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 204 f.; Parker (above, note 62) 107–10 and 196 f.; Sommerstein (above, note 45) 7–10; cf. Seaford (above, note 45) 95–98.

<sup>86</sup> J. D. Mikalson, *Athenian Popular Religion* (Chapel Hill and London 1983) 50–52 and 128 n. 7.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Mikalson (previous note) 31–38; Parker (above, note 62) 126, 186 f.

<sup>88</sup> Dem. 23. 67 f., trans. MacDowell (above, note 30) 91. Cf. Burkert (above, note 8) 250–54; MacDowell 90–100. On oath sacrifices involving a triad of male animals (τριτῦς or τριττοῖα) and on the "cut pieces" (τόμια, the testicles of the victims), see Stengel (above, note 44) *Kultusaltertümer* 119, 136 f., 153 f. and *Opferbräuche* 78–85, 195 f.; Burkert 251–53. For a representation of a sacrificial procession including a bull, boar, and ram on a band cup, ca. 560 B.C.E., in a private collection in London, see E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary* (Madison 1983) 63, with pls. 16.2 and 17.2, and *Die Götter der Griechen*, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt 1985) 193, with pl. 176.

<sup>89</sup> Demosthenes reports (21. 115) that in 347/6 he was "chosen from among all the Athenians as one of three *hieropoioi* for the Semnai Theai." These particular *hieropoioi* were appointed either by the Areopagos Council (Wallace [above, note 15] 109) or the Ekklesia (D. M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes. Against Meidias* [Oxford 1990] 338 ad loc.). On the numerous boards of *hieropoioi* in Athens, see Stengel, *Kultusaltertümer* (above, note 44) 48 f.; Rhodes (above, note 30) 605–10; R. S. J. Garland, *ABSA* 79 (1984) 117 f.

name—that of Eumenides, the “Kindly Ones.”<sup>90</sup> This euphemism suggests, but does not prove, that the divinities who witnessed this oath included the Semnai Theai rather than the Erinyes.<sup>91</sup> We know of at least one oath sworn by the Semnai Theai and administered by the Areopagos. Deinarchos informs us that when Demosthenes testified before the Areopagos Council in the Harpalos affair (324 B.C.E.)—which concerned corruption, not murder—he swore an oath “by the Semnai Theai and the other gods by whom it is the custom to swear there” (1. 47).<sup>92</sup> We are left wondering who those “other gods” might have been, and whether the Semnai Theai of this oath were held to be identical with the Erinyes.

### III. Polarity: Erinyes and Eumenides

Whether associated with curses or solemn oaths, the Erinyes presided over matters of life and death and embodied a distinctly primitive concept of justice older than any legal procedure or court of law and based on the principle of absolute retaliation: violence for violence, blood for blood, a life for a life. In their archaic role as instruments of vengeance and punishment, the Erinyes were considered frightful and abominable by the Greeks. Nevertheless, as portrayed in literature and art, they are ubiquitous in Greek myth. In real life, however, the Erinyes would have been invoked on rare occasions and for sinister purposes, not only in curses but also in binding spells and other magical texts as well as in inscriptions designed to protect tombs and burial places from potential violators.<sup>93</sup> In all these cases, the Erinyes occupy an ambivalent position in the twilight zone where the dark world of the dead encroaches upon the social order of the living.

As recipients of chthonian cult, the Semnai Theai/Eumenides must be distinguished from the Erinyes, who had no cult.<sup>94</sup> Yet all three entities share characteristics associating them with the chthonian world and pointing to their common origin in the Greek conception of the dead. Their genealogies are strikingly similar.<sup>95</sup> Hesiod's Erinyes are daughters of Earth (Ge), who “received the bloody drops” of Ouranos after he was castrated by Kronos (*Th.* 183–85). Thus, the Erinyes are engendered by the same sort of kindred bloodshed that would become their major

<sup>90</sup> Just before he quotes the oath, Demosthenes invokes the trials of Ares and Orestes as mythical precedents and refers to Orestes' divine prosecutors euphemistically as Eumenides rather than Erinyes (Dem. 23. 66; cf. below, note 121).

<sup>91</sup> So Mikalson (above, note 50) 215 f., whereas Rohde (above, note 43) I 268 (Eng. trans. 178) and Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 208 waver between the two names.

<sup>92</sup> Frazer (above, note 26) II 365 refers to the divinities who witnessed this oath as “Furies,” thereby obscuring the difference between the mythical Erinyes and the cultic Semnai Theai.

<sup>93</sup> T. B. Mitford, *The Inscriptions of Kourion*, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 83 (Philadelphia 1971) 411, Index 6(a) s.v. Ἐρινύες; Robert (above, note 50) 248 = 704, esp. nn. 42–43.

<sup>94</sup> Above, note 50.

<sup>95</sup> Wüst (above, note 51) 84 f.



preoccupation in the course of the archaic period and would define their function in tragedy. In Aischylos, the Erinyes are—like Hesiod's Keres—daughters of Night (Nyx); at the end of the play they return to their dark hiding places beneath the earth, to be worshiped as Semnai Theai.<sup>96</sup> In the *Oidipous at Kolonos*, Sophokles expands upon the Aischylean assimilation of myth (Erinyes) and cult (Semnai Theai/Eumenides) by exploring the associations between Oidipous as a cult hero and the local cult of the Semnai Theai in the poet's native deme of Kolonos, where the goddesses are known as "daughters of Earth and Darkness" (*OK* 40; cf. 106).

In the significant language of myth, Earth, Night, and Darkness are homonyms referring to the chthonian gods' traditional habitat, which is the same in myth as in cult. At the end of the *Eumenides*, after the Erinyes have agreed to take up residence in Athens as protective deities of the city, Athena sends them off to their subterranean dwelling, which will be located in the heart of Athens from now on. This contributes a downward extension to the towering monuments of Olympian cult on the nearby Akropolis:

Go, and as this solemn sacrifice is done,  
make speed beneath the earth,  
and keep far away what is baneful,  
but send what brings advantage,  
that the city may triumph.  
...

And I will escort you by the light of blazing torches,  
to your place below, beneath the earth.<sup>97</sup>

With their punitive role in abeyance, the dread goddesses are now perceived as Semnai Theai rather than Erinyes. As they are being escorted in solemn procession to their new home, Athena draws attention to the sacrifices—"this reverent slaughter of animals" (*Eum.* 1006 σφαγίων τῶνδ' ὑπὸ σεμνῶν)—that are already taking place in their honor.<sup>98</sup> At the exact moment when the Erinyes are transposed into Revered Goddesses and figures of cult, the patron goddess of Athens pointedly characterizes the first sacrifices performed for them as σφάγια σεμνά, thus alluding to the distinctive epithet that constitutes the official cult name of the Semnai Theai. In the processional song with which the play ends, the full name of the goddesses finally emerges: "Right-minded and well disposed toward our land, come this way, Semnai Theai."<sup>99</sup> It has often been suggested that the Erinyes were formally renamed Eumenides in the lacuna of Athena's

<sup>96</sup> Aisch. *Eum.* 321 f., 416, 745, 791 f. = 821 f., 844 = 878, 1032 ff.

<sup>97</sup> *Eum.* 1005–09 and 1022 f., trans. Lloyd-Jones (above, note 81) 269 f.

<sup>98</sup> The term σφάγια refers to slaughtered animals and to "victims in process of being sacrificed" (P. E. Easterling, "Tragedy and Ritual," *Mètis* 3 [1988] 87–109, at 99 n. 29).

<sup>99</sup> *Eum.* 1040 f. Ἰλαοὶ δὲ καὶ εὐθύφρονες γαῖ / δεῦρ' ἔτε, σεμναὶ <θεαί>. J. A. Hartung's supplement, which restores metrical resposion by introducing the official Athenian cult name of the Erinyes/Eumenides, has been accepted by Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 208 f., Sommerstein (above, note 45), and M. L. West, *Aeschylus. Tragoediae* (Stuttgart 1990) 397.

closing speech.<sup>100</sup> However, despite the play's title, it is more likely that Athena bestowed their official cult title on them, namely Semnai Theai.<sup>101</sup> And if the play's title goes back to Aischylos, as it indeed may, the poet chose *Eumenides* not only to "indicate the meaning of the whole conclusion of the trilogy, the reconciliation of the Erinyes"<sup>102</sup>—Athena refers to the Semnai Theai poignantly as being "kind" (992 εὐφρονες; cf. 1030 and 1034)—but even more so to honor the Argive alliance (289–91, 673, and 754–77) by adopting the Argive cult title of these goddesses, namely Eumenides.<sup>103</sup>

The names of the Erinyes, Eumenides, and Semnai Theai are ultimately more revealing than their genealogies. Sophokles makes the important point that the names of the "daughters of Earth and Darkness" vary from place to place. When Oidipous inquires how they are called at Kolonos, a deme of Attica located just outside the city, he gets the following reply from a local informant:

Oidipous: By what solemn name, when I hear it, should I pray to them?

Stranger: People here would call them the all-seeing Eumenides.

But elsewhere other names are considered fine.<sup>104</sup>

Regional differentiation was the hallmark of Greek religion, and different local names and epithets for the same divinities are consistent with the general trend. The same goddesses who were worshiped as Semnai Theai in Athens and Attica were known as Eumenides in the rest of the Greek world.<sup>105</sup> The different regional names may explain why the comic poet Philemon insisted on the difference between the Eumenides and Semnai Theai.<sup>106</sup> If Oidipous' informant is to be trusted, at Kolonos the goddesses were called Eumenides. But despite his display of ignorance, Oidipous seems to be at least as well informed as his local source, as he refers to the divinities' "revered name," σεμνὸν ὄνομα (*OK* 41). The very occurrence of this distinctive epithet in this context suggests that, like Aischylos in the *Eumenides*, Sophokles, too, is alluding to the Semnai Theai of the

<sup>100</sup> So the hypothesis of *Eum.*, Harpokration p. 140.13 Dindorf, and most recently West (previous note) 396, on *Eum.* 1028. A. L. Brown (above, note 45) 267–75 rejects the combined testimony of the hypothesis and Harpokration and argues against the alleged name change.

<sup>101</sup> Sommerstein (above, note 45) 12, as well as 281, on *Eum.* 1027; cf. C. W. Macleod, *Collected Essays* (Oxford 1983) 41.

<sup>102</sup> Macleod (previous note).

<sup>103</sup> On the Argive shrine of the Eumenides, see below, note 122. Unlike A. L. Brown (above, note 45) and Sommerstein (above, note 45) 11 f., I do not believe that the correlation of Erinyes and Eumenides (as opposed to Semnai Theai) was an invention of Euripides.

<sup>104</sup> Soph. *OK* 41–43, trans. Blundell, *Oedipus at Colonus* (above, note 66) 21.

<sup>105</sup> Apart from their polis cult near the Areopagos, the Semnai Theai were also worshiped in the Attic demes of Phlya (Paus. 1. 31. 4) and Kolonos (below, at notes 108–09). Cults of the Eumenides existed on the Greek mainland, the Peloponnese, and Sicily, and in places as distant as Cyrene; see Brown (above, note 45) 260 f. for references.

<sup>106</sup> Philemon fr. 180 Kassel–Austin.

Areopagos, whose full name occurs fifty lines later in Oidipous' prayer to them (89–90 θεῶν / σεμνῶν ἔδραν).

Almost a century ago, Jane Harrison concluded from this scene that the goddesses of Kolonos bore indeed the cult title Eumenides, in distinction from their sister goddesses at the Areopagos, who were called Semnai Theai. What made Harrison so confident was the authority of Sophokles: "We have the express statement of Sophocles, who, as a priest himself and a conservative, was not likely to tamper with ritual titles."<sup>107</sup> Sophokles may have held a minor priesthood, but as a playwright he was anything but conservative in matters of religion. In his extant plays he is more unconventional than Euripides in making full dramatic use not only of religious institutions and rituals, but also of divine names and titles. This is particularly true of the name Eumenides, whose root meaning, "The Kindly Ones," is made explicit in a later scene of the same play (*OK* 486 Εὐμενίδας ἐξ εὐμενῶν). Unlike Harrison, we can no longer be certain that Sophokles put the official cult name of the goddesses at Kolonos in the mouth of the local informant when he reported their name as Eumenides. A new piece of epigraphical evidence has changed the picture. In the deme of Kolonos excavators found a terracotta roof tile stamped with the words ΣΕΜΝΩΝ ΘΕΩΝ, "property of the Semnai Theai."<sup>108</sup> The discovery confirms that far from being Sophokles' invention, as some have suggested, the Semnai Theai were indeed worshiped at Kolonos and that their cult site included a permanent structure, perhaps a temple.<sup>109</sup> The tile further reveals that the divinities of the deme cult must have been officially known by the same name as the Semnai Theai of the Areopagos. Unofficially they were perhaps also known as Eumenides. By juxtaposing two different names for the same divinities, Semnai Theai and Eumenides—one officially adopted by the polis and uniquely Athenian; the other unofficial, demotic, and at the same time Panhellenic—Sophokles has his cake and eats it too. While playing with different divine names, Sophokles also plays on the difference between country and city, between deme cult and polis cult. Ultimately, this brief scene in which divine names are explored—unique in extant tragedy—leaves the local nomenclature of the Semnai Theai/ Eumenides deliberately ambiguous. One might say that the plurality of their epithets,

<sup>107</sup> Harrison (above, note 41) 253 f.

<sup>108</sup> H. W. Catling, *Archaeological Reports for 1988–1989* (1989) 13; *SEG* 38 (1988 [1991]), no. 265. Cf. A. Lardinois, "Greek Myths for Athenian Rituals: Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*," *GRBS* 33 (1992) 313–27, nn. 13 and 44.

<sup>109</sup> Catling (previous note) assumes that the tile "must come from the shrine at Hippios Kolonos" and, on the basis of Paus. 1. 30. 4, that "the sanctuary was probably destroyed in the Chremonidean War (265–261 BC)." The discovery raises new questions about the location and nature of the cult site of the Semnai Theai. Sophokles' poetic description of their sacred grove—an *abaton* according to *OK* 39 and 126 (cf. Parker [above, note 62] 167)—makes no reference to any man-made structure; nor does D. Birge, "The Grove of the Eumenides: Refuge and Hero Shrine in *Oedipus at Colonus*," *CJ* 80 (1984) 11–17.

combined with the absence of a true theonym, only magnifies their ultimate anonymity as "nameless goddesses" (ἀνώνυμοι θεαί). Emphasis on the lack of divine names (ἀνωνυμία) as well as on their abundance (πολυωνυμία) can be seen as opposite but complementary attempts to articulate the ineffability of the divine.<sup>110</sup>

In the same dialogue Sophokles describes the Eumenides of Kolonos as "dread goddesses" (39–40 ἔμφοβοι / θεαί), a description that would also fit the Erinyes, who may well have been in the back of his mind. In two earlier plays, *Aias* and *Elektra*, he introduces the Erinyes as the "revered/awesome Erinyes" (σεμναὶ Ἐρινύες), thus assimilating the Erinyes to the Semnai Theai while reminding us of the punitive aspect and latent polarity of the latter.<sup>111</sup> This polarity is reflected in the diverse translations of the cult name Semnai Theai, which range from "Venerable Goddesses,"<sup>112</sup> "Revered Goddesses,"<sup>113</sup> "August Goddesses,"<sup>114</sup> and "Solemn Goddesses"<sup>115</sup> to "Awesome Goddesses,"<sup>116</sup> "Awful Goddesses,"<sup>117</sup> and "Dread Goddesses."<sup>118</sup>

But Sophokles never fully identifies the Erinyes with either the Semnai Theai or the Eumenides. Neither does Aischylos, whose Erinyes are elaborately transposed into Eumenides, a process that preserves their basic polarity and turns it to dramatic advantage. Even though the title *Eumenides* identifies the Erinyes by the only name that auspiciously emphasizes their benevolent side with certainty, they are never called Eumenides in the course of the play and are referred to only once as Semnai Theai, and this only in the closing scene.<sup>119</sup> It was Euripides, that notorious

<sup>110</sup> On this point, see G. Bader, "Gott nennen: Von Götternamen zu göttlichen Namen," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 86 (1989) 306–54, esp. 339 f. Bader quotes, among other texts, *Ascl.* 20 *hunc vero innominem vel potius omninominem* (*Corp. Herm.* II 321.5 f. Nock-Festugièr), a description of the "Father and Lord of all." In a similar vein, an oracle of the Clarian Apollo from the late 2nd or the 3rd century C.E. describes the highest god as "admitting of no name, with many names," οὐνομα μὴ χωρῶν, πολυώνυμος (L. Robert, "Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda," *CRAI* [1971] 597–619 = *Op. min. sel.* V [above, note 50] 617–39, at 611 f. = 631 f.).

<sup>111</sup> Soph. *Aias* 837 and *El.* 112. The Erinyes of the *Eumenides* certainly retain their punitive power even as Semnai Theai (*Eum.* 932–37 and 954 f.; cf. Lloyd-Jones [above, note 7] 208).

<sup>112</sup> Frazer (above, note 26) II 364 f.; Harrison (above, note 41) 239; H. W. Smyth, *Aeschylean Tragedy* (Berkeley 1924) 230.

<sup>113</sup> Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 204; cf. S. Goldhill, *Aeschylus. The Oresteia* (Cambridge 1992) 79 "the Revered Ones (Semnai)."

<sup>114</sup> Blundell, *Helping Friends* (above, note 66) 256; A. J. Podlecki, *Aeschylus. Eumenides* (Warminster 1989) 5.

<sup>115</sup> MacDowell (above, note 89) 157; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides I* (Oxford 1991) 209.

<sup>116</sup> Lardinois (above, note 108) 316; Seaford (above, note 45) 133.

<sup>117</sup> J. O. Burt, *Minor Attic Orators II* (Cambridge, MA and London 1954) 219 and 237, in his translation of Deinarchos 1. 64 and 87 (contrast 207, "holy goddesses," for the Semnai Theai at Dein. 1. 47).

<sup>118</sup> A. H. Sommerstein, *The Comedies of Aristophanes. Volume 2: Knights* (Warminster 1981) 214.

<sup>119</sup> Above, note 99.

nonconformist among the Attic tragedians, who had the daring to amalgamate the separate mythical and cultic identities of the two groups. In his *Orestes* (408 B.C.E.), he refers to the Erinyes of the Orestes myth repeatedly as Eumenides and equates them with the Semnai Theai.<sup>120</sup> For reasons that appear to be dramatic rather than religious, and that amount to a drastic reinterpretation of Aischylos, Euripides thus chose to obliterate the traditional distinction between two antithetical aspects of chthonian power, one destructive and the other benign. Demosthenes and Euphorion followed suit, and so did successive generations of Roman poets from Lucilius to Ovid, who called the mythical Furies by their ritual antonym, Eumenides.<sup>121</sup> The Erinyes are again euphemistically called Eumenides on a fragment of an inscribed Apulian vase (4th century B.C.E.).<sup>122</sup>

In each of their various manifestations—mythical or cultic, local or functional, Attic or Panhellenic—the Erinyes/Semnai Theai/Eumenides bear a distinct and separate “name.” Their nomenclature has created a good deal of unnecessary confusion among modern scholars. The vast majority of them has always identified the Erinyes and the Eumenides, used the two names interchangeably, and largely ignored the Semnai Theai.<sup>123</sup> These scholars have several distinguished Greek and Latin poets on their side, as has been mentioned. But, of course, poets were free to take liberties that may never have occurred to the ancient worshippers of the Eumenides or the

<sup>120</sup> Eur. *Or.* 37 f., 321, 836, and 1650 (Erinyes), 408–10 (σεμναὶ γάρ; see above, note 45); cf. Henrichs (above, note 7) 171–74. Demosthenes, too, refers to the Erinyes of the Orestes myth as Eumenides (above, note 90), while Deinarchos 1. 87 equates them with the Semnai Theai. Even if Euripides in 408 B.C.E. was the first writer to use the names of the Erinyes and Eumenides interchangeably, it does not at all follow that he was also the first to “identify” the two as opposite aspects of the same set of chthonian divinities, as has been argued by A. L. Brown (above, note 45).

<sup>121</sup> Dem. 23. 66 (who compares the murder trial of Ares on the Areopagos with the lawsuit between “the Eumenides and Orestes” in the same location [above, notes 60 and 90]); Euphorion fr. 94 Powell; Lucil. fr. 176; Cat. 64. 193; Verg. *G.* 1. 278 (cf. R. Thomas, *Virgil. Georgics* [Cambridge 1988] I 115 ad loc.: “he has civilized the Erinyes, giving them their cult name, Eumenides”), 4. 483, *Aen.* e.g. 4. 469, 6. 250; Horace, *C.* 2. 13. 36; Ovid, *Met.* e.g. 6. 430 f., 8. 482; as well as in the *Eumenides* of Ennius and Varro. Cf. Brown (above, note 45) 267.

<sup>122</sup> C. Allen, *A la recherche de l'ordre cosmique* (Zürich 1994) I 64 f., II 202 f., no. 6; H. Sarian, “Erinyes,” in *LIMC* III.1 (1986) 828, no. 12, and 839. The iconography of the Erinyes and Eumenides is equally euphemistic. Compared to their terrifying appearance in Aischylos (*Eum.* 48 ff.), the Erinyes of Greek art are relatively benign creatures equipped with snakes and/or wings (Sarian III.1 825–43, III.2 595–606). On more than half a dozen stelae dedicated “to the Eumenides” (Εὐμενίστιν) and found in their sanctuary near Tiryns in the Argolid, the Eumenides are represented as dignified ladies holding snakes and poppies (Sarian III.1 839, III.2 605 f.). Cf. Sarian, “Réflexions sur l'iconographie des Erinyes dans le milieu grec, italote et étrusque,” in *Iconographie et identités régionales*, BCH Suppl. 14 (Paris 1986) 25–35.

<sup>123</sup> Two telling examples of the modern tendency to assimilate the Erinyes and the Eumenides/Semnai Theai: MacDowell (above, note 89) 338, on Dem. 21. 115, explains Semnai Theai as “a name used at Athens for the Erinyes or Eumenides, the avengers of homicide” (a role foreign to the Eumenides); J.-P. Vernant in Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, rev. ed. (New York 1990) 420 implies that Paus. 1. 28. 6 (quoted above, at note 65) refers to “the sanctuary of the August Erinyes, Semnai Erinyes, on the Areopagus,” even though Pausanias painstakingly differentiates between the two names.



Semnai Theai. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish when the poets are constructing their own religious world and when they are mirroring the conventions of actual cult. To guard against these pitfalls, some students of Greek religion have gone out of their way to keep the three groups separate.<sup>124</sup> Such a rigorous approach may recommend itself from a purely methodological point of view, but in the end it leads to grave distortion and does more harm than good. By exaggerating their undeniable differences, the conceptual link that connects the three groups is obscured. That conceptual link will occupy us now.

Greek gods derive their distinct identities to a large extent from their names and epithets. In addition to individual gods, the Greeks recognized numerous divine societies, whose members lacked personal features and bore collective names.<sup>125</sup> Such groups could be either male or female, but their membership never comprised both sexes at the same time. Examples of female groups that come readily to mind include the Moirai, Charites, Gorgons, Harpies, Muses, Horai, Eileithyiai, and Nymphs. Individual members of most of these groups can be referred to in the singular—Moirai, Gorgo, Muse, Eileithyia, or Nymph—but the fact remains that each individual always shares the name and characteristics of the whole group. The name of the Erinyes fully conforms to this general pattern. It, too, can be used collectively as well as individually.<sup>126</sup> In fact the single Erinyes, attested on some Linear B tablets from Knossos, predates the collective Erinyes of the earliest epic tradition.<sup>127</sup> In the *Oresteia*, the singular and the plural—Erinyes and Erinyes—are interchangeable.<sup>128</sup> The Semnai Theai and the Eumenides, however, are different; they never lose their collective identity and are nowhere referred to in the singular.<sup>129</sup> The lack of individuation within each group is not necessarily a mark "of hoary

<sup>124</sup> The most prominent representative of the χωρίζοντες remains Harrison (above, note 41) 223–56, who treats the Erinyes, Eumenides, and Semnai Theai in separate chapters. To her credit, she does recognize the polarity of Erinyes versus Eumenides/Semnai Theai (214, 252 f.) and acknowledges the Eumenides and Semnai Theai as both "kindred figures" (240) and "precisely identical" (253). The most rigorous "separatist" is A. L. Brown (above, note 45), who advocates the complete separation of the Erinyes from the Eumenides/Semnai Theai and of the Eumenides from the Semnai Theai. Brown's approach has been challenged by Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) esp. 203 f., 208 f., 211 as well as Henrichs (above, note 7) 167 n. 13 and 176 n. 30.

<sup>125</sup> Burkert (above, note 8) 173 f.

<sup>126</sup> Rohde (above, note 47) II 240 f.; Gruppe (above, note 50) II 763 n. 10.

<sup>127</sup> G. Neumann, "Wortbildung und Etymologie von Ἐρινύς," *Die Sprache* 32 (1986) 43–51, esp. 42 f.; A. Heubeck, "Ἐρινύς in der archaischen Epik," *Glotta* 64 (1986) 143–65, esp. 144 f., 162 f.; D. Sansone, "The Survival of the Bronze-Age Demon," *ICS* 13 (1988) 1–17, esp. 11 ff.

<sup>128</sup> Wüst (above, note 51) 122; Sommerstein (above, note 45) on *Eum.* 950.

<sup>129</sup> Like the Erinyes, the Eumenides/Semnai Theai are often, if not exclusively, represented as a triad in art and literature. Cf. Robert (above, note 52) 837 n. 1; Harrison (above, note 41) 242 f. and 286–92; Wüst (above, note 51) 122 f.; T. Hadzisteliou Price, "Double and Multiple Representations in Greek Art and Religious Thought," *JHS* 91 (1971) 48–69, esp. 57 f.; S. Scheinberg, "The Bee Maidens of the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*," *HSCP* 83 (1979) 1–28, esp. 2–7 on female triads; Sarian, "Erinyes" (above, note 122) III.1 839, III.2 605 f.

antiquity," as Jane Harrison might have argued,<sup>130</sup> but may rather signify strength in numbers. The divinities together may be understood as an expression of collective divine benevolence—a more powerful female version of the male ancestral Tritopatores—and as a counterpoint to the numerous collective manifestations of divine wrath such as the personified Arai, Blabai, Erinyes, Keres, Maniai, Poinai, and Praxidikai.<sup>131</sup>

More revealing than the occasional fluctuation between singular and plural is the fundamental semantic difference that divides the names on our list into two distinct categories. Most of the names are common nouns or descriptive adjectives which are employed as proper names to describe the basic function or some external property of each god. The two cases that fail most conspicuously to fit this description are the two very designations we are discussing, namely Semnai Theai and Eumenides. Never achieving the status of true proper names, they remained transparent cult names that appealed euphemistically to the ambivalent power of these divinities by addressing them as "Revered Goddesses" and "Kindly Ones."<sup>132</sup> Once properly placated, the divinities would live up to the promise of their titles and exhibit a kindly disposition commensurate with the awe and veneration they received from their worshippers.

Such expectations were strong and enduring. Had it been otherwise, the cult of the Athenian Semnai Theai would not have lasted as long as it did, from the archaic period to the time of Pausanias in the second century C.E. But the fear of the darker side of these powers persisted too, and so did the Erinyes, who are mentioned more frequently in poetry than in prose. A curse tablet from Hellenistic Athens invokes "chthonian Hekate," another dread goddess, along with the Erinyes, whose name and epithet have poetic resonance—"with the maddening Erinyes" (Ἐρινύσιν ἡλιθιώναις).<sup>133</sup> The most conspicuous quality of the Aeschylean Erinyes, their spiteful anger, still characterized their namesakes in the Roman period. Pausanias connects the name Erinyes with the Arcadian dialect word ἐρινύειν, to which he assigns the meaning "to be angry" (τὸ θυμῶι χρῆσθαι).<sup>134</sup> Although the Arcadian gloss is merely a denominative verb derived from the name Erinyes—"to behave like the Erinyes"—this confirms that at the time of Pausanias anger was still considered their abiding trait.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Harrison (above, note 41) 239–43, esp. 240: "It is obvious from the play of the *Eumenides* that the worship of the Semnae at Athens was of hoary antiquity."

<sup>131</sup> On harmful groups of female divinities, see Wüst (above, note 51) 86–91. On the Tritopatores, see Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky (above, note 44) 107–14.

<sup>132</sup> Brown (above, note 45) 262 rightly emphasizes the intrinsic namelessness of the Semnai Theai ("this hardly counts as a name at all") while denying arbitrarily that the designation Eumenides "arose as a euphemism or 'antiphrasis' for some other name (such as Erinyes)."

<sup>133</sup> R. Wünsch, *Appendix continens defixionum tabellas in Attica regione repertas* (Berlin 1897 = *IG* III.3) 193, no. 108b, line 2 (3rd/2nd century B.C.E.); G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata graeca ex lapidibus collecta* (Berlin 1878) 511, no. 1136.

<sup>134</sup> Paus. 8. 25. 6. Cf. Gruppe (above, note 50) II 764 f. n. 8; Wüst (above, note 51) 83 f.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. Neumann (above, note 127) 48 f., who derives "Erinyes" from ἔρις, "strife."

Before the Erinyes could be portrayed as Eumenides, their anger had to be mollified. In Aischylos' play Athena intervenes, and owing to her gentle persuasion their anger turns into benevolence and the fear they once inspired becomes worship—a reorientation of their powers from which both sides benefit greatly.<sup>136</sup> Their cult titles, Eumenides and Semnai Theai, reflect the blessings they now pronounce and the new cultic status they acquire. Perhaps we can now understand why Euripides calls these powers the “Nameless Ones,” a title he may have found in actual cult. No single name could adequately express their two opposite yet reciprocal identities, neither of which can function without the presence of the other. The Erinyes require the existence of the Eumenides to achieve their full meaning, and vice versa.<sup>137</sup>

The Erinyes/Eumenides provide the most explicit case of polarity in Greek religion. Elsewhere the two opposite aspects of a given polar concept are subsumed under the overarching umbrella of a single complex deity, for instance Artemis or Dionysos. In this case, however, the two sides have been polarized into two distinct groups of divinities, each of which represents a plurality of identical members, whose mythical and cultic roles determine each other. As happens so often in Greek religion, the mythical aspect represents a worst-case scenario, such as the matricide of Orestes and his persecution by the Erinyes, indeed a sequence of events far removed from real life. The cultic model of the kindly Eumenides presents the opposite picture and emphasizes the flourishing of humans, animals, and plants.<sup>138</sup> The Erinyes/Eumenides dichotomy thus provides a perfect illustration of the polar yet mutually complementary functions of myth and ritual. Through myth, mortals confront the most extreme boundaries of human experience. In this way, myth ultimately reinforces the normal order of things, the preservation of which depends upon the proper reciprocity between the human and the divine world, which is, in turn, maintained in cult.

#### IV. The Countless and Nameless Dead

Central features of the nomenclature of the Erinyes and their antonyms, the Eumenides and Semnai Theai, are reminiscent of the ways in which the Greeks—or, rather, some Greeks—of the classical period thought and spoke about the dead and the chthonian powers. According to this view, the ordinary dead—in contrast to local recipients of hero cult—ranked as “countless” (ἀνάρητοι), while the special dead—those who had died a

<sup>136</sup> Aisch. *Eum.* 778–end.

<sup>137</sup> Henrichs (above, note 7) 164–68; cf. Wüst (above, note 51) 121 f.

<sup>138</sup> Lloyd-Jones (above, note 7) 207 f.; cf. Sommerstein (above, note 45) 239 f. and 260–62.



violent death, for instance—ranked as “nameless” (ἀνώνυμοι).<sup>139</sup> The Greek tendency to characterize the dead and their world by using negative modifiers is reflected by these two terms.<sup>140</sup> Two extraordinary texts from the margins of Greek literature, and indeed of the Greek world, provide striking evidence for both the anonymity and innumerability of the dead.

The Derveni papyrus, the earlier of these two texts, is a syncretistic commentary, perhaps by Stesimbrotos of Thasos (ca. 425–400 B.C.E.), on an Orphic cosmogonic poem.<sup>141</sup> Discovered in a tomb of the 4th century B.C.E. near Thessaloniki and still awaiting definitive publication, it offers invaluable insights into Orphic poetry, Presocratic philosophy, and allegorical interpretation. In a section that precedes the commentary proper, the author discusses various chthonian rites—prayers, sacrifices, and libations—designed to appease the “souls” (ψυχαί) of the dead and performed by “magicians” (μάγοι)—ritual experts outside the mainstream of Greek religion: “Over the sacrifices they pour (ἐπισπένδουσιν) water and milk, with which they also perform (chthonian) libations (χοαί). The cakes (πόπανα) they sacrifice are countless in number (ἀνάρριθμα) and have many knobs (πολυόμφαλα), because the souls (ψυχαί) too are countless (ἀνάρριθμοι). The initiates (μύσται) perform a preliminary sacrifice for the Eumenides in the same manner as the μάγοι. For the Eumenides are souls (ψυχαί).”<sup>142</sup> These lines touch upon matters of considerable religious interest—the comparison of μάγοι and μύσται; the reference to two different types of wineless libations, σπονδαί and χοαί; the number and shape of sacrificial cakes—discussion of which must await the publication of the final edition and commentary.<sup>143</sup> By identifying the Eumenides as

<sup>139</sup> On these two characteristics of the dead, see Rohde (above, note 47) II 240 f. and 243 n. 3. Because the dead were a countless multitude, the Greeks referred to them collectively as “the majority” (οἱ πλείους; cf. Rohde (above, note 43) II 382 n. 2 (Engl. trans. 570 n. 124) and, in addition to the citations provided there, Ar. *Ekk.* 1073, Kallim. *Hekale* fr. 145. 3 Hollis, and Komoutos, *Theol.* 35, p. 74.16 Lang. The various categories of the special dead are discussed by R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (Ithaca 1985) 77–103.

<sup>140</sup> In addition to being ἀνώνυμοι (cf. Hes. *Op.* 154) and ἀνάρριθμοι, the dead were seen as “strengthless heads” (ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα, for instance at *Od.* 10. 521) and “lifeless” (ἄψυχοι, Aisch. fr. 273a. 4 Radt; Eur. *Tro.* 623), the Styx as ἀμέγαρτον ὕδωρ (Aisch. fr. 273a. 11 Radt; cf. Vergil’s *palus inamabilis unda(e)* at G. 4. 479 and *Aen.* 6. 438, describing the Stygian waters), and Hades as “unpleasant” (ἀτερπής, *Od.* 11. 94) and “sunless” (ἄνῆλιος, Aisch. *Th.* 859; Eur. *Alc.* 436 f. and *HF* 607 f.). Cf. A. Henrichs, “Zur Perhorreszierung des Wassers der Styx bei Aischylos und Vergil,” *ZPE* 78 (1989) 1–29, esp. 25–27.

<sup>141</sup> On the question of authorship, see W. Burkert, “Der Autor von Derveni: Stesimbrotos ΠΕΡΙ ΤΕΛΕΤΩΝ?” *ZPE* 62 (1986) 1–5 (with further bibliography).

<sup>142</sup> Derveni papyrus, col. ii, lines 5–10. A partially obsolete version of the Greek text of this column can be found in the unauthorized preliminary edition published anonymously in *ZPE* 47 (1982) after p. 300. Professor Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou of the University of Thessaloniki, one of the two scholars in charge of the forthcoming edition, will present a substantially improved text of cols. i–iv in the Proceedings of the Princeton conference on the Derveni papyrus (April 1993).

<sup>143</sup> On wineless libations, see above, notes 44, 46, 53, and 71; on sacrificial cakes, notes 76–77. On the meaning of μάγος in the context of Greek (rather than Persian) religion, see W. Burkert, “ΓΟΗΣ. Zum griechischen Schamanismus,” *RhM* 105 (1962) 33–55, at 38 n. 12; M.

"souls" the Derveni papyrus lends modest support to the theories of Erwin Rohde and Jane Harrison, who interpreted the Erinyes as the angry souls of the deceased.<sup>144</sup> Rohde and Harrison were thinking of a special category of souls—the restless souls of those special dead who died a violent death and haunted the living until vengeance had been achieved. By contrast, the author of the Derveni papyrus embraces a more benign and optimistic brand of animism, which equates the Eumenides (as distinct from the Erinyes)<sup>145</sup> with the "countless souls" of the ordinary and "kindly" dead who were expected to bestow blessings upon the living and "to send up the good things" (ἀνιέναι τὰγαθά).<sup>146</sup>

The other text illustrates the concept of the anonymous and fearsome dead. An inscribed lead tablet of the type known as binding spells (κατάδεσμοι or *defixiones*), it was found at Olbia (Pontos) and has been assigned a tentative date in the late 3rd century B.C.E., or, at any rate, one within the Hellenistic period. The curse tablet was first published in 1908 and has been reedited with an important commentary by Benedetto Bravo.<sup>147</sup> This difficult text invokes unidentified underworld powers as witnesses who will enforce the curse (lines 1–2): "As certainly as we don't know you, just as certainly Eupolis, Dionysios, Makareus, Aristokrates, Demopolis, Komaios, and Heragores (will) make their appearance (in court) in order to do a terrible thing" ([ὥ]σπερ σε ἡμεῖς οὐ γινώσκομεν, οὕτως—the list of seven names follows—ἐπὶ [δ]εινὸν πρᾶγμα παραγείνονται). Bravo has shown on the basis of similar formulae of the type ὥσπερ/οὕτως on other tablets that the magical procedure used in these cases is that of "Analogiezauber" or "persuasive analogy."<sup>148</sup>

In the case of the Olbia text, the purpose of the formula is twofold: to authenticate the author's claim that his opponents will malign him in court, and to secure the help of the "unknown" underworld power who is asked in the closing lines of the text to "paralyze" (κατασχεῖν) the enemies of the man who commissioned this tablet. Such curse tablets were often "buried

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Marcovich, *Heraclitus, Greek Text with a Short Commentary* (Merida 1967) 466 f., on Heraclitus fr. 22 B 14 Diels–Kranz; H. S. Versnel, *Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion I: Ter Unus: Isis, Dionysos, Hermes: Three Studies in Henotheism*, *Studies in Greek and Roman Religion* 6 (Leiden 1990) 110 n. 58 and 116–18.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Henrichs, "Eumenides" (above, note 44) 265 f. and Loyd-Jones (above, note 7) 205 f.

<sup>145</sup> The author of the Derveni papyrus treats the Erinyes (above, note 4) as distinct from, but related to, the Eumenides. On this difference, see Brown (above, note 45) 266 n. 45 (with reference to the Derveni papyrus): "It must anyway be significant that the name is Erinyes in the context of crime and punishment, Eumenides in the context of cult."

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Henrichs (above, note 7) 168 f. and 199.

<sup>147</sup> B. Bravo, "Une tablette magique d'Olbia pontique: les morts, les héros et les démons," in *Poikilia: Études offertes à Jean-Pierre Vernant*, *Recherches d'histoire et de sciences sociales* 26 (Paris 1987) 185–218; cf. D. R. Jordan, *GRBS* 26 (1985) 195, no. 173; *SEG* 37 (1987 [1990]), no. 673.

<sup>148</sup> Bravo (previous note) 194–96 and 199–202. On the pedigree of the term "persuasive analogy" as well as on the magical procedure described by it, see C. A. Faraone in Faraone and D. Obbink (eds.), *Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and Religion* (New York and Oxford 1991) 8.

with the corpse or placed in chthonic sanctuaries.”<sup>149</sup> According to Bravo, the addressee “whom we don’t know” is just such a dead person. But in all comparable cases, the dead person is known to the author of the curse tablet and is identified by name. To account for this anomaly, I propose to identify the unknown addressee—σε ἡμεῖς οὐ γινώσκομεν—as a chthonian alter ego of the ἄγνωστος θεός: a chthonian power left nameless in observance of the widespread taboo against the naming of *chthonioi*.<sup>150</sup> This unknown and anonymous denizen of the chthonian realm corresponds onomastically and functionally to the category of the anonymous dead invoked along with the “Erinyes beneath the earth” (Ἐρινύες ὑποχθόνιοι) and various other chthonian powers on several curse tablets of the third century C.E. from Kourion (Cyprus): “You who are buried here, having died before your time and being nameless (ἀνώνυμοι).”<sup>151</sup> Insistence on the anonymity of the *chthonioi* seems to have served two purposes. First, by invoking the “unknown” and “anonymous” dead, the users of the curse tablets sought to assure that no known or unknown chthonian power was omitted or ignored.<sup>152</sup> Second, and more ominously, by avoiding the names of certain *chthonioi* the living were attempting to put a safe distance between themselves and the special, dangerous dead.<sup>153</sup>

Perceived as an anonymous swarm of departed souls—All Souls, as it were—the dead had the dual power to do either harm or good. To contain the damage that they could potentially inflict, they were given propitiatory and honorific titles, such as “Blessed Ones” (μακάριοι), “Good Ones” (χρηστοί), and “Lords” (ἡρώες), which are comparable to the euphemistic antonyms of the Erinyes such as “Revered Goddesses” (σεμναὶ θεαί) and “Kindly Ones” (Εὐμενίδες). The opposite roles of the Erinyes and Eumenides, or of the Erinyes and the Semnai Theai, correspond closely to

<sup>149</sup> C. A. Faraone, “The ‘Performative Future’ in Three Hellenistic Incantations and Theocritus’ Second *Idyll*,” *CP* 90 (1995) 4 n. 13, who also provides a current bibliography on curse tablets.

<sup>150</sup> In two cases underworld gods are expressly referred to as “unknown gods”: (1) In Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Medea while performing magical rites “prays to her unknown gods with an unknown charm” (14. 366 *ignotisque deos ignoto carmine adorat*; cf. Statius, *Ach.* 1. 139 *ignotis horrenda piacula divis*); see Norden (above, note 21) 116. (2) Less certain are the “libations to unknown [gods?]” (θεοῖσι γ’ ἐπ’ ἀγνωστοῖς ἐπιπλαῖν) mentioned in what appears to be a fragment of a late Hellenistic hymn to Apollo (P. Chicago inv. no. 101, col. vi 26 = P. Lit. Goodspeed 2 = Pack<sup>2</sup> 1620). Cf. E. J. Goodspeed, “Alexandrian Hexameter Fragments,” *JHS* 23 (1903) 237–47, at 244, with pl. x; J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford 1925) 85; van der Horst (above, note 20) 40.

<sup>151</sup> Mitford (above, note 93) nos. 127.36 f., 129.20 f., 131.25 f., 134.24, 135.29 f., 136.23, 137.24, 138.28 f., 139.27 f., 140.23, and 142.24 f. all offer the same invocation: ὑμεῖς οἱ ὧδε κάτω κείμενοι ἄωροι καὶ ἀνώνυμοι. On the status of ἄωροι, see Rohde (above, note 43) II 411–13, 424 f. (Eng. trans. 594 f., 603–05) and Garland (above, note 139) 77–88, esp. 86.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. van der Horst (above, note 20) 39 f.

<sup>153</sup> For a different emphasis, see van der Horst (above, note 20) 40: “The names of the χθόνιοι θεοί, the gods of the nether-world, had magical power in *malam partem*. To pronounce these names meant the provocation of dangerous powers.” He refers to Rohde (above, note 43) I 206–08 (Eng. trans. 159 f.).

the Greek concept of the dead and their dual power to bless and curse. The Dread Goddesses in their ambivalent role are best understood if we regard them as an extraordinary exemplification of the Greek belief in the opposite gifts of good or ill that may accrue from the dead. Magnified by myth and institutionalized by cult, the sum total of traditions and beliefs that surround the Erinyes and Eumenides constitutes the most complete and consistent record of this concept that has come down to us from antiquity.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Some of the ideas presented here I first developed in a lecture delivered at Wesleyan University in April 1987. I am grateful to the audience on that occasion for their interest and their comments, and to Maura Giles for improving this final product.

## Bride or Concubine? Iole and Heracles' Motives in the *Trachiniae*

CHARLES SEGAL

Heracles' command to Hyllus has been one of the most controversial passages in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* (1219-29):

HP.	τὴν Εὐρυτεῖαν οἶσθα δῆτα παρθένον;	
YL.	Ἰόλην ἔλεξας, ὥς γ' ἐπεικάζειν ἐμέ.	1220
HP.	ἔγνως, τοσοῦτον δὴ σ' ἐπισκῆπτω, τέκνον· ταύτην, ἐμοῦ θανόντος, εἴπερ εὐσεβεῖν βούλῃ, πατρῶων ὀρκίων μεμνημένος, προσθοῦ δάμαρτα, μηδ' ἀπιστήσης πατρί· μηδ' ἄλλος ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἐμοῖς πλευροῖς ὁμοῦ κλιθεῖσαν αὐτὴν ἀντὶ σοῦ λάβῃ ποτέ, ἀλλ' αὐτός, ὦ παῖ, τοῦτο κήδευσον λέχος. πεῖθου· τὸ γάρ τοι μέγ' ἀλά πιστεύσαντ' ἐμοὶ σμικροῖς ἀπιστεῖν τὴν πάρος συγχεῖ χάριν.	1225

Heracles: You know the maiden born of Eurytus?

Hyllus: You mean Iole, as I infer.

Heracles: Yes. This is what I enjoin upon you, my child. Take her as wife (προσθοῦ δάμαρτα) when I am dead, if you wish to be pious, remembering the oaths to your father, and do not disobey your father; and let no other man instead of you ever take one who has lain at my side, but do you yourself, my child, make this marriage bond (κήδευσον λέχος). Obey, for though you obey me in great matters, disobeying in small destroys the previous gratitude.

The essay of J. K. MacKinnon, "Heracles' Intention in his Second Request of Hyllus: *Trach.* 1216-51," *CQ* 21 (1971) 33-41, has been influential in the interpretation of this difficult scene, and deservedly so.<sup>1</sup> It makes a valuable contribution in removing false preconceptions about Heracles' motives, especially Bowra's galant "unsuspected trait of tenderness and justice in Heracles," and in underlining Heracles' egotism in requiring

<sup>1</sup> In his note on 1216 ff. M. Davies (ed.), *Sophocles. Trachiniae* (Oxford 1991) calls MacKinnon's article "an important study."



Hyllus to marry Iole.<sup>2</sup> In his view that Heracles intends only concubinage and not marriage for Iole, however, MacKinnon is incorrect; and precisely because this essay has been so influential and has now been endorsed by the most recent commentator on the play, it is important to have some of the counterarguments set forth.<sup>3</sup> A reexamination of this passage, furthermore, will bring out a few points about the precision of Sophocles' language that have been neglected.

MacKinnon himself acknowledges the greatest objection to his view, namely that Hyllus and Iole are to be the founders of the Dorian race; and he responsibly collects the evidence for this strong ancient tradition for their marriage (33). He goes on, however, to dismiss as "a pedantry which is alien at least to that Sophocles whom we possess" (33) the notion that Sophocles could be concerned with following this tradition. This is a purely subjective judgment; and in fact many scholars have pointed out how frequently the endings of Sophocles' extant plays refer to other parts of the literary tradition. The clearest instance is the end of *Philoctetes* (1440–44), with its allusion to the violence of Neoptolemus at the sack of Troy. The end of the *Electra* also refers to the future sufferings of the Atreid house (*El.* 1497–1500). The end of the *Coloneus* foreshadows the civil war between Oedipus' two sons in Thebes and therefore also the events of the *Antigone* (*OC* 1769–72), which have already been hinted at by a major scene in the play (*OC* 1181–1446).<sup>4</sup> A hint at Hyllus and Iole as the future founders of the Dorian race, therefore, is not out of keeping with "that Sophocles whom we possess."

To support his view, MacKinnon must deny the natural meaning of words for "bride" or "wife" throughout the play.<sup>5</sup> The phrase κήδευσον

<sup>2</sup> C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 142, criticized by MacKinnon on pp. 33 f., and see also p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Davies (above, note 1) on 1224 seems to accept MacKinnon's interpretation. His note to προσθοῦ δάμαρτα reads, "on the meaning of this phrase see MacKinnon." Davies acknowledges that *damar* "usually refers to a legitimate wife" but cites Eur. *Tro.* 658 ff. to show that it may be "used of a less formal relationship." MacKinnon's view has also been accepted by M. McCall, "The *Trachiniae*: Structure, Focus, and Heracles," *AJP* 93 (1972) 161 n. 20.

<sup>4</sup> This point is well made apropos of the marriage of Iole by P. E. Easterling, "The End of the *Trachiniae*," *ICS* 6 (1981) 69. See also *Ajax* 1171–79 and P. Burian, "Supplication and Hero Cult in Sophocles' *Ajax*," *GRBS* 13 (1972) 151–56. The endlessly discussed question of the relevance of the legend of Heracles' apotheosis to the play is probably the most controversial issue of extra-dramatic mythical references; see, inter alia, H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, Sather Classical Lectures 41 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971) 126–28; my "Sophocles' *Trachiniae*: Myth, Poetry, and Heroic Values," *YCS* 25 (1976) 138 ff. and my *Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles* (Cambridge, MA 1981) 99 ff., with the references there cited; P. E. Easterling (ed.), *Sophocles. Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1982) 9–12, 17–19; P. Holt, "The End of the *Trachiniae* and the Fate of Heracles," *JHS* 109 (1989) 69–80, especially 78 f.; Davies (above, note 1) xix–xxii.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. MacKinnon 37–39 apropos of 428 f., 545 f., 550 f., 857 f., 894 f., 1224, 1227. On *damar* and *gamos* and related terms, see my *Tragedy and Civilization* (previous note) 75 f. and "Time, Oracles, and Marriage in the *Trachiniae*," *Lexis* 9/10 (1992) 71 ff. (the latter forthcoming, in revised form, in my *Sophocles' Tragic World: Divinity, Nature, Society*, Harvard University Press).

λέχος is admittedly somewhat vague, but, as Easterling suggests apropos of *damar* in 1224, the vagueness is probably due to the heroic setting rather than to an allusion to concubinage.<sup>6</sup> MacKinnon is certainly correct to observe that κήδευσον by itself can mean "care for" or "tend," and that λέχος by itself can mean "concubine." But his divide-and-conquer approach is inappropriate when the two words are used together; and the meaning "tend" is far from the mark. Sophocles' other uses of the verb κηδεύειν in the sense of "tend" refer to the loving, intimate care of a close relation, as MacKinnon observes (37, citing *OT* 1323 and *OC* 750), which is certainly not the meaning here, particularly given the object, λέχος.<sup>7</sup>

The phrase κήδευσον λέχος, however, may be more appropriate to the context than has generally been appreciated, for the verb κηδεύειν suggests the formal alliance of marriage, particularly with a view to ties within the family, as numerous parallels from tragedy attest.<sup>8</sup> The noun κήδευμα, or the poetic plural common in tragedy, κηδεύματα, regularly refers to the bonds of the extended family created by the marriage.<sup>9</sup> Now, MacKinnon objects that the notion of an alliance by marriage cannot be relevant because Iole's "city is sacked and there can be no strong allies in her kinfolk" (38). But the term is indeed appropriate, first because it reminds us that Iole is no ordinary slave captive but the daughter of a royal house which, though destroyed, has a nobility and dignity worthy of Heracles' line (note τὴν Εὐρυτείαν . . . παρθένον 1219 and see my comment below on *gennaia* 309), and second because it points up that Hyllus is in fact continuing the family line and indeed (despite his repugnance) has an obligation to do so, even though Heracles emphasizes only obedience to a father and avoidance of a father's curse. Sophocles can, of course, count on his audience's knowledge of the importance of this lineage in the mythical tradition, even if Heracles himself has only a dim sense of the future. Even within the play, Heracles, for all his faults, is keenly aware of his extended family ties in this closing movement. When he recognizes the true import of the oracle, his first response is to summon all his sons (κάλει τὸ πᾶν μοι σπέρμα σὼν ὁμαιμόνων 1147, addressed to Hyllus) and his mother, Alcmena (1143–50). Of course there are bitter ironies here, for, as I have pointed out elsewhere, this little scene is a cruel parody of normal marital situations, where Heracles, who has so disrupted the sanctities of marriage in his own house,

<sup>6</sup> See Easterling, *Trachiniae* (above, note 4) on 1224: "Soph. uses δάμαρτα with a vagueness appropriate to the heroic setting, cf. 428 n."

<sup>7</sup> In Soph. *El.* 1141 κηδεύειν refers to the "care" for a family member in the funeral rites. For the meaning "care for" with intimacy and affection, see also Eur. *Ion* 734, *Or.* 791, 796, 883. This sense is extended to the city (*polis*) in Eur. *IT* 1212 and, ironically, in Soph. *Phaedra*, fr. 683. 4 Radt = 622. 4 Nauck.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Aesch. *PV* 890; Eur. *Hipp.* 634, *Hec.* 1202, *Ion* 47, *Phoen.* 347; see LSJ s.v. II. R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments*. Part 5, *The Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1892) ad loc. cites Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1307a37.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Eur. *Med.* 76, 367, 885 (κήδος); cf. Soph. *OT* 86 (κήδευμα).



takes on the roles both of the father of the groom and the father of the bride, whom he now disposes in marriage.<sup>10</sup>

As MacKinnon and others have observed, Heracles is less concerned with Iole than with his own egotistical possession of one who has "lain at his side" (1225–26).<sup>11</sup> The contrast between ἄλλος ἀνδρῶν in 1225 and αὐτός, ὃ παῖ in 1227, reinforcing ἀντὶ σοῦ in 1226, makes this emphasis clear. A woman won with so much effort and suffering is to remain within the family, and no "other" is to have her. Heracles' verb λάβῃ also suggests a certain brutality. He envisages Iole as a possession to be handed over between men. This harshness is especially strong if, with most recent editors, we accept Elmsley's emendation, the jussive subjunctive λάβῃ, in place of the manuscripts' optative of a future wish, λάβοι.<sup>12</sup> Yet Heracles' possessiveness need not exclude marriage; marriage is merely the form in which this possessiveness is to be expressed.<sup>13</sup> We must not be influenced by modern notions of marriage. Heracles' handing Iole over to Hyllus in marriage so that "no other man" may "take her" is in keeping with what we have seen of Heracles' view of his own marriage, which includes winning Deianeira (twice) as the prize of a battle (9–28, 497–530, 555–68) and asking his son to hand her over so that he can kill her with his own hands (1064–69). We should recall too that Iole is a secondary matter in Heracles' view. The lighting of his funeral pyre belongs to "the great things," *megala*, and obedience in the matter of Iole to "the small," *smikra* (1228–29). The injunction of marriage, therefore, need not imply a new sensitivity toward Iole, and it certainly expresses a total lack of sensitivity toward Hyllus. The marriage enables Sophocles to take account of the mythical tradition, to recognize the greatness of Heracles as a hero whose line will continue, and at the same time to show him continuing in his harsh and self-centered power, in this respect very much like Ajax. Heracles, as Kamerbeek remarks, is still "one for whom nothing is of any interest except his own glorious deeds, his own excessive desires and his divine descent."<sup>14</sup>

MacKinnon further objects that tragedy offers no clear parallel to a king or noble marrying a captive woman, who is of course a slave. Strictly speaking, this is true. But the *Trachiniae* plays so deliberately and

<sup>10</sup> On the ironies of Heracles' multiple roles here, see my "Time, Oracles, and Marriage" (above, note 5) 75 ff., 83 ff. Iole's situation also resembles that of the *epikleros*, the daughter-heiress in the absence of a son, who is given to the closest male kin upon the death of her father; see "Time, Oracles, and Marriage" 84.

<sup>11</sup> MacKinnon 34, 41.

<sup>12</sup> See Jebb and Easterling's commentaries, ad loc. J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles*. Part 2, *Trachiniae* (Leiden 1959) ad loc. is one of the few recent commentators or editors who would retain λάβοι.

<sup>13</sup> See W. Kraus, "Bemerkungen zum Text und Sinn in den 'Trachinierinnen'," WS 99 (1986) 108, apropos of 1225–27: "Das [κῆδευσον λέχος] brauchte nichts anderes zu heißen als 'schließe diese Ehe.' Aber κηδεύειν heißt doch eigentlich 'sich kümmern,' und αὐτός παῖ weniger zu 'heirate' als zu 'nimm dich an'."

<sup>14</sup> See Kamerbeek (above, note 12) on 1225–26 (p. 247).

intricately on inversions of marriage that one cannot safely apply generalizations from such unions elsewhere in tragedy.<sup>15</sup> In fact, Sophocles has gone out of his way to emphasize Iole's special status and her noble bearing (308–13):

O unfortunate one, who are you among these young women? Without a husband, or are you a mother? For by her bearing and stature (*physis*) she has no experience of all these things, but is of noble birth (πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φύσιν / πάντων ἄπειρος τῶνδε, γενναία δέ τις 308–09). Lichas, of what mortal is the stranger born, who her mother, who the father that sired her? Tell me, since in looking on her I pity her most among these (captive women) in so far as she alone also has the capacity to understand (her situation).

Deianeira's characterization of her rival-to-be here as *gennaia* is a brilliant Sophoclean touch that serves many functions. It obviously arouses pity for Iole, shows Deianeira's generosity, and prepares for the irony of her much less generous response when she discovers the true meaning of Iole's presence. But it may also look ahead to Iole's marriage with Hyllus at the end of the play. Iole is presented as definitely bridal material. In commanding Hyllus to marry her at the end, moreover, Heracles introduces her as "the girl born of Eurytus" (τὴν Εὐρυτεῖαν παρθένον 1219), thereby emphasizing both her marriageable status as a *parthenos* and her noble birth as the daughter of a royal house.

There are multiple ironies in Deianeira's emphasis on Iole's nubile status. Iole will not "marry" the man for whom she was intended, i.e., Heracles. There is a further level of irony for Deianeira, for the scene of her receiving Iole is an echo of the scene of Clytaemnestra confronting Cassandra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.<sup>16</sup> In the play's massive reversals of marriage rituals, however, this scene also places her in the role of the mother of the groom welcoming the new bride into the house. Heracles had intended Iole as a sort of second "bride" for himself, but in the course of events he turns her into the bride of his son. Thus, in marrying her to Hyllus at the end, he also makes Deianeira, posthumously, and with still crueler irony, the mother of the groom after all.

There are other reasons why Iole's slave status is not a serious barrier to legitimate marriage with Hyllus. Although Tecmessa in *Ajax* is never formally married to Ajax, it is clear that she has the respect of his family and the protection of Teucer, who also defends the dignity of his own birth

<sup>15</sup> On the inversions of marriage in *Trach.*, see R. Seaford, "Wedding Ritual and Textual Criticism in Sophocles' *Women of Trachis*," *Hermes* 114 (1986) 50–59 and "The Tragic Wedding," *JHS* 97 (1987) 106–30, especially 119–22; Segal, "Time, Oracles, and Marriage" (above, note 5) 63–92 *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> On the echo and its ramifications, see Segal, "Greek Myth as a Semiotic and Structural System and the Problem of Tragedy" (1983), in *Interpreting Greek Tragedy: Myth, Poetry, Text* (Ithaca, NY 1986) 48–74, especially 57 f.; also Seaford, "Tragic Wedding" (previous note) 127 f.

from a mother won in battle as a spear-prize (1299–1307). Polyxena, in Euripides' *Hecuba*, is acutely aware and ashamed of her servile status as a possession of her captor; but even this bleak play insists on her dignity, tragic though it is. Andromache, in her homonymous Euripidean play, likewise comes off as more dignified and nobler than the free, legitimate wife, Hermione. Whereas Euripides, however, dramatizes the ever-present degradation of the enslaved captive woman (especially in the *Hecuba* and *Trojan Women*), Sophocles (without denying her misery) keeps her nobility in the foreground.

For Iole's marriage to Hyllus there was the Homeric precedent of Patroclus' intention of making Briseis the "wedded wife" of Achilles (*Il.* 19. 297–99; cf. 9. 335 f.). MacKinnon cites the former passage, but attempts unconvincingly to explain it away (40 f.). His argumentation is circular: Iole, as a spear-captive, is a slave and so "there would surely need to be some clear indication in the passage that she is henceforth to be Hyllus' wife. This is impossible to find" (38). But in order to prove this "impossibility" he has to deny the natural meanings of προσθοῦ δάμαρτα and κήδευσον λέχος in 1224–27.

MacKinnon inadvertently destroys the basis for his position when he observes in the following paragraph (38 f.) that Hyllus would inherit Iole anyway in the normal course of events, as he is heir to all of his father's possessions. Why then should Heracles make a point of Hyllus' taking her as a concubine? MacKinnon's answer is that Hyllus would feel repugnance at cohabiting with the woman who caused his father's death and so "will eject her from his house" (39). But it requires a far-fetched and unjustified supplementing of Sophocles' text to make Hyllus think so far in advance; and it is out of keeping with Heracles' character to have him so attuned to Hyllus' sensibilities.<sup>17</sup> And even were this the reason, why would Sophocles lay so much stress on words that naturally evoke marriage? If keeping Iole in the house were Heracles' only concern, there would be other ways of conveying that idea without the use of such maritally colored terms. That Heracles is actually commanding marriage is a much more economical explanation, and more in keeping with the mythical tradition and the vocabulary for marriage in the rest of the play.

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<sup>17</sup> Contrast, for example, the explicitness about the delicacy of taking in a woman at the end of Euripides' *Alcestis*, where Euripides' Heracles, despite his little game, still acknowledges Admetus' reluctance (e.g. 1082 ff.).

Conjectures on *Oedipus at Colonus*

R. D. DAWE

Sophocles, like the honorand of this volume, seems to have suffered no diminution in his creative vigour with the passing of the years. But whereas the scholarship of Marcovich will be protected in the centuries to come by the permanence of the printed word, the text of Sophocles has had the benefit of no such safeguard. In this paper we shall take the play he wrote at around the age of ninety, and see if in a few places we may be able, by conjecture, to restore the pristine clarity of the poet's words to a text which has been dulled during the centuries of its transmission. In each case the excerpts are taken from the second Teubner edition of 1985.

450-54

ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὴ λάχῃσι τοῦδε συμμάχου,  
οὐδέ σφιν ἀρχῆς τῆσδε Καδμεΐας ποτὲ  
ὄνησις ἦξει· τοῦτ' ἐγώϊδα, τῆσδέ τε  
μαντεῖ' ἀκούων, συννοῶν τε τάξ' ἐμοῦ  
παλαίφαθ' ἄμοι Φοῖβος ἤνυσέν ποτε.

453 τε τάξ Heath: τά τ' ἐξ codd.

Heath's popular conjecture does not meet the main objection which has to be levelled against this passage as it is most commonly printed, namely that we have "*from me*" where the sense at first sight should be "*about me*"; hence Rauchenstein's τὰπ' ἐμοί, an unwelcome duplication of the ἐμοί which is to follow in the next line. The Oxford editors, Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, adopt the hob-nailed boot approach just as they do with the next crux we shall consider, and substitute Heimsoeth's συννοῶν τε θέσφατα. But I suspect the true answer is already implicit in Mazon's translation, which Kamerbeek cites at the end of his note ad loc., "et quand je songe en moi-même aux vieilles prophéties." We should write τε κάξ' ἐμοῦ, with Oedipus adding to the external evidence he has just heard from Ismene the internal evidence of his own knowledge. Kamerbeek points out that Dain's note and Mazon's translation are at variance with each other. Dain is correct as against Mazon in identifying these prophecies as the ones "concernant le parricide et l'inceste d'Œdipe." Only such an interpretation

is easily reconcilable with both ἦνυσεν and ποτε. Oedipus knows, from his own knowledge, that what Apollo predicts will happen.

## 503-05

- IS. ἀλλ' εἴμ' ἐγὼ τελοῦσα· τὸν τόπον δ' ἵνα  
 χρῇ στέμμ' ἐφευρεῖν, τοῦτο βούλομαι μαθεῖν.  
 XO. τοῦκείθεν ἄλλους, ὃ ξένη, τοῦδ'...

504 χρῇ στέμμ' Elmsley: χρῆσταί μ' vel sim. codd.

Ismene announces her intention of making the sacrifice according to the ritual which has been prescribed by the chorus in the dialogue at 465 ff. "Very well, I shall go and perform the rites; but the place where I must find the offering with which I shall garland them, that I desire to know." Such is the meaning of the text given above, based on what, from a purely technical point of view, one has to concede is a brilliant emendation by Elmsley. Jebb was not so easily seduced, and retained χρῆσταί, translating "but where I am to find the spot"—impossible, since ἵνα is never interrogative. The trouble with Elmsley's στέμμ' is that even if it could be used for an offering of which a woollen wreath forms only a part, honey and water being the items which the Eumenides will actually consume, the question "Where shall I find all the stuff which you tell me I shall need?" seems strangely literal and prosaic, almost in the manner of Euripides parodying the shortcomings of some myth or other. The Oxford editors show themselves aware of this, and once again march boldly in, this time printing Reiske's ὑπουργεῖν for ἐφευρεῖν. But far more likely would be ἀφιεροῦν, "consecrate," with τοῦτο adjusted to ταῦτα, an alteration which will also obviate the unpleasant equation τοῦτο = τόπον. A virtually identical corruption has occurred at *El.* 278: ἱεροῦς' Seyffert for the manuscripts' εὔροῦς'.

## 720-21

- ὃ πλεῖστ' ἐπαίνους εὐλογούμενον πέδον,  
 νῦν σὸν τὰ λαμπρὰ ταῦτα δὴ κραίνειν ἔπη.

721 σὸν et κραίνειν Nauck: σοι et φαίνειν codd. | δὴ L: δεῖ rell.

The principal difficulty resides in the apparent use of δεῖ with the dative σοι, a use so suspect<sup>1</sup> as to lead editors to accept L's δὴ instead, which in turn necessitates some such further alteration as Nauck's σόν. So much for grammar; but what of the tone of the whole? Antigone's words follow a choral ode in praise of Athens, and her first line clearly indicates that that

<sup>1</sup> At Eur. *Hipp.* 940, the only example that editors can quote from tragedy, the nuance is presumably not "the gods will have to add another land" but "there will be a need for the gods to add another land."



praise has not been lost on her. If she now follows 720 with a line saying, as Jebb puts it, "now is it for thee to make those bright praises seen in deeds!" she might seem to be casting doubt on the validity of those praises, as if all that talk of an ἐγγέων φόβημα δαΐων (699) were just that, talk. In the absence of some strengthening particle we cannot interpret as "now (and not some hours or days hence) is it for thee . . ." On the other hand a sentence tacitly acknowledging the truth of the ode of praise, and asking, rather like those prayers, "if ever you helped me in the past, help me now," for another manifestation of Athenian merit, would be ideal. So write νῦν σ' αὖ τὰ λαμπρὰ ταῦτα δεῖ φαίνειν ἔπη. Nauck's other emendation, κραίνειν, never strictly necessary, is rendered less necessary still once Athens's help on this occasion is seen as another item in the series of excellences on which the chorus have just been dwelling.

## 1224–27

μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νι-  
καῖ λόγον· τὸ δ', ἐπεὶ φανῇ,  
βῆναι κεῖς' ὁπόθεν περ ἦ-  
κει πολὺ δεύτερον ὥς τάχιστα.

1226 κεῖς' ὁπόθεν Blaydes: κάκεῖθεν ὅθεν KZnZo: κεῖθεν ὅθεν tell.

The definite article in τὸν ἅπαντα λόγον is hard to justify, and the next Teubner edition will, following Blaydes's τιν' ἅπαντα, print τινὰ πάντα: not the whole λόγος, but every λόγος, for which the most apt translation might be, in the current term, "scenario." But the real problem in these lines is the famous crux κεῖθεν ὅθεν. There is no need to rehearse former discussions. The plain fact is that κεῖθεν cannot possibly mean "to that place," and no convincing parallel to the alleged attraction of ending to the following ὅθεν can be found. Blaydes's κεῖς' ὁπόθεν has been the most popular solution to date: "to that place, wherever it is that he has come from." The precision imparted by περ, "to the very same place," does not sit well alongside the indefinite ὁπόθεν, which cannot be a mere synonym of ὅθεν; and one wonders why the required straightforward "go to that place" should ever have been altered to "go from that place."

Perfect sense would be given by a smaller change: βῆναι κεύθε' ὅθεν περ ἦκει. Κεύθεα stands in contrast to φανῇ, the word chosen by Sophocles here in preference to the φυῇ which a close adherence to the Theognidean model (425 ff.) would have suggested, and which Mähly in fact conjectured. In a way κεύθεα corresponds with the ἄδηλα and κρύπτεται in Ai. 647: φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται. The idea that the life-force not only goes to the Underworld after death but also comes from there at birth is echoed by Plato's words (*Phaedo* 70c–d): σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τηιδέ πηι, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἄιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις



λόγος οὖ μὲνήμεθα, ὥς εἰσὶν ἐνθὲνδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνῶνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. . . οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. My colleague Nicholas Denyer reminds me too of a passage from the Seventh Letter, where soon after mention of "old and holy stories" the word νοστήσαντι, "returning," is used of the ψυχή of some one in connection with his life ὑπὸ γῆς (335c). If returning, then it is from those hidden depths that the life-force of men arises. The fitness of such a doctrine in *Oedipus at Colonus* may be judged from the mention of the μεγάλαιν θεαῖν at 683 and from 1050 ff. Although there is no reason why the chorus's reflections here should have anything other than a universal applicability, those reflections are prompted by the special case of Oedipus, and the overtones of the word κεύθεα fit very well with what will in the end prove to be his fate; cf. ἄσκοποι δὲ πλάκες ἔμαρψαν / ἐν ἀφανεῖ τινι μόρῳ φερόμενον (1681 f.); ὦ τὸν αἰὲ κατὰ γῆς σκότον εἵμενος (1701); κοῖταν δ' ἔχει / νέρθεν εὐσκίαστον αἰὲν (1706 f.). Compare too Oedipus's own use of the word κέκευθε at 1523.

## 1568–78

ὦ χθόνιαί θεαί, σῶμά τ' ἀνικάτου	
θηρὸς ὃν ἐν πύλαισι	
ταῖσι πολυξένοις	1570
εὐνάσθαι κνυζεῖσθαι τ' ἐξ ἄντρων	
ἀδάματον φύλακα παρ' Αἴδαι	
λόγος αἰὲν ἔχει·	
τόν, ὦ Γᾶς παῖ καὶ	
Ταρτάρου, κατεύχομαι	1575
ἐν καθαρῷ βῆναι	
ὀρμωμένῳ νερτέρας	
τῷ ξένῳ νεκρῶν πλάκας·	
σέ τοι κικλήσκω τὸν αἰένυπνον.	

1570 ταῖσι Bergk: φασὶ codd. || 1574 τὸν Hermann: ὃν codd.

The most valuable service to Sophoclean scholarship in recent years has been the one provided, with the least imaginable publicity, by Dr. van Paassen of Amsterdam: an astonishingly full list of all the conjectures ever put forward on the plays. Yet here, just for once, something of real value has escaped the trawl. It is Blaydes's λόχον for λόγος in 1573, recorded in his edition of 1859. All that remains to be done is to tidy up some of the peripheral damage which the corruption has brought in its train. But to begin with λόχον itself: Λόγος αἰὲν ἔχει means that there is a perpetual legend to the effect that Cerberus makes his bed and snuffles at the portals of Hades. The perpetuity of the legend is however of minimal importance compared with the constancy of Cerberus's watch, and the fact that his snuffling emanates from the cave is a pictorial detail which again is of secondary importance compared with the idea that the cave is the place

where he lies in wait, and from which he will, when he feels like it, issue forth. It is not for nothing that the poet has written ἐξ ἄντρων and not ἐν ἄντροις; and not for nothing that the eternal nature of Cerberus's watch is to be countered by τὸν αἰένυπνον (1578).

Blaydes's emendation confers another great benefit on the text of this antistrophe. Bergk's ταῖσι for φασὶ in 1570, substituting as it does a mere definite article as if the scribes had found the word baffling, is incredible in itself, and incredible too is the explanation that φασὶ is a dislodged gloss on the λόγος αἰὲν ἔχει three lines further on. Φασὶ is sound.

All that remains then in the immediate vicinity is first to alter ἔχει to ἔχειν, part of the *oratio obliqua* introduced by φασί (this in turn will remove any metrical argument for accepting Hermann's τόν for ὄν in the next line—though stylistically the emendation remains attractive and the next Teubner text will in fact retain it); and secondly to link ἔχειν to the two infinitives εὐνᾶσθαι and κνυζεῖσθαι by writing either ἐξ ἄντρων <τ'> or ἔκ τ' ἄντρων.

Finally, and on a separate point, since what the chorus are praying for is that Cerberus will stay in the clear for the traveller to the Underworld, the mildest alteration to the phrase ἐν καθαρῳ βῆναι, if alteration is needed, as many editors have insisted it is, would be ἐν καθαρῳ μεῖναι.

1695-97

XO.

οὐ-

τοι κατάμεπτ' ἔβητον.

AN.

πόθος <-> καὶ κακῶν ἄρ' ἦν τις.

Here is another difficult appearance of βαίνω, and again the right answer may have been found by Blaydes in his edition of 1859: ἔτλητον, a conjecture repeated by Mähly in 1868. This at any rate would approach the sense rightly implied by Jebb's translation: "Ye have so fared that ye should not repine." However the purpose of the present note is not to extol the merits of Blaydes, but to warn against excessive reliance being placed on the supplement <τοι> after πόθος, the conjecture of Hartung accepted by Jebb, Pearson, and the current Oxford text. Kamerbeek gives it the more cautious welcome of "not unsatisfactory." It appears however from the list of tragic examples given by Denniston on page 555 of his *Greek Particles* that although τᾶρα is frequent, τοι and ἄρα *divisim* does not occur.

What of the tone of Antigone's reply? Should she be echoing the τοι in the chorus's οὐτοι? It is at least possible that to their words, which amount to "you haven't done so badly, you know," she replies with a more direct counter, "on the other hand . . .," i.e. <δ' αὖ>.

\* \* \*

*Oedipus at Colonus* contains 1779 lines. The average length of the other plays is 1427. It is at least possible that some of the disparity originates from interpolation by people who wished to develop yet further the political, patriotic, and religious aspects of the play. To reduce *OC* to the Sophoclean average would require the deletion of 352 lines—a prospect to daunt even the boldest critic. But we may make a more modest start by looking at two more passages, this time printed, to assist clarity, from the third, not second, Teubner edition.

## 1018–35

KP.	τί δῆτ' ἀμαυρῶι φωτὶ προστάσσεις ποεῖν;	
ΘΗ.	ὁδοῦ κατάρχειν τῆς ἐκεῖ, πομπὸν δέ μοι χωρεῖν, ἴν'· εἰ μὲν ἐν τόποισι τοῖσδ' ἔχεις	1020
	τὰς παῖδας ἡμῖν, αὐτὸς ἐνδείξεις ἐμοί. .....	
	εἰ δ' ἐγκρατεῖς φεύγουσιν, οὐδὲν δεῖ πονεῖν· ἄλλοι γὰρ οἱ σπεύσοντες, οὓς οὐ μὴ ποτε χώρας φυγόντες τῆσδ' ἐπεύξωνται θεοῖς. ἀλλ' ἐξυφηγοῦ· γνῶθι δ' ὡς ἔχων ἔχηι.	1025
	[καί σ' εἶλε θηρῶνθ' ἡ τύχη· τὰ γὰρ δόλωι τῶι μὴ δικαίῳι κτήματ' οὐχὶ σώζεταιαι. κοῦκ ἄλλον ἔξεις εἰς τόδ'· ὡς ἔξιδά σε οὐ ψιλὸν οὐδ' ἄσκειον ἐς τοσὴνδ' ὕβριν ἤκοντα τόλμης τῆς παρεστῶσης τανῦν, ἀλλ' ἔσθ' ὅτῳ σὺ πιστὸς ὦν ἔδρας τάδε. ἂ δεῖ μ' ἀθρῆσαι, μὴδὲ τήνδε τὴν πόλιν ἐνὸς ποιῆσαι φωτὸς ἀσθενεστέραν. νοεῖς τι τούτων, ἢ μάτην τὰ νῦν τέ σοι δοκεῖ λελέχθαι χῶτε ταῦτ' ἐμηχανῶ.]	1030 1035

1019 δέ μοι Heath: δέ με codd. || 1021 ἡμῖν Elmsley: ἡμῶν codd.: οἶμον anon. | ἐνδείξεις Mähly: ἐκδ- codd. | ἐμοί] ὅπου Halbertsma | post hunc versum lacunam indicavit Dawe || 1022 σφ' ἄγουσι Otto | οὐ με δεῖ Halbertsma || 1023 πολλοὶ seu ἄλλις Nauck | σπεύδοντες codd.: corr. Mekler: futurum iam desideraverat Blaydes

The apparatus given above is abbreviated, and we may skim rapidly through the early part of our passage, full of difficulties though it is. Heath's δέ μοι is accepted to avoid the inelegance of πομπὸν δέ με (or δ' ἐμέ) as a paratactic expression of a subordinate thought, exceedingly harsh following τί προστάσσεις ποεῖν; In 1021 ἐνδείξεις is the proper compound for "putting the finger on" some one: Ἐκδείξεις would mean "display." Thereafter a lacuna is suggested by two things: First, we need a brief statement of what Theseus will do if he does find the kidnappers *in situ*; second, ἐγκρατεῖς can scarcely mean "the people holding them captive" even with Housman's dubious addition of the article, οὐγκρατεῖς. But it can stand very well as "having power over them" as opposed to

"surrendering power over them," part of the sense of the putative lacuna. As for 1023, the apparatus speaks for itself.

But what of the rest? In skeletal form the speech develops as follows: (1) Lead the way. (2) <I shall deal with the villains if I find them still there.> Others will, if they have fled with the girls in their power. (3) Lead the way, and recognise that the game is up. (4) Fortune has caught you, the hunter. (5) Gains made by trickery are not permanent. (6) You will have no one else for this purpose. (7) I make this remark because I'm sure you would not have attempted this enterprise alone. (8) Which is something I must consider, and not make the city weaker than one man. (9) Do you think I am bluffing, either now or then?

This is an astonishing farrago. At first all is well, for the repetition of (1) in (3) "lead the way" can be accepted as increasing the sense of urgency; and with our proposed lacuna (3) will in any case stand further from (1) than it does at present. (4) Why fortune? The idea has minimal relevance to the story told. (5) Why trickery? Creon was acting not by trickery but by force. (6) What purpose? (7) The idea that Creon could not have been acting alone does not need to be spelled out now: It has already been taken for granted in ἐγκρατεῖς above. (8) A total *non sequitur*. "I have to bear your numbers in mind, and not make this city weaker than a single individual." (9) Rodomontade, of only the sketchiest relevance.

The only clean solution to all these problems, which are problems not of textual corruption but of thought, is excision.

# 1139-49

ΘΗ.	οὐτ' εἴ τι μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἔθου πλέον, τέκνοισι τερφθεῖς τοῖσδε, θαυμάσας ἔχω, οὐδ' εἰ πρὸ τοῦμοῦ προύλαβες τὰ τῶνδ' ἔπη. [βάρος γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτων ἔχει.] οὐ γὰρ λόγοισι τὸν βίον σπουδάζομεν λαμπρὸν ποιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς δρωμένοις. [δείκνυμι δ' ὧν γὰρ ὤμοσ' οὐκ ἐψευσάμην οὐδὲν σε, πρέσβυ· τάσδε γὰρ πάρειμ' ἄγων ζώσας, ἀκραίφνηις τῶν κατηπειλημένων.] χῶπως μὲν ἄγων ἡιρέθη, τί δεῖ μάτην κομπεῖν, ἃ γ' εἴσηι καὶ τὸς ἐκ τούτων ξυνών;	1140
		1145

1141 οὐτ' Elmsley || 1142 del. Lazarewicz || 1148 ἀγὼν οὗτος codd.: corr.  
Heath | vv. 1148 sq. ante v. 1143 trai. Tournier

"Es scheint mir undenkbar, dass dieser nüchterne und unpassende Vers [1142] von Sophokles herrühre" commented Nauck, and the verse was condemned by Mekler too. If we look for more specific arguments, βάρος seems too strong a word for the context, whether taken as anger or depression of spirits. The correct emotional tone has already been given by θαυμάσας ἔχω. Secondly, the reference of τούτων after τῶνδε in the

preceding line is none too clear. Would Theseus really count Oedipus's address to his children and their words to him as two separate things, justifying a plural? Alternatively, would he, in his dismissal of βάρος, really treat it as something which might have emanated from, or be caused by the children? But very likely the interpolator did mean τούτων to refer to the children; cf. ἐκ τούτων at 1149, which unquestionably does so refer. He may also have thought that the γάρ sentence (1143) had to explain θαυμάσας ἔχω, and that to introduce it something stronger than surprise was required. But the sentence can very well be taken as developing the idea inherent in τοῦμοῦ; indeed one might go so far as to say that the choice of τοῦμοῦ in preference to something more obvious meaning "what I have to say myself" is best explained on precisely those lines.

But, as with the previous passage discussed, what follows is a *non sequitur*, or at any rate a *vix sequitur*. What Theseus should be doing is citing some previous episode to throw light on the present case: "I give you evidence to prove that I am not the man to win glory by self-praise, hence I shall not be doing it now." If Theseus uses the present case as proof, his argument becomes transparently circular, quite apart from the fact that having said he will not use λόγοι to glorify himself he immediately does precisely that. There is also a technical argument, by no means conclusive, but carrying some weight, to support the idea that 1145–47 are intrusive. The καί concealed in ἥπῳ (1148) gives a perfect connection with 1144 as we pass immediately from the general τοῖς δρωμένοις to the specifics of the recent struggle. If 1148 had been intended to follow 1147, ὅπως δέ would have been the likelier mode of progression.

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## Euripides Outside Athens: A Speculative Note

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Oliver Taplin<sup>1</sup> has recently taken a fresh and challenging look at what we can learn from vase paintings about responses to the theatre in the Greek cities of South Italy and Sicily from the fifth to the third centuries B.C. It is not a new idea, of course, that other cities were powerfully attracted by the drama, as by the visual art, of Athens, but what needs to be stressed, as Taplin rightly claims, is the fact that the process begins so early, spreads so widely and involves both tragedy and comedy.

My concern in this paper is with the spread of tragedy outside Athens—not only in the West—in the fifth century. I want to suggest that in addition to the material souvenirs of performances, especially painted pottery, and to the inscriptions relating to city and deme festivals at Athens, which have helped us understand how a “classic” repertoire developed,<sup>2</sup> there is also more to be gathered from the literary sources. It is not just a matter of evaluating what has been transmitted, and often enough distorted, by the ancient biographical and critical traditions; the texts of the plays themselves also have something to offer.

As Taplin notes,<sup>3</sup> theatrical connexions between Syracuse and related cities on the one hand and Athens on the other started early; it is not out of the question that Aeschylus’ *Women of Aetna* was produced for performance at Aetna as early as 476/5, and there is every reason to think that the links continued during Aeschylus’ lifetime (the ancient *Life* [68] says he put on a successful revival of *Persians* in Sicily, and we know that he was at Gela at the time of his death in 456). It would certainly be very odd if there was then a complete break in dramatic contacts between the Sicilian cities and Athens until the tyrant Dionysius won the prize for tragedy at the Athenian Lenaea in 368. One text that can help to fill the gap

<sup>1</sup> O. Taplin, *Comic Angels* (Oxford 1993). Cf. C. W. Dearden, “Fourth-Century Tragedy in Sicily: Athenian or Sicilian?” in J.-P. Descoeudres (ed.), *Greek Colonists and Native Populations* (Oxford 1990) 231–33.

<sup>2</sup> On the idea of a repertoire, cf. my article, “The End of an Era? Tragedy in the Early Fourth Century,” in A. H. Sommerstein et al. (eds.), *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis* (Bari 1993) 559–69.

<sup>3</sup> Taplin (above, note 1) 2; cf. M. Griffith, “Aeschylus, Sicily and Prometheus,” in R. D. Dawe et al. (eds.), *Dionysiaca* (Cambridge 1978) 105–06.



is Euripides' *Trojan Women*, produced at Athens in 415. When the Chorus of that play include Sicilian and South Italian places in the list of destinations to which they can imagine going as captives, the best explanation for the inclusion of these localities is that the play was likely to be performed there. This would be in the same spirit as many references in the lyric poets, whose choral songs often have much to say—and in very positive terms—about the expected place or places of performance.<sup>4</sup> And it would work in exactly the same way as the many passages in tragedy which praise Athens and which critics have always taken as designed to gratify the original audience.<sup>5</sup>

Scholars have long been perplexed by *Troades* 187 ff., which goes out of its way to make pointed reference, favourable or unfavourable, to a number of Greek locations, some of them places that Trojan captives in the heroic age might plausibly name, and others distinctly surprising, though mentioned allusively enough to avoid seeming glaringly anachronistic.<sup>6</sup> Looked at with performance in mind the whole passage makes good sense, and the fact that it is sung by the Chorus is crucial to our understanding of its function.

187–89:        τίς μ' Ἀργείων ἢ Φθιωτᾶν  
                  ἢ νησαίαν ἄξει χώραν  
                  δύστανον πόρσω Τροίᾳ;

Who will take me to the land of the Argives or the Phthians or to an island  
land far from Troy in my misery?

This accords with the dramatic situation of the Trojan women and is too general to suggest any specific contemporary allusion (cf. 30 f., 233 f., 242 f., 1092 f.).

202–06:        μόχθους <δ'> ἔξω κρείσσους,  
                  ἢ λέκτροις πλαθεῖς Ἑλλάνων  
                  ...  
                  ἢ Πειρήνας ὑδρευομένα  
                  πρόσπολος οἰκτρὰ σεμνῶν ὑδάτων.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. e.g. the opening of Pindar, *O.* 13 or *P.* 2. More examples in E. Thummer, *Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte I* (Heidelberg 1968), chapter 4. Eric Handley draws my attention to J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford 1925) 138, a Hellenistic paean so composed as to be adaptable to whichever city the occasion required.

<sup>5</sup> The most famous passage in extant Euripides is *Medea* 824–45. Cf. more generally G. Grossmann, *Promethie und Orestie* (Heidelberg 1970) 127–43.

<sup>6</sup> The best discussion is by H. D. Westlake, "Euripides, *Troades* 205–229," *Mnemosyne* 6 (1953) 181–91. K. H. Lee's edition of *Troades* (London 1976) uses the term "glaring anachronism" (101), but this does not take account of the fact that Thurii is not actually named at 224–29. See now W. Poole, "Euripides and Sparta," in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *The Shadow of Sparta* (London 1994) 1–3.

I shall have greater tribulations (*sc.* when I leave Troy), being taken to the beds of Greeks . . . or drawing water as a wretched servant from the holy fountain of Peirene (*sc.* at Corinth).

The mention of Peirene hardly does more than evoke a famous Greek landmark, but more pointed allusions now follow.

207–13: τὰν κλεινὰν εἴθ' ἔλθοιμεν  
Θησέως εὐδαίμονα χώραν.  
μὴ γὰρ δὴ δῖναν γ' Εὐρώτα  
τὰν <τ'> ἐχθίσταν θεράπηναν Ἐλένας,  
ἔνθ' ἀντάσω Μενέλαϊ δούλα,  
τῷ τὰς Τροίας πορθητῷ.

May we go to the famous, fortunate land of Theseus! Not indeed to the eddying waters of the Eurotas and the hated dwelling place of Helen, where as a slave I shall meet Menelaus, destroyer of Troy.

Sparta as object of Trojan hatred suits the dramatic context, but the opposition Athens/Sparta implies the point of view of the Athenian audience.

214–19: τὰν Πηνειοῦ σεμνὰν χώραν,  
κρηπιδ' Οὐλύμπου καλλίσταν,  
ὄλβωι βρίθειν φάμαν ἤκουσ'  
εὐθαλεῖ τ' εὐκαρπείαι.  
τὰ δὲ δευτέρᾳ μοι μετὰ τὰν ἱερὰν  
Θησέως ζαθέαν ἐλθεῖν χώραν.

I have heard that the holy land of the Peneus, the very beautiful foundation of Olympus, is rich in prosperity and abundant fruitfulness; this is best for me after going to Theseus' sacred, holy land (*sc.* if I don't go to Athens).

Mention of such landmarks as the river Peneus and Mt. Olympus would not be inappropriate for Trojan captives expecting to be allocated to victorious Greeks from Thessaly (*cf.* Φθιωτῶν at 187 and Hecuba's references to Thessaly and Phthia at 242–43). But the laudatory tone is no more suitable for the Trojan women here than it is in the praise of Athens, and the reference to Olympus is similar to that at *Bacchae* 409–11 (οὐδ' ἄ καλλιστευομένα / Πιερίᾳ, μούσειος ἔδρα, / σεμνὰ κλειτὺς Ὀλύμπου, “where is the very beautiful Pieria, home of the Muses, the sacred slope of Olympus”), which critics have taken as meant to gratify a potential Macedonian audience.<sup>7</sup> The river Peneus, though, seems to imply a reference to the area south of Mt. Olympus, and we should perhaps be thinking of Euripides' alleged Magnesians connexions. The reference in the

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. J. Roux, *Euripide. Les Bacchantes* I (Paris 1970) 6–7 and II (1972) 390; N. G. L. Hammond in Hammond and Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* II (Oxford 1979) 149–50. A performance under the patronage of Archelaus (at Dion?) is not unlikely, despite the reservations of E. R. Dodds, *Euripides. Bacchae*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1960) xxxix–xl.

ancient *Life* to Euripides as *proxenos* of the Magnesians looks like one of the few possibly authentic scraps of information among the fictional constructions identified by scholars.<sup>8</sup> It would certainly be normal for persons of Euripides' social standing to have links outside Athens through *xenos* and *proxenos* networks, as Gabriel Herman's work has shown,<sup>9</sup> and there is no need to regard such connexions as unlikely, for Euripides any more than for Pindar.

220-29: καὶ τὰν Αἰτναίαν Ἥφαιστου  
Φοινίκας ἀντήρη χώραν,  
Σικελῶν ὄρεων ματέρ', ἀκούω  
καρύσσεσθαι στεφάνοις ἀρετᾶς,  
τὰν τ' ἀγχιστεύουσιν γᾶν  
† Ἴονίῳ ναύται πόντῳ,  
ἂν ὑγραίνει καλλιστεύων  
ὁ ξανθὸν χαίταν πυρσαίνων  
Κράθις ζαθέαις παγαῖσι τρέφων  
εὐανδρόν τ' ὀλβίζων γᾶν.

And I hear that the Aetnaean land of Hephaestus opposite Phoinike, mother of Sicilian mountains, is proclaimed as winning wreaths for valour. (And I hear the same of) the land next to the Ionian Sea . . . [text uncertain],<sup>10</sup> which is watered by the beautiful Crathis, the river that makes hair golden, nourishing the land with its holy streams and making it prosperous and rich in men.

The first of these sentences must refer to Sicily, but the phrasing "Aetnaean" and "opposite Phoinike," i.e. (presumably) Carthage,<sup>11</sup> leaves unclear exactly where is intended. The second reference is more precise: The river Crathis locates it as Thurii on the Tarentine gulf, as Athenian a place as one could expect to find outside Attica, and a very appropriate place for the performance of an Athenian tragedy.<sup>12</sup>

If Euripides was composing the play with future performances in mind at some Sicilian location and at Thurii the references are entirely understandable, far more so than if we have to take this stanza as referring

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the ancient *Life* 1 and P. T. Stevens, "Euripides and the Athenians," *JHS* 76 (1956) 90–91. M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London 1981) 91–93 suggests that the story "could easily have originated from literal interpretation of a metaphorical expression of friendship," but there is no reason in principle why a few details of actual biographical tradition should not have survived.

<sup>9</sup> G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987), esp. chapter 5.

<sup>10</sup> No convincing emendation has been suggested for line 225, but the overall point is clear enough.

<sup>11</sup> Phoenicia itself seems too far away; cf. Westlake (above, note 6) 183 on contemporary Athenian interest in the geography of Sicily in relation to Libya. As to the most likely Sicilian venue, John Graham points out to me that any of the three Ionian cities under Mt. Etna, viz. Leontini, Naxos or Catane, would be possible candidates.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Taplin (above, note 1) 14–16.

in some specifically political way to the proposed Sicilian expedition.<sup>13</sup> Of course Athens was buzzing with talk of Sicily at the time (cf. Thucydides 6. 24–26), and a general topical reference would be quite compatible with the interpretation suggested here. We should not be put off by the thought that Athenian relations with Sicily were soon to be hostile; not all Sicilian cities regarded the Athenians as potential enemies, and Taplin has shown that despite all the tensions the period between 415 and 390 was a time of great Athenian artistic and dramatic influence in the area.<sup>14</sup> If Euripides could be sent as an ambassador to the Syracusans (after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition?: Ar. *Rhet.* 1384b16–17, with schol.) the implication might be that his work was admired by the Syracusans, as the famous anecdote recorded by Satyrus and Plutarch certainly suggests.<sup>15</sup>

There is a comparable passage in *Hecuba* (444–83), where the Trojan women imagine going to a “Dorian land,” to Phthia, “where men say the father of beautiful waters, Apidanus, enriches the plains” (451–54), to Delos, where they think of themselves joining local girls in the worship of Artemis (455–65), and to Athens, where they look forward to decorating the robe for Athena (466–74). The least to be got out of this passage would be a complimentary reference to Athens for the benefit of the Athenian audience, and agreeable associations with other places to point up the superiority of the Greek world. But it is worth taking a closer look at some of the detail.

The language of the passage just quoted from *Hecuba* is rather closely echoed in the Second Stasimon of *Bacchae* (560–75), where most critics have seen a clear compliment to Euripides’ Macedonian patrons.<sup>16</sup> The maenads here are calling Dionysus to witness what Pentheus is doing to his devotees, and in the context it is perfectly appropriate for them to mention places where the god is likely to be, such as Nysa, Parnassus or Olympus (556–64), but their elaborate evocation of Pieria and the Macedonian rivers suggests that there is a more pointed allusion to be understood:

565–75:                    μάκαρ ὦ Πιερία,  
                                 σέβεται σ’ Εὐβίος, ἥξει  
                                 τε χορεύων ἅμα βακχεύ-  
                                 μασι, τόν τ’ ὠκυρόαν

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Westlake (above, note 6) and the commentaries of Lee (above, note 6), W. Biehl (Heidelberg 1989) and S. A. Barlow (Warminster 1986) for a review of interpretations, none of them persuasive.

<sup>14</sup> Taplin (above, note 1) 97–99.

<sup>15</sup> Athenian captives released on the strength of their capacity to teach Euripidean lyrics to the sons of the Syracusans: Satyrus, *Life of Euripides* fr. 39 XIX 1–10; Plutarch, *Nicias* 29. On the embassy to Syracuse, see Stevens (above, note 8) 91. Satyrus also makes one of the speakers remark that the Athenians were outdone by the Macedonians and Sicilians in their recognition of the greatness of Euripides. On Satyrus, see M. R. Lefkowitz, “Satyrus the Historian,” in *Atti del XVII Congresso di Papirologia* (Naples 1984) 339–43.

<sup>16</sup> So Roux ad loc.; Dodds on 568–75; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus* (Cambridge 1948) 81–82.

διαβάς Ἀξιὸν εἰλισ-  
 σομένας μαινάδας ἄξει  
 Λυδῖαν τε τὸν εὐδαιμονίας βροτοῖς  
 ὀλβοδόταν πατέρ', ὃν ἔκλυον  
 εὐῖππον χώραν ὕδασιν  
 καλλίστοισι λιπαίνειν.

571–72 εὐδαιμονίας Burges: τᾶς εὐδαιμονίας codd. || 573 πατέρ', ὃν Ferrari: πατέρα τε τὸν codd.

O blessed Pieria, Euioi reveres you and will come to celebrate you in the dance with his revelry. Bringing his whirling maenads he will cross the swift-flowing Axius and the Lydias, the prosperity-giving father of happiness to mortals, who, as I have heard, enriches the land with his lovely waters and makes it famed for horses.

This is Diggle's text,<sup>17</sup> which adopts F. Ferrari's neat emendation of the problematic line 573.<sup>18</sup> On this reading the stanza deals with only two rivers, the Axius and the Lydias, and not also with an unnamed third, the "father," who enriches the land and makes it good for horses. The language of 574–75 recalls the description of the Apidanus at *Hec.* 451–54, but this river would be too far to the south to suit the context, and Ferrari's reading at 573 is very attractive. At all events there is clear insistence on the Macedonian location, and all the elements in the description are matched by the passages from *Trojan Women* and *Hecuba* that we have been considering. There seems almost to be a typology of encomiastic themes: the abundance and prosperity of the land and the fertilising effect of rivers with their beautiful waters, to which the motif "as I hear tell" gives further emphasis. Here are the references:

Prosperity: *Tro.* 209 εὐδαίμονα χώραν; *Tro.* 216–17 ὀλβωι βρίθειν κτλ.; *Ba.* 572–73 τὸν εὐδαιμονίας βροτοῖς ὀλβοδόταν πατέρ'; cf. *Med.* 824 Ἐρεχθεῖδαι . . . ὀλβιοι.

Rivers fertilising: *Tro.* 228–29 τρέφων εὐανδρόν τ' ὀλβίζων γᾶν; *Hec.* 454, *Ba.* 575 λιπαίνειν.

"Most beautiful" (whether waters or other features): *Tro.* 226 καλλιστεῶν (the river Crathis); *Hec.* 452 καλλίστων ὕδάτων; *Ba.* 574–75 ὕδασι καλλίστοισι; cf. *Med.* 835 τοῦ καλλινάου τ' ἐπὶ Κηφισοῦ ῥοαῖς. *Tro.* 215 κρηπιδ' Οὐλύμπου καλλίσταν; *Ba.* 409–10 ἃ καλλιστευομένα Πιερία, μούσειος ἔδρα κτλ.

"As I hear": *Tro.* 216, 222 ἤκουσ', ἀκούω; *Hec.* 454 φασίν; *Ba.* 573 ἔκλυον; cf. *Med.* 831 λέγουσι.

<sup>17</sup> Euripidis *Fabulae* III (Oxford 1994).

<sup>18</sup> F. Ferrari, "In margine alle *Baccanti*," *SCO* 35 (1985) 48–49.



These references are quite different from the evocation of places in escape odes like the one at *Hipp.* 732–51, where the emphasis is on the remoteness or other-worldliness of the locations. It may be that in giving appropriate mention to a fairly limited number of places that were actual or possible venues for his plays Euripides had found a way of linking his patrons (individuals or communities) outside Athens with the increasingly panhellenic medium of Attic drama. It is disappointing that we have only fragments of *Archelaus*<sup>19</sup> and cannot examine in detail the way he handled a more directly encomiastic commission, but there is at least a possibility that *Andromache*, with its concluding prophecy about the Molossian kings, is to be connected with the patronage of the Molossian Tharyps, who was probably at Athens in the 420s and was granted Athenian citizenship.<sup>20</sup> But the play offers few clues other than Thetis' remarks about the future prosperity of the Molossian royal house (1243–49). The Thessalian setting is not given any specially detailed attention, and the lyrics look back to Troy rather than evoking new locations. The only external evidence we have is the scholion on 445, which simply remarks that the play was not produced at Athens, adding that Callimachus said it was ascribed to Democrates in the *didaskaliai*.<sup>21</sup>

If we are willing to make this general approach to Euripides' output, allowing not only for growth in the frequency of performance outside Athens but also for references on the poet's part to places where a production might be staged, then there may be new light to throw on a couple of puzzling passages in other plays. The famous reference to the "Sicilian Sea" at the end of *Electra* (1347–53) might take on a new significance, and perhaps we should have another look at *Cyclops*, with its insistent references to the (untraditional) setting near Mt. Etna.<sup>22</sup> What if this play was composed for performance at Syracuse (or Catane?) and the rather pointed allusion to the absence of buildings in *Cyclops*' time (115)

<sup>19</sup> See C. F. L. Austin, *Nova fragmenta Euripidea in papyris reperta* (Berlin 1968) 11–21; A. Harder, *Euripides' Kresphontes and Archelaos*, *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 87 (Leiden 1985), esp. 125–31.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford 1967) 505, 507–08.

<sup>21</sup> D. L. Page, "The Elegiacs in Euripides' *Andromache*," in C. Bailey et al. (eds.), *Greek Poetry and Life* (Oxford 1936) 223–24 has some robust comments on this scholion, worth quoting for their general applicability: "This is expert and unambiguous evidence; but it is fashionable to despise the scholiast and accuse him of stupidity. . . it seems unreasonable that, in this instance at least, modern scholars should spend time and energy in inventing a muddle and then attributing it to the learned men of antiquity. . . There is no reason why Euripides should not have had a play produced in a foreign city; and, if he did so, it is natural that he should have entrusted its production to a friend in that city."

<sup>22</sup> On the historical context of this play, see L. Paganelli, *Echi storico-politici nel "Ciclope" euripideo* (Padua 1979); R. A. Seaford, "The Date of Euripides' *Cyclops*," *JHS* 102 (1982) 161–72. The best piece of external evidence for a South Italian or Sicilian interest in *Cyclops* is the fifth-century Lucanian calyx-crater now in the British Museum (1947.7–14.18) showing the blinding of Polyphemus, with satyrs (= pl. II in Seaford's commentary on *Cyclops* [Oxford 1984]). See A. D. Trendall, "Farce and Tragedy in South Italian Vase-Painting," in T. Rasmussen and N. Spivey (eds.), *Looking at Greek Vases* (Cambridge 1991) 159–61.



was meant as a teasing compliment to the audience? There is no reason why they should have been offended by the idea that before the Greek cities of Sicily were founded the place was the home of the uncivilised Cyclopes; they might rather have felt some satisfaction in learning that their place figured in the world of the *Odyssey*. At the end of the play Odysseus says he will "sail over the Sicilian Sea to my own country" (702–03). Perhaps *Cyclops* was designed to travel from west to east, while *Electra* was intended to go in the opposite direction?<sup>23</sup>

If these suggestions broadly carry conviction they have interesting implications which need to be seriously explored. Perhaps we ought to be less inclined to define the ideology of fifth-century tragedy as almost obsessively Athenocentric and pay more attention to the potential interest and relevance of Attic drama to contemporary audiences elsewhere. The shift of perspective could be liberating.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> On the mysterious reference to Sicily at *Pho.* 208–13, see now the admirable note in D. J. Mastronarde's commentary (Cambridge 1994) 209–10.

<sup>24</sup> Peter Wilson has particularly urged on me the importance of the ideological implications. Three further possible references might be worth considering. (1) The mention of Delos at *Hec.* 455–65 has been taken to recall the purification of the island by the Athenians in 426; but perhaps we should be thinking more specifically of performance at the Delia: Thucydides (3. 104) mentions a continuing tradition, and it is not out of the question that odes from plays were performed at an early date (this certainly happened later, as we know from an inscription recording an ἄσμα μετὰ χοροῦ Διόνυσσον καὶ κιθάρισμα ἐκ Βαχχῶν Εὐριπίδου at Delphi in 194 B.C., *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 648B). (2) When the maenads at *Ba.* 402 express a longing to go to Cyprus there may be more point to their song than the evocative reference to the worship of Aphrodite. By the time this play was composed Cyprus under Evagoras was a place with close Athenian connexions (Evagoras himself was made a citizen; cf. M. J. Osborne, *ZPE* 9 [1972] 55–56); it would not be absurd, surely, for Euripides to think of a possible performance at Salamis. (3) Some of Euripides' lost plays have western settings: *Melanippe in Chains* at Metapontum and *Aeolus* (presumably) at Lipari. In view of what is known about the theatrical interests of these places in slightly later times we should at least give thought to the possibility that Euripides had links with them.

In order to test the plausibility of this paper I have consulted a rather large number of colleagues, and I am grateful to Paul Cartledge, James Diggle, John Graham, Alan Griffiths, Eric Handley, Richard Janko, Alan Johnston, Tim Ryder, Oliver Taplin and Peter Wilson for their expert comments and advice.

Εὐπόρως ἔχειν and Antiphon, *De caede Herodis* 76

JAMES DIGGLE

οὔτε γὰρ ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν εὐρόπως (εὐρόπως A<sup>c</sup>: εὐρ' ὅπως AN) εἶχεν αὐτῷ . . . τοῦτο δ' αὖ μένοντι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῷ ἀδυνάτως εἶχεν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.

The word εὐροπος is cited by LSJ from this passage of Antiphon ("it was not easy," LSJ) and from Philip, *AP* 9. 543. 5 (= Gow–Page, *The Garland of Philip* 2999) εὐροπον ἄμμα ("an easy-sliding noose," LSJ; "clinch-hold . . . bent easily downward," Gow–Page). The most recent editors of Antiphon (M. Edwards and S. Usher, *Greek Orators I: Antiphon and Lysias* [Warminster 1985]) invite us to "compare *palirropon gonu* in Eur. *El.* 492," I am not sure why.

Antiphon wrote εὐπόρως, proposed by G. F. Schoemann, *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1839) II 496, reported by the successive Teubner editors (F. Blass 1881, T. Thalheim 1914) and accepted by the Budé editor (L. Gernet 1923). The Loeb editor (K. J. Maidment 1941), like Edwards and Usher, ignores it.

The closest parallel is Gorgias, *Hel.* 11 (82 B 11. 11 D–K) νῦν γε οὔτε μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον οὔτε σκέψασθαι τὸ παρὸν οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον εὐπόρως ἔχει. From Antiphon himself we may quote 1.1 δεινῶς . . . καὶ ἀπόρως ἔχει μοι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, and just a little earlier than the passage in question we find: . . . ἐν πολλῇ ἂν ἔχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπορίᾳ δοκῶ. μὴ τοίνυν ἐμοὶ νείμητε τὸ ἄπορον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ μὴδ' ἂν αὐτοὶ εὐποροῖτε (5. 65–66). Similar are Eur. *IA* 55–56 τὸ πρᾶγμα δ' ἀπόρως εἶχε Τυνδάρεω πατρὶ / δοῦναί τε μὴ δοῦναί τε (cf. Isoc. 21. 4 ἀπόρως . . . ἡμῖν ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα), Arr. *An.* 1. 26. 1 ἀπόρως ἔχει . . . ὁδοιπορεῖν.

Εὐπόρως (ἀπόρως) ἔχειν (with infinitive or other dependent expression) sometimes has a personal subject: Hipp. *Oss.* 13 (IX 186.10–11 Littré) οὐκ εὐπόρως ἐχόντων κατασπᾶν, Pl. *Symp.* 204e τοῦτ' εὐπορώτερον . . . ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1. 2 ἀπόρως μὲν εἶχε τί χρῶτο τῷ πράγματι, Dem. *Proem.* 14. 1 οὗτος (οὕτως pars codd.) εὐπόρως εἰπεῖν ἔχει, D. H. *Ant.* 6. 14 ἀπόρως εἶχον συμβάλλειν, Rh. 9. 5 ἀπόρως ἔχει ἐκστρατεῦσαι, Jos. *BJ* 7. 403. 2 ἀπόρως εἶχον τὸ γεγονὸς συμβαλεῖν, Arr.

Απ. 2. 3. 7 ἀπόρως εἶχεν . . . ἐξευρεῖν, and a variation on this is Antiphon 3. 2. 1 ἀπορωτέρως διάκειμαι ὅπως χρή κτλ.

There are many comparable expressions, in which εὖπορος or ἄπορος is variously constructed with the infinitive: Pi. *Ol.* 1. 52 ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα . . . εἰπεῖν, *Nem.* 4. 71–72 ἄπορα . . . μοι διελθεῖν, Democr. 68 B 8 D–K γινώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐστί, 106 ἐν εὐτυχίῃ φίλον εὐρεῖν εὖπορον, ἐν δὲ δυστυχίῃ ἀπορώτατον, Thuc. 1. 25. 1 ἐν ἀπόρῳ εἶχοντο θέσθαι, 2. 77. 1 ἄπορον εἶναι . . . ἐλεῖν, 3. 22. 6 ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν εἰκάσαι, 4. 26. 7 ἄπορον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο περιορμεῖν, 4. 34. 2 ἄπορον . . . ἦν ἰδεῖν, 4. 78. 2 οὐκ εὖπορον ἦν διέναι, Xen. *Anab.* 3. 3. 4 ὥς ἄπορον εἶη . . . σωθῆναι, 3. 5. 17 εὖπορον . . . εἶναι . . . πορεύεσθαι, Dem. 3. 18 ἐλέσθαι . . . οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως εὖπορον, 10. 48 μηδ' ὅτι χρή συμβουλευεῖν εὖπορον εἶναι, Arist. *Rh.* 1373a31 ἂ πολλὰ τοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὖπορον, Archytas 47 B 3 D–K ἐξευρεῖν δὲ μὴ ζατοῦντα ἄπορον καὶ σπάνιον, ζατοῦντα δὲ εὖπορον καὶ ῥάδιον, Aeschin. *Socr.* fr. 53 Dittmar ἀνθρώπῳ δέ τοι οὐκ ἄπορον (εὖπορον Meineke) καλὸν κάγαθόν εἶναι, Str. 10. 3. 8 πλεοναχῶς τὸ ἐτυμολογεῖν τοὺς Κουρήτας ἐν εὐπόρῳ κεῖται.

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## Style, Genre and Author

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Let us take two passages of Greek and for the moment defer their identification, observing only that they are both prose, both Attic and close in time. I will call them simply "Text I" and "Text II." Let us now compare them in respect of five formal parameters:

(A) Nouns ending in -ή, -ιά, -ειᾶ, -οιᾶ, -σις or -τις, -της (stem -τητ-) and -μός. This category is largely coincident with the semantic category "abstract noun," though it omits some nouns which are certainly "abstract" (e.g. τύχη, φθόνος) and includes one or two which are not (e.g. φυλή).

(B) Other nouns, excluding names of persons, nations and places.

(C) Noun-phrases consisting of the definite article with an adjective, participle, infinitive, adverb (e.g. τὰ ἐκεῖ), phrase (e.g. οἱ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου) or genitive (e.g. τὰ τῆς πόλεως).

(D) Adjectives, participles used adjectivally and regular adverbs in -ως / -ῶς, together with neuter adjectives used adverbially.

(E) Finite verbs, participles (except as in [C] and [D]) and infinitives without the article.

The following, however, are excluded throughout: names of persons, nations and places; numerals, cardinal and ordinal, and πρότερον and ὕστερον; πᾶς and ἅπας; πολὺς and ὀλίγοι, with their comparative and superlative; words which function sometimes as adjectives and sometimes as pronouns (e.g. ἄλλος); finite tenses of εἶναι.

In respect of categories (A)–(E), Text I and Text II differ as shown in the following "contingency table":

	A	B	C	D	E	Total
I	52	53	60	52	81	298
II	19	118	13	23	133	305

Table I

(The figures represent not the number of lexemes but the number of "tokens," i.e. instances or occurrences, and in each text there are several lexemes which occur more than once.)

It is obvious that the two texts are extraordinarily different stylistically, whatever their subject-matter, and that they are bound to make profoundly different impressions on any hearer or reader. Since the literary historian is rather apt to treat differences as significant without specifying, as a statistician would require, a level of significance, it is desirable to calculate, for any contingency table such as the above, the probability that Text I and Text II could be two random samples taken from the same population. The procedure for calculation of the value  $\chi^2$  has been described in several recent works for the non-statistician.<sup>1</sup> For the table above it is 89.854. For four "degrees of freedom" (i.e.  $2 - 1$  rows  $\times$   $5 - 1$  columns)  $\chi^2 = 18.467$  would have meant a probability of one in a thousand, and  $\chi^2 = 89.854$  means—if rhetoric may intrude on the mathematical domain—what I am tempted to call an "inconceivably" low probability.

If we identify a style with an author and consequently speak of "Thucydides' style" or "Plato's style," it is disconcerting to discover that Text I is Thucydides 3. 82–83, the famous generalising description of the effects of stasis on political morality, and Text II is the military narrative (85–91) which follows (84 is a spurious chapter). It is not, however, surprising to find a certain degree of dependence of style upon content—generalisation naturally tends to raise the total of phenomena in categories (A) and (C)—which requires us to recognise that a passage in which an author generalises may not belong to the same "population" as one in which that same author particularises. It is clear that classification of style by author is subordinate to classification by genre.

It could still be the case that in 3. 82–83 Thucydides has realised the stylistic potential of generalisation to a far greater degree than other authors, thereby creating a distinctive "Thucydidean generalising style." To test this we can compare Thuc. 3. 82–83 with a passage of Isocrates (7. 20–33) which generalises about the morality of an earlier age. Using precisely the same parameters as in the previous table, we get:

	A	B	C	D	E	Total
Thuc.	52	53	60	52	81	298
Isocr.	49	53	53	54	97	302

Table 2

Here  $\chi^2 = 1.648$ , which means the exceedingly high probability of (approximately) 4/5 that both texts are samples from the same population—

<sup>1</sup> E.g. A. Kenny, *The Computation of Style* (Oxford and New York 1982) 110–19 and D. F. McCabe, *The Prose-Rhythm of Demosthenes* (New York 1981) 176–83. I have applied "Yates' correction" (Kenny 118 f.) in all my calculations.

false if we interpret "population" in terms of author, but entirely acceptable in terms of genre.

For the sake of completeness let us add a comparison of Thuc. 3. 85-91 with a particularising narrative of Xenophon (*HG* 3. 1. 1-14):

	A	B	C	D	E	Total
Thuc.	19	118	13	23	133	305
Xen.	7	99	12	30	165	313

Table 3

Here  $\chi^2 = 7.507$ , with a probability of approximately 1/10.

Now, I am very far indeed from suggesting that the parameters I have chosen to present in the contingency tables are those which matter most in stylistic comparison, let alone that they are the only ones that matter. They were selected because in reading Thuc. 3. 82-83 I was struck by the prominence of phenomena of categories (A) and (C). We cannot be struck by the abnormal unless we have formed a conception of the normal. A priori decision on the choice of parameters to be used for stylistic differentiation is impossible, and trial and error is pointlessly tedious when adequate acquaintance with the literature under examination offers a much more promising approach. Writers hope to impress us, to elicit our admiration, to arouse our interest, by the power and beauty of their work. It is therefore reasonable that we should begin stylistic comparison from those linguistic features of a text which impress or attract us—and, conversely, from those to which we react with dislike, puzzlement or boredom.

We have seen that the parameters used in Table 2 suggested that the generalising narrative style of Thucydides and that of Isocrates are indistinguishable. But we know very well that they are not, and that is demonstrable from a more refined treatment of category (C) and from a different set of parameters not considered hitherto. Take first six sub-categories of (C):

- (C<sup>1</sup>) Article with masculine singular adjective or participle.
- (C<sup>2</sup>) Article with neuter singular adjective or participle.
- (C<sup>3</sup>) Article with masculine plural adjective or participle.
- (C<sup>4</sup>) Article with neuter plural adjective or participle.
- (C<sup>5</sup>) Article with infinitive.
- (C<sup>6</sup>) Article with adverb, phrase or genitive.

	C <sup>1</sup>	C <sup>2</sup>	C <sup>3</sup>	C <sup>4</sup>	C <sup>5</sup>	C <sup>6</sup>	Total
Thuc.	8	23	10	7	9	3	60
Isocr.	0	1	26	16	6	4	53

Table 4



$\chi^2 = 33.483$ , probability very much less than 1/1,000.

The second set of parameters is likely to strike any reader of the Isocrates passage:

(F<sup>1</sup>) Contrast between a negative and a following ἀλλά...

(F<sup>2</sup>) Contrast between a negative and a following ... δέ...

(F<sup>3</sup>) Negative with ὅπως ... and a following ἀλλά ..., "so far from ... that actually ..."

(F<sup>4</sup>) Negative with μόνον and a following ἀλλά καί ..., "not only ... but also ..."

(F<sup>5</sup>) Demonstrative (especially, but not exclusively, τοσοῦτος) followed by ὥστε ...

I have entered in the table not the number of instances of these constructions, but the total number of mobile<sup>2</sup> tokens comprised in the instances of each category. This requires also a statement of the number not so comprised, (F<sup>6</sup>).

	F <sup>1</sup>	F <sup>2</sup>	F <sup>3</sup>	F <sup>4</sup>	F <sup>5</sup>	F <sup>6</sup>	Total
Thuc.	0	9	0	0	0	348	357
Isocr.	167	0	11	13	30	206	427

Table 5

(The Isocrates passage actually contains 13 examples of F<sup>1</sup>, 2 of F<sup>3</sup>, 1 of F<sup>4</sup> and 2 of F<sup>5</sup>.) We may spare ourselves the trouble of calculating  $\chi^2$  here.

This table reveals another very striking difference between the generalising narrative styles of the two authors, and it is worth looking to see if the same differences appear in their treatment of a different genre. A comparison which suggests itself is one between Pericles' argumentative and defensive speech in Thuc. 2. 60–64, heavily charged with generalisation, and Isocrates 8. 28–40, political argument resting largely on generalisation and (like Pericles' speech) critical of its audience. For parameters (C<sup>1</sup>)–(C<sup>6</sup>) the figures are:

	C <sup>1</sup>	C <sup>2</sup>	C <sup>3</sup>	C <sup>4</sup>	C <sup>5</sup>	C <sup>6</sup>	Total
Thuc.	10	21	2	5	4	4	46
Isocr.	0	5	20	8	7	1	41

Table 6

<sup>2</sup> I use "mobile" as the antonym of "appositive," denoting a lexeme which may appear both immediately before and immediately after pause, and "mobile token" to mean "token of mobile lexeme."

$\chi^2 = 31.135$ , very close to Table 4 ( $\chi^2 = 33.483$ ). And for parameters ( $F^1$ )–( $F^6$ ):

	$F^1$	$F^2$	$F^3$	$F^4$	$F^5$	$F^6$	Total
Thuc.	3	17	0	0	0	541	561
Isocr.	9	6	0	0	62	319	396

Table 7

These figures are much less spectacular than those of Table 5, but it should be observed that where either author's figure is positive the balance between the two takes the same direction.

This fact points to a possibility that may prove of the highest importance for the description of style: the possibility that a feature which strikes us as conspicuous in a specimen text is an extreme example of a tendency which may well prove to be on balance characteristic of the author's handling of the same genre in other specimens randomly selected. Conspicuous features are sometimes mannerisms or tags, which are a gift to the imitator and parodist but do not necessarily exemplify general tendencies; we have to find out, in each case, how far they do or do not. The existence of mannerisms in a text is itself a stylistic "epiphenomenon" which can be investigated (and quantified) irrespective of the phenomena whose recurrence constitutes mannerism.

My insistence on treating the aesthetic reactions of readers intimately acquainted with the language as the starting-point of stylistics—an insistence welcome, I hope, to the dedicated professional scholar in whose honour this volume is published—is in no way a devaluation of the "microstylistics" concerned with the statistical evaluation of linguistic habits of which the writers themselves are presumed (rightly, as a rule) to be unconscious. The two domains are independent of each other, just as the history of sculpture investigated from the standpoint of visual and tactile form is independent of the physical analyses which determine the composition and provenance of a sculptor's material.

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# “Opening Socrates”: The Εἰκὼν of Alcibiades<sup>1</sup>

HELEN F. NORTH

When Plato introduced formal oratory into his dialogues, his preference was for the kind designated in the fourth century as epideictic or panegyric. The *Apology* necessarily imitates forensic oratory, but the *Menexenus*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus* all exploit various categories of epideictic—the *epitaphios logos* and other types of encomium, including the paradoxical. Both because of this preponderance of epideictic in Plato's dialogues and because of its brilliance, he became for rhetorical critics of the Graeco-Roman period the supreme model for such oratory, under whatever name.

Aristotle, who established the tripartite division of rhetoric—forensic, deliberative, and epideictic—best known in antiquity,<sup>2</sup> used “epideictic” to refer to the oratory of praise and blame. The word “panegyric” always had a broader field of reference and at some time, not as yet precisely determined, it became part of a twofold classification different from Aristotle's: πολιτικός, which includes Aristotle's forensic and deliberative types, and πανηγυρικός, which embraces not only Aristotle's epideictic, but non-oratorical prose, and poetry as well.<sup>3</sup>

Hermogenes of Tarsus, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, employs this bipartite division in his influential treatise *Peri Ideon* (*On Types of Style*), and within the category of panegyric he recognizes two subdivisions, pure (αὐτὸ τοῦτο) panegyric and another kind confusingly called

<sup>1</sup> It is an honor to contribute to this collection of essays dedicated to Miroslav Marcovich, and I am particularly happy to offer a paper dealing with encomium, as part of the greater encomium constituted by this issue of the journal that he has edited for so many years and with such distinction.

<sup>2</sup> *Rhet.* 1. 3, 1358a1–13. For the suggestion that this division may have originated in the Academy, see F. Solmsen, *Kleine Schriften* II (Hildesheim 1969) 185 n. 26. For a contrary view, see A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Göttingen 1973) 113 n. 5. Plato introduces his own tripartite division in *Sophist* 222c: δικανική, συμβουλευτική, προσομιλητική (conversational). His third genre, appropriate to its context (see Hellwig, 114 n. 12), would also accommodate most of Plato's dialogues, but he does not elsewhere apply the term.

<sup>3</sup> On the appearance of πολιτικός and πανηγυρικός as terms for rhetorical genres, evidently first in Philodemus, *Rhet.* 2, quoting the *Symposium* of Epicurus, see I. Rutherford, “Inventing the Canon: Hermogenes on Literature,” *HSCP* 94 (1992) 355–78, esp. 365–68, with notes 42 and 43. T. C. Burgess, “Epideictic Literature,” *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902) 89–261, reviews the sources for the various terms (91–92).

πολιτικός, which is panegyric adapted to a real case. For both varieties he finds that Plato offers the most beautiful example, and he identifies in his dialogues many stylistic qualities appropriate to the various kinds of panegyric, including some that result in grandeur (μέγεθος) and others that produce simplicity (ἀφέλεια), sweetness (γλυκύτης), and certain kinds of intensity (δαινότης).<sup>4</sup>

Menander Rhetor, in the age of Diocletian, uses the term "epideictic," referring narrowly to speeches of praise and blame. He too mentions Plato in connection with several types of encomium and salutes him in extravagant terms as highest and best (ἄκρον καὶ ἄριστον) where writing is concerned.<sup>5</sup> Like Hermogenes he finds in Plato the model for certain virtues of style appropriate to epideictic, notably purity (καθαρότης), freedom from excess (τὸ ἀπροσκορές), and charm (χάρις).<sup>6</sup>

Pseudo-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, perhaps a contemporary of Menander, prefers the term "panegyric" to "epideictic" in his *Techne*, and he too admires Plato extravagantly, if Russell and Wilson are correct in identifying as Plato the stylistic model described as ruler and leader of the chorus (χοροῦ ἡγεμόνα τε καὶ κορυφαῖον).<sup>7</sup> Of this exemplar, evidently so familiar that his name need not be mentioned, ps.-Dionysius says that the matter dealt with gave him the impetus for each stylistic character. Among the kinds of subject-matter mentioned is that which involves comparison and contrast (παραβολῶν καὶ συγκρίσεων).<sup>8</sup>

The prominence accorded to these figures by ps.-Dionysius reflects their importance in epideictic oratory, early acknowledged by Aristotle, who in the *Rhetoric* recommends comparison (σύγκρισις, παραβολή) as a source of amplification (αὐξήσις), which is itself most appropriate to epideictic (1. 9. 38–40). Their significance is recognized in practical terms by most of the *progymnasmata* (preliminary exercises) taught for centuries in Greek and Roman schools.<sup>9</sup> They regularly include an exercise on encomium, immediately followed by one on comparison (*encomium* and *synkrisis* in the Greek handbooks, *laudatio* and *comparatio* in the Latin).

<sup>4</sup> *Hermogenis Opera*, ed. by H. Rabe (Stuttgart 1969) 387–88. See also 403–04, where solemnity (σεμνότης), purity (καθαρότης), diligence (ἐπιμέλεια), charm (ἡδονή), ornament (κόσμος), and clarity (σαφήνεια) are mentioned as characteristic of the most beautiful panegyric. Hermogenes holds that what Demosthenes is to practical oratory and Homer to poetry, Plato is to panegyric (389). See C. B. Wooten, *Hermogenes' On Types of Style* (Chapel Hill and London 1987) Appendix 2 (138–40).

<sup>5</sup> *Menander Rhetor*, ed. with trans. and comm. by D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson (Oxford 1981) Treatise I, p. 8 (334,7–8 Spengel).

<sup>6</sup> Russell and Wilson (previous note) Treatise I, p. 20 (340,24–30 Spengel) and Treatise II, p. 158 (411,29–31 Spengel).

<sup>7</sup> Russell and Wilson (above, note 5) 365 n. 17, on D.H. *Opuscula* II 260 Usener–Radermacher.

<sup>8</sup> II 260,14–15 Usener–Radermacher. The author regards the variety of diction exemplified by Plato as ἐπιδεικτικώτερον, more appropriate to epideictic.

<sup>9</sup> See D. L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (New York 1957) 177–212 and Russell and Wilson (above, note 5) xxv–xxix.

The *Exercises* attributed to Hermogenes (probably not the same as the author of *Peri Ideon*) are twelve in number, eight preparing the student for deliberative and forensic rhetoric, four for epideictic. Encomium, the seventh exercise, becomes invective with the reversal of the standard encomiastic topics. Comparison, the eighth exercise, uses these topics as reference points against which persons or things can be rated as equal, superior, or inferior.<sup>10</sup> The first example Hermogenes gives of encomium of a particular person is praise of Socrates,<sup>11</sup> but he does not cite any specific encomiastic passage, whether by Plato or another. He might well have pointed to the speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, which for many readers constitutes the most memorable eulogy of Socrates in the dialogues, and, what is more, accomplishes its praise through comparison. This paper will address itself to certain features of Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates, especially its adaptation of epideictic conventions and its use of comparison.

No reader of Plato needs to be reminded that one of his greatest gifts is for analogy in all its forms, used in contexts great and small and introduced in a variety of ways. Marsh McCall in his historical review of such terms as εἰκών, παραβολή, and ὁμοίωσις credits Plato with the earliest use of παραβολή and ὁμοίωσις, but cites Aristophanes, *Clouds* 559 and *Frogs* 905–06 for εἰκών in contexts suggesting comparison.<sup>12</sup> Plato often describes as an εἰκών a particularly vivid image to which someone or something is compared, as when Socrates compares the licentious soul to a leaky sieve (*Gorgias* 493d6), or the Athenian Stranger likens men to puppets manipulated by the gods (*Laws* 644c1–2).<sup>13</sup> Since the basic meaning of εἰκών is "image" or "likeness," it is the *vox propria* for the kind of comparison that Plato puts into the mouth of Alcibiades in the final speech of the *Symposium*.

Instead of eulogizing Eros; like all the previous speakers, Alcibiades proposes to praise Socrates, encouraged by Eryximachus, who has constituted himself symposiarch, and even by Socrates himself, provided he speaks the truth (214d–e). The recurrent claim to truth-speaking is one of several traces of conventional rhetoric, either forensic or epideictic, in the speech of Alcibiades. In addition to promising to speak the truth and inviting correction if he lies (214e–15a, 216a), Alcibiades employs an adaptation of one of the familiar topics of the proem, the attempt to allay suspicion of being δεινὸς λέγειν. He exploits his obvious tipsiness by warning his listeners not to be surprised if he relates his memories ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν (haphazardly), since it is hard for someone in his condition to

<sup>10</sup> Rabe (above, note 4) 14–18 (*encomium*), 18–20 (*synkrisis*).

<sup>11</sup> Rabe (above, note 4) 14–15.

<sup>12</sup> M. H. McCall, Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison* (Cambridge, MA 1969) 8–18.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle cites three uses of εἰκών from the *Republic* (*Rhet.* 3.4, 1406b32–07a1), discussed by McCall (previous note) 34–36.



describe the ἀτοπία (oddness, uniqueness) of Socrates in a fluent and orderly way (215a3–5). This ploy is akin to the ἀπειρία-topos (“inexperienced as I am”) used to such effect by Socrates himself at the beginning of the *Apology*.<sup>14</sup> Another topos frequent in forensic oratory, this one a commonplace of the epilogue, is appropriated by Alcibiades when he maintains that his purpose in telling the humiliating story of his rejection by Socrates is to save Agathon from a similar fate (222b5–9). This is a variant of the σωτηρία-topos, with which the orator seeks to win favor by making it seem that his motive in prosecuting the accused is to protect the members of the jury, or the entire *polis*, or all the Greeks.<sup>15</sup>

If these two devices recall forensic oratory (specifically invoked when Alcibiades addresses his hearers as ἄνδρες δικάσταί, “gentlemen of the jury,” and reminds them that they are judging Socrates on a charge of insolence, ὑπερηφανία [219c7–8]), the body of the speech is solidly epideictic in its reliance on the *topoi* of ἀρετή and πρᾶξις, virtue and accomplishment. The *aretai* are with one exception identical with the cardinal virtues that Agathon in his textbook example of encomium had ascribed to Eros: *sophrosyne*, *andreia*, *sophia* or *phronesis* (196d5–7), with *karteria* in the speech of Alcibiades replacing Agathon’s *dikaiosisyne*, and they are validated in the manner prescribed throughout the history of ancient rhetorical theory: by the description of appropriate *praxeis*.<sup>16</sup> The subject of the speech is the paradoxical ἀρετή of Socrates, and the entire structure of the encomium consists of the step-by-step development and amplification of the comparison introduced in the very first sentence, when Alcibiades announces that he will attempt to praise Socrates δι’ εἰκόνων, through images (215a7). Aristotle might have had this speech in mind when he recommended amplification through comparison in the *Rhetoric*.

Although εἰκόν in its extended meaning can be translated as “comparison” or even “simile,”<sup>17</sup> its basic meaning of “image” is precisely what Plato needs to introduce Alcibiades’ characterization of Socrates, by turns mocking and suffused with admiration and chagrin. He likens Socrates to those statues of silenoi holding pipes or flutes which, when opened up (διχάδε διοιχθέντες), prove to have within them images (ἀγάλματα) of gods (215b4–5).<sup>18</sup> Thus with one vivid analogy Plato not only directs attention to the physical appearance of Socrates, which obviously inspires the silenoi-comparison, but also introduces the

<sup>14</sup> 17d2–18a7.

<sup>15</sup> I have discussed the topics of ἀπειρία and σωτηρία in *From Myth to Icon: Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and Art* (Ithaca and London 1979) 163–64, 168.

<sup>16</sup> See, e.g., for theory, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 35; for practice, Isocrates, *Evagoras* and Xenophon, *Agésilas*; for commentary, Russell and Wilson (above, note 5) xiv–xv and Burgess (above, note 3) 123–25.

<sup>17</sup> See McCall (above, note 12) for an exhaustive discussion of the implications of εἰκόν as a term of comparison in the fifth century and thereafter.

<sup>18</sup> No such statues are extant.

distinction between the outer and the inner, appearance and reality, on which the revelation of the real nature of Socrates will be based. The musical instruments associated with silenoi might well be pipes (with subliminal links to Pan), but the reference to flutes (αὐλοί) is more telling because it prepares for the transition to the satyr Marsyas, to whom Socrates is next compared.

Silenoi and satyrs are often confused (Marsyas is elsewhere described as a silenoi),<sup>19</sup> and Alcibiades makes no generic distinction between them, but he exploits elements specific to the story of Marsyas, not to silenoi in general. Whereas Socrates resembles both silenoi and satyrs in appearance (εἶδος), beyond that he is like Marsyas in being ὕβριστής and αὐλητής. Silenoi and satyrs are generically hybristic, in the sense of being sexually aroused and given to pursuing maenads, nymphs, and other targets, but Marsyas is hybristic in a different sense as well, is in fact a famous exemplar of insolence,<sup>20</sup> and his appropriation of the αὐλός discarded by Athena is a crucial element in the story of his hybris. The first development of the εἰκὼν requires us to contemplate the superiority of Socrates to Marsyas where the αὐλός is concerned. Within the ring composition that determines the structure of Alcibiades' speech, Plato at this point introduces a chiasmus, taking up in reverse order the charges of hybris and of being an αὐλητής, in both of which Socrates not only resembles but surpasses Marsyas. Yet a third element in the myth of Marsyas—the most important of all—is not mentioned, but will make its impact at a later point.

### Socrates as αὐλητής

The αὐλητής segment of the εἰκὼν, which ignores the imagery of "opening," centers on the theme of enchantment (ἐκπληξίς).<sup>21</sup> Both Marsyas and Socrates enchant their hearers, but Socrates is superior to Marsyas because, while the satyr needs an instrument to effect his enchantment, Socrates uses *logoi* alone. Both have pupils, and in both cases those who imitate their teacher also have the power of enchantment. Even an indifferent (φάυλη) flutegirl can enchant by playing the melodies of Marsyas, and even an indifferent (φάυλος) speaker can enchant by speaking the *logoi* of Socrates. (Here it is tempting to see one of the elusive Plato's rare references to himself.)

Socrates' power to enchant is emphasized by two further comparisons. When Alcibiades hears him, he is moved more powerfully even than are the

<sup>19</sup> As by Herodotus 7. 26, describing the cave where the flayed hide was exhibited.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. North (above, note 15) 64–65.

<sup>21</sup> See also 218a5–b4 for the philosophic madness. On the topic of enchantment by the Sophists and by Socrates, see North, "Swimming Upside Down in the Wrong Direction": Plato's Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic Grounds," in ΠΑΡΑΔΟΣΙΣ: *Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain* (New York 1976) 11–29.

Korybantes, far more than he is moved when he hears Pericles and other excellent orators. The explicit comparison to Pericles is strong praise, especially coming from his ward, but stronger still is the implied comparison of Socrates to whatever orgiastic deities—Bacchus or the Great Mother—produce the emotional reaction in the Korybantes. Still another comparison, suggestive of irresistible powers of enchantment, follows. To avoid the disaster of spending his life with Socrates, at the cost of renouncing his political career, Alcibiades deafens his ears to him, as to the Sirens (216a7–9).

This section of the encomium comes to a climax with Alcibiades' insistence on the uniqueness of Socrates. He is the only person capable of making Alcibiades ashamed (216b1–4): ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι. His shame stems from the realization that, while he is himself in great need, he neglects his own interests in order to cater to those of the Athenians. Like the timocratic youth in *Republic* 8, who observes that those who attend to their own affairs are regarded as fools, while those who attend to the affairs of others are honored, and who therefore gives himself over to φιλοτιμία (550a2–b6), Alcibiades is overwhelmed by desire for the honors within the gift of *hoi polloi*. The ironic result is that, in this unique moment of self-knowledge, he perceives the consequence of his thirst for honor to be its direct opposite—slavery.<sup>22</sup> Immediately after comparing himself explicitly to the Korybantes and implicitly to Odysseus (who resisted the Sirens), he likens himself to a fugitive slave escaping from Socrates and the unacceptable demands of genuine self-interest (216b7–8; cf. 215e7, 219e4). Even now, long after the events that he is about to record, he is torn by the most profound ambivalence where Socrates is concerned, sometimes wishing him dead, then realizing what his death would mean to him (216c2–5). It is the most tragic moment in the *Symposium*.

### Socrates as ὕβριστής

To introduce the next section of the encomium, Plato returns to his original εἰκὼν, the comparison of Socrates to a satyr or silenus. The resemblance now lies in his erotic disposition and his affectation of ignorance, his celebrated irony. Here begins the treatment of Socrates as ὕβριστής, the other Marsyas-like aspect of his character, and it is here that the contrast between outer and inner makes its impact. Just as the silenus-statues, when opened up, prove to contain images of the gods, so Socrates, outwardly erotic, proves, if opened up, to be laden (γέμει) with *sophrosyne*. This is the first of the *aretai* to be ascribed to Socrates; it will be demonstrated by the *praxis* consisting of his rejection of Alcibiades' attempt to seduce him.

<sup>22</sup> For other instances in which successful politicians are compared to slaves, see North (previous note) 26.

Plato's use of the myth of Marsyas is subtle in the extreme. He makes no explicit reference to the flaying of the satyr, which was a familiar element in the story, even though not portrayed in Greek art until the Hellenistic period.<sup>23</sup> Knowledge of it is taken for granted when at a later stage of Alcibiades' speech the comical surface of Socrates' *logoi* is compared to the skin of a hybristic satyr (221e3–5). The "opening" of the silenus-statues is substituted for the flaying. Moreover, as noted above, the hybris of Marsyas is not just the standard sexuality generic to sileni. He is a hybris-figure in Greek traditional morality because of his challenge to Apollo in the musical contest between the αὐλός and the lyre—hybris in another sense. But both senses are important for the portrait of Socrates; he is erotic, like all sileni and satyrs, and he is insolent, like Marsyas himself. An underlying unity is provided by the fact that *sophrosyne*, the ἀρετή that Alcibiades has discovered in Socrates, is the antithesis of both forms of hybris.

The proof of Socrates' *sophrosyne* begins with the accusation that he despises (καταφρονεῖ) beauty, wealth, and honor—the three elements that traditionally impede the care of the soul in the ethics of Socrates (*Apology* 29d). The verb alerts us to accusations of hybris yet to come, especially when Alcibiades continues with the charge that Socrates considers not only possessions but "ourselves" worth nothing and spends his life making fun of his fellow-men (216e3–6). His behavior is described as εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων (treating his fellows with irony and ridicule), but Alcibiades, and perhaps he alone, has seen him σπουδάσαντος (being serious) and ἀνοιχθέντος (opened up). Inside were ἀγάλματα so divine, so golden, so totally beautiful, and so marvellous that he felt obliged to do whatever Socrates commanded (217a1–3). In short, he was inspired by the sight of the Socratic ἀγάλματα to attempt to gratify their owner. Thus, with yet another allusion to the εἰκόν of the sileni, he embarks on the tragicomic (or perhaps better satyric) story of his efforts at seduction (217a–19d).

The tale is told with infinite artistry, proceeding by stages from mere conversation, alone with Socrates, to wrestling with him in the palaestra, to dinner à deux, and finally to the climax of the failed seduction. (One is reminded of the βαθμοί—rungs—by which in the speech of Diotima the lover arrives at the vision of beauty absolute [211c1–d1]).<sup>24</sup> The outcome—Socrates' withering contempt for what Alcibiades offered—is described in a series of four verbs linked by καί, all denoting contemptuous and insulting conduct: περιεγένετό τε καὶ κατεφρόνησε καὶ κατεγέλασε . . . καὶ ὕβρισε ("he was superior and disdainful and he mocked . . . and insulted," 219c5–

<sup>23</sup> Consult C. W. Clairmont, "Studies in Greek Mythology and Vase-Painting," *YCS* 15 (1957) 161–78.

<sup>24</sup> R. G. Bury, *The Symposium of Plato* (Cambridge 1909) lxiv, calls attention to this parallel. For further discussion, see R. Hornsby, "Significant Action in the *Symposium*," *CJ* 52 (1956) 37–40.

6). Polysyndeton emphasizes climax, with ὕβρισε coming last in the series. Thus Socrates is convicted of being ὕβριστής, as promised, and the paradox is that his hybris is identical with his *sophrosyne*.

Not only *sophrosyne*, however, but other cardinal virtues are perceived by Alcibiades in consequence of this episode. *Andreia*, *phronesis*, and *karteria* are mentioned as additional reasons why he continued to be enslaved to Socrates (219e). Thus a transition is made to the second major use of the topos of ἀρετή/πρᾶξις: the proofs of Socrates' *andreia* and *karteria*, evinced by his behavior at Potidaea and Delium (219e–21c). This section too comes to a climax with an assertion of the uniqueness (ἀτοπία) of Socrates (221d3–8). While Brasidas can be compared to Achilles, or Pericles to Nestor, Antenor, and others, Socrates and his *logoi* are comparable to no human being, now or in the past, only to silenoi and satyrs. Once more the εἰκὼν is invoked to focus our attention on the outer/inner theme, and now we are reminded of the actual fate of Marsyas, the flaying, which was interpreted by the Florentine Neoplatonists to mean the revelation of the inner self.<sup>25</sup>

The flaying, though not explicitly mentioned, is irresistibly brought to mind by the comparison of Socrates' *logoi*—seemingly ridiculous with their talk of pack-asses, smiths, cobblers, and tanners—to the hide of a hybriatic satyr. Any person inexperienced and thoughtless would laugh at them, but anyone who saw them opened up and got inside them would find them unique among *logoi*, first in having intelligence (νοῦς), then in having the most divine and numerous ἀγάλματα of ἀρετή within, and finally in being supremely relevant to the search for excellence (καλῶ κάγαθῶ ἔσεσθαι, 222a1–7), another example of polysyndeton enhancing climax.

What is most notable here is the substitution of Socrates' *logoi* for Socrates himself. Just as it was earlier said, in the αὐλητής section of the encomium, that his *logoi*, uttered even by the poorest speaker, continue to have power to enchant hearers (215d3–6), so now, in the ὕβριστής section, rather than imagining Socrates opened up like a silenoi-statue and revealing images of gods within, we are made to think of his *logoi* as being opened up and beneath their ludicrous surface revealing those images of ἀρετή that are equivalent to images of gods. The function of such images is now for the first time explicitly revealed: They are supremely fit to be the object of scrutiny (σκοπεῖν) by one aiming to be καλὸς κάγαθός (fine and noble). The choice of the verb σκοπεῖν is reminiscent of all the verbs meaning to look, behold, contemplate, with which Diotima describes the behavior of one who has achieved the sight of beauty absolute (211d3–12a5). Thus briefly Plato hints at the parallel between the upward progress of the lover capable of climbing from rung to rung on Diotima's ladder and the insight into the hidden beauty of Socratic teaching.

<sup>25</sup> See E. Wind, *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance* (Harmondsworth 1967) 171–76.



The *Symposium* is a dialogue whose fabric consists of many intricately interwoven themes and images. One such theme, and a basic one, is that of *logoi* repeated by someone other than the original speaker. The elaborate framework with which the dialogue is introduced (172a–73c) prepares us to encounter speeches delivered on a long-ago occasion, reported to us now by a speaker who heard them from someone else (and checked certain elements with Socrates himself). The central speech consists of the *logos* of Diotima, as reported by Socrates (as reported by Aristodemus and then by Apollodorus). Just before reporting Diotima's *logos*, Socrates has corrected Agathon's admission that he cannot refute Socrates, by saying that it is truth, not Socrates, that cannot be refuted (201c7–d2). Alcibiades has already told us that anyone, even a poor speaker, can enchant hearers by the use of Socrates' *logoi* (215d3–6). And now the last reference to the εἰκόν of the silenus-statues completes the equation of Socrates with his *logoi*.<sup>26</sup> The recurrent emphasis on the importance of the speech, rather than the individual speaker, contributes to the effect of distancing the reader from the accidental historical aspects of characters and events, while encouraging him to attend to the inner meaning of what is said, that which is revealed when the hide of the satyr is stripped away or the exterior of the statue is opened up.

In the long history of the development of epideictic oratory (both theory and practice) Isocrates claims a position of primacy. He was the first, he says in the *Evagoras*, to write an encomium of an actual, rather than a mythical person (190–91). His subject, the ruler of Cypriot Salamis, died in 374 B.C. and presumably the encomium came not much later. The date of the *Symposium* cannot be determined with certainty, but most estimates locate it a decade earlier than the *Evagoras*. The question arises whether priority in composing an encomium of an actual person should be assigned to Plato on the basis of the speech of Alcibiades. The relative chronology of the two encomia involves, however, the question whether Plato here (and indeed elsewhere in the dialogues) eulogizes an actual person. Those who regard the Platonic Socrates as essentially mythical<sup>27</sup> might seem to concede the primacy to Isocrates. Yet the Socrates who is the basis of the Platonic character, however mythologized he may be in the dialogues, is an actual person, and for this reason Plato deserves to be recognized as an innovator in the history of encomium. Nevertheless, his use of the εἰκόν of the silenus-statues in the speech of Alcibiades encourages us to focus on the *logoi* of Socrates, not the man, who, despite (or because of) the vividness and immediacy of the dialogue, is transformed into a unique sort of image,

<sup>26</sup> Cf. S. Rosen, *Plato's Symposium* (New Haven and London 1968) 319: "This use of the Silenus enforces the insight that Socrates' interior is coincident with the interior of his speeches."

<sup>27</sup> See J. F. Callahan, "Dialectic, Myth and History in the Philosophy of Plato," in *Interpretations of Plato: A Swarthmore Symposium*, ed. by H. F. North (Leiden 1977) 72–75.



carved by a supreme craftsman (like the δεινὸς πλάστης of *Republic* 9)<sup>28</sup> both to conceal and to reveal—though only to the initiate—the true nature of his master.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The δεινὸς πλάστης moulds by his *logos* an εἰκὼν of the soul in which the image of a tripartite creature—a many-headed monster combined with a lion and a man—is enclosed within the εἰκὼν of a human being, an εἰκὼν misunderstood by one who cannot see what is inside (*Rep.* 588b7–e2). The many references to the verb πλάττειν in this and other passages in the *Republic*, where the image of a sculptor appears, might have reminded readers of Plato's name. H. H. Bacon, in her unpublished presidential address to the American Philological Association, "Plato and the Greek Literary Tradition," December 28, 1985, cites many other examples of the analogy to sculpture and the use of πλάττειν to describe the activity of the philosopher in the *Republic*.

<sup>29</sup> For some remarkable changes in the figure of Socrates as the symposiac genre develops out of Plato's dialogue, see J. Reihan and the Members of the Greek Seminar 420, "Rethinking the History of the Literary Symposium," *JCS* 17 (1992) 213–44. Particularly interesting are references to later echoes of the disruptive figure of Alcibiades, of whom it is said (215) that Plato's Alcibiades is the other half of Socrates' own self, and that the uninvited disrupter is himself a Socratic figure. According to the view expressed in this article (221), the entrance of Alcibiades represents the intrusion of the social order of Athens, forcing a reevaluation of the character of Socrates (left unchallenged in the *Apology* and *Phaedo*). W. S. Cobb, *The Symposium and the Phaedrus: Plato's Erotic Dialogues* (Albany 1993) 7–9, 178–79, cites recent interpretations of Alcibiades' speech as conveying Plato's criticism of "the Socratic way of life and love." Such interpretations, especially those that charge Socrates with responsibility for the disaster of Alcibiades' subsequent career, depend to varying degrees on an exaggerated faith in the historicity of the Platonic Socrates.

## Philip II, The Greeks, and The King 346–336 B.C.

JOHN BUCKLER

"Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace!—  
but there is no peace."

Patrick Henry

The aim of this piece is to examine a congeries of diplomatic, political, and legal arrangements and obligations that linked the Greeks, Macedonians, and Persians in various complicated ways during Philip's final years. The ties among them all were then often tangled and now imperfectly understood and incompletely documented. These matters evoke such concepts as the King's Peace and the Common Peace, and involve a number of treaties, some bilateral between Philip and individual states, others broader, as with the Peace of Philokrates between himself and his allies and the Athenians and theirs, and finally the nature of Philip's settlement with the Greeks in 338/7. In the background there always stood the King, who never formally renounced the rights that he enjoyed under the King's Peace of 386, even though he could seldom directly enforce them. It is an irony of history that Philip used the concept of a common peace in Greece both to exclude the King from Greek affairs and also as a tool of war against him. By so doing, Philip rejected the very basis of the King's Peace as it was originally drafted and later implemented. In its place he resurrected the memory of the days when the Greeks had thwarted Xerxes' invasion, and fanned the desire for retaliation of past wrongs, a theme that Alexander would also later put to good use.<sup>1</sup>

The original version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians in Los Angeles on 4 May 1990. It is a distinct pleasure to offer heartfelt thanks to my friends and co-panelists Professors Ernst Badian and Stephen Ruzicka for their many helpful and stimulating ideas. We have not always agreed, and they are by no means responsible for any weaknesses of this piece, but their help has been indispensable. Only after this article was in proof did M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Hermes Einzelschr. 63 (Stuttgart 1994) appear, too late for inclusion here. Although a fine piece of scholarship, it does not address many of the specific questions raised in this piece.

<sup>1</sup> Proof that the King was instrumental in establishing the concept of a general peace comes from Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 31–32, in which he writes Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον . . .

The year 346 was remarkable for three peace treaties, each separate, although all involved at least some of the same numerous belligerents. The first was the Phokian general Phalaikos' surrender to Philip that ended the hostilities between them.<sup>2</sup> The next was the Peace of Philokrates between Philip and the Athenians that ended their conflict for control of the northwestern Aegean.<sup>3</sup> The terms of the Peace of Philokrates bound most, but not all, of the major participants of the "War for Amphipolis."<sup>4</sup> Thebes and its allies were not considered a party to it, even though Thebes itself had only the year before concluded a separate alliance with Philip.<sup>5</sup> Last-minute efforts to include Phokis failed; and Kersebleptes, who had played such a prominent, if undistinguished, role in the conflict was expressly excluded from it.<sup>6</sup> The only Athenian allies who formally participated in it were the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Despite the number of Greeks involved, this treaty can in no way be considered a Common Peace, and was not so referred to in antiquity.<sup>7</sup> That much should have been clear from the testimony of Aischines, who repeatedly mentions the failure of the Athenians to interest other Greeks in peace with Philip.<sup>8</sup> This simple fact is hardly surprising, inasmuch as most of them were not at war with him, which of itself made a peace treaty pointless. Nor did they wish unnecessarily to become embroiled with him. Finally, the Peace of Philokrates did not include the King, who had played no part in these events.

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τὰς δὲ ἅλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 147 and E. Badian in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell*, BICS Suppl. 58 (London 1991) 37 emphasize that he was ending a bilateral war with the Spartans and their allies, basing their argument on the next clause beginning with ὁπότεροι. If limited merely to that goal, one can reasonably expect terminology identical with that found in Thucydides 8. 37, which includes only "the Lakedaimonians and their allies" on the Greek side. The King encompassed in the Peace of 386 even those states that had not participated in the war, a view independently proposed by R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time* (New York and Oxford 1993) 13. Lewis and Badian do not realize that the King used his diktat both to end the Corinthian War and also to settle to his satisfaction the affairs of all the Greek states.

<sup>2</sup> H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II*<sup>2</sup> (Munich 1975) 330 [hereafter Bengtson, *SdA II*<sup>2</sup>].

<sup>3</sup> Bengtson, *SdA II*<sup>2</sup> 329; T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965) 145–49, with earlier bibliography; J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 107–26; G. L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (Boston and London 1978) 91–113; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia II* (Oxford 1979) 329–41; R. M. Errington, *AJAH* 6 (1981) 73–77; J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War*, *Mnemosyne Suppl.* 109 (Leiden 1989) 114–42; R. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden von 387/86 v. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1991).

<sup>4</sup> For the term, see Isok. 5. 2; Aischin. 2. 70; Dem. 5. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Bengtson, *SdA II*<sup>2</sup> 327; Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) 266; D. E. Kelly, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 64–83; J. Buckler in H. Beister and J. Buckler (eds.), *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 160–61.

<sup>6</sup> Aischin. 3. 73–74; 2. 84; Buckler (above, note 3) 132–34.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. 16. 77. 2, who in fact pays little attention to this treaty. F. Hampl, *Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig 1938) 58–59; G. T. Griffith, *JHS* 59 (1939) 71–79; Ryder (above, note 3) 149.

<sup>8</sup> Aischin. 2. 57–61; 3. 58.

The last treaty came when the Amphiktyonic Council accepted the surrender of the Phokians, and resumed control of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphoi.<sup>9</sup> Himself not then a member of the Delphic Amphiktyony, Philip nonetheless participated in the rites that concluded hostilities, and used the votes of his allies to establish a peace to his and their liking.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, a Delphian inscription makes it abundantly clear that only some members of the Amphiktyony were formally involved in these events. Others were conspicuously absent.<sup>11</sup> Sparta, Corinth, and Sikyon remained passive in the Peloponnesos; and when Philip explicitly called upon the Athenians for help in liberating the sanctuary, they refused because of fear.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the term "Common Peace" is nowhere found in the document. Nor should it even be expected, for the Amphiktyony was a religious, not a political, association.<sup>13</sup> The King was neither a member of the Amphiktyony nor a participant in the plundering of Apollo's treasures. Therefore, there was absolutely no reason for him to be a party to these events. Philip had simply made possible a settlement by most, but not all, of the Amphiktyons concerning the sanctuary. He had in fact ended a war that had neither involved all the states of Greece nor had anything to do with the King.

Diodoros (16. 60. 3), however, states that the Amphiktyons established a "common peace and concord of the Greeks" (κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν), a phrase reminiscent of Andokides' "common peace and freedom for all of the Greeks" (πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ἐλευθερίαν, 3. 17). Here again the adjective *koine* modifies both nouns, and cannot be taken as a technical term. It is thus well to ask what Diodoros meant by a "common peace." The use of it in the so-called "Reply to the Satraps"<sup>14</sup> and by ps.-Demosthenes (17, *Concerning the Treaty with Alexander*) clearly dates it to the fourth century, and perhaps Diodoros found it in Ephoros. The latter, however, should not be assumed, if only because not one example of the phrase *koine eirene* appears in the 238 fragments of Ephoros that Jacoby prints in *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Diodoros' usage deserves separate treatment, but one best confined to an appendix (see below). The point here is that the Amphiktyonic Council could not officially conclude a "Common Peace," as that term is generally understood by scholars today, nor did it attempt to do

<sup>9</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 331.

<sup>10</sup> *Fouilles de Delphes* III.5 19, line 74; Dem. 5. 13; 19. 24; Diod. 16. 60. 1. Philip only later became a member of the Council; see ps.-Dem. 11. 4 and G. Roux, *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Lyons 1979) 18, 166–67.

<sup>11</sup> *Fouilles de Delphes* III.5 19, lines 71, 75.

<sup>12</sup> Dem. 5. 14; 19. 51; Aischin. 2. 137.

<sup>13</sup> E. A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy* (London 1893) chapter 3; Roux (above, note 10) chapter 1; E.-J. Gehrke, *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta* (Munich 1986) 166–68.

<sup>14</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 292.

so.<sup>15</sup> In short, neither the Peace of Philokrates nor the end of the Sacred War constituted a "Common Peace" analogous to the settlement that Artaxerxes dictated to Antalkidas in 387/6 and again in 375 or to Pelopidas in 367/6.<sup>16</sup> Nor were these treaties of 346 identical with that made after the battle of Mantinea in 362.<sup>17</sup> In 346 there was no single, joint convention of the Greeks and no one formal, general treaty of peace mutually accepted. Instead, most of the major and many of the minor Greek states had simply settled their differences for the moment in separate situations and under separate treaties, and that without the participation of the King.

It remains to observe what Philip and the Greeks made of this state of affairs. The general response of the Greeks, when it can be documented at all, was largely favorable to Philip, as even the Athenians grudgingly admitted.<sup>18</sup> The Boiotians and Thessalians were pleased by Philip's diplomatic accomplishments. Demosthenes and Aischines, for once in agreement on a topic, realized that Athens had virtually simultaneously lost two wars. In the process, Athens had also lost Euboia, and Phokis was already politically dissected. The Peloponnesian allies of Thebes saw in Philip one willing to assist their friend and to continue the policies of Epameinondas.<sup>19</sup> Although consensus elsewhere in the Peloponnesos was lacking, that was nothing more than a reflection of normal Greek politics there, and yet another sign that many states did not consider the treaties of 346 as a "Common Peace." In Elis the citizenry was hotly divided between those who championed Philip and those who opposed him (Dem. 19. 260). In Megara Philip's supporters were so strong that Demosthenes (19. 294–95, 334) claimed that they almost handed the area to him. The Arkadians and the Argives openly honored Philip for his efforts (Dem. 19. 261). Thus, by 346 Philip had won new friends in a region where his influence had previously been negligible, and he was beginning to draw the noose around the Athenian neck. Furthermore, he did so solely on the basis of his own achievements without reference to any "Common Peace" and without drawing unwelcome attention from the King.

If the point needs any further demonstration, the history of the following years readily provides it. As early as 344 Demosthenes complained that Philip was breaking the Peace of Philokrates, which he describes as a treaty only between Macedonia and Athens.<sup>20</sup> Although he

<sup>15</sup> In 368 Philiskos tried to restore peace at a meeting in Delphoi (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 27; Diod. 15. 70. 2), but his presence there was independent of the Amphiktyonic Council. Delphoi, like Geneva today, was presumably chosen as a neutral spot. See also Ryder (above, note 3) 134–35; J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC* (Cambridge, MA 1980) 102–04.

<sup>16</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 242, 265, and (for 371) 269; for Pelopidas, see Buckler (previous note) 151–60.

<sup>17</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 292, with bibliography.

<sup>18</sup> Dem. 18. 219–20, 334; Aischin. 2. 119–20.

<sup>19</sup> Cawkwell (above, note 3) 108–13; Buckler (above, note 15) 145–47; G. Wirth, *Philipp II.* (Stuttgart 1985) 95–98; M. Errington, *Geschichte Makedoniens* (Munich 1986) 75–76.

<sup>20</sup> Dem. 6. 2; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 30.



also claims that Philip had designs on all of Greece, it is clear that most Greeks thought otherwise, and preferred to let Athens settle its own differences with Philip. Nor for that matter is there any evidence to suggest that Philip then entertained thoughts of the conquest of Greece. He had far too much to do in the northern Aegean to think of further fields of conquest to the south. Decisive proof of the point comes from the embassy of Python of Byzantion to Athens, also in 344.<sup>21</sup> Python and other ambassadors from Philip and his allies traveled to Athens to settle a dispute over the possession of Halonnesos. Python proposed to submit the question to the legal procedure of *symbole* and any other differences between Philip and Athens to arbitration.<sup>22</sup> Neither *symbole* nor arbitration had hitherto been a part of a Common Peace in the classical period. *Symbole* was a commercial contract between two states in which any dispute was to be settled in court.<sup>23</sup> Arbitration was normally a feature of peace treaties between two powers, such as that found in the Thirty Years' Truce and the Peace of Nikias.<sup>24</sup> Halonnesos was itself unimportant, but it provided the occasion to review the clauses of the Peace of Philokrates.<sup>25</sup> Some Athenians urged in response that the peace be amended and others that it be rescinded in order to regain Amphipolis, Poteidaia, and other places.<sup>26</sup> Still another ps.-Demosthenes, perhaps in this case Hegesippos, states specifically that the peace was limited to Athens, Philip, and their allies, and suggests that other Greeks should be included so that it could become a real and generally shared peace.<sup>27</sup> Here is additional contemporary testimony that nothing so

<sup>21</sup> Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) 493–95; Wirth (above, note 19) 115.

<sup>22</sup> Dem. 18. 136; ps.-Dem. 7. 7, 12–14; Plut. *Mor.* 804a–b.

<sup>23</sup> U. Kahrstedt, "συμβολή, σύμβολον 1," *RE* IV A (1931) 1088–90.

<sup>24</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 156, 183; M. N. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks* (Oxford 1913) 179. Ryder (above, note 3) 84–85, 140–44 suggests arbitration as part of the Peace of 362 on the authority of S. Accame, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV a.C.* (Rome 1941) 175, but there is actually no evidence for it. Arbitration cannot be proven an ingredient in the Common Peace even in the late Hellenistic period: W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* II<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig 1917) 665, lines 19–20. See also J. A. O. Larsen, *CP* 34 (1939) 378; 39 (1944) 160; Ryder 158–59, 161, but even here the evidence is at best inconclusive: M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* II (Oxford 1948) 179.

<sup>25</sup> If ps.-Dem. 12 truly came from Philip's hand, it would suggest that Philip also took the occasion to enjoy some fun at Athenian expense; see 12. 13–15, in which the author remorselessly proves the idiocy of the Athenian case. On the authenticity of the letter, see F. Wüst, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338* (Munich 1938) 133–36; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>4</sup> (Munich 1969) 301. According to ps.-Dem. 7. 33, the letter was still in the *bouleuterion*.

<sup>26</sup> Ps.-Dem. 7. 13, 18, 22–23, 26–27; ps.-Dem. 12. 8; 7. 18 alone argues against the statement of Cawkwell ([above, note 3] 124) that Philip suggested any amendments to the Peace of Philokrates (see also 7. 7–11). Indeed, Philip claimed (7. 32–33) that he had never agreed to amend the peace, which fully explains his offer only of arbitration.

<sup>27</sup> On the authorship of ps.-Dem. 7, see A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature*, Eng. trans. (London 1966) 604. The words of ps.-Dem. 7. 30–31 have special importance: Περί δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπανορθώματος, ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπανορθοῦσθε, τοὺς ἄλλους "Ἕλληνας, ὅσοι μη κοινωνοῦσι τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους εἶναι, καὶ εἰάν τις ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύῃ, βοηθεῖν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ἡγοῦμενοι καὶ δίκαιοι τοῦτο καὶ φιλόανθρωποι, μὴ μόνον ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους καὶ Φίλιππον καὶ τοὺς



formal as the previous King's Peace or the Common Peace of 362 was a feature of the Peace of Philokrates. The evidence is quite to the contrary. Nor did Philip accept the Athenian suggestion to broaden the peace. He obviously preferred to keep his diplomatic relations with other Greek states separate from those with the Athenians and some of their allies. Noteworthy, moreover, is that some Athenians now saw both Philip and the King as threats to Greek liberty (Dem. 6. 6, 11–12).

Immediately pertinent in this connection is yet another embassy to Athens in 344, this one from the King. The Persian ambassadors were received at a time when Macedonian envoys were also in the city. Philochoros, Androtion, and Anaximenes report that the Persian ambassadors stated that the King considered it appropriate that the peace and the ancestral friendship between them be maintained.<sup>28</sup> The Athenians replied stoutly that peace would endure between them unless the King attacked the Greek cities.<sup>29</sup> The arrival of the Persian embassy had absolutely nothing to do with that of Philip's. Artaxerxes at the time was engaged in reconquering Phoenicia and Egypt, and obviously wanted to recruit mercenaries, or, failing that, at least be assured of Athenian neutrality.<sup>30</sup> Nothing better reflects the complexity of the meaning of the concept of the common peace in these years than the Athenian response to these delegations. First, the term *koine eirene* nowhere appears here, merely a reference to hereditary friendship.<sup>31</sup> Yet the reference to peace in the context of the Persian delegation surely refers to previous treaties between the King and the Greeks. The Athenian allusion to the Greek cities obviously echoes the terms of the original King's Peace, by which Asia was Persian and Europe Greek. It simply repeats the Greek sentiments expressed earlier in the so-called "Reply to the Satraps." In essence, the Greeks considered a peace to be both *de facto* and also *de jure* in effect among themselves and between themselves and the King so long as he

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συμμάχους τοὺς ἐκείνου ἄγειν τὴν εἰρήνην, τοὺς δὲ μήθ' ἡμετέρους ὄντας μήτε Φιλίππου συμμάχους ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰρήνην ὑπάρχειν σωτηρίαν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἡμᾶς καταθεμένους τὰ ὅπλα. The words τοὺς ἄλλους "Ἕλληνας, ὅσοι μὴ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης prove that the phrase κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης need not, and in this case cannot, refer to a Common Peace. Rather it means only a specific peace shared by specific parties. In view of this passage alone, it is impossible to understand why Ellis (above, note 3) 146, claims that Philip proposed a Common Peace, when it was clearly an Athenian initiative.

<sup>28</sup> Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 157; F. Jacoby, *FGrH* IIIb (Suppl.) Text (Leiden 1954) 531–33; IIIb (Suppl.) Noten 426–30; Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 53; Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F 28. See also Diod. 16. 44; M. Sordi, *Diodori Siculi Bibliothecae Liber XVI* (Florence 1969) 81–82.

<sup>29</sup> E. M. Harris, *CP* 84 (1989) 36–44, denies that the Athenian response was haughty, yet the tone is decidedly firm, and reminiscent of the "Reply to the Satraps." Sealey (above, note 1) 172 fails even to address Harris' arguments.

<sup>30</sup> M. A. Dandamaev, *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (Leiden 1989) 309–11. For the date: Isok. 5. 102–03; S. Smith, *Babylonian Historical Texts* (London 1924) 148.

<sup>31</sup> In terms of hereditary friendship, the Argives had earlier done something similar, when they sent an embassy to Artaxerxes to ask whether the friendship that they had enjoyed with Xerxes was still in effect: Hdt. 7. 151.

confined his activity to Asia. Thus, the Greeks remained willing to abide by their part of the pact made in 386 and later renewed, the failure of the "Peace of Pelopidas" notwithstanding. Even though a multitude of events earlier in the fourth century makes the Athenian stance in 344 convenient, specious, and even sanctimonious, it was nevertheless legally correct.<sup>32</sup>

If peace of whatever sort prevailed in Greece in 344, it did not elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. A detailed account of these years would go well beyond the immediate theme of this piece, and can be found elsewhere.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, certain specific events pertain alike to the history of Philip's career, his relations with the King and some of his subjects, and with the Athenians, as well as to the topic of common peace. In the following years a single Macedonian policy both provoked renewed hostility with Athens and also brought Philip into conflict with the King. That policy was Philip's determination to subdue Thrace in order at the very least to anchor the eastern boundary of his empire on the western shore of the Hellespont. If successful, Philip would eliminate all Athenian influence in the northern Aegean, imperil the vital grain route of Athens, and give the King a powerful and perhaps unwanted neighbor.<sup>34</sup> War with Athens, its allies, and perhaps other Greek states was quite likely, and Philip could not readily foresee how wide such a war would be. Granted that possession of the Thermopylai corridor gave him a solid defensive position in the south, and granted that many Greek states felt well disposed towards him, the fact nonetheless remains that he had not yet secured either their loyalty or their obedience.<sup>35</sup> Even his settlement in Phokis had its dangers. Although the Phokians were physically and politically divided and garrisoned by Macedonians and Thebans, in terms of power the area was a political vacuum, one that Thebes could fill more quickly, if not permanently, than he, as the Theban occupation of Nikaia amply demonstrated.<sup>36</sup> It thus becomes clear that until Philip had conquered Thrace he could not in any reasonable strategical terms think either of moving south against Athens and the rest of Greece or of mounting a major invasion of Persian territory.

<sup>32</sup> Convenient: In 344 the Athenians were in no position to aid anyone. Specious: Iphikrates had earlier helped the Persians in precisely the same way that Artaxerxes requested in 344 (Diod. 15. 34). Sanctimonious: The Athenians were forced in 357 to recall Chares because he was leading rebellious Persian forces (Diod. 16. 21–22), but only after Artaxerxes' firm complaint. No diplomatic principles were involved in these episodes, only political expediency.

<sup>33</sup> Wüst (above, note 25) 86–140; Ellis (above, note 3) 125–59; Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) II 458–95; H. Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander der Große* (Munich 1985) 75–92; Dandamaev (above, note 30) 296–313; S. Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty* (Norman, OK 1992) 115–21.

<sup>34</sup> D. Kienast, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Munich 1973) 13–15 provides a discussion of Philip's Thracian ambitions and their place in his policy towards Persia.

<sup>35</sup> For the strategic importance of Thermopylai, see Aischin. 2. 132, 138; 3. 140 with schol.; ps.-Dem. 11. 4; W. A. Oldfather, "Nikaia 5," *RE* XVII (1936) 222–26; Buckler (above, note 3) 92–97.

<sup>36</sup> Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 56b.

Philip renewed his operations in Thrace in 342 and by the next year he had dethroned Kersebleptes and sent aid to Kardia in the Chersonesos to baffle Athenian aspirations there.<sup>37</sup> Despite the vociferous denials of some Athenian orators, Philip had every right to protect his Kardian allies from Athenian depredations.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, his intervention in the Chersonesos brought him again in conflict with the Athenians. Moreover, he moved farther north in the defense of the Greek cities of the Hellespont, where he was at first welcomed as an ally and protector (Diod. 16. 71. 2). The Athenians responded by claiming that he had broken the peace, and Demosthenes urged that embassies be sent to various Greek cities and to the King to stop any further Macedonian advance.<sup>39</sup> According to ps.-Demosthenes (12. 6–7), the Athenians had actually proposed to send an embassy to the King seeking a common front against Philip. Whether true or not, such a delegation, if limited only to a defensive alliance, would not violate the terms of the Peace of Philokrates.<sup>40</sup> Nor does ps.-Demosthenes 12 at any time accuse the Athenians of having violated any Common Peace. These factors make the reference to the King especially pertinent in this connection. Gone is the image of the King as the traditional enemy of Greek freedom. Elsewhere as well Demosthenes (10. 52) tells his audience that the King harbors friendly feelings for all of the Greeks except the Athenians.<sup>41</sup> He reminds them that they deserve such treatment for having earlier spurned the King's overtures (10. 34), an obvious reference to the events of 344. To mend this state of affairs he urges them to send an embassy to the King (10. 33), the latter a reflection of Demosthenes' earlier policy (9. 71). Ps.-Demosthenes shows no patience with those who call the King "the barbarian and the common enemy of the Greeks."<sup>42</sup> Although the Athenians apparently rejected his advice, at least some of them had obviously come to fear Philip far more than the King. He is ironically enough depicted as the one best able to protect the common liberty of the Greeks.

<sup>37</sup> Kersebleptes: ps.-Dem. 10. 5, 8; Diod. 16. 71. 1–2; Justin 9. 1. Kardia: Dem. 8. 14; 9. 16; ps.-Dem. 10. 60, 65; ps.-Dem. 12. 11; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39–45. The two events are linked by ps.-Dem. 10. 15–18 and Dem. 8. 14.

<sup>38</sup> Dem. 5. 25 (see also Diod. 16. 34. 4) in 346 admits that the Athenians had renounced any claim to Kardia in the Peace of Philokrates, thus leaving them no legal claim to it. Accordingly, Philip had no reason either to deny or to justify his aid to the city: Dem. 8. 14; 9. 16; ps.-Dem. 12. 11; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39–45.

<sup>39</sup> Dem. 9. 71; the passage referring to these embassies, though lacking in the best mss., is nonetheless printed by W. Dindorf and F. Blass, *Demosthenis Orationes*<sup>4</sup> (Leipzig 1901) ad loc.; ps.-Dem. 10. 33.

<sup>40</sup> If these accusations be true, however, they would be still another sign of the increasing isolation of Athens in Greek politics, and cannot then be taken as typical of the attitude of other Greek states. Since the Athenians had long been sending embassies to the King (Hdt. 7. 151), there is nothing implausible about the claim.

<sup>41</sup> For the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*, see A. Körte, *RhM* 60 (1905) 388–416; C. D. Adams, *CP* 33 (1938) 129–44; and now I. Worthington, *Mnemosyne* 44 (1991) 425–28.

<sup>42</sup> Didymos 6. 63–64; Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F 9; see also Jacoby (above, note 28).

The purported reason for this new community of purpose, insofar as it can be documented, is that Philip had wronged both the Greeks and the Persians. In fact, Philip had as yet done nothing of the sort to either. The only flimsy evidence that Philip harbored at that time any hostile designs against the King comes from the inconsiderable cases of Artabazos and Hermeias of Atarneus. After the failure of his revolt against Artaxerxes, Artabazos and his son-in-law Memnon fled to Philip's court.<sup>43</sup> Yet Artabazos' other son-in-law, Mentor, served so well as satrap of the Asian coast and overall commander of the Persian forces that he gained pardon for his kinsmen, who thereafter served the King faithfully.<sup>44</sup> The two Persians could at most have provided Philip with information drawn from experience and perhaps with some friendly Persian contacts. Yet they could hardly have served as useful agents for any designs that Philip may have made on the King's possessions. Nor had Philip harmed the Greeks during these years, his attention having been directed primarily against the Thracians.<sup>45</sup>

The career of Hermeias of Atarneus, for all of its dramatic qualities, could not have prompted hostility between Philip and the King. Hermeias is generally depicted as a political adventurer who took advantage of the turmoil in Asia Minor to turn Atarneus into his own independent principality and to expand his influence into the Troad. Although ps.-Demosthenes calls Hermeias Philip's agent, privy to the Macedonian's plots, he probably played no part in Philip's plans.<sup>46</sup> There is certainly no evidence at all of any formal treaty between the two, and absolutely none to support ps.-Demosthenes' claims about Philip's intentions.<sup>47</sup> A mere glance at the map will show that Atarneus could never successfully have served as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor. The political dimension of this relationship may have been nothing more elaborate than Philip's desire to remain on friendly terms with Hermeias and his colleagues in the Troad. Hermeias in turn wanted to remain in good standing with his new neighbor in Europe, especially should the failure of his ambitions make it necessary for him to seek asylum. The fate of Hermeias had nothing to do with Philip. Hermeias had independently, briefly, and ultimately unsuccessfully set himself against the King, a part of a larger and common enough pattern in Asia Minor in these years. He paid the price of his failure with his life. Even his famous refusal to divulge anything to the Persians

<sup>43</sup> Diod. 16. 52. 3; Buckler (above, note 3) 53 n. 35, with bibliography.

<sup>44</sup> Diod. 16. 52. 2; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 12. 9; A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I* (Oxford 1980) 112–13.

<sup>45</sup> Diod. 16. 34. 4; Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 308, 318; Wirth (above, note 19) 121–23.

<sup>46</sup> Ps.-Dem. 10. 32 and schol. to 10. 7; Didymos 4. 61–67; 8. 26–32; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F 250; Diod. 16. 52. 5. Although Wirth (above, note 19) 118–19 rightly sees an anti-Persian element in this relationship, Errington (above, note 19) 85 is correct in finding no long-cherished ambitions of Philip in the area. See also Sealey (above, note 1) 183.

<sup>47</sup> W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 298, nonetheless posits a formal alliance between them.



about Philip's plans may have resulted more from his lack of anything to say than from any philosophical principle or political friendship.

Philip did give both the Athenians and the King cause for alarm, when he attacked Perinthos and Byzantion without clear provocation. The details are obscure, but the complaints against the two cities are doubtless specious.<sup>48</sup> Philip and later Alexander claimed that Perinthos had wronged Macedonia and that Byzantion had failed to honor its treaty obligations, when it refused to take up arms against Perinthos. In terms of alliances, Byzantion had seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy, and Perinthos had apparently followed its lead.<sup>49</sup> Hence, they were bound neither by the agreements that had created the Athenian sea-league nor had they participated in the Peace of Philokrates. Byzantion had in the meantime agreed to an alliance with Philip that it interpreted as purely defensive in nature.<sup>50</sup> The Byzantines clearly did not believe that Perinthos was the aggressor, and accordingly refused to answer Philip's call to arms. Lastly, since Artaxerxes had never renounced his right to do what he considered "just," he could consider it proper for him to intervene against Philip to defend the "autonomy of Greek states small and great." Thus, in this incident at least two different treaties could be invoked, with each party interpreting the situation in the way that it wished.

Philip's attacks on Perinthos and Byzantion drew Athens and the King, albeit independently, closer to a common goal of thwarting Philip's ambitions in the area. At least one Athenian orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 6) even hoped that the King would become the paymaster of the Athenians in the effort to repel Philip. Although the King had never since the original King's Peace attempted directly to enforce his will militarily in Greece, he was now in a situation in which he could do so with very slight risk. He intervened so effectively that the orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 5) averred that the mercenary soldiers of the satraps of Asia Minor had compelled Philip to raise the siege of Perinthos.<sup>51</sup> Support for his claim comes from a variety of sources, some of them contemporary. Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F 222) reports that one Aristodemos of Pherai, who later commanded Greek mercenaries against Alexander the Great, had also served with the generals of the King against Philip. Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F 11b.5) also testifies to mercenaries in the pay of the King operating against Philip in defense of Perinthos. Diodoros (16. 75. 1-2) states that the King ordered his satraps on the coast to assist Perinthos with mercenaries, funds, food, and material. One of the mercenary commanders was Apollodoros of Athens, who was

<sup>48</sup> In the *Letter of Philip* (ps.-Dem. 12) no mention of Perinthos is made, even though the matter figures prominently in the *Answer to Philip's Letter* (ps.-Dem. 11. 3, 5); Dem. 18. 87; ps.-Dem. 12. 2; Diod. 16. 74. 2; Arr. *Anab.* 2. 14. 5; Justin 9. 1. 2-5.

<sup>49</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 17. 2; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley 1981) 181.

<sup>50</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 318.

<sup>51</sup> Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 T 54; Diod. 16. 75. 1.

dispatched by Aristes, the satrap of Phrygia.<sup>52</sup> An important aspect of this incident is that whatever the Greeks might make of the concept of the Common Peace, Artaxerxes still thought in terms of his original King's Peace. If he acted in 340 and not earlier, it was because these events provided him with a unique situation. He had never before enjoyed such a favorable opportunity directly to use military might to enforce his will in Greece without at the same time alarming the Greeks.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, there was no one to stop him, and the scene of action was far removed from the mainstream of Greek politics. He could even justifiably argue, although there is no evidence that he did, that he protected Greek freedom from Macedonian aggression.

Sometimes associated with these events is the alleged treaty of alliance and friendship between Philip and the King, which surfaces in a very suspicious context.<sup>54</sup> According to Arrian (*Anab.* 2. 14. 2), after the battle of Issos, Dareios sent Alexander a letter in which, among other things, he mentioned such a treaty. He also claimed that when Arsēs, son of Artaxerxes, became King, Philip first wronged him. The letter also observes that Alexander had sent no envoy to the King to confirm their ancient friendship and alliance. The events of 340 argue forcibly that the letter cannot be authentic. Nevertheless, even should one wish to accept it, it is obvious that the situation compelled Dareios to be as conciliatory and as aggrieved as possible. Alexander had just defeated him in pitched battle, Egypt was in the Macedonian's grasp, and even as Alexander read the letter he had the King's wife, children, and mother in his power. Dareios had every reason to bend the truth and to fabricate generalities of past amicable Persian and Macedonian relations. Furthermore, in his purported reply Alexander never acknowledges the existence of this treaty, much less does he defend his conduct by accusing the Persians of having been the first to violate it. Instead, he retails the various wrongs that the Persians had done the Macedonians and Greeks, a defense of Philip's publicly proclaimed reason for having invaded Persian territory in the first place. Alexander's letter provides no evidence whatsoever that the Macedonian was even aware of a treaty, which, even had it existed, would have had nothing to do either with the King's Peace or the Common Peace.

In his letter Alexander is himself guilty of trying to falsify history. He claims that Ochos at some unspecified time had sent a force into Thrace, then under Macedonian rule (*Arr. Anab.* 2. 14. 5). Yet it is virtually

<sup>52</sup> Paus. 1. 29. 10, on which see J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece II* (London 1898) 382–83; Strabo 16. 3. 5.

<sup>53</sup> Phamabazos' use of Konon during the Corinthian War is somewhat analogous: P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche*, *Historia Einzelschr.* 37 (Wiesbaden 1980) 81–85.

<sup>54</sup> Bengtson, *SdA II*<sup>2</sup> 333; Bosworth (above, note 44) I 228–33, with earlier bibliography. Wirth (above, note 19) 115 associates the treaty with the King's Egyptian campaign. Neither R. Bernhardt, *Chiron* 18 (1988) 181–98 nor Sealey (above, note 1) 308 n. 40 can prove a formal alliance.



impossible to substantiate the accusation. Theopompos mentions that Philip launched an attack on a Thracian tribe, the Tetrachoritai, also identified with the Bessoi, and the city of Agessos, to which Polyainos (4. 4. 1) adds that Antipatros played a prominent part in the operations.<sup>55</sup> Some have put this incident in 340.<sup>56</sup> Yet even without questioning the authenticity of a Macedonian campaign in this area, one cannot link the Persians to it. Geography alone is against any alleged Persian intervention in northern Thrace in this or, for that matter, any other time. Moreover, there is no comprehensible way that a Persian expedition to assist the Bessoi could be strategically significant to an effort to bring relief to Perinthos and Byzantion, even as a diversionary tactic. For the Persian-paid forces the distances were too great, the lines of supply too long, and the invading army too vulnerable to the danger of being cut off from its base. If Alexander's complaint has any validity at all, which is extremely doubtful, he must have referred to the actions around Perinthos. If so, he was doing nothing more than gilding the lily, and so that particular claim should not be taken as a separate grievance. Perhaps the important aspect of his allegation, despite its meretricious nature, is that it brings the point of friction between Philip and the King once again to Thrace. The soundest conclusion of all, however, is that the entire matter of a Persian-Macedonian alliance as related by Arrian is an ancient fabrication.

The only other piece of evidence available also supports the view that Philip had no official ties with Persia. Plutarch reports a Persian embassy to Philip that cannot be dated.<sup>57</sup> Philip himself was absent at the time, and obviously nothing came of the matter. It need not be doubted that Philip maintained contact with the satraps in Asia Minor and also with the King, but that hardly constitutes a treaty.<sup>58</sup> Nor have historians found an appropriate and convincing place in Philip's career for such a treaty. The only contemporary evidence to bear upon the matter comes from Demosthenes (4. 48). In 351 he claimed that some Athenians had spread the rumor that Philip had sent an embassy to the King, and immediately added (4. 49) that these rumor-mongers were a pack of fools. The important point in this connection is that the only contemporary witness, who was certainly no friend of Philip, displays no knowledge of any treaty between Philip and the King. Therefore, there is no need to postulate one.

Enough remains, however, to prove Philip's distinct interest in Asian affairs but nothing more. Even his response to the King's intervention in

<sup>55</sup> Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 217-18; Hdt. 7. 3. 2; Livy 44. 7; Steph. Byz. s.v. Tetrachoritai; E. Oberhummer, "Bessoi," *RE* III (1897) 329-31; W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus II* (Oxford 1912) 168.

<sup>56</sup> Beloch, *GG* III<sup>2</sup>.1 548-51; Bosworth (above, note 44) 231.

<sup>57</sup> *Alex.* 5. 1; *Mor.* 342b; J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch. Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) 13.

<sup>58</sup> A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934) 139 n. 1; Wüst (above, note 25) 89; Wirth (above, note 19) 148.

the Perinthian affair was defensive in nature. His new advances in Thrace gave Philip additional reason to seek friendly relations with his immediate Asian neighbors, as the incident with Pixodaros proves.<sup>59</sup> Pixodaros of Karia made overtures to Philip, seeking a marriage alliance. Philip treated the matter with his usual caution. Nothing came immediately of the contact, although Alexander would later reap the harvest of friendly relations between Macedonia and Karia. Nevertheless, this otherwise insignificant incident demonstrates both Philip's interest in Asia Minor and the realization of dynasts there that Philip could be a potential friend against the King. Yet nothing could be done in Asia until Philip had settled Greek affairs.

In Greece meanwhile the Athenians declared war on Philip in 340.<sup>60</sup> The Macedonian victory over the Athenians and Thebans at Chaironeia in 338 ended the period of open warfare. Victory also gave Philip the opportunity to secure the obedience of the other Greek states. He first made peace with his two opponents and their allies.<sup>61</sup> He next entered the Peloponnesos, where he settled a number of territorial disputes.<sup>62</sup> Having done so, he announced his intention to wage a war of revenge against Persia, and summoned the Greeks to a congress at Corinth.<sup>63</sup> Philip's conduct can be put into a traditional context. It was by no means unusual for Greeks to settle their differences and to choose a hegemon before embarking upon a war. Some had done so before Xerxes' invasion. Afterwards, without a formal peace having been concluded, some Greeks joined with Athens to establish the Delian Confederacy.<sup>64</sup> In the fourth century the Athenians called upon the Greeks to form a coalition under the hegemony of Athens to maintain the existing King's Peace. Similarly, in 378 Agesilaos had ordered Sparta's allies to suspend their various hostilities before his invasion of Boiotia (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 37). With the exception of the creation of the Delian Confederacy, in which peace was not a factor, the other examples display similarities. First, there is the concept of a generally perceived external threat; next, the necessity for Greeks to pool their resources against it; and lastly agreement among them on a leader that commanded overall respect. Those assembled at Corinth in 337 concluded

<sup>59</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 10. 1-3; Hamilton (above, note 57) 25-26. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 23. 7; Bosworth (above, note 44) I 152-53. Wirth (above, note 19) 151-52 rightly points out that Halikarnassos was too far removed to serve as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia.

<sup>60</sup> Ellis (above, note 3) 179-80, with full references at 288, correctly interprets Philip's seizure of the grain fleet as the last straw. Nevertheless, the Athenians are hardly innocent of blame for the deterioration of relations, if only because they had earlier and needlessly antagonized Philip in the Chersonesos: ps.-Dem. 12. 23; Dem. 8. 2; ps.-Dem. 9. 20, 23; schol. Dem. 10. 1 et passim.

<sup>61</sup> H. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* III (Munich 1969) 403.

<sup>62</sup> Polybios 9. 33. 7-12; 18. 14; Aelian, *VH* 6. 1; F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybios* II (Oxford 1967) 172-73.

<sup>63</sup> Diod. 18. 89. 1-2; *FGrH* 255, 5; Justin 9. 5. 5, 8.

<sup>64</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 130, 132, 257.

an alliance and elected Philip both hegemon and *strategos autokrator* of it. Philip immediately set quotas of soldiers and supplies to be contributed by the cities for the campaign against the King.

These conclusions lead to the question of whether Philip's settlement was considered a Common Peace. The answer, unfortunately, is not as simple as the question. Contemporary literary sources do not use the term until 330 (see below) and only two later secondary sources, Plutarch and Justin, apply it to this treaty. Plutarch (*Phok.* 16. 5) states that Demades introduced a bill enjoining the Athenians to participate in the common peace and the *synhedrion* of the Greeks (ἡ πόλις μετέχει τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν), which he could perhaps have found in Krateros' collection of Athenian decrees.<sup>65</sup> Justin's testimony is far less important, for in his eyes any large meeting of the Greeks could be seen as universal or common, and any state of peace that ensued would also therefore be general or common (9. 5. 2). Thus, he had earlier referred (8. 1. 4) to the Amphiktyonic Council as the "common council of Greece," which it decidedly was not.<sup>66</sup> In fact, most contemporaries do not use the phrase *koine eirene* in connection with the "Charter of the League of Corinth." Demosthenes (18. 201) speaks of Philip as lord of all Greece, and Aischines (3. 132) refers to the Macedonian hegemony of Greece against the Persians. Polybios (9. 33. 7) saw Philip as such a benefactor of Greece that he was given hegemony on land and sea. He further observed (9. 33. 11-12) that Philip forced the Greeks to settle their differences in a common body.<sup>67</sup> Even Diodoros (16. 89. 1-5), who has at least once manufactured a Common Peace for posterity, the "Peace of Pelopidas," never applies the term to the settlement of 337.<sup>68</sup> In brief, he states that after Chaironeia Philip wanted to be the hegemon of all Greece. In order to discuss with the Greeks matters of individual and general concern, he convened a common congress (*koinon synhedrion*) at Corinth, at which he was elected *strategos autokrator*. Both Plutarch (*Mor.* 240a-b) and the Oxyrhynchos Chronicle (*FGrH* 255, 5) record the creation of a common congress and the election of Philip as hegemon and *strategos autokrator*, but nowhere is peace mentioned.

Despite this body of testimony, there is ample reason to conclude that Philip's settlement indeed included a *de facto* and *de jure* Common Peace as part of his settlement of Greek affairs. Likewise, common or general peace in Greece now certainly has become a well-understood notion without,

<sup>65</sup> W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (Baltimore 1959) 20 s.v. Craterus, and for Plutarch's use of inscriptions: J. Buckler, *ANRW* II.33.6 (Berlin and New York 1992) 4794-99.

<sup>66</sup> Roux (above, note 10) 1-59.

<sup>67</sup> Walbank (above, note 62) II 171-73.

<sup>68</sup> Ryder (above, note 3) 137-39; Buckler (above, note 15) 198-201.

however, *koine eirene* having become a technical term.<sup>69</sup> The best monument to the complexity of Philip's settlement and the most important is the contemporary inscription often referred to as the "Charter of the League of Corinth."<sup>70</sup> Here one finds peace. The question becomes, "Of what sort?" The answer is complicated by the fact that most of the left-hand side of the inscription and some of the right are lost. Hence, resort must be made to restoration. Yet with so much of the original wording gone, virtually any restoration amounts to speculation. It is moreover unsound method to base a historical interpretation on one restoration, especially when others are equally possible.<sup>71</sup> For example, M. N. Tod prints the following text of lines 3–5 of the inscription:

[ν "Αρη θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσα]ς· ἐμμενῶ [ἐν τῇ]  
[ι εἰρήνῃ, καὶ οὐ λύσω τὰς συνηθῆκας τὰς πρ]  
[ὸς Φίλιππον Μακεδόνα, οὐδ]᾽ ὅπλα ἐποί[σω ἐ]

The stoichedon-count of the inscription is 33 but with irregularities. The extant parts of these lines read

[... 22 ...]ς ἐμμενῶ [...]  
[... 21 ...]νηθῆκας τὰ [...]  
[... 21 ...]᾽ ὅπλα ἐποί[...]

Hence, there are 26 letters missing from line 3, 24 from line 4, and 24 from line 5, although the restorations of [σ]υνθῆκας τὰς[ς] in line 4 and [οὐδ]᾽ ὅπλα ἐποί[σω ἢ] in line 5 are obvious. Even though some formulaic material helps to fill the gap at the beginning of line 3, its end and the beginning of line 4 remain a mystery. In fact, most restorations of lines involving *eirene* in this inscription are among the most intractable. Restorations of line 4 range from Wilcken's [τῇ σὺμμαχίαι] through Schwahn's [ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις] and Calabi's [ταῖς ἰσπονδαῖς] to Tod's and Wilcken's [ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ]. H. H. Schmitt (*SdA* III 403) wisely rejects all of them. The same problem occurs in lines 7–8, where two possibilities are equally acceptable. Once again, with due caution Schmitt rejects the one involving *eirene* and prints another, though with hesitation. Likewise, in lines 9–10 Köhler suggests οὐθενὸς τῶν τ[ῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντ]ων, a phrase that is indeed unrestored in Tod, *GHI* II 192, lines 12–13: ἀποτὸς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνουσῶν, the inscription

<sup>69</sup> G. Dobesch, *Der Panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v. Chr. und der "Philippos" des Isokrates: Untersuchungen zum Korinthischen Bund I* (Vienna 1968) 25; S. Perlman, *Historia* 34 (1985) 168–69.

<sup>70</sup> Schmitt, *SdA* III 403; E. Badian, in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford 1966) 51–52, 66 n. 60.

<sup>71</sup> For an earlier enunciation of this approach, see E. Badian and T. Martin, *ZPE* 61 (1985) 172; E. Badian, *ZPE* 95 (1993) 139. Restorations *exempli gratia*, no matter how attractive, do not constitute fact.

concerning Alexander's restoration of the Chian exiles.<sup>72</sup> Raue, however, posits [τῶν σπονδαῖς ἐμμενόντων].

Lines 19–20 have the most direct bearing on the question of a Common Peace in 338/7. Schmitt is quite alive to the difficulties involved, when he prints [οἱ ἀδικοῦμενοι (?)] καὶ πολεμήσω τῶν [τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην (?)] παρ]αβαίνοντι. If correct, this restoration would constitute only the second fourth-century epigraphical appearance of the phrase *koine eirene*. Three other equally suitable restorations have also been proposed, none of them involving the word *eirene*. Schwahn suggested instead τῶν [τὰς κοινὰς συνθήκας], with line 4 as support,<sup>73</sup> Schehl τῶν [τὰςδε τὰς συνθήκας], with lines 15–16 as support,<sup>74</sup> and Raue τῶν [τοῦσδε τοὺς ὅρκους], unsupported by anything on the stone.<sup>75</sup> Lastly, Heisserer prints *koine eirene* without comment.<sup>76</sup>

Only in line 14 is there an unequivocal reference to a sworn peace: τ[οὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὥμνουν. It is instructive that *eirene* cannot be modified by *koine* because of the stoichedon-count. The imperfect of the verb adds its own complications. Regarding the exchange of these oaths, it is impossible “to distinguish between the progress of an action and its mere occurrence”<sup>77</sup> or as an act or process not yet completed. It is conceivable, but not demonstrable, that the process of formally concluding the peace had not been completed when the delegates met at Corinth. For example, the Spartans stubbornly refused to participate in these affairs.<sup>78</sup> The epigraphical debut of the term may help to solve the problem. In Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 292 one reads in lines 2 and 5 of a *koine eirene*. Thereafter the noun is without any modifier but the article. At the beginning of this document, the Greeks were determined to emphasize the common nature of the peace among them and their desire to remain at peace with the King, so long as he refrained from interfering in Greek affairs. One does not find the same usage in line 14 of *SdA* III 403, the first time in the inscription when peace is undeniably mentioned. The absence of the phrase *koine eirene* in this context proves that it was not a technical term. As in 362 many Greeks and now the Macedonians had concluded peace without including the King. In fact, Philip had done precisely what the Athenians had urged in 344. The greater number of states involved made Philip's settlement even a more extensive and general peace than that concluded after Mantinea in 362. Because peace preceded the formal

<sup>72</sup> For a new edition of Schmitt, *SdA* III 403, see A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks* (Norman, OK 1980) 9.

<sup>73</sup> *Klio*, Beih. 21 (1930) 2, 37.

<sup>74</sup> *ÖJh* 27 (1932) 115–45.

<sup>75</sup> H. O. Raue, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes* (diss. Marburg 1937) 5–6, 72–74.

<sup>76</sup> Heisserer (above, note 72).

<sup>77</sup> W. W. Goodwin and G. B. Gulick, *Greek Grammar* (Boston 1958) 1261b.

<sup>78</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 240a–b; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 1. 1–2; 1. 16. 7; C. Roebuck, *CP* 43 (1948) 84–89; M. Clauss, *Sparta* (Munich 1983) 75.



congress at Corinth, at least in most cases, it could reasonably be called a common peace in a way that would generally be understood in Greece.

If the inscription recording Philip's settlement with the Greeks says nothing about a *koine eirene*, the phrase is likewise conspicuously absent elsewhere in contemporary Greek inscriptions, except in restorations that admit of other possibilities. The closest analogies come from Tod, *GHI* II 183 (= Schmitt, *SdA* III 403.II), lines 10–11, which is Alexander's renewal of Philip's treaty. Wilhelm, Tod, and Schmitt refuse restoration. Yet A. J. Heisserer in a masterful restoration prints [ἀλλὰ ἀπᾶσαι αἱ κοινωνοῦσαι τῆς εἰρήνης], which is reminiscent of Tod, *GHI* II 192, lines 12–13: αὐτοῦς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνουσῶν.<sup>79</sup> Heisserer was the first to observe the four-bar sigma at the beginning of line 11, yet he also notes that in line 11 a sigma and a tau occupy the same *stoichos*, which suggests that similar irregularities are possible elsewhere on the stone, thus making certain restoration ultimately impossible.<sup>80</sup> One will also seek the phrase in vain in the longer inscription printed by Schmitt (*SdA* III 446, the treaty between Antigonos and Demetrios and the Greeks). Although peace is mentioned several times (lines 22, 67, 72), it is never modified by *koine*, whereas war is (ὁ κοινὸς πόλεμος, lines 71, 77, 91). In these diplomatic contexts, *koine* and *koinos* are obviously as exclusive as they are inclusive.<sup>81</sup>

The problem of the nature of Philip's settlement is further complicated by still another technicality. There has long been a dispute as to whether the "Charter" is one of a Common Peace or only of alliance. Among recent scholars T. T. B. Ryder and S. Perlman claim that it is a Common Peace, largely on the basis of ps.-Demosthenes 17, but J. A. O. Larsen and A. J. Heisserer argue that the document is an instrument of alliance.<sup>82</sup> The very clauses of the inscription support the position of Larsen and Heisserer. The first of them, lines 4–7, concerns non-aggression among those who had sworn the oaths sealing the agreement. A similar clause appears earlier in Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 280, lines 23–30, an alliance between Athens and Dionysios I of Syracuse, in which both parties agree not to attack each other. This stipulation is also found in the Peace of Nikias (Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 188), which alone suggests that things may not be as clear-cut as one would like. Lines 12–13 require that no state overthrow a constitution then

<sup>79</sup> Heisserer (above, note 72) 4, 9, 80.

<sup>80</sup> Heisserer (above, note 72) 81–95, where Heisserer remarks that "the lettering is undistinguished."

<sup>81</sup> Compare Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 262, lines 21–22, referring to members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, as opposed to those outside it; Tod, *GHI* II 137, line 16, a reference to the common practices of the Greeks; and note 27 above.

<sup>82</sup> Ryder (above, note 3) 150–62; Perlman (above, note 69); Larsen, *CP* 20 (1925) 316–17; 34 (1939) 378. Larsen's theory that the alliance excludes the peace is contradicted by line 14 of the inscription. See also Heisserer (above, note 72) 8–20; A. B. Bosworth, *Historia* 20 (1971) 610–13; J. Seibert, *Alexander der Große* (Darmstadt 1981) 74–77; N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* III (Oxford 1988) 571–79.



in existence of a member state. This clause was very common in treaties among Athens and its allies.<sup>83</sup> One finds a version of it in the "Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy," where each ally has the right to live under whatever constitution it wants (Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 257, lines 10–12). This right is repeated in a treaty between Athens and Chalkis (Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 259, lines 21–26) and in the alliance between Athens and Dionysios (above, lines 23–30). Lines 15–19 of *SdA* III 403 pledge to provide mutual assistance to any of the parties that had been wronged or attacked. This clause is standard in alliances, as can be seen from a host of inscriptions. The reference to peace, such as that found in line 14 of *SdA* III 403, is also common, parallels being *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 34, 35, and 103. Finally, a fragment of *SdA* III 403 gives a partial list of the participants of the agreement, which again has an epigraphical precedent in Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 257.

Although the word "alliance" never appears in this document, even in a restoration, the fact of alliance is proven by the clear reference to the hegemon of the signatories in lines 21–22. A peace treaty did not have a hegemon, as witnessed by the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5. 18). The reference in lines 13–14 to a peace that was already considered sealed or in the process of being sealed strengthens the conclusion that peace and alliance were two separate parts of the same settlement, and that *SdA* III 403 dealt only with alliance. In fact, the "Charter of the League of Corinth" most closely resembles that of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which was also made within the framework of an existing peace.

Two other fourth-century sources later support the conclusion that Philip's settlement, taken as a whole, was considered a Common Peace. The first is the Athenian orator known only as ps.-Demosthenes (17, *On the Treaty with Alexander*). In his speech, which is normally dated to 331, he repeatedly refers to a Common Peace with Alexander, and accuses him of several violations of it.<sup>84</sup> One serious difficulty with the use of ps.-Demosthenes in connection with the events of 337 is the question of whether Alexander's arrangements were a simple renewal of Philip's pact or something new. Alexander, as had Philip before him, made some adjustments to the situation in Greece, especially in the Peloponnesos.<sup>85</sup> Other literary sources maintain that upon Philip's death Alexander immediately demanded that the Greeks recognize him as hegemon, and that

<sup>83</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 290, lines 24–34, an alliance among Athens, Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious, which guarantees the existing constitutions of the participants.

<sup>84</sup> Common Peace: 1. 2, 4, 16–17; violations: 4, 8, 10, etc.; G. L. Cawkwell, *Phoenix* 15 (1961) 74–78. Heisserer (above, note 72) xxvii, is quite right to note that no modern, systematic examination of this speech is available.

<sup>85</sup> Polybios 18. 14. 6–13, on which see Walbank (above, note 62) II 568–70. On this problem, Schmitt, *SdA* III 403 (p. 14) provides an extensive earlier bibliography, and Seibert (above, note 82) 74–76 an excellent discussion of the problem. My thanks to Professor Dr. Ralf Urban, who is in no way responsible for my conclusions, for his letter of 19 March 1990, with his helpful comments on this topic.

he assumed all of his father's other rights.<sup>86</sup> All of the evidence indicates that Alexander simply renewed Philip's settlement, and that he made his decisions regarding Peloponnesian affairs under its aegis. Furthermore, Alexander doubtless lacked the time, inclination, and the need radically to recast Philip's treaty. The second contemporary source is Aischines (3. 254), who in 330, immediately before the celebration of the Pythian Games and the meeting of the *synhedrion* of the Greeks, spoke against any Athenian decision to honor Demosthenes. Aischines' ostensible reason is that such a gesture would make it appear that the Athenians were sympathetic with those who violate the Common Peace. Hence, these two Athenian sources link the concepts of the Common Peace, the *synhedrion* of the Greeks, and the hegemon of an alliance with Macedonia.

Another episode, though not from a contemporary source, is singularly pertinent to this topic. Diodoros reports an incident that occurred in 335 during Alexander's siege of Thebes.<sup>87</sup> Before launching his assault on the city, Alexander sent a herald to invite the Thebans "to share in the peace that was common to the Greeks" (καὶ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰρήνης). The Thebans responded that anyone who wished to free the Greeks from tyranny should rather join them and the King. Although the Theban retort could conceivably refer to the abortive "Peace of Pelopidas" or more probably to the original King's Peace and its renewals, it is preferable to understand it as a denouncement of the state of peace in which the king of Macedonia had not only assumed the role of the King in Greek affairs but had also become the guarantor of the Common Peace. Significant also is that peace with the King is contrasted with a Common Peace shared by Greeks and Macedonians.<sup>88</sup>

The evidence, taken as a whole, presents a reasonably clear picture of the settlement in 338/7. In effect, Philip did several things in quick succession. He brought about a state of peace among the Greeks in which the King had played no part. Next, he established a broad Greek alliance of which the King was not a member. Philip thus excluded the King from Greek affairs, and freed the concept of a general Greek peace from the notion of the King's control. Lastly, he intended to use this situation against the King. The peace was only a component, albeit an important one, of Philip's policy towards the Greeks and Persians. Hegemony was the

<sup>86</sup> Diod. 17. 3. 1-2, 4. 9; Plut. *Alex.* 14. 1; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 1. 1-2.

<sup>87</sup> Diod. 17. 9. 5; see also Plut. *Alex.* 11. 8.

<sup>88</sup> As hegemon of the League of Corinth, Alexander had the right and the duty to maintain the peace and alliance that Philip had established. It was also utterly necessary for him to assert his position in the face of the first serious opposition to it. Yet more was involved than mere propaganda or rationalization. By invoking the Common Peace, Alexander issued a singular ultimatum to the Thebans, as well as a practical way in which to end the rebellion. If the Thebans surrendered and honored the Common Peace, they would return to the fold of the Greeks. If not, they would betray the Greeks, just as their forebears had done during the invasion of Xerxes, this at a time when Alexander was preparing to take his father's war of revenge into Asia itself.

essential element in Philip's plans, peace a means to make them possible of fulfillment, and war against Persia a traditional Greek way to bring them to completion.

The novel component of Philip's policy was to use the concept of general peace in Greece for ends certainly not envisaged in 386 and later. Both in 362 and again in 344 Greeks had said that they were at peace with the King, and thus would not take military or naval action against him so long as he honored the peace. Yet for Philip peace in Greece formed the foundation for a war to avenge the depredations of Xerxes, a grievance that had nothing to do with the conditions that had led to the original King's Peace. Since during the fourth century the King had not harmed the Greeks to any significant degree, a *casus belli* not covered by the King's original edict must be found to justify Philip's planned attack on Asia. For that purpose Xerxes' invasion served his needs well enough.

Once he had made peace and alliance with the Greeks, Philip turned his attention to the King, so it remains to ask what his intentions were in this area.

It may be . . . that [he] never had a blue-print of expansion and conquest, complete with dates, but instead often responded opportunistically to crises brought about by the drift of events or the actions of others.

That is actually the opinion of A. J. P. Taylor of the ambitions of Adolf Hitler, but the evaluation seems far more appropriate to Philip.<sup>89</sup> If Philip ever had a "master-plan," he never revealed it to anyone who subsequently repeated it, nor lived long enough to implement it. Hostile sources hinder understanding and baffle speculation. Nothing of the extant evidence suggests that he had had any ambitions in Asia until the King interfered with his Thracian operations, specifically the King's aid to Perinthos. Philip's Asian contacts further suggest that the Macedonian's ambitions were limited to the coast and to the environs of Asia Minor. The available evidence points to one reasonable conclusion. All of Philip's known contacts with the King's subjects and his rebels were with those in the immediate vicinity of the expanded Macedonian kingdom. As hegemon of the Greeks, he pursued a traditional Greek policy, one limited to the Aegean basin. There is absolutely no reason to think that he ever seriously looked beyond the Ionian coast. Seen in this light, one can justifiably conclude that Philip used the concepts of hegemony and peace in Greece to pursue a traditional and limited policy against the Persians. There is nothing to

<sup>89</sup> Taylor, quoted in C. Barnett, *Hitler's Generals* (New York 1989) 5. Nevertheless, Ellis (above, note 3) 175 refers to Philip's "time-table," a view quite common in the United States as early as the Colonial Period: Madison in J. E. Cooke (ed.), *The Federalist* (Middletown, CT 1961) 113; F. Ames in C. S. Hyneman and D. S. Lutz, *American Political Writing during the Founding Era II* (Indianapolis 1983) 1306.

suggest that he, like his son, ever seriously planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire.<sup>90</sup>

### Appendix: King's Peace and *Koine Eirene*

The term *koine eirene* is as remarkably absent from extant fourth-century sources as it is prominent in Diodoros' later account of Greek affairs. The most useful approach to the problem is perhaps to compare Diodoros' interpretations of the treaties with the evidence of the fourth century. By casting Diodoros' testimony in schematic form, one sees the following:

1. 14. 110. 3; 15. 5. 1 (387/6): The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all other Greeks shall be autonomous. Those refusing to accept these terms suffer war at the hands of the King and those who support him. The Greeks enjoy the *koine eirene* of Antalkidas.
2. 15. 38. 1 (375): The King sent ambassadors to Greece to conclude a *koine eirene*.
3. 15. 42. 2 (374): The Greeks no longer honor the *koine eirene* that had been made. Greek cities should be autonomous and free.
4. 15. 50. 4 (372/1): The King sent ambassadors to renew a *koine eirene* in accordance with former agreements.
5. 15. 51. 1 (371/0): Thebes not a participant in the *koine eirene* of 15. 50. 4.
6. 15. 70. 2 (369/8): Artaxerxes sent Philiskos to Greece to establish a *koine eirene*.
7. 15. 76. 3 (366/5): The King sent envoys to Greece to make a *koine eirene*.
8. 15. 89. 1 (362/1): After the battle of Mantinea the Greeks met to conclude a *koine eirene* and *symmachia*.
9. 15. 90. 2 (362): The Spartans were estranged from Artaxerxes because he had included the Messenians in the *koine eirene* on the same terms as the other Greeks.
10. 15. 94. 1 (362): Reference to *koine eirene* after Mantinea, obviously referring to 15. 89. 1, 90. 2.
11. 16. 60. 3 (346): The Amphiktyons established a *koine eirene* and *homonoia* among the Greeks.
12. 20. 46. 6 (307): Demetrios called upon the Rhodians to engage in war, but they refused to break the *koine eirene*.

<sup>90</sup> For Philip's ambitions, see S. Ruzicka, *AJAH* 10 (1985 [1992]) 84–91, whom I gladly thank for his kindness in having shared an earlier draft of his paper with me. The question is an old one: E. Badian in W. M. Calder III and A. Demandt (eds.), *Eduard Meyer* (Leiden 1990) 18–19. Perhaps the most nihilistic view ever presented comes from G. Clemenceau, *Demosthenes*, Eng. trans. (Boston 1926) 14–15, who claims that Philip waged his war against Persia "for ends that he never took the trouble to determine."

It is immediately obvious that in Diodoros' mind the meaning of *koine eirene* has not changed from his first use of it in 14. 110. 3 to his last in 20. 46. 6. Although by Demetrios' day there was no longer a Great King or a political system in Greece quite like that obtaining before Philip's victory at Chaironeia, Diodoros could nonetheless write of a *koine eirene* throughout the period, as though nothing at all had changed. The precise details of these various agreements differed, but Diodoros was indifferent to them.

The very concept of a Common Peace as a technical term is probably Diodoros' own creation, perhaps the result of his acceptance of Stoic ideas of universality, which range from the deity bringing nature into κοινὴν ἀναλογία (1. 1. 3), the commonality of life (τὸν κοινὸν βίον 1. 1. 1, 2. 1), common affairs (1. 1. 3), and benefactors for the common good (27. 18. 2).<sup>91</sup> Diodoros may very well have seen these fourth-century treaties in this very same light—pacts made for the common tranquility of mankind.

Whatever the interpretation of Diodoros' thought, fourth-century evidence tells a dramatically different story, one that can again be told most conveniently schematically in terms of nomenclature, participants, and treaty obligations:

1. The Peace of 386 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 242) is called the Peace of Antalkidas (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 36; Plut. *Artax.* 21. 5) and the peace that the King sent down (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 32, 35–36). It may also have been called a *koine eirene*, if the restoration of line 13 of *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 257 be accepted. *Basileus* (line 14) is preserved, as is part of *syn[thekas]*. The treaty put an end to the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 35; 5. 3. 27; see also Plut. *Ages.* 23. 1–5). All states, with some specific exceptions, were to be autonomous, whether or not they had been belligerents (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 31; Plut. *Artax.* 21. 5–6; *Ages.* 23. 1).
2. The Peace of 375 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 265): It is called a King's Peace (Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 151). The participants included the King (Dem. 19. 253), Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Amyntas of Macedonia, and most of the Greeks (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 1; Isok. 15. 109–10; Aischin. 2. 32; Dem. 3. 16; 19. 253; Nepos, *Tim.* 2. 2). All cities were to be free of garrisons and autonomous (Isok. 14. 10).
3. First Peace of 371 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 269): Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 18 mentions only *eirene*. The participants included the King, Sparta, Athens, and their allies. Thebes abstained. Terms called for general disarmament, and autonomy for all Greek states (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 12).
4. Second Peace of 371 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 270): This treaty was called a King's Peace (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 103, line 24). Although Athens, Sparta, and their allies attended (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 1, 3), Thebes presumably remained aloof. The terms were the same as those that the King had earlier sent down

<sup>91</sup> For an excellent study of this aspect of Diodoros' thinking, see K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton 1990) 23–54, which supplants Ryder (above, note 3) xiv–xv.



- (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 1–3). Included was an enabling clause whereby participants swore to take the field against anyone breaking the peace.
5. So-called Peace of Pelopidas (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 282): Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 39 refers to this pact between those Greeks who wanted to be friends of the King and the Thebans. Participation by the King is well attested, as is that of other Greeks (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 36; Plut. *Pel.* 30; *Artox.* 22). Stipulations called for a recognition of Messenian independence, a disarmament clause aimed at the Athenian fleet, and an enabling clause that bound participants to enforce the peace militarily, if necessary.
  6. Peace of 362 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 292): The first treaty unequivocally to be called a *koine eirene* in contemporary inscriptions, it is also described as *spondai* (Polyb. 4. 33. 8) and *eirene* among the Greeks (Plut. *Ages.* 35. 3). Neither the King nor the Spartans were participants (Polyb. 4. 33. 8–9). The terms embraced general peace and alliance. The terms declared that since the Greeks had concluded a general peace, they had no quarrel with the King, who had not harmed them.
  7. Peace of Philokrates (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 329): Given its name by contemporaries (Aischin. 3. 54; Dem. 19; see also Dion. Hal. *Epist. ad Ammaeum* 1. 11). The treaty was one of peace and alliance between Philip and his allies and Athens and its maritime confederacy. The King did not participate, nor did Phokis or Kersebleptes (Dem. 19. 49). Aischines (2. 57–61; 3. 58) urged that other Greeks be allowed to participate. The terms recognized the principle of holding what one possessed (Dem. 19. 143; ps.-Dem. 7. 26), and included an enabling clause.
  8. Peace of 346 (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 331): It ended the Third Sacred War. The King played no part in the peace, which was limited to Philip and most members of the Delphic Amphiktyony, with Athens, Sparta, and Corinth being conspicuously absent: Dem. 5; *Fouilles de Delphes* III.5, nos. 19–20.
  9. Founding of the so-called Hellenic League (*SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 343): The pact was an alliance of the Athenians, Thebans, several Peloponnesian cities, and various islands opposed to Philip, with Athens serving as hegemon. The King was not involved, nor is the alliance called a *koine eirene*.
  10. The League of Corinth (*SdA* III 403): Often called a *koine eirene* (ps.-Dem. 17. 2, 4; Justin 9. 5. 1; see Plut. *Phok.* 16. 5), it was a treaty of alliance and peace. The participants included Philip and “the Greeks,” and excluded the King. The terms involved peace, alliance, and recognition of Philip’s hegemony. One of its principal aims was war with the King (Justin 9. 5. 6; *FGrH* 255, 5).

Some conclusions follow from these sketchy observations, relating primarily to terminology and participants. Contemporaries obviously had no technical term for the peace treaties that the Greeks made either with the King or among themselves. The original Peace of 386 (no. 1) could be called either “peace” or “the so-called Peace of Antalkidas.” It could even



be called a *koine eirene*, should one accept the dubious restoration of the term in line 13 of *SdA* II<sup>2</sup> 257. Both the Peace of 375 (no. 2) and both of those of 371 (nos. 3–4) could be named the “King’s Peace.” In two cases (nos. 6 and 10) contemporaries referred to a *koine eirene*, but in neither instance was the King directly involved. Yet each peace was founded upon the basic stipulations of the earlier treaties. *Koine* is merely descriptive. When modifying *eirene*, it means nothing more than a general treaty of peace, whether or not the King was directly involved, in which the majority of the leading Greek cities settled their differences along the lines that had become traditional following the original treaty of 386. Therefore, it is erroneous to take Diodoros’ *koine eirene* as a technical term, sanctioned by diplomatic usage and so understood by all parties in the fourth century. Rather, it is a modern, anachronistic, and incorrect concept, a major misinterpretation of the evidence.

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## Reflexe hellenistischer Dichtungstheorie im griechischen Epigramm<sup>1</sup>

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Selten sind in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte wissenschaftliche Erforschung von Dichtung und eigenes poetisches Schaffen eine ähnlich enge Verbindung eingegangen wie zu Beginn jener Epoche, die mit der enormen Ausdehnung des griechischen Einflßbereichs in den Osten unter Alexander dem Großen einsetzte und die seit Johann Gustav Droysen gewöhnlich als Hellenismus bezeichnet wird.<sup>2</sup> Die maßgeblichen Dichter des Zeitraums von 323 (Alexanders Todesjahr) bis ca. 240 v. Chr.—unter ihnen so klingende Namen wie Kallimachos von Kyrene und Apollonios Rhodios—waren neben ihrer künstlerischen Aktivität auch im modernen Sinne sprach- und literaturwissenschaftlich tätig.<sup>3</sup> Vom ägyptischen Königshaus der Ptolemäer großzügig gefördert, haben viele von ihnen teils länger, teils kürzer im Museion, dem berühmten Musenheiligtum von Alexandrien mit seiner für damalige Verhältnisse einzigartig reichhaltigen Bibliothek, gewirkt. Zusammen mit anderen Gelehrten haben sie als erste die frühgriechische und klassische Literatur gesichtet und inventarisiert,<sup>4</sup> kritische Textausgaben veranstaltet, detaillierte Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Metrik wichtiger Autoren, nicht zuletzt Homers, angestellt—und

<sup>1</sup> Um Anmerkungen erweiterte und überarbeitete Fassung der im Sommersemester 1993 in Zürich als Priv.-Doz. und im Wintersemester 1993/4 in Mainz als Prof. gehaltenen Antrittsvorlesung. Es ist mir eine große Freude, diesen Beitrag Herrn Prof. Miroslav Marcovich zu widmen. Vor mehr als sechs Jahren hat er mit seiner großzügigen Bereitschaft, mir bereits vor der (1990 erfolgten) Publikation seiner Neuausgabe dreier ps.-justinischer Schriften Einblick in sein Typoskript zu gewähren, entscheidend zum Gelingen meines Habilitationsprojekts beigetragen. Dafür sei ihm auf diese Weise nochmals ganz herzlich gedankt.

<sup>2</sup> Zur Problematik der Periodisierung cf. R. Kassel, "Die Abgrenzung des Hellenismus in der griechischen Literaturgeschichte," in: ders., *Kleine Schriften*, hg. von H.-G. Nesselrath (Berlin-New York 1991) 154 ff. (= Berlin-New York 1987).

<sup>3</sup> Grundlegend dazu R. Pfeiffer, *Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie: Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Hellenismus*<sup>2</sup> (München 1978) 114 ff.; cf. auch P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) I 447 ff.; E.-R. Schwinge, *Künstlichkeit von Kunst: Zur Geschichtlichkeit der alexandrinischen Poesie*, *Zetemata* 84 (München 1986) 24 f.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. bes. Kallimachos' Πίνακες (dazu Pfeiffer [wie Anm. 3] 161 ff.; Fraser [wie Anm. 3] I 452 f.; R. Blum, *Kallimachos und die Literaturverzeichnis bei den Griechen: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Biobibliographie* [Frankfurt am Main 1977]).

sind damit zu den eigentlichen Begründern eben jener universitären Disziplin geworden, die wir heute als Klassische Philologie bezeichnen.

Daß die im antiken Griechenland vorher noch kaum betriebene philologische Tätigkeit<sup>5</sup> auch in den poetischen Werken dieser Autoren Spuren hinterlassen und zur Ausbildung eines neuartigen, erheblich verfeinerten Kunstverständnisses geführt hat, ist nicht überraschend. Die profunde Kenntnis der älteren Dichtung schlägt sich u.a. in zahlreichen, z.T. überaus subtilen literarischen Anspielungen nieder, die als entscheidendes Merkmal für die Blütezeit der hellenistischen Poesie gelten (man hat im Italienischen dafür den Ausdruck "arte allusiva" geprägt).<sup>6</sup> Als *poetae docti*, die überwiegend für ein ähnlich belesenes Publikum, wie sie selbst es sind, schreiben,<sup>7</sup> zeigen sie weiter eine ausgeprägte Neigung, entgegenes Bildungsgut aufzugreifen (z.B. wenig bekannte Mythenvarianten, aber auch ausgefallene dichterische Wörter—Glossen—, die als Resultat philologischer Studien in Handbüchern gesammelt vorlagen). Das Gefühl für sprachliche Reinheit war überdies durch die intensive kritische Beschäftigung mit Literatur aufs äußerste geschärft. Von Philitas<sup>8</sup> von Kos, der zu den Ahnherren der neuen Dichtung zählt, heißt es in einem fiktiven Grabepigramm sogar, er sei an der Suche nach fehlerhaften Wortfügungen—"presumably in his own writings"<sup>9</sup>—und allgemein an nächtelangem Grübeln zugrunde gegangen.<sup>10</sup> Das ist selbstverständlich boshafte Karikatur, wirft aber nichtsdestoweniger ein bezeichnendes Licht auf die akribische Arbeitsweise der frühhellenistischen Dichterphilologen, denen sprachliche Korrektheit und überhaupt artistische Vollkommenheit ganz besonders am Herzen lagen.

Solche Vollkommenheit ist naturgemäß in dichterischen Kleinformen eher zu erreichen als in umfangreichen Gattungen wie dem Epos. Das ist ein, wenn nicht der Hauptgrund für den einzigartigen Aufschwung, den die

<sup>5</sup> Zur Vorgeschichte cf. Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 18 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Literaturangaben bei M. B. Skinner, "Aphrodite Garlanded: *Erôs* and Poetic Creativity in Sappho and Nossis," in: F. De Martino (Hg.), *Rose di Pieria*, "le Rane," Studi 9 (Bari 1991) 91 Anm. 25; cf. auch P. Bing, *The Well-Read Muse: Present and Past in Callimachus and the Hellenistic Poets*, Hypomnemata 90 (Göttingen 1988) 73 Anm. 39.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 23 "... die neue Poesie ... setzt sich in der Tat nur noch in Bezug zu einem kleinen Kreis von Kennern und literarischen Spezialisten; sie ist esoterisch, will Exklusivität." Als Extremfall ist auf Philikos zu verweisen, der sich im Proömium seines Demeterhymnus ausdrücklich an "Philologen" wendet (*SH* 677 καινογράφου συνθέσεως τῆς Φιλίκου, γραμματικοί, δῶρα φέρω πρὸς ὑμᾶς).

<sup>8</sup> Dies die korrekte Form des Namens; cf. C. W. Müller, "Philetas oder Philitas?" in: P. Steinmetz (Hg.), *Beiträge zur hellenistischen Literatur und ihrer Rezeption in Rom*, Palingenesia 28 (Stuttgart 1990) 30 ff.

<sup>9</sup> D. L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge 1981) 442.

<sup>10</sup> Anon. *Epigr.* cxxviii FGE ξεῖνε, Φιλίτας εἰμί· λόγων ὁ ψευδόμενός με / ὤλεσε καὶ νυκτῶν φροντίδες ἐσπέριοι (zur seltenen Fügung am Schluß, der mutmaßlichen Pointe des Distichons, siehe Page ad loc.); cf. auch Hermesianax *Leontion* fr. 7. 77 Powell περί πάντα Φιλίταν / ῥήματα καὶ πᾶσαν <τ>ρυόμενον λαλήν; C. W. Müller, "Erysichthon: Der Mythos als narrative Metapher im Demeterhymnos des Kallimachos," *Mainzer Akad. der Wiss. und der Literatur, Abhandl. der geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl.* 1987, 13 (Mainz-Stuttgart 1987) 40 f.

Epigrammdichtung in dieser Zeit genommen hat.<sup>11</sup> Die hellenistischen Dichter sahen in dem auf wenige Verse eingegrenzten Epigramm—übrigens überhaupt weitgehend eine Schöpfung der Griechen<sup>12</sup>—offenkundig eine ihnen kongeniale Kunstform.<sup>13</sup> Sie pflegten nicht nur die traditionellen Typen, die Weihe- und die Grabinschrift, weiter und verfeinerten sie, wobei der Anlaß immer häufiger fiktiv wurde und die Verse nicht mehr, wie ursprünglich, zur Beschriftung eines Gegenstandes, sondern von vornherein zur Publikation in Buchform bestimmt waren. Auch ganz neue Gebiete wurden dem Epigramm erschlossen. So machten diese Poeten u.a. das alltägliche Leben, bukolische Szenen, Wein und Liebe oder Werke der bildenden Kunst zum Gegenstand solcher Kurzgedichte.

Zu einem beliebten Thema wurde aber auch die Literatur selbst. Man verfaßte Epigramme auf z.T. längst verstorbene berühmte Dichter und Dichterinnen.<sup>14</sup> Editionen wurden mit eigens dafür komponierten Epigrammen eingeleitet, welche u.a. Titel und Name des Verfassers enthielten.<sup>15</sup> In solchen und ähnlichen Epigrammen finden sich nun nicht selten bald implizite, bald explizite Urteile über die dichterische Qualität eines Werkes, die für die Kunstästhetik jener Epoche überaus aufschlußreich sind. Der eigene literarische Standpunkt und derjenige anderer Autoren werden dabei oft durch raffinierte Anspielung oder auch durch ausdrückliche Berufung auf klassische Vorbilder wie Homer und Hesiod umschrieben.

Derartigen Brechungen hellenistischer Dichtungstheorie soll im folgenden nachgegangen werden, und zwar sowohl echten wie auch vermeintlichen, wobei im vorgegebenen Rahmen das Thema natürlich nur anhand ausgewählter Beispiele behandelt werden kann. In der ersten Hälfte dieses Beitrags werden einige Epigramme des bedeutendsten Exponenten der neuen Dichtung, des Kallimachos,<sup>16</sup> erörtert, die in der für diese Gattung charakteristischen Verknappung wichtige ästhetische Grundsätze des alexandrinischen Dichterphilologen erkennen lassen, dessen Kunstideal

<sup>11</sup> Cf. dazu R. Reitzenstein, "Epigramm," *RE* VI (1907) 81 ff.; J. Geffcken, "Studien zum griechischen Epigramm," *NJb für das Klass. Altertum* 20 (1917) 102 ff.; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* (Berlin 1924) I 119 ff. und II 102 ff.; H. Beckby, *Anthologia Graeca I-VI*<sup>2</sup> (München 1965) 20 ff.; Fraser (wie Anm. 3) I 553 ff.; E. Degani, "L'epigramma," in: R. Bianchi Bandinelli (dir.), *Storia e civiltà dei Greci* IX (Mailand 1977; Repr. 1991) 266 ff.; G. Tarditi, "Per una lettura degli epigrammatisti greci," *Aevum Antiquum* 1 (1988) 12 ff.; G. Hutchinson, *Hellenistic Poetry* (Oxford 1988) 20 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Die Phönizier, von denen die Griechen wohl angeregt waren, kannten anscheinend nur Prosainschriften; cf. P. Friedländer, *Epigrammata: Greek Inscriptions in Verse from the Beginning to the Persian War*, with the collaboration of H. B. Hoffleit (London-Berkeley 1948; Repr. Chicago 1987) 7; G. Pfohl, in: *L'épigramme grecque*, Entretiens Fond. Hardt 14 (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1968) 27.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Degani (wie Anm. 11) 268.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. M. Gabathuler, *Hellenistische Epigramme auf Dichter* (Diss. Basel 1937).

<sup>15</sup> Beispiele bei Page (wie Anm. 9) 336 f.; cf. auch Bing (wie Anm. 6) 29 f.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 3 "Kallimachos ist . . . der Exponent der neuen Dichtung, und das nicht nur, weil er ihr begabtester und extremster Vertreter war, sondern vor allem weil er über die Möglichkeit von Poesie in seiner Zeit am intensivsten nachgedacht hat."

bekanntlich über römische Dichter wie Catull, Horaz und Properz auch abendländische Poetiken beeinflusst hat. Diese Epigramme sind in der modernen Forschung keineswegs unbeachtet geblieben, im Gegenteil.<sup>17</sup> Gleichwohl ist manches noch immer umstritten, und ich glaube, daß bei einer erneuten Untersuchung verschiedene Punkte—z.T. Kleinigkeiten, aber auch Dinge von Belang—klarer gefaßt werden können, als dies bisher geschehen ist. Der kürzere zweite Teil gilt dann einem Epigramm der Nossis—einer Dichterin aus dem unteritalischen Lokroi, die wohl ungefähr gleichzeitig wie Kallimachos gelebt hat.<sup>18</sup> In ihrem kühnen Lob auf Eros glaubte man in den letzten Jahrzehnten ein buntes Geflecht literarischer Anspielungen feststellen zu können. Darauf gestützt pflegt man heute die vier Verse gerne als spezifisch weibliches poetisches Manifest zu deuten—eine Deutung, die freilich, wie ich meine, einer genauen Prüfung nicht standzuhalten vermag.

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Beginnen wir, wie gesagt, mit Kallimachos, und zwar mit einem Gedicht auf Arat, den wohl nur wenig älteren<sup>19</sup> Verfasser eines in Antike und Mittelalter überaus beliebten astronomisch-meteorologischen Lehrgedichts—der *Phainomena*—, aus dem bekanntlich auch der Apostel Paulus in der Areopagrede einen Vers zitiert<sup>20</sup> (*Epigr. lvi*<sup>21</sup> = 27 Pfeiffer):

Von Hesiods Art ist dieser Gesang. Nicht den höchsten  
Sänger, sondern ich fürchte, das süßeste epische Gedicht hat  
der Mann von Soloi nachgebildet. Seid begrüßt, feine  
Worte, (Frucht von) Arats angestrengte(r) Schlaflosigkeit.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Cf. besonders auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 5 ff. (mit zahlreichen Literaturangaben).

<sup>18</sup> Zur Datierung siehe unten Anm. 112.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. V. Arati I, p. 9,5 Martin μέμνηται γοῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ Καλλιμάχος ὡς πρεσβυτέρου κτλ.; die Angaben in den Quellen sind allerdings widersprüchlich (cf. W. Ludwig, "Aratos," *RE Suppl.* X [1965] 27).

<sup>20</sup> NT App. 17. 28 ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, ὡς καὶ τινες τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασιν. "τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν" (Arat *Phaen.* 5).

<sup>21</sup> Zählung im folgenden, wenn nicht anders vermerkt, nach D. L. Page (Hg.), *Epigrammata Graeca* (Oxford 1975). Die Abkürzung "HE" nach einer Zahl bezieht sich auf Gow–Page (wie Anm. 23), "GPh" auf A. S. F. Gow–D. L. Page (Hgg.), *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams* (Cambridge 1968), und "FGE" auf Page (wie Anm. 9).

<sup>22</sup> 'Ἡσιόδου τόδ' αἶσισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος· οὐ τὸν αἰοιδῶν

ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον

τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμᾶξάτο. χαίρετε λεπταί

ρήσεις, 'Αρήτου σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη.

1 τόδ' Codd.: τό τ' Blomfield | αἰοιδῶν Scaliger: αἰοιδόν Codd. || 4 σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη P: σύγγονος ἀγρυπνίης V. Arati I, p. 9,16 Martin (cf. III, p. 18,1 f.); die kühne Metalepse der in P überlieferten Lesart ist wohl trotz Leonides von Alex. vii. 1 f. *FGE* . . . βύβλον, / . . . ἰσηρίθμου σύμβολον εὐεπίης nicht mit Ruhnken zu σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης zu emendieren; cf. G. Lohse, "ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ ΑΓΡΥΠΝΙΗ (zu Kallimachos *Epigr.* 27,4),"



Die Übersetzung läßt die Schwierigkeiten, welche das kunstvolle kleine Gebilde den Interpreten aufgibt, kaum erkennen. Schon der erste Satz ist nämlich im Griechischen nicht ohne weiteres verständlich. In der Lesart der Handschriften lautet er wörtlich: "Hesiōds ist dieser Gesang und die Art." Die meisten modernen Herausgeber, u.a. Pfeiffer und Page, beseitigen das Demonstrativpronomen τὸδ'. Sie sind der Ansicht, das überlieferte Ἡσιόδου τὸδ' ἄεισμα eigne sich nur als Aufschrift für ein Hesiodisches Werk, und übernehmen daher die Emendation Blomfields τὸ τ' (also "Hesiōds ist sowohl der Gesang wie die Art" der *Phainomena*).<sup>23</sup> Diese Änderung erweist sich indessen als unnötig, sobald man beachtet, daß Kallimachos hier ein durchaus gängiges Stilmittel, das sogenannte Hendiadyoin, verwendet, den zusammengesetzten Begriff also in seine zwei Teile zerlegt. Mit anderen Worten: "Hesiodisch ist dieser Gesang und die Art" steht für "Hesiodisch ist die Art dieses Gesangs."<sup>24</sup>

Auf ein Demonstrativpronomen möchte man in einem Epigramm wie dem unsrigen in der Tat nicht verzichten. Denn daß es als Aufschrift für eine Buchrolle gedacht war, die Arats *Phainomena* enthielt, steht wohl außer Zweifel. Bei griechischen Epigrammen dieser Art aber war es üblich, auf das betreffende Werk unmißverständlich hinzuweisen. "Dies ist die süße (Frucht von) Erinna's Mühe," beginnt beispielsweise Kallimachos' Zeitgenosse Asklepiades von Samos, auf den wir noch zurückkommen werden, ein entsprechendes Gedicht auf eine Ausgabe der Erinna, einer beliebten frühhellenistischen Dichterin (xxviii. 1 ὁ γλυκὺς Ἑρίννας οὗτος πόνος). Das hinweisende Pronomen ist allenfalls dann überflüssig, wenn der Dichter nach dem Vorbild echter Grabinschriften, in denen der Grabstein in Ich-Form zum Betrachter spricht, den edierten Text sich selbst vorstellen läßt. Dies ist z.B. in Kallimachos' Epigramm auf ein in der Antike Homer zugeschriebenes Epos der Fall, welches nach Ansicht unseres Dichterphilologen in Wirklichkeit von Kreophylos von Samos stammt (lv. 1

*Hermes* 95 (1967) 379 ff. und A. Cameron, "Callimachus on Aratus' Sleepless Nights," *CR* 22 (1972) 169 f., die beide allerdings die Leonides-Parallele übergehen (daß die Fügung σύντονος ἀργυρνία bei Joh. Chrysost. *De sacerdotio* 2. 2 = PG XLVIII 633 und in der Praefatio der frühbyz. *Vita s. Melaniae* eine Kallimachosreminiszenz ist, scheint mir im übrigen gegen Wifstrand—bei Herter [wie Anm. 80] 226—bzw. Cameron loc. cit. zweifelhaft; denn sowohl ἀργυρνία wie σύντονος werden nicht selten zur Kennzeichnung des Eifers christlicher Asketen verwendet; cf. Lampe s.v.).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. E. Reitzenstein, "Zur Stiltheorie des Kallimachos," in: Ed. Fraenkel et al., *Festschrift R. Reitzenstein* (Leipzig-Berlin 1931) 46 f. "Ἡσιόδου τὸδ' ἄεισμα könnte nur heißen: 'dieses Gedicht ist von Hesiod'; Pfeiffer ad loc. 'τὸδ', si ipsius Hesiodi carminis inscriptio esset"; A. S. F. Gow-D. L. Page (Hgg.), *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* II (Cambridge 1965) 208 "Since the subject of the epigram is plainly Aratus, not Hesiod, the correction τὸ τ' for τὸδ' is clearly necessary."

<sup>24</sup> Damit erübrigen sich auch Spekulationen über die Bedeutung von ἄεισμα, wie sie sich im maßgeblichen modernen Kommentar von Gow-Page (wie Anm. 23) 208 finden.



f. = 6. 1 f. Pfeiffer in der Übersetzung von Emil Staiger): "Bin des Samiers Werk, der einst den göttlichen Sänger / Aufgenommen bei sich."<sup>25</sup>

Im Epigramm auf Arat ist anders als in diesem Vierzeiler nicht die Verfasserschaft<sup>26</sup> das philologische Problem. Vielmehr geht es um die Frage nach dem literarischen Modell. Wir wissen, daß es in der Antike eine Auseinandersetzung darüber gab, ob sich Arat in den *Phainomena* hauptsächlich Homer, von dem er zahlreiche sprachliche Wendungen übernimmt, oder vielmehr Hesiod zum Vorbild genommen hat,<sup>27</sup> dessen *Werke und Tage* ebenfalls mit einem Hymnus auf Zeus beginnen und die allgemein als Archetyp der Gattung des Lehrgedichts galten.<sup>28</sup> Kallimachos gibt seiner eigenen Auffassung deutlich Ausdruck, wenn er anhebt: "Von Hesiods Art ist dieser Gesang."<sup>29</sup>

Als nächstes würde man ein paar Worte zum Inhalt des eingeleiteten Werkes erwarten,<sup>30</sup> doch Kallimachos bleibt bei der Literaturkritik. In aller Behutsamkeit formuliert er ein Urteil über die literarische Qualität des Vorbilds der *Phainomena*, welches nicht nur für sein eigenes Verhältnis zu Homer und Hesiod sehr aufschlußreich ist, sondern indirekt zugleich auch ersichtlich werden läßt, warum er Arats Sterngedicht so sehr schätzt:

Nicht den (wörtlich) äußersten  
Sänger, sondern ich fürchte, das süßeste epische Gedicht hat  
der Mann von Soloi nachgebildet.

Die Deutung dieser Verse ist teilweise umstritten. Verschiedene Interpreten sind der Auffassung, daß hier allein von Hesiod die Rede sei, wobei die

<sup>25</sup> Τοῦ Σαμίου πόνος εἰμὶ δόμῳ ποτὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν / δεξαμένου κτλ.; cf. allgemein zu diesem Gedicht Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 9 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. ebenfalls Kallimachos *Epigr.* fr. 397 Pfeiffer (Echtheit des homerischen Margites).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. V. Arati II, p. 12,7 Martin ζηλωτῆς δὲ ἐγένετο τοῦ ὁμηρικοῦ χαρακτήρος κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπῶν σύνθεσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ αὐτὸν λέγουσιν Ἡσιόδου μᾶλλον ζηλωτὴν γεγονέναι. καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ Ἡσιόδος τῶν Ἔργων καὶ Ἡμερῶν ἀπαρχόμενος τῶν ὕμνων ἀπὸ Διὸς ἤρξατο λέγων "Μοῦσαι Πιερὶθην ἀοιδῆσι κλείουσαι, / δεῦτε Δί' ἐννέπετε," οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἄρατος τῆς ποιήσεως ἀρχόμενος ἔφη "ἔκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα"· τὰ τε περὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ, <καὶ> κατὰ πολλοὺς ἄλλους μύθους. Βοηθὸς δὲ ὁ Σιδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν οὐχ Ἡσιόδου αὐτὸν ζηλωτὴν, ἀλλ' Ὀμήρου γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ πλάσμα τῆς ποιήσεως μείζον ἢ κατὰ Ἡσιόδον; V. Arati IV, p. 21,7 Martin ζηλωτὴν δὲ τοῦτόν φασι γενέσθαι Ὀμήρου, οἱ δὲ Ἡσιόδου μᾶλλον; V. Arati I, p. 9,10 Martin (Anm. 29); Suda s.v. Arat τὰ Φαινόμενα, ὧν θαυμάσιος ἡ εἰσβολὴ καὶ ὁ ζήλος ὁμηρικῶς; Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 43 f.; H. Reinsch-Werner, *Callimachus Hesiodicus: Die Rezeption der hesiodischen Dichtung durch Kallimachos von Kyrene* (Berlin 1976) 10; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 12.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. u.a. B. Effe, *Dichtung und Lehre: Untersuchungen zur Typologie des antiken Lehrgedichts*, *Zetemata* 69 (München 1977) 24 f.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. V. Arati I, p. 9,10 Martin γέγονε δὲ ὁ Ἄρατος ζηλωτῆς Ἡσιόδου, ὡς καὶ Καλλιμάχος παρεσημῆνατο τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιγράμματος οὕτως; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 12: Das Epigramm greift "gezielt in eine diesbezügliche, gleichsam literarhistorische Kontroverse ein."

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Epigr.* lv. 2 f. = 6. 2 f. Pfeiffer κλείω δ' Εὐρυτον ὅσσ' ἔπαθεν, / καὶ ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν (zu den Grundlinien des Epos cf. W. Burkert, "Die Leistung eines Kreophylos: Kreophyleer, Homeriden und die archaische Heraklesepi," *MH* 29 [1972] 80 ff.).

einen an der überlieferten Lesart τὸν ἀοιδόν / ἔσχατον festhalten und den Text so verstehen, als ob Kallimachos sagen möchte, Arat habe diesen Dichter nicht bis zum äußersten, sondern vielmehr nur in seinen süßeren, d.h. glatteren und eleganteren, Versen nachgebildet.<sup>31</sup> Andere übernehmen die geringfügige Emendation von Scaliger und verstehen οὐ τὸν ἀοιδῶν ἔσχατον als Litotes ("nicht den letzten, den schlechtesten der Dichter hat Arat nachgeahmt").<sup>32</sup> Zumindest die erste Lösung käme einer impliziten Kritik an Hesiod gleich, der jedoch nach allem, was wir sonst wissen, bei Kallimachos in so hohem Ansehen stand, daß sein Name, um mit Pfeiffer zu sprechen, "sogar so etwas wie ein Programm für die neue Dichtung von der Art der *Aitia*" war.<sup>33</sup>

Viel plausibler erscheint daher die schon von Karl Dilthey, Ulrich von Wilamowitz und Erich Reitzenstein vertretene Annahme, daß Kallimachos in diesen Versen Hesiod und Homer einander gegenüberstellt.<sup>34</sup> In der Tat, daß mit dem "äußersten Sänger"—das Adjektiv ἔσχατος ist an sich wertneutral und bezeichnet "nur den äußersten Punkt einer Skala"<sup>35</sup>—Homer gemeint ist, macht auch der Vergleich mit dem ersten Vers des erwähnten Epigramms auf Kreophylos (lv = 6 Pfeiffer) wahrscheinlich, wo Homer ebenfalls ohne Nennung des Namens als der "göttliche Sänger" (θεῖον ἀοιδόν)<sup>36</sup> eingeführt wird. Im Unterschied zu diesem Sänger *par excellence* zeichnet sich Hesiods Lehrgedicht, von dessen Art Arats Gesang ist, durch einzigartige Süßigkeit aus (2 f. τὸ μελιχρότατον / τῶν ἐπέων).

Damit ist ein wichtiges Stichwort für Kallimachos' Poetik genannt. Denn Süßigkeit nimmt er an anderer Stelle auch für seine eigene Dichtung

<sup>31</sup> G. Kaibel, "Aratea," *Hermes* 29 (1894) 120; Gow-Page (wie Anm. 23) 208 f. (zustimmend Hutchinson [wie Anm. 11] 79 Anm. 104); cf. auch W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom: Die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit*, Hermes Einzelschriften 16 (Wiesbaden 1960) 57, der zwar grundsätzlich anerkennt, daß das erste Glied auf Homer zu beziehen ist, τὸ μελιχρότατον τῶν ἐπέων aber gleichwohl für doppeldeutig hält: "Es kann heißen nicht nur 'das Süßeste der Epik' (= Hesiod), sondern bereits auch im KAIBELschen Sinn 'das Süßeste der hesiodischen Epik' (also das Beste an Hesiod, der ja bereits genannt war [V. 1])."

<sup>32</sup> W. Ludwig, "Die Phainomena Arats als hellenistische Dichtung," *Hermes* 91 (1963) 428 (= A. D. Skiadas [Hg.], *Kallimachos*, WdF 296 [Darmstadt 1975] 305); ähnlich schon Bentley (cf. C. Dilthey, *De Callimachi Cydippa* [Leipzig 1863] 11); siehe ferner auch G. Lohse, "Der Aitienprolog des Kallimachos als Reproduktion von Wirklichkeit," *A&A* 19 (1973) 31.

<sup>33</sup> Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 150. Cf. Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 11 f.; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 14 (Hesiod wird außer in unserem Epigramm noch in der Berufungsszene fr. 2. 2 Pfeiffer erwähnt; dazu siehe A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik: Untersuchungen zu Hesiodos, Kallimachos, Properz und Ennius* [Heidelberg 1965] 69 ff.; Reinsch-Werner a.O., 4 ff.).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Dilthey (wie Anm. 32) 12; Wilamowitz (wie Anm. 11) I 206; Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 42 ff.; Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 56; Gabathuler (wie Anm. 14) 59 f.; Fraser (wie Anm. 3) I 592; Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 9 ff.; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 11 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 11 im Anschluß an Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 45 f.; cf. auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 13.

<sup>36</sup> Zur Göttlichkeit Homers cf. A. D. Skiadas, *Homer im griechischen Epigramm*, *MEΛΕΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΕΥΝΑΙ* 4 (Athen 1965) 63 ff. und Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 10 mit Anm. 19.

in Anspruch.<sup>37</sup> Im berühmten Prolog zu den *Aitien*, einem zwar längeren, aber in kleinere Einzelgedichte unterteilten<sup>38</sup> Werk über die Entstehung verschiedener griechischer Kulte und Bräuche, wehrt sich Kallimachos bekanntlich gegen Kritiker, die ihm mißgünstig vorwerfen, er habe bislang kein einziges zusammenhängendes Gedicht über Könige und Heroen in "vielen Tausenden" von Versen zustande gebracht—gemeint ist episch-heroische Dichtung in der Nachfolge Homers, wie sie im Hellenismus *en vogue* war<sup>39</sup>—, sondern er rolle das dichterische "Wort wie ein Kind nur über eine kurze Strecke" (fr. 1. 3–6 Pfeiffer).<sup>40</sup> Kallimachos lehnt die homerisierende Art von Dichtung für sich entschieden ab—vielleicht weniger, weil er es von vornherein für unmöglich hielt, Homer nachzuahmen,<sup>41</sup> als vielmehr weil er der Überzeugung war, daß die angestrebte artistische Vollkommenheit in so umfangreichen Werken nie zu realisieren war, und wohl glaubte, daß selbst Homer in dieser Hinsicht zuweilen versagt hatte.<sup>42</sup> Er hält den Kritikern sein Ideal der kurzen, nur wenige Zeilen umfassenden (ὀλιγόστιχος), dafür feinen (λεπτός),<sup>43</sup> sprachlich und metrisch reinen,<sup>44</sup> technisch vollendeten Dichtung entgegen.<sup>45</sup> "Auf diese Weise," schreibt er in V. 16 des Prologs, "sind die Nachtigallen süßer" (ἀ[ηδονίδες] δ' ὥδε μελιχρό[τεραι]).<sup>46</sup>

Der Zusammenhang zwischen diesen für Kallimachos' Poetik grundlegenden Äußerungen und unserem Epigramm liegt—nicht allein wegen der Verwendung des Wortes "süß"—auf der Hand und ist auch schon oft betont worden. Ich kann mich daher kurz fassen. Die Gegenüberstellung läßt erkennen, daß Kallimachos im Epigramm auf Arat Homer

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 9, 11 f. und besonders 326 f.; knappe Erwähnung des Zusammenhangs auch bei Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 14 und 33; cf. ferner Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 47; Müller (wie Anm. 10) 91; Hutchinson (wie Anm. 11) 84 Anm. 115.

<sup>38</sup> Die *Aitien* widersprechen daher nicht dem poetischen Ideal der ὀλιγοστιχία; cf. u.a. Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 8.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 37 ff. (mit weiterführender Literatur).

<sup>40</sup> Zum Aitienprolog allgemein Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 20 ff. (mit ausführlichen Literaturangaben).

<sup>41</sup> Dies die (wohl auch von Theokr. *Id.* 7. 47 f. καὶ Μοισᾶν ὄρνιχες [sc. ἀπέχθονταί μοι] ὅσοι ποτὶ Χίον αἰοδόν / ἀντία κοκκύζοντες ἐτώσια μοχθίζοντι beeinflusste) *communis opinio*; cf. z.B. Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 41 (u.a. "Homer hat seine Gattung so vollkommen verkörpert, daß ein ζῆλος Ὀμηρικός absolut unmöglich und darum auch der Versuch zu verwerfen ist"); Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 11 ("unerreichbar"); Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 172 ("nicht einmal annäherungsweise nachahmbar"); Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 12 ("prinzipiell nicht nachahmbar") usw.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Horaz *AP* 359 *quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus*, Ps.-Longin *Περὶ ὕψους* 33. 4; in diese Richtung deutet auch Kallimachos' Vergleich der epischen Dichtung mit dem großen und schmutzigen Euphrat am Ende des Apollonhymnus (siehe unten).

<sup>43</sup> Dazu unten Anm. 49.

<sup>44</sup> Zu καθαρός als Stilbegriff cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 18.

<sup>45</sup> Τέχνη / [κρίνετε,] μὴ σχοίνω Περσίδι τὴν σοφίην, verlangt Kallimachos von seinen Gegnern (fr. 1. 17 f. Pfeiffer); cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 22 f.

<sup>46</sup> Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 326 f. vermutet Einfluß von Hes. *Th.* 97 auf diesen Vers. Die Adjektive λεπτός und μελιχρός im Kallimacheischen Sinne nebeneinander auch bei Hedylos *Epigr.* v. 2.

und Hesiod wohl nicht so sehr aus literaturkritischer als vielmehr aus dichtungstheoretischer Perspektive beurteilt: Es geht ihm weniger um die beiden frühgriechischen Autoren an sich als um ihre Eignung als Modelle für zeitgenössisches Dichten.<sup>47</sup> Wenn er dabei Homer als "äußersten" Sänger, das Hesiodeische Lehrgedicht aber als "das süßeste" aller Epen bezeichnet, so gibt er indirekt zu verstehen, daß sein eben u.a. mit Süßigkeit umschriebenes künstlerisches Ideal nur in der Nachfolge Hesiods, nicht aber in epischer Dichtung nach homerischem Muster zu verwirklichen ist. Eben weil sich Arat an die im Vergleich zu Homer viel kürzere Hesiodeische Lehrgedichtung gehalten hat, findet er Kallimachos' Zustimmung. Denn allein in diesem Rahmen konnte er auch jene sprachliche Vollendung erlangen, die Kallimachos von guter zeitgenössischer Dichtung erwartet und die er den *Phainomena* in einer überraschend persönlichen Anrede<sup>48</sup> am Schluß des Epigramms ausdrücklich attestiert:

Seid begrüßt, feine

Worte, (Frucht von) Arats angestrenge(r) Schlaflosigkeit.

Λεπτός ("fein, dünn, zart, klein") ist ein Schlüsselbegriff für Kallimachos' Kunstverständnis.<sup>49</sup> Ebenfalls im Aitienprolog erzählt er u.a., daß der Musengott Apollon ihm einst, als er zu schreiben begann, geboten habe, er solle das Brandopfer zwar möglichst fett (ὄττι πάχιστον) mästen, die Muse aber schlank (λεπταλέην),<sup>50</sup> sozusagen auf Diät halten (fr. 1. 23 f. Pfeiffer).<sup>51</sup> Ein paar Verse weiter vorne weist er darauf hin, daß nur die schlanken, feingliedrigen Gedichte, nicht aber die, wie es metaphorisch heißt, "große Frau" den Dichter Mimnermos als süß (γλυκύς) erwiesen hätten (fr. 1. 11 f. Pfeiffer = Philitas 675 SH).<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Lohse (wie Anm. 32) 33 "Mit den Worten ... kommt zum Ausdruck, daß Kallimachos die Nachahmung wegen des Vorbilds, das Vorbild aber als Prototyp epischer Kunst modernen Geschmacks lobt"; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 11 f. "Das Epigramm realisiert das Lob, indem es die Vorbildwahl Arats herstellt."

<sup>48</sup> Sie mag von Grabinschriften inspiriert sein, auf denen die Verstorbenen mit χαίρετε angesprochen werden (z.B. CEG 4).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 23) 25 ff.; Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 115 Anm. 1; Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 173; B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen* (Göttingen 1980) 114; Lohse (wie Anm. 32) 21 ff.; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 13 Anm. 31.

<sup>50</sup> Zur Wortform cf. J.-M. Jacques, "Sur un acrostiche d'Aratos (*Phén.*, 783–787)," *REA* 62 (1960) 53 Anm. 3.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Vergil *Ecl.* 6. 3 ff. cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthus aurem / vellit et admonuit: "pastorem, Tityre, pinguis / pascere oportet ovis, deductum dicere carmen" etc. (dazu und zu weiteren Nachbildungen in der lateinischen Literatur Wimmel [wie Anm. 31] 133 ff.).

<sup>52</sup> Die genaue Deutung der nur fragmentarisch erhaltenen Stelle ist bekanntlich heftig umstritten. Ich halte es *pace* Müller (wie Anm. 10) 89 ff., der nach dem Vorbild von Herter und Puelma Antimachos' *Lyde* ins Spiel bringt und das ausdrückliche Zeugnis des Florentinerscholions, wonach Kallimachos an dieser Stelle längere und kürzere Gedichte des Philitas und des Mimnermos miteinander verglich, durch Polemik z.T. wilamowitzscher Prägung zu entwerfen sucht (cf. 93 "Wen diese Doppelung nicht stört, der sollte sich fragen, was er für eine Vorstellung von Kallimachos hat"), mit Pfeiffer ad loc. und anderen für

Es scheint, daß sich Arat übrigens auch selbst zu diesem Stilideal der Feinheit, der *Leptotes*, bekannt hat, findet sich doch an einer Stelle seiner *Phainomena* in auffälliger Weise das Akrostichon *λεπτή* (783–87).<sup>53</sup> Kallimachos betrachtete ihn also wohl zu Recht als seinen künstlerischen Gesinnungsgenossen.<sup>54</sup>

Wenn schließlich die *λεπταὶ ῥήσεις* Arats als Ergebnis angespannter Schlaflosigkeit bezeichnet werden, so spielt Kallimachos damit kaum ironisch auf nächtliche Beobachtungen des Sternenhimmels an, wie etwa Peter Bing im Gefolge von Gow–Page vermutet<sup>55</sup>—nach Bing besteht die Pointe des Epigramms darin, daß Arat, wie man weiß, seine Kenntnis der Gestirnwelt gerade nicht aus eigener Betrachtung, sondern aus dem Buch des Eudoxos schöpfte.<sup>56</sup> Doch der Akzent liegt m.E. allein auf der sprachlichen Gestalt der *Phainomena*. Auf den Inhalt des Werkes, die Sternkunde, geht Kallimachos hier überhaupt nicht ein. Die Erklärung der “feinen Sätze” als “angestrenzter Schlaflosigkeit” drückt nichts anderes als seine Überzeugung aus, daß dichterische Inspiration allein nicht genügt, sondern unendlicher Fleiß und entsagungsvolle Arbeit bis tief in die Nacht hinein Voraussetzung für das Gelingen eines poetischen Kunstwerkes sind<sup>57</sup>—wir erinnern uns an die Aussage im eingangs erwähnten scherzhaften Grabepigramm auf Philitas, wonach diesen Dichter u.a. nächtelanges Nachdenken ins Grab gebracht habe. Nur am Rande sei noch bemerkt, daß die beiden Wörter *ῥήσεις* *Ἀρήτου* im letzten Vers kaum zufällig neben-

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möglich, daß mit der “großen Frau” die Gedichtsammlung *Nanno* des Mimnermos gemeint sein könnte. Darauf kann hier jedoch nicht näher eingegangen werden.

<sup>53</sup> Das Akrostichon wurde von Jacques (wie Anm. 50) entdeckt; cf. auch E. Vogt, “Das Akrostichon in der griechischen Literatur,” *A&A* 13 (1967) 83 ff.; Lohse (wie Anm. 32) 33.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 12 f. Kallimachos drückt seine Hochschätzung für Arat ebenfalls in der Prosaschrift gegen Praxiphanes aus (fr. 460 Pfeiffer *πάνν ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ὥς πολυμαθὴ καὶ ἄριστον ποιητήν*). Arat galt im übrigen auch seinem Gönner, dem König Ptolemaios Philadelphos, als *λεπτολόγος*; *Epigr.* i. 4 FGE (= *SH* 712. 4); cf. femer Leonidas von Tarent *Epigr.* ci γράμμα τόδ’ Ἀρήτοιο δαήμονος, ὅς ποτε λεπτῇ / φροντίδι δηναίους ἀστέρας ἐφράσατο κτλ.; cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 15 f.

<sup>55</sup> Gow–Page (wie Anm. 23) 209; Bing (wie Anm. 6) 36; cf. schon *V. Arati* III, p. 18,2 f. Martin.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. u.a. das in *V. Arati* I, p. 8,9 Martin überlieferte Bonmot des Antigonos Gonatas: *εὐδοξότερον ποιεῖς τὸν Εὐδόξον ἐντείνας τὰ παρ’ αὐτῷ κείμενα μέτρῳ*; femer *V. Arati* III, p. 16,24 ff. Martin; allgemein auch Cic. *De oratore* 1. 16. 69 *constat inter doctos hominem ignarum astrologiae ornatissimis atque optimis versibus Aratum de caelo stellisque dixisse*; zur modernen Diskussion um die Vorlagen Arats cf. die Angaben bei Effe (wie Anm. 28) 40 Anm. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. auch Helvius Cinna fr. 11 (in Anlehnung an Kallimachos) *haec tibi Arateis multum invigilata (codd.; vigilata Scaliger) lucernis / carmina*; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 13 f.



einanderstehen,<sup>58</sup> sondern vielmehr ein absichtliches Wortspiel vorliegen dürfte.<sup>59</sup>

Wie auch immer: Das erläuterte Epigramm ist jedenfalls in seiner artistischen Vollendung auch selbst ein eindruckliches Beispiel von Leptotes. Dichtung und Dichtungstheorie bilden in diesen Versen eine harmonische Einheit.<sup>60</sup>

Solche Leptotes wird gewiß auch einem anderen literaturkritischen Epigramm unseres Dichterphilologen geeignet haben, welches die *Lyde* des Antimachos von Kolophon zum Gegenstand hatte. Dieser Dichter, der um 400 v. Chr. wirkte und dessen Werke u.a. vom Philosophen Platon hochgeschätzt wurden,<sup>61</sup> hatte sich über den vorzeitigen Tod seiner Geliebten mit dem Namen *Lyde* dadurch hinweggetröstet, daß er die Schicksale verschiedener unglücklich Liebender in elegischen Distichen niederschrieb. Von Kallimachos' Epigramm auf dieses offenbar in epischer Breite erzählende Werk<sup>62</sup> ist uns leider nicht einmal ein ganzer Vers erhalten. Wir können uns daher von seiner Art—war es vielleicht ebenfalls als Buchaufschrift konzipiert?<sup>63</sup>—kein richtiges Bild mehr machen.

Klar ist immerhin, daß sich Kallimachos darin unzweifelhaft negativ über das Werk geäußert hat: Nach seiner Ansicht ist "die *Lyde* ein feistes und unklares Buch" (lxvii = fr. 398 Pfeiffer Λύδη καὶ παχὺ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τορόν).<sup>64</sup> Ein härteres Verdikt läßt sich aus seinem Mund kaum denken.

<sup>58</sup> Der Gebrauch von ῥήσιες für Verse ist auffällig; cf. später (wohl unter dem Einfluß des Kallimachos) Pinytos *Epigr.* i. 2 *GPh* (über Sappho) αἱ δὲ σοφαὶ κείνης ῥήσιες ἀθάνατοι ("this noun . . . seems unsuitable for such poetry as Sappho's": Gow—Page [wie Anm. 21] II 465).

<sup>59</sup> Etwa "Gesagtes des Unsäglichen" (unter Geminatio des ρ). Kallimachos spielt nicht selten mit (z.T. geradezu kalauerartig anmutenden) Anklängen, wobei meist vulgäre Aussprache vorausgesetzt wird; cf. außer dem Echo in *Epigr.* ii. 5 f. = 28. 5 f. Pfeiffer (unten) und fr. 75. 36 f. Pfeiffer (dazu K. Strunk, "Frühe Vokalveränderungen in der griechischen Literatur," *Glotta* 38 [1959] 86) auch Κρεφφύλω neben Ζεφφύλε in *Epigr.* lv. 4 = 6. 4 Pfeiffer (ν und ι hatten sich in der Umgangssprache des Hellenismus bereits stark einander angenähert; cf. E. H. Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*<sup>2</sup>, William Dwight Whitney Linguistic Series [Philadelphia 1940] 43 f. und A. Strohschein, *Auffälligkeiten griechischer Vokal- und Diphthongschreibung in vorchristlicher Zeit*, Beiträge zur Sprach-, Stil- und Literaturforschung Abt. Antike 16,1 [Berlin 1941] 151 f.; daß eine der beiden betroffenen Silben lang, die andere kurz ist [-φύ- und -φι-], läßt sich mit καλός-ἄλλος im Echo-Epigramm vergleichen).

<sup>60</sup> Das gilt für die Epigramme allgemein; cf. F. Bum, *Die Epigramme des Kallimachos* (Diss. Wien 1940) (Typoskript) 16; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 16 etc.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Antimachos test. 1–3 Wyss; V. J. Matthews, "Antimachean Anecdotes," *Eranos* 77 (1979) 43 ff.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. u.a. G. Serrao, "La struttura della *Lide* di Antimaco e la critica callimachea," *QUCC* 3 (1979) 92.

<sup>63</sup> Auch im Epigramm für eine Ausgabe der Οἰχαλίας ἄλωσις äußert Kallimachos ja am Schluß ein kritisches Urteil (lv. 4 = 6. 4 Pfeiffer).

<sup>64</sup> Zur Bedeutung von τορόν (nicht zu verwechseln mit τορευτός [cf. Krinagoras xi. 1 Καλλιμάχου τὸ τορευτὸν ἔπος τόδε]; τορός in Anspielung auf Kallimachos bei Antipatr. Sid. lxi. 3 εἰ τορόν οὖας / ἔλλαχες) cf. Pfeiffer ad loc. (anders Serrao [wie Anm. 62] 95 ff.). M. Puelma, "Kallimachos-Interpretationen," *Philologus* 101 (1957) 99 zieht wenig überzeugend fr. 532 Pfeiffer zu unserem Fragment. Auf dieses spielt bekanntlich auch Catull. 95. 9 f. (=



Denn παχύς ist, wie gesehen, der genaue Gegenbegriff zu λεπτός, seinem poetischen Ideal: "Fett" sollen nach der Weisung Apollons die Brandopfer für die Götter sein, die Dichtung jedoch schlank und fein.

Kallimachos' Ablehnung steht in scharfem Kontrast zum enthusiastischen Lob, welches Asklepiades von Samos—ein bedeutender zeitgenössischer Dichter—derselben *Lyde* gesendet hat, und zwar ebenfalls in Epigrammform (xxxii):

Lyde (also: Lyderin) bin ich der Herkunft und dem Namen nach;  
angesehener aber als alle Frauen, die von Kodros abstammen, bin ich  
wegen Antimachos.

Denn wer hat mich nicht besungen? Wer hat die *Lyde* nicht gelesen,  
das gemeinsame Buch der Musen und des Antimachos?<sup>65</sup>

Die beiden Epigramme sind schwerlich unabhängig voneinander entstanden.<sup>66</sup> Seit Wilamowitz<sup>67</sup> geht man gewöhnlich davon aus, daß Kallimachos auf Asklepiades' Verse, die wohl wiederum als Aufschrift für eine Edition gedacht waren, reagiert. Ja es heißt sogar, Kallimachos habe Asklepiades' Worte bewußt ins Lächerliche gewendet,<sup>68</sup> wobei auf die m.E. wenig aussagekräftige Parallele Λύδη καὶ . . . καὶ (mit anschließendem Diphthong ου) verwiesen wird.

Die umgekehrte Möglichkeit, daß Asklepiades gegen das Verdikt des Kallimachos Stellung bezieht, ist m.W. bisher nie ernsthaft erwogen worden.<sup>69</sup> Das mag in erster Linie damit zusammenhängen, daß man sich den Samier gewöhnlich als um mindestens eine Generation älter denn Kallimachos denkt.<sup>70</sup> Außerdem besteht die (nicht ganz unbegründete)

Antimachos test. 23 Wyss) an: parva mei mihi sint cordi monumenta \*\*\*, / at populus tumido gaudeat Antimacho.

<sup>65</sup> Λυδή καὶ γένος εἰμι καὶ οὖνομα, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ Κόδρου  
σεμνοτέρη πασῶν εἰμι δι' Ἀντίμαχον·  
τίς γὰρ ἔμ' οὐκ ἤεισε; τίς οὐκ ἀνέλεξάτο Λυδὴν,  
τὸ ξυνὸν Μουσῶν γράμμα καὶ Ἀντιμάχου;

<sup>66</sup> Skeptisch freilich M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London 1981) 124 ff.

<sup>67</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Die Thukydideslegende," in: ders., *Kleine Schriften* III (Berlin 1969) 30 Anm. 2 (= *Hermes* 12 [1877] 356 Anm. 42).

<sup>68</sup> Cf. F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit* II (Leipzig 1892) 525 Anm. 34; R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der alexandrinischen Dichtung* (Gießen 1893) 162; O. Knauer, *Die Epigramme des Asklepiades v. Samos* (Diss. Tübingen 1933) 26; Gabathuler (wie Anm. 14) 62; Pfeiffer ad Kallim. fr. 398 "Asclepiadis ipsa verba ad ridiculum convertit Call." (anders aber ders. [wie Anm. 3] 122; cf. unten Anm. 75); Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 50 Anm. 1; Gow-Page (wie Anm. 23) 138 ("possibly in conscious contradiction") und 217; Serrao (wie Anm. 62) 95; Bing (wie Anm. 6) 30; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 27. Nicht zugänglich war mir: M. and W. Wallace, *Asclepiades of Samos* (Oxford 1941).

<sup>69</sup> Cf. immerhin Tarditi (wie Anm. 11) 27 "Rispondeva all'accusa di Callimaco, che la *Lide* era καὶ παχὺ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τοπὸν (fr. 398) ο Callimaco replicava a lui?" Lefkowitz (wie Anm. 66) 125 "his epigram could be seen to be answering (or answered by) Asclepiades' and Posidippus'" ist aus der Sicht antiker Biographen gesagt, die nach Lefkowitz' Ansicht darauf versessen waren, "to establish connections between famous poets."

<sup>70</sup> Cf. u.a. Wilamowitz (wie Anm. 11) I 144 "Man mag ihn etwa von 320 bis 290 dichtend denken."

Vermutung, daß sich Kallimachos in anderen Epigrammen thematisch von Asklepiades hat anregen lassen.<sup>71</sup>

Doch abgesehen davon, daß sich die genauen Lebensdaten dieser wie überhaupt der meisten Dichter jener Zeit unserer Kenntnis entziehen (die Chronologie der hellenistischen Dichtung ist noch immer ein besonders unangenehmes Problem der griechischen Literaturgeschichte): Selbst wenn Asklepiades mehrere Jahrzehnte älter wäre als Kallimachos, wofür ein eindeutiger Beweis fehlt,<sup>72</sup> so gab es doch auf jeden Fall eine mehr oder weniger lange Periode gemeinsamen Wirkens (das einzige halbwegs zuverlässige Datum für Asklepiades ist eine delphische Inschrift von ca. 275 v. Chr.;<sup>73</sup> zu dieser Zeit aber war Kallimachos ebenfalls bereits aktiv).<sup>74</sup> Und dafür, daß sich auch ältere Künstler von jüngeren beeinflussen lassen, genügt es, etwa auf Haydn und Mozarts Streichquartette als Beispiel zu verweisen.

Kurzum, chronologisch steht der Annahme, Asklepiades antworte mit seinen Versen auf Kallimachos, grundsätzlich nichts im Wege. Für eine solche Lösung lassen sich aber durchaus auch positive Anhaltspunkte liefern. Einerseits wissen wir, daß Kallimachos in ausdrücklichem Zusammenhang mit Antimachos' Dichtung den literarischen Geschmack des Philosophen Platon und seine Eignung als Literaturkritiker in Zweifel gezogen hat (fr. 589 Pfeiffer = Antimachos test. 1 Wyss). Das vernichtende Urteil über die *Lyde* könnte also sehr wohl von Platons bereits erwähntem Lob für diesen Dichter veranlaßt worden sein.<sup>75</sup>

Andererseits gibt es auch in Asklepiades' Epigramm selbst ein Indiz dafür, daß vielleicht eher sein Gedicht gegen Kallimachos gerichtet war als

<sup>71</sup> Cf. u.a. Knauer (wie Anm. 68) 71; W. Ludwig, "Die Kunst der Variation im hellenistischen Liebesepigramm," in: *L'épigramme grecque* (wie Anm. 12) 303 ff.; Hutchinson (wie Anm. 11) 264 f. Zum Verhältnis von Kallim. *Hymn.* 5. 2 und Asklepiades xxxv. 4 *HE* = Poseidippos xxiv. 4 cf. Lefkowitz (wie Anm. 66) 125.

<sup>72</sup> Das in *AP* 9. 752 überlieferte Epigramm liefert *pace* Knauer (wie Anm. 68) 76 und Fraser (wie Anm. 3) I 557 keinen zuverlässigen Anhaltspunkt für die Bestimmung von Asklepiades' Geburtsdatum (Fraser loc. cit. "after about 340"). Denn (1) ist völlig unsicher, ob die vier Verse tatsächlich von Asklepiades stammen (die Überschrift in *AP* nennt auch Antipatros von Thessalonike als möglichen Verfasser: 'Ἀσκληπιάδου, τινὲς δὲ Ἀντιπάτρου Θεσσαλονικέως; während Gow-Page [wie Anm. 23] das Epigramm unter Asklepiades xlv behandeln, hat es Page [wie Anm. 21] 357 mit der Begründung "potius Antipatri Thess." nicht in seine Sammlung aufgenommen); (2) selbst wenn das Epigramm von Asklepiades stammen sollte, bleibt die Identifikation der in Vers 3 genannten Kleopatra mit der 309 v. Chr. ermordeten Tochter Philipps von Makedonien eine Hypothese (es gab eine Vielzahl von Trägerinnen dieses Namens; cf. auch Gow-Page a.o., 148).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Fraser (wie Anm. 3) I 557 mit Anm. 45; A. W. Bulloch, *Callimachus. The Fifth Hymn*, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 26 (Cambridge 1985) 40; Hutchinson (wie Anm. 11) 265 (Theokrit *Id.* 7 [wohl zwischen 275 und 265 v. Chr. abgefaßt]. 39 ff., wo Asklepiades mit Philotas zusammen erwähnt wird, sagt weniger über Asklepiades' Alter als über seine Geltung aus).

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 157; zur Datierung der *Aitien* siehe unten Anm. 80.

<sup>75</sup> So auch Pfeiffer (wie Anm. 3) 122 "Platons Parteinahme erregte den Ärger des Kallimachos, der Antimachos' Verse als 'plump und unklar' verabscheute und Platon jede kritische Fähigkeit auf dem Gebiet der Dichtkunst absprach" (cf. allerdings auch oben Anm. 68).

umgekehrt. Sehen wir uns dazu die ersten beiden Verse nochmals genau an. Asklepiades betont im Einleitungssatz, daß Antimachos' Geliebte nicht-griechischer Herkunft ist, aus Kleinasien stammt: "Lyderin bin ich der Herkunft und dem Namen nach." Aber trotz dieser fremden, in Griechenland gering geachteten<sup>76</sup> Abstammung, so der Epigrammatiker, übertreffe sie an Ansehen alle Frauen, die ihr Geschlecht von Kodros herleiten—eine Wendung, die Asklepiades als *poeta doctus* ausweist und nach einer Erklärung verlangt. Kodros war ein mythischer König von Athen. Sein Name galt in der Antike als Symbol für hohes Alter und vornehme Abstammung. Es gab die beiden sprichwörtlichen Ausdrücke "älter als Kodros" und "vornehmer als Kodros."<sup>77</sup> Asklepiades variiert an unserer Stelle offensichtlich die zweite dieser Redeweisen, wenn er Lyde sagen läßt: "angesehener als alle von Kodros abstammenden Frauen bin ich wegen Antimachos."

Bei diesen Frauen wird man also zunächst einmal an die Athenerinnen denken—als Griechinnen κατ' ἐξοχήν im Gegensatz zur "Barbarin" Lyde—, ferner vielleicht auch an Frauen aus dem ionischen Hochadel, da sich verschiedene kleinasiatische Städte rühmten, von Söhnen des Kodros gegründet worden zu sein.<sup>78</sup> Die gelehrte Umschreibung mag darüber hinaus aber sehr wohl noch einen tieferen Sinn haben. Auf Kodros führte nämlich insbesondere auch die Naxierin Kydippe ihr vornehmes Geschlecht zurück,<sup>79</sup> deren rührende Geschichte Kallimachos im 3. Buch der *Aitien* erzählte (Akontios hatte sich bekanntlich in die schöne Kydippe verliebt und wußte sie mit Hilfe eines Apfels, den er ihr beim Artemisfest auf Delos zurollte und der die Aufschrift "Bei Artemis, ich werde den Akontios heiraten" trug, an sich zu binden).<sup>80</sup> Kallimachos' Darstellung dieser Liebesgeschichte erfreute sich in der Antike großer Beliebtheit. Ovid und Aristainetos haben sie nachgedichtet.<sup>81</sup> Zumindest Ovid galt sie, aus *Rem. am.* 381 (= Kallim. test. 65 Pfeiffer) zu schließen, überhaupt als Inbegriff der Kallimacheischen Verskunst.<sup>82</sup> Der Vater der Kydippe aber wird in den

<sup>76</sup> Zahlreiche Sklaven stammten aus Lydien (cf. u.a. Diosk. *Epigr.* xxxviii. 1 f. Λυδὸς ἐγώ, καὶ Λυδὸς, ἐλευθερίω δέ με τύμβω, / δέσποτα, Τιμάνθη τὸν σὸν ἔθεν τροφέα).

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Diogenian. 7. 45 πρεσβύτερος Κόδρου, Zenob. 4. 3 εὐγενέστερος Κόδρου etc.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. u.a. Strabon 14. 1. 3 p. 632 f.; allgemein K. Scherling, "Kodros 1," *RE* XI (1921) 987 f.

<sup>79</sup> Gemäß Paus. 7. 3. 3 floh der Sohn des Kodros Πρόμηθος, nachdem er seinen Bruder Damasichthon getötet hatte, nach Naxos, wo er auch verstarb; Kydippe gehörte seinem Geschlecht an (cf. fr. 67. 7 Pfeiffer ἡ δὲ Προμηθίς).

<sup>80</sup> Die erhaltenen griechischen Verse finden sich in der Ausgabe von Pfeiffer unter fr. 67–75. Die Datierung der *Aitien* ist umstritten; cf. H. Herter, "Kallimachos aus Kyrene 6," *RE Suppl.* XIII (1973) 206 f.; ich schließe mich der Auffassung von R. Pfeiffer, "Ein neues Altersgedicht des Kallimachos," in: ders., *Ausgewählte Schriften*, hg. von W. Bühler (München 1960) 131 (= *Hermes* 63 [1928] 339) an, wonach die *Aitien* in ihrer ersten Auflage "ein Werk seiner ἀκμῇ" sind ("also wohl vor 270"); cf. auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 20 f.

<sup>81</sup> Ov. *Her.* 20 und 21; Aristain. 1. 10; cf. u.a. A. Lesky (Hg.), *Aristainetos. Erotische Briefe* (Zürich 1951) 144 ff.

<sup>82</sup> Callimachi numeris non est dicendus Achilles, / Cydippe non est oris, Homere, tui.

erhaltenen Kallimachos-Fragmenten einmal ausdrücklich als *Κοδρείδης* bezeichnet (fr. 75. 32 Pfeiffer).<sup>83</sup>

Es scheint mir somit, um mich vorsichtig auszudrücken, zumindest nicht ausgeschlossen, daß die ersten Verse des Asklepiades eine feine Spitze gegen Kallimachos enthalten: "Zwar bin ich nur eine Lyderin," eröffnet das Gedicht dem Leser, "doch dank Antimachos bin ich viel berühmter als alle Frauen, die—wie die von Kallimachos besungene Kydippe—ihr Geschlecht von Kodros herleiten." Sollte meine Vermutung zutreffen, so würde Asklepiades das Kallimacheische Verdikt über die *Lyde*—"ein fettes Buch" (*παχὺ γράμμα*)—mit einem subtil-maliziösen Hinweis auf die unübertroffene Beliebtheit dieses "den Musen und Antimachos gemeinsamen"<sup>84</sup> Buches" (wiederum *γράμμα*) parieren.<sup>85</sup>

Soviel zu der hauptsächlich in Epigrammen ausgetragenen literarischen Kontroverse um Antimachos.<sup>86</sup> Außer auf die Leptotes hat Apollon seinen Schützling Kallimachos im Aitienprolog auch darauf verpflichtet, nicht auf breiten, vielbefahrenen Straßen in den Spuren anderer zu wandeln, sondern neue, "unbetretene Pfade" (fr. 1. 27 f. Pfeiffer *κελεύθους* / [*ἀτρίπτο*]ς) zu begehen, selbst wenn diese schmaler seien—eine weitere einprägsame Metapher der Kallimacheischen Poetik.<sup>87</sup>

Sein Mißfallen an vielbefahrenen Wegen drückt dieser Dichter aber auch in einem sehr originellen Epigramm aus, auf das hier wenigstens kurz einzugehen ist (ii = 28 Pfeiffer):<sup>88</sup>

Ich hasse das kyklische Gedicht, und nicht freue ich mich  
am Pfad, der viele hierhin und dorthin bringt.  
Nicht ausstehen kann ich auch den umherlaufenden Geliebten,  
noch trinke ich vom Brunnen: Ich verabscheue alles Gemeine.  
Lysanias, du aber bist fürwahr schön, schön! Doch ehe dies  
klar gesagt ist, spricht ein Echo: "Ein anderer hat (ihn)."<sup>89</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Akontios stammte aus nicht minder vornehmerem Geschlecht; cf. frr. 67. 7 und 75. 32 ff. Pfeiffer.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. auch Antipatr. Sid. *Epigr.* lxvi. 3 über Antimachos' *Thebais*: Πιερίδων χαλκευτὸν (sc. στίχον) ἐπ' ἄκμοσιν.

<sup>85</sup> Das Insistieren auf Antimachos (sein Name steht zweimal betont am Versende: 2 δι' Ἀντιμάχου, 4 τὸ ξυνὸν Μουσῶν γράμμα καὶ Ἀντιμάχου) deutet vielleicht ebenfalls darauf hin, daß Asklepiades die *Lyde* gegen Kritiker in Schutz nimmt.

<sup>86</sup> Die *Lyde* wird zusammen mit Mimnermos' *Nanno* auch noch in einem epigrammatischen Trinkspruch des Poseidippos erwähnt (ix. 1 ff. *Ναννοῦς καὶ Λύδης ἐπίχει δύο καὶ φιλεράστου* / *Μιμνέρμου καὶ τοῦ σώφρονος Ἀντιμάχου κτλ.*).

<sup>87</sup> Cf. auch *Epigr.* lvii. 1 = 7. 1 Pfeiffer (*καθαρὴν ὁδόν*; dazu Schwinge [wie Anm. 3] 34); die Metapher des "unbetretenen Pfades" bereits bei Pindar *Paean* viib. 11 f. 'Ομήρου [δὲ μὴ τρι]πτόν κατ' ἀμαξίτον / ἰόντες κτλ. (dazu Bing [wie Anm. 6] 103 ff.); cf. allgemein Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 105 ff.

<sup>88</sup> Es handelt sich um eines der am meisten besprochenen Epigramme des Kallimachos; cf. außer den im folgenden genannten Arbeiten die Angaben bei P. Krafft, "Zu Kallimachos' Echo-Epigramm (28 Pf.)," *RhM* 120 (1977) 1 ff.; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 5 ff.

<sup>89</sup> ἔχθαιρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ  
χαίρω τις πολλοὺς ὥδε καὶ ὥδε φέρει·

Ein äußerst schillerndes Gebilde. Kallimachos läßt den Leser lange im Ungewissen, worauf er eigentlich hinaus will. Der Anfang klingt so, als wäre wiederum Dichtung, Literaturkritik, das eigentliche Thema. "Ich verabscheue das kyklische Gedicht," setzt Kallimachos, diesmal pointiert subjektiv, an den Anfang. "Kyklisch" läßt verschiedene Deutungen zu. Es kann einerseits allgemein das, was in Umlauf, im Schwange ist, bezeichnen: also das gewöhnliche, konventionelle Gedicht<sup>90</sup>—eine Bedeutung, die ohne Zweifel zum Grundgedanken des Epigramms paßt. "Kyklisch" ist aber auch ein fester Terminus für verschiedene ältere Epen, in denen Ereignisse vor und nach der Iliashandlung sowie verwandte Sagenkreise, auch der thebanische um Oedipus, behandelt wurden.

Vermutlich wendet sich Kallimachos hier eher gegen diese Epen als gegen konventionelle Dichtung im allgemeinen. Und wie im Epigramm auf Arat das Urteil über die literarische Vorlage zugleich auch etwas über das ihr nachgestaltete Werk aussagt, so mögen die Worte "Ich hasse das kyklische Gedicht" ebenfalls weniger gegen die kyklische Dichtung an sich als gegen Zeitgenossen gerichtet sein, die mit diesen kyklischen vergleichbare Epen verfaßten und die von einem um mehrere Jahrhunderte jüngeren Epigrammatiker prägnant οἱ κύκλιοι genannt werden.<sup>91</sup>

Wie auch immer: Das Gedicht beginnt jedenfalls mit einem literarischen Urteil, und in diesem Zusammenhang versteht man wohl spontan auch den als nächstes genannten Weg als poetologische Metapher<sup>92</sup>—ja mehr noch: man fragt sich, ob der von Kallimachos abgelehnte Weg, der die vielen hierhin und dorthin führt, nicht letztlich ein und dasselbe ist wie die an erster Stelle genannte Dichtung im Stile kyklischer Epen—eine Dichtungsart, die, wie erwähnt, mit dem Kallimacheischen Ideal der Leptotes unvereinbar ist. Der folgende Satz liest sich zunächst wie eine Bestätigung des Gesagten durch ein Beispiel aus einem anderen Bereich,

μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης

πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.

Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ νᾶϊγι καλὸς καλός· ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν

5

τοῦτο σαφῶς, ἡχώ φησὶ τις "ἄλλος ἔχει."

6 ἡχώ φησὶ τις "ἄλλος ἔχει" P: ἡχώ φησὶ τί; καλὸς ἔχει; Giangrande

<sup>90</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. II und IV mit den kritischen Erläuterungen dazu von H. J. Blumenthal, "Callimachus, *Epigram* 28, Numenius Fr. 20, and the Meaning of κυκλικός," *CQ* 28 (1978) 125 ff.; ferner u.a. Hutchinson (wie Anm. 11) 79 Anm. 104.

<sup>91</sup> Pollian *AP* 11. 130. 1; cf. Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 6 "Sein Haß gilt mithin aller (wie sich zeigen wird, epischen) Dichtung seiner Zeit, die wie die kyklischen Epen von allen möglichen Dichtern produziert wird und die wie jene gegenüber Homer von gewöhnlichem Zuschnitt ist, anspruchslos und flüchtig gemacht ist, gerade damit aber dem Geschmack der Menge konveniert."

<sup>92</sup> Erst in der Fortsetzung wird deutlich, daß der Weg "hier eine umfassende Bedeutung" hat und "durch seine Zwischenstellung . . . nicht allein auf das kyklische Dichten, sondern auch auf den anschließend genannten Geliebten Lysanias bezogen" ist (Wimmel [wie Anm. 31] 103). Die literarische Konnotation der Metapher zieht Kraft (wie Anm. 88) 19 f. (gefolgt von Schwinge [wie Anm. 3] 6 Anm. 10) m.E. zu Unrecht in Zweifel (er vermutet, "daß sie hier um ihrer selbst willen, d.h. als Beispiel des dem Dichter verhaßten Gemeinen und Kommunen, angeführt wurde").



nämlich der Erotik: Wie die breite Straße epischer Allerweltsdichtung verabscheut Kallimachos auch den von einem zum andern gehenden, feilen Geliebten.<sup>93</sup>

Der Zusatz "noch trinke ich vom Brunnen," von der Leitung, scheint dann genauso eine poetologische Konnotation zu haben.<sup>94</sup> Denn Kallimachos vergleicht im berühmten Epilog des Apollonhymnos<sup>95</sup> seine eigene Dichtung mit dem "reinen und unverschmutzten, geringen Tropfen aus heiliger Quelle," welchen die Bienen der Göttin Demeter zutragen.<sup>96</sup> Und während er dort als Gegensatz dazu für die homerisierende Dichtung das Bild des mächtigen Euphratflusses wählt, der mit seinem Wasser auch viel Dreck mitschleppe, mag in unserem Epigramm das Leitungswasser Metapher für die von ihm abgelehnte Dichtung sein.<sup>97</sup>

Mit der anschließenden Zusammenfassung "Ich verschmähe alles Öffentliche, Gemeine" kommt das Gedicht an ein vorläufiges Ende. Es scheint, als ob Kallimachos in diesen weitgehend parallel gebauten, formal in sich vollendeten zwei Verspaaren<sup>98</sup> sein Dichtungsideal gleichsam *e contrario* durch Absage an die gängige Dichtung definieren wollte. Doch die letzten beiden Verse, deren Echtheit ohne durchschlagende Gründe verschiedentlich in Zweifel gezogen wurde,<sup>99</sup> geben dem Epigramm eine überraschende Wendung. Mit dem Liebesbekenntnis zu Lysanias ("schön

<sup>93</sup> Kallimachos dürfte hier von Theognis 581 f. ἐχθαίρω δὲ γυναῖκα περίδρομον, ἀνδρά τε μάργον, / δὲ τὴν ἀλλοτρίην βούλετ' ἀρουραν ἀροῦν angeregt sein; cf. auch Anon. *Epigr.* iv οὐμὸς ἔρωσ παρ' ἐμοὶ μενέτω μόνω· ἦν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλους / φοιτήσῃ, μισῶ κοινὸν ἔρωτα, Κύπρι (cf. G. Giangrande, "Callimachus, Poetry and Love," in: ders., *Scripta Minora Alexandrina* III, Classical and Byzantine Monographs 10 [Amsterdam 1984] 2 [= *Eranos* 67 (1969) 34]); ferner Anakreon fr. 99 Gentili ἐγὼ δὲ μισῶ / πάντας <δ>σοι χθονίους ἔχουσι ῥυσμούς / καὶ χαλεπούς· μεμάθηκά σ', ὦ Μεγιστή, / τῶν ἀβακίζομένων. Zu περίφοιτος cf. Kallim. *Epigr.* xx. 2 (= 38. 2 Pfeiffer). An sich wäre es möglich, auch den Geliebten als poetologisches Symbol zu deuten: nämlich für das Gedicht, welches allen gefallen will. Die Mehrdeutigkeit der ersten vier Verse des Epigramms ist Absicht und gehört zum literarischen Spiel des Kallimachos (cf. auch B. M. Palumbo Stracca, "L'eco di Callimaco [*Ep.* 28 Pf.] e la tradizione dei versi 'echoici'," *SIFC* 6 [1988] 216 "il tono e il significato del componimento rimangono volutamente ambigui").

<sup>94</sup> Dies schließt nach dem eben in Anm. 93 Gesagten natürlich nicht aus, daß das Bild zugleich auch erotisch gemeint sein könnte (allerdings weist Krafft [wie Anm. 88] 17 f. darauf hin, daß die Metapher "aus der Quelle trinken" sonst für den Liebesgenuß im allgemeinen steht, Kallimachos hier jedoch nur den *amor vulgivagus* für sich ablehnt).

<sup>95</sup> Cf. allgemein dazu u.a. Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 59 ff., 223–25; Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 16 ff.; Müller (wie Anm. 10) 31 ff.; Th. Fuhrer, *Die Auseinandersetzung mit den Choralikern in den Epinikien des Kallimachos*, Schweiz. Beiträge zur Altertumswiss. 23 (Basel–Kassel 1992) 252 ff.

<sup>96</sup> 110 ff. Δημοῖ δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕδωρ φορέουσι μέλισσαι, / ἀλλ' ἦτις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράαντος ἀνέρπει / πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς ἄκρον ἄωτον.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. auch Tarditi (wie Anm. 11) 34. Zurückhaltend Wimmel (wie Anm. 31) 59 ("noch nicht im späteren Sinn festgelegt"); cf. aber auch 223.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. ἐχθαίρω... οὐδὲ... neben μισέω... οὐδ'..., gefolgt von der Verallgemeinerung σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια; auch auf die Parechesen ἐχθαίρω–χαίρω und μισέω–πίνω ist hinzuweisen.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Krafft (wie Anm. 88) 2 Anm. 4.



bist du, fürwahr schön!")<sup>100</sup> wird deutlich, daß das Epigramm insgesamt dem erotischen Typus zugehört, daß also Vers 3 "ich verabscheue den umherlaufenden Geliebten" nicht, wie es zunächst schien, als Illustration für Kallimachos' Hang zum künstlerisch Exquisiten gedacht war, sondern daß vielmehr umgekehrt die poetologische Aussage im ersten Vers seine Haltung in Liebesdingen veranschaulichen soll: seine Weigerung, den Geliebten mit anderen zu teilen.

So erweisen sich die vorausgehenden 4 Verse mit einem Schlag nur noch als Vorspiel, als Priamel für die Hauptaussage: des Dichters Liebe zu Lysanias, der mit  $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon$  emphatisch vom Vorausgehenden abgehoben wird.<sup>101</sup> Von diesem schönen Lysanias erwartet der Leser folglich, daß er anders als die aufgezählten Beispiele nichts Gemeinsames ist—kein "umherziehender Geliebter," kein gewöhnlicher "Brunnen"—, sondern daß er allein Kallimachos gehört. Doch auch diese Erwartung wird zum Schluß nochmals in geistreicher Art enttäuscht.<sup>102</sup> Das Echo auf Kallimachos' Liebeserklärung "schön bist du, fürwahr schön" wirft ihm nämlich zurück:<sup>103</sup> "Ein anderer hat ihn."<sup>104</sup> "Ein anderer" klingt im Griechischen recht ähnlich wie "schön" ( $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  –  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$ ), und das Verb "hat ihn" entspricht klanglich der Partikel "fürwahr"—vorausgesetzt, man verwendet die vulgäre Aussprache, wie sie sich im Neugriechischen später durchgesetzt hat und für welche dieses Epigramm ein wichtiges frühes Zeugnis ist (also  $\epsilon\chi\iota$  –  $\nu\epsilon\chi\iota$ ).<sup>105</sup>

Daß in diesem Echo im Unterschied zu anderen antiken und modernen Echo-Epigrammen<sup>106</sup> die Laut- und Wortfolge nicht genau beibehalten

<sup>100</sup> Cf. dazu Giangrande (wie Anm. 93) 3 Anm. 10; Krafft (wie Anm. 88) 13 f.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Giangrande (wie Anm. 93) 7 f.; zum Epigramm als Priamel A. Henrichs, "Callimachus *Epigram* 28: A Fastidious Priamel," *HSCPh* 83 (1979) 207 ff. und Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 5 ff.

<sup>102</sup> Dadurch wandelt sich nach Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 8 "die antithetische Priamel zu einer analogischen: Auch Lysanias ist ein  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\phi\omicron\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\alpha\acute{\nu}\eta\rho$ , auch ihm muß statt der Liebe der Haß des Dichters gelten. Jedoch auch der Haß auf Lysanias wird, wie eben noch die Liebe zu ihm, auf der Folie der vorausgegangenen Beispielreihe erst eigentlich deutlich. Beispiele und Schlußaussage sind homolog, die Schlußaussage ordnet sich in ein Ensemble gleichsinniger Beispiele ein und erhält dadurch Prägnanz und Gewicht."

<sup>103</sup> In  $\varsigma\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$   $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$   $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$  /  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$   $\sigma\alpha\phi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$  ist nach allgemeiner Auffassung  $\mu\epsilon$  und nicht  $\tau\iota\nu\alpha$  (so J. C. Bramble, *Persius and the Programmatic Satire: A Study in Form and Imagery* [Cambridge 1974] 61) zu ergänzen. Für wenig überzeugend halte ich außerdem die von Krafft (wie Anm. 88) 11 ff. erneut vorgebrachte Annahme,  $\eta\chi\omega$  sei Subjekt des  $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ -Satzes; cf. auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 7 Anm. 12.

<sup>104</sup>  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$  dürfte hier eher den eigentlichen Liebesgenuß (so Krafft [wie Anm. 88] 27 ff. mit Anm. 92; zustimmend Schwinge [wie Anm. 3] 7 Anm. 12) als nur eine feste Beziehung bezeichnen (so u.a. Giangrande [wie Anm. 93] 8 Anm. 17).

<sup>105</sup> Cf. dazu Strunk (wie Anm. 59) 85 ff., Giangrande (wie Anm. 93) 5 und die weiteren Angaben bei Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 7 Anm. 13; ferner Palumbo Stracca (wie Anm. 93) 217 f. mit Anm. 2. Emil Staiger hat in seiner Übertragung den Klingeffekt folgendermaßen wiederzugeben versucht: "Bist doch vor anderen lieblich, Lysanias! Aber 'Ein anderer / Liebi dich' ruft Echo mir zu, ehe ich's deutlich gesagt."

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Gauradas *Epigr.* i *FGE*; Leonides von Alexandrien *Epigr.* x *FGE*; *AP* 7. 548, 8. 206 (Greg. Naz.); Krafft (wie Anm. 88) 3 Anm. 8 f. und 8 Anm. 25.

wird, hat viele Interpreten irritiert<sup>107</sup>—zu Unrecht, wie ich meine. Denn abgesehen davon, daß Kallimachos auch sonst gerne mit Assonanzen spielt:<sup>108</sup> An unserer Stelle bereitet er unmißverständlich darauf vor, daß kein exaktes Echo folgen wird, sagt er doch einleitend dazu: "noch ehe dies deutlich (σαφῶς) gesagt ist." Die undeutliche Äußerung hat also ein entsprechend unscharfes Echo, eine ἡχώ τις,<sup>109</sup> zur Folge,<sup>110</sup> und eben darin liegt wohl eine Pointe dieses nicht ganz einfachen Gedichts, in dem Dichtungstheorie und Erotik so eigenwillig ineinandergewoben sind.<sup>111</sup>

\* \* \*

Eine Verknüpfung von Poetik und erotischer Thematik glaubt man neuerdings auch in einem Epigramm der Nossis von Lokroi, einer der beachtlich vielen Frauen, die im Hellenismus die Epigrammdichtung gepflegt haben, feststellen zu können. Diese Dichterin, die wohl ähnlich wie Kallimachos in der ersten Hälfte des 3. Jh.s v. Chr. gelebt hat (die Datierung ist freilich auch in diesem Fall sehr unsicher),<sup>112</sup> äußert sich in

<sup>107</sup> Cf. u.a. Krafft (wie Anm. 88) 3 ff. Um eine genauere Entsprechung zwischen Ausspruch und Echo zu erhalten, ändert Giangrande (wie Anm. 93) 6 zu ἡχώ φησι τί; ἄλλος ἔχει;—ein willkürlicher Eingriff (sowohl bei ναίχι wie bei καλός fällt im Echo der Anfangskonsonant weg).

<sup>108</sup> Cf. oben Anm. 59.

<sup>109</sup> Das Pronomen τις ist m.E. nicht "meaningless in its context" (Giangrande [wie Anm. 93] 5), sondern deutet wohl ebenfalls auf die Unschärfe des Echos hin (etwas anders Schwinge [wie Anm. 3] 7 Anm. 12 "τις weist auf das Ominöse des Echos"; cf. auch Krafft [wie Anm. 88] 7 Anm. 21).

<sup>110</sup> Anders Giangrande (wie Anm. 93) 5 ("σαφῶς . . . expresses the contrast between the clear utterance spoken by the poet and the less clear reflection of the sound as produced by Echo") und ders., "Due Note Callimachee," in: *Scripta Minora Alexandrina* III (wie Anm. 93) 107 (= *Maia* 26 [1974] 229). Palumbo Stracca (wie Anm. 93) 218 versteht den πρίν-Satz im Anschluß an andere Gelehrte als Hinweis darauf, daß Kallimachos sein Liebesbekenntnis noch nicht vollständig ("per intero") ausgesprochen habe, und beschränkt daher das Echo auf ναίχι—ἔχει; eine solche Deutung scheitert jedoch daran, daß σαφῶς nicht "vollständig" heißt (cf. Krafft [wie Anm. 88] 9 mit Anm. 29 und 15).

<sup>111</sup> Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 8 f. betont, daß die Wendung ins Negative am Schluß (Lysanias ist ebenfalls ein ganz gewöhnlicher Geliebter) rückblickend besonders die erste Aussage wieder in helleres Licht rückt und daß sich das ganze Epigramm daher "durchaus auch als eindringliche Entfaltung von Kallimachos' Haß auf alle (epische) Dichtung seiner Zeit lesen" läßt.

<sup>112</sup> Die elf zweifelsfrei von Nossis stammenden Epigramme (die Echtheit von *Epigr.* xii ist umstritten, da *AP* 6. 273 ὧς Νοσίδος schreibt; für Authentizität M. Gigante, "Nosside," *PP* 29 [1974] 29) liefern zwei Anhaltspunkte: (1) Im Weiheepigramm ii erfahren wir von kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen der Lokrer mit den benachbarten Brettinern; diese werden vor dem Tarentinischen Krieg (seit 282 v. Chr.) und der damit verbundenen Unterwerfung ganz Unteritaliens unter die Herrschaft Roms stattgefunden haben; cf. Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 68) 137; A. Olivieri, "Nossis, poetessa di Locri Epizefirii," *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale* 16–17 (Miscellanea di studi siciliani ed italiani in onore di P. Orsi) (1920) 280 f. (= *Civiltà greca nell'Italia Meridionale* [Neapel 1931] 195 f.); G. Carugno, "Nosside," *GIF* 10 (1957) 324 f.; Gow–Page (wie Anm. 23) 434 f.; Gigante a.O., 27 (ob Nossis in unserem Epigramm von Leonidas von Tarent *Epigr.* xxxv beeinflusst ist, wie meist angenommen wird [cf. außer der bereits genannten Literatur auch noch G. Luck, "Die Dichterinnen der griechischen Anthologie," *MH* 11 (1954) 182 = G. Pfohl (Hg.), *Das Epigramm: Zur Geschichte einer*

den vier einschlägigen Versen erfrischend direkt, um nicht zu sagen provokativ, über die Freuden des Eros (i):

Süßer ist nichts als Liebe. Was es an Glücksgütern gibt: Alles ist zweitrangig. Selbst den Honig speie ich<sup>113</sup> aus dem Munde aus. Dies sagt Nossis. Doch jene, welche die Kypris nicht liebt,<sup>114</sup> die weiß nicht, wie beschaffene Blumen die Rosen sind.<sup>115</sup>

Vom letzten Satz abgesehen, in dem auch ein textkritisches Problem steckt, ist das Gedicht sogleich verständlich, die Gedankenfolge durchsichtig und folgerichtig: Allen denkbaren Glücksgütern dieser Welt (ὄλβια) wird die Einzigartigkeit der Liebe gegenübergestellt. Daß aus den zweitrangigen äußeren Gütern dann der Honig besonders hervorgehoben wird, ist eine logische Folge des Einleitungssatzes. Denn wenn die sinnliche Komponente der Liebe durch das Adjektiv ἡδύς, süß, veranschaulicht wird, so drängt sich der Vergleich mit Honig auf. Honig ist ja nicht nur in der Antike Inbegriff von Süßigkeit, und die oft belegte Wendung "süßer als Honig"<sup>116</sup> drückt stets ein Höchstmaß an Süßigkeit aus.

Nossis wandelt in den ersten beiden Versen im Grunde einfach diese Redewendung ab: Statt "süßer als Honig ist die Liebe" zu sagen, stellt sie geradezu apodiktisch die Feststellung "Süßer ist nichts als Liebe" an den Anfang,<sup>117</sup> und erst nachdem sie alle materiellen Güter auf den zweiten Platz verwiesen hat, fügt sie schließlich den natürlichen Vergleichspunkt zu ἄδιον in einer hyperbolischen Bestätigung<sup>118</sup> des Einleitungssatzes hinzu: Selbst Honig möchte sie im Vergleich zur Süße des Eros aus dem Mund speien. Also ein gelungenes Spiel mit einer gängigen Aussageform. Keck und selbstbewußt bekräftigt die Dichterin ihr Bekenntnis im dritten Vers mit den Worten: "Dies sagt Nossis."

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*inschriftlichen und literarischen Gattung* (Darmstadt 1969) 102; E. Degani, "Nosside," *GFF* 4 (1981) 49; Tarditi (wie Anm. 11) 22], läßt sich nicht mit Sicherheit sagen). (2) Epigramm x auf Rhinthon von Syrakus muß nach dessen Tod verfaßt sein; das genaue Todesdatum ist freilich nicht bekannt (man weiß lediglich, daß er unter Ptolemaios I [† 283/3] lebte); außerdem könnte Nossis die Verse auch erst einige Zeit später gedichtet haben; cf. Gow–Page loc. cit.; J. McIntosh Snyder, *The Woman and the Lyre: Women Writers in Classical Greece and Rome* (Carbondale, IL 1989) 82 f.

<sup>113</sup> Zur Verwendung des Aorists cf. K–G I 164.

<sup>114</sup> Oder "küßt."

<sup>115</sup> ἄδιον οὐδὲν ἔρωτος· ἃ δ' ὄλβια, δεύτερα πάντα  
ἐστίν· ἀπὸ στόματος δ' ἔπτυσσεν καὶ τὸ μέλι.  
τοῦτο λέγει Νοσσίς· τίνα δ' ἂ Κύπρις οὐκ ἐφίλασεν,  
οὐκ οἶδεν τίνα γ' ἄνθεα ποῖα ῥόδα.

4 κῆνα P (κῆνα codicis corrector): πῆνας Guyet: πῆνος Wakefield | γ' ἄνθεα Reitzenstein: τάνθεα P (τ' ἄνθεα codicis corrector)

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Homer *Il.* 1. 249, 18. 109; Theokrit *Id.* 20. 27; Moschos *Europa* 3 etc.

<sup>117</sup> Die von Sappho fr. 130. 2 mit dem Adjektiv "bittersüß" so treffend beschriebene Ambivalenz des Eros bleibt hier völlig außer acht (im Unterschied etwa zu Asklepiades *Epigr.* xvi. 3 f., xix. 3 f., Poseidippos *Epigr.* i. 4 etc.).

<sup>118</sup> Cf. auch I. Cazzaniga, "Critica testuale ed esegesi a Nosside A.P. VII 718," *PP* 25 (1970) 440 "concetto iperbolico, aggressivo, dalla tonalità quasi di proverbio."

Nun, von Dichtungstheorie scheint sich in den ersten 2½ Versen zunächst keine Spur zu finden. Die modernen Interpreten, die in diesem Gedicht ein poetisches Manifest der Dichterin sehen wollen, gehen in der Tat auch nicht von den bisher besprochenen Versen aus, sondern stützen ihre Argumentation wesentlich auf die letzten 1½ Zeilen. In der Fassung der Handschrift<sup>119</sup> lauten diese:

Doch jene, welche die Kypris nicht liebt,  
die weiß nicht, wie beschaffene Blumen die Rosen sind.

Der frühbarocke Philologe François Guyet (1575–1655)<sup>120</sup> hat den überlieferten Nominativ "jene" (κήνα bzw. dor. τήνα)<sup>121</sup> zu einem Genitiv emendiert, was dem Satz einen anderen Sinn gibt: "Wen aber die Kypris nicht liebt, der weiß nicht, was für Blumen die Rosen *jener* sind" (τήνα wird dadurch geschlechtsneutral, während es in der überlieferten Fassung durch das darauf bezüglich Pronomen τήνα als weiblich bestimmt ist).<sup>122</sup>

Diese an sich geringfügige Emendation hat sich in den modernen Ausgaben und Abhandlungen weitgehend durchgesetzt.<sup>123</sup> Das Pronomen "jener" kann dabei entweder auf die Kypris oder auf Nossis bezogen werden. Die Anhänger einer poetologischen Deutung entscheiden sich für die zweite Lösung: also "Wen die Kypris nicht liebt, der weiß nicht, was für Blumen die Rosen der Nossis sind." Nach ihrer Ansicht stehen die Blumen metaphorisch für Nossis' Gedichte. In der näheren Bestimmung als Rosen sehen sie eine unmißverständliche Anspielung auf Sappho, die in einem berühmten Fragment zu einer ungebildeten Frau sagt, niemand werde sich nach ihrem Tod an sie erinnern, da sie "keinen Anteil an den Rosen aus Pierien" habe (fr. 55. 2 f. οὐ γὰρ πεδέχης βρόδων / τὼν ἐκ Πιερίας).<sup>124</sup>

Von dieser Deutung des letzten Satzes ausgehend hat man das Gedicht insgesamt metaphorisch zu interpretieren begonnen. Nossis, heißt es, skizziere in diesen Versen, die ihre Epigrammsammlung eingeleitet hätten,

<sup>119</sup> Reitzensteins Emendation γ' ἄνθεα (statt τάνθεα P bzw. τ' ἄνθεα codicis corrector) scheint mir angezeigt (anders H. White, *Essays in Hellenistic Poetry* [Amsterdam 1980] 19, die an τ' ἄνθεα festhält und τ' entweder als asseveratives τε oder als τοι betrachtet ["forsooth"]).

<sup>120</sup> Cf. zu seiner Person I. Uri, *Un cercle savant au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle: François Guyet (1575–1655)* (Paris 1886); J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship II* (Cambridge 1908) 283 f.

<sup>121</sup> Guyet scheint als erster die sicher richtige dorische Form des Pronomens (cf. Nossis *Epigr.* v. 4, ix. 3 und xi. 3) geschrieben zu haben.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. dazu unten Anm. 153.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. außer der im folgenden genannten Sekundärliteratur P. Waltz–J. Guillon (Hgg.), *Anthologie grecque II* (Paris 1928) 78; Page (wie Anm. 21) 67 (siehe schon Gow–Page [wie Anm. 23] 436). Wichtige Ausnahme: Beckby (wie Anm. 11) 344.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. E. Cavallini (Hg.), *Poetesse greche e romane: Introduzione, traduzione e note* (Venedig–Rom 1980) 130, 144 Anm. 3; Degani (wie Anm. 112) 52; Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 181 Anm. 8; M. Gigante, "Il manifesto poetico di Nossiside," in: *Letterature comparate – problemi e metodo: Studi in onore di E. Paratore* (Bologna 1981) 245; dens. (wie Anm. 126) 552; Skinner (wie Anm. 6) 92; dies., "Nossis Théluglōssos: The Private Text and the Public Book," in: S. B. Pomeroy (Hg.), *Women's History and Ancient History* (Chapel Hill–London 1991) 33.



durch kunstvolle literarische Anspielungen ihr eigenes poetisches Programm; sie grenze sich intertextuell einerseits gegen die auf die männliche Erlebniswelt konzentrierte Dichtung vor allem Hesiods und Pindars ab (als Symbol dafür gilt der Honig, den Nossis aus dem Munde spuckt) und beanspruche andererseits durch subtile Anspielungen auf Sappho für ihre Dichtung eine spezifisch weibliche Subjektivität; Kennzeichen dieser Poesie sei die Ausrichtung auf Eros; Aphrodite trete an die Stelle der Musen; nur wer von der Aphrodite geküßt werde, könne nach Ansicht der Nossis ihre von Erotik durchtränkten Gedichte wirklich verstehen.

Eine solche Deutung liegt heute fraglos im Trend. Allerdings ist zu sagen, daß sie nicht erst von der feministisch orientierten Amerikanerin Marilyn B. Skinner vertreten worden ist.<sup>125</sup> Die Grundlagen dafür haben bereits früher italienische Philologen und Philologinnen gelegt (Ignazio Cazzaniga, Marcello Gigante, Enzo Degani, Eleonora Cavallini).<sup>126</sup>

Nun ist Beziehungsreichtum, Freude an kunstvoll verhüllten literarischen Anspielungen, wie sie diese Deutung voraussetzt, durchaus ein Wesensmerkmal hellenistischer Dichtung (das Stichwort "arte allusiva" wurde eingangs erwähnt). Daß weiter die Verse, in denen der Name der Dichterin so nachdrücklich hervorgehoben wird ("Dies sagt Nossis"), als Sphragis, als Siegel, ein Buch mit Werken der Nossis eröffnet hätten,<sup>127</sup> ist zumindest nicht ausgeschlossen, auch wenn es mir eher zweifelhaft scheint;<sup>128</sup> in einem Einleitungsgedicht aber wären poetische Reflexionen keineswegs fehl am Platz. Für die Richtigkeit der angedeuteten Interpretation scheint überdies zu sprechen, daß Nossis in einem anderen Epigramm sich selbst ausdrücklich zu Sappho, der berühmtesten griechischen Dichterin, die in der Antike auch als weiblicher Homer bezeichnet wurde,<sup>129</sup> in

<sup>125</sup> M. B. Skinner, "Sapphic Nossis," *Arethusa* 22 (1989) 6 ff. (unter dem Einfluß von McIntosh Snyder [wie Anm. 112] 78 f. verbindet freilich dies. [wie Anm. 6] 91 ff. ihre poetologische mit der erotischen Deutung des Epigramms); cf. auch P. Liviabella Furiani, "Intimità e socialità in Nosside di Locri," in: F. De Martino (Hg.), *Rose di Pieria*, "le Rane", Studi 9 (Bari 1991) 180 und 188.

<sup>126</sup> Cazzaniga (wie Anm. 118) 439 f. ("il richiamo a Saffo"; nicht zugänglich war mir ders., *Nosside*, a cura di M. Gigante [Santo Spirito 1977]; cf. die Rezension von N. Scivoletto, *GIF* 9 [1978] 102 ff.); Gigante (wie Anm. 112) 25; ders. (wie Anm. 124) 243 ff. (ähnlich ders., "La civiltà letteraria nell'antica Calabria," in: G. Cingari [dir.], *Storia della Calabria: La Calabria antica*, a cura di S. Settis [Rom-Reggio Calabria 1988] 552); Degani (wie Anm. 112) 51 f.; E. Cavallini, "Noss. A.P. V 170," *Sileno* 7 (1981) 179 ff.

<sup>127</sup> So bereits Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 68) 140 Anm. 1; cf. Luck (wie Anm. 112) 102; Cazzaniga (wie Anm. 118) 440; Gigante (wie Anm. 124) 243; dens. (wie Anm. 126) 552; O. Specchia, "Recenti studi su Nosside," *Cultura & Scuola* 23 (1984) 49 f.; Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 6 f.; dies. (wie Anm. 124) 32 und dies. (wie Anm. 6) 91; zur Sphragis in der alexandrinischen Dichtung allgemein cf. W. Kranz, "Sphragis: Ichform und Namensiegel als Eingangs- und Schlußmotiv antiker Dichtung," in: ders., *Studien zur antiken Literatur und ihrem Fortwirken: Kleine Schriften*, hg. von E. Vogt (Heidelberg 1967) 58 ff. (= *RhM* 104 [1961] 97 ff.).

<sup>128</sup> Τοῦτο in τοῦτο λέγει Νοσσίς bezieht sich ausschließlich auf die beiden vorausgehenden Verse. Die selbstbewußte Erklärung ist an sich an jeder Stelle in der Gedichtsammlung denkbar (Nossis erwähnt ihren Namen auch noch in *Epigr.* iii. 4 und xi. 4; die Epigrammatiker weisen allgemein nicht selten namentlich auf sich hin; cf. Luck [wie Anm. 112] 183 Anm. 63).

<sup>129</sup> Antipatros von Thessalonike *Epigr.* xix. 3 f. *GPh*; cf. dazu Skiadas (wie Anm. 36) 130 ff.



Beziehung setzt: In Abwandlung eines Grabepigramms fordert Nossis darin den vorbeiziehenden Fremden auf, wenn er nach Mytilene auf Lesbos segle, um sich "an den Blüten von Sapphos Grazien zu entzünden," solle er dort melden, daß die lokrische Erde sie selbst als Freundin der Musen und der Sappho hervorgebracht habe (xi).<sup>130</sup> Diese Worte laden förmlich dazu ein, auch in anderen Epigrammen nach Anspielungen auf Sappho zu suchen.

Dennoch stellen sich bei näherer Betrachtung erhebliche Zweifel an der Richtigkeit der poetologischen Deutung ein. Die literarischen Beziehungen erweisen sich entweder als nicht sonderlich eng oder überhaupt als inexistent. Dies sei im folgenden in aller Kürze dargelegt.

Für den Anfang "Süßer ist nichts als Liebe. Was es an Glücksgütern gibt: Alles ist zweitrangig usw." wird gerne auf ein vielverhandeltes Gedicht von Sappho verwiesen,<sup>131</sup> wo es um das Schönste auf Erden geht und Sappho bzw. eine ihrer Schülerinnen<sup>132</sup> den Vorstellungen anderer ihre eigene Auffassung entgegenstellt (fr. 16. 1–4):

Die einen sagen, eine Schar von Reitern, die anderen eine von Fußsoldaten, wieder andere eine von Schiffen sei das Schönste auf der dunklen Erde, ich aber jenes, wonach einer liebend verlangt usw.<sup>133</sup>

Es handelt sich bei diesen Versen um ein Standardbeispiel für eine aus verschiedensten Literaturen bekannte Gedankenform, die sogenannte Priamel—d.h. eine Beispielreihe, die "als Vorauslauf (praeambulum, daraus Priamel) für eine Schlußpointe" dient.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Cf. zu diesem wohl zu Recht als Abschluß der Gedichtsammlung betrachteten Epigramm Reitzenstein (wie Anm. 68) 139 f.; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Sappho und Simonides: Untersuchungen über griechische Lyriker* (Berlin 1913) 299; G. Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Florenz 1920) 321 f.; Gabathuler (wie Anm. 14) 48; Luck (wie Anm. 112) 186 f.; Carugno (wie Anm. 112) 327 ff.; Gow–Page (wie Anm. 23) 442 f.; Cazzaniga (wie Anm. 118) 431 ff.; C. Gallavotti, "L'epigramma biografico di Nosside come esempio di critica testuale," in: *Studi De Falco* (Neapel 1971) 241 ff.; Gigante (wie Anm. 112) 24 ff., 38 f.; auch dens. (wie Anm. 126) 554; S. Barnard, "Hellenistic Women Poets," *CJ* 73 (1978) 210 f.; S. L. Tarán, *The Art of Variation in the Hellenistic Epigram*, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 9 (Leiden 1979) 146 ff.; Specchia (wie Anm. 127) 50 f.; Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 11 f.; McIntosh Snyder (wie Anm. 112) 79; Liviabella Furiani (wie Anm. 125) 192 f.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. Cazzaniga (wie Anm. 118) 439 f.; Cavallini (wie Anm. 124) 130, 144 Anm. 2; Gigante (wie Anm. 112) 25; dens. (wie Anm. 126) 552; Barnard (wie Anm. 130) 211; Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 180; Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 7 f. und dies. (wie Anm. 6) 92. Schon Wilamowitz (wie Anm. 11) I 135 dachte wohl an diese Stelle, als er schrieb: "Auf Sappho konnte Nossis sich doch auch berufen, wenn sie in dem reizenden Spruche V 170 gestand, wie süß ihr die Liebe war."

<sup>132</sup> Dies die Ansicht von F. Lasserre, *Sappho – une autre lecture*, Proagones 21 (Padua 1989) 165 ("une élève de Sappho établie à Sardes").

<sup>133</sup> οἱ μὲν ἰππῶν σθένος, οἱ δὲ πῆδων,  
οἱ δὲ νᾶων φαῖς' ἐπ[ι] γᾶν μέλαι[ν]αν  
ἔμμεναι κάλλιστον, ἔγω δὲ κτῆν' ὄτ-  
τω τις ἔρεται κτλ.

<sup>134</sup> F. Domseiff, *Die archaische Mythenerzählung: Folgerungen aus dem homerischen Apollonhymnos* (Berlin–Leipzig 1933) 3; ein Überblick über die Forschungsgeschichte zur Priamel (mit weiteren Definitionen) bei W. H. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to*

Faßt man den Begriff der Priamel sehr weit, so lassen sich Nossis' erste Verse vielleicht als Variation einer solchen betrachten. Freilich würden die normalerweise vorangestellten Beispiele, die als Folie für die Hauptaussage dienen, in diesem Fall erst hinterher folgen.<sup>135</sup> Über die Nähe zu Sappho wäre damit noch nichts ausgesagt, denn Priameln sind eine zu allen Zeiten der griechischen Literatur weitverbreitete Darstellungsform (priamelartig ist, wie erwähnt, u.a. auch Kallimachos' Echo-Epigramm). Es müßten wörtliche Anklänge hinzukommen, um mit Cavallini von einem "con-sapevole legame" sprechen zu können, welches Nossis hier zwischen sich selbst und Sappho errichte.<sup>136</sup> Diese aber fehlen—vom Wort ἔρωται abgesehen, welches bei Sappho freilich nicht unbedingt auf den erotischen Sinn eingeschränkt ist.<sup>137</sup> Die beiden Gedichte berühren sich im übrigen zwar darin, daß es in ihnen primär um die Intensität von Sinneseindrücken geht; doch während Nossis' Verse auf den Geschmackssinn zielen (was ist am süßesten?), steht bei Sappho der Sehsinn im Zentrum (was ist am schönsten—sc. anzusehen? cf. Vers 18 ἴδην).<sup>138</sup>

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*Boethius*, *Mnemosyne Suppl.* 74 (Leiden 1982) 1 ff.; cf. auch Schwinge (wie Anm. 3) 5 "Als Priamel bezeichnet man eine Beispielerhebung, bei der mehrere aneinandergereihte Beispiele die Folie abgeben für eine Aussage, die am Schluß folgt und die auf dieser Folie Prägnanz und Gewicht erhält."

<sup>135</sup> Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 7 hält ὁ δ' ἄλβια κτλ. für eine summarische Priamel: "Formally, that initial distich presents us with a sweeping gnomic utterance, ἄδιον οὐδὲν ἔρωτος, followed by a 'summary priamel' in which the final supremacy awarded the climactic element to *meli* is simultaneously and paradoxically revoked. This clever variation upon the standard priamel scheme heightens the controlling opposition of *meli* and *erôs*" (der Begriff der "summary priamel" stammt aus E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica I: The Eleventh Olympian Ode* [Berkeley-Los Angeles 1962] 6 ff.; kritisch dazu T. Krischer, "Die logischen Formen der Priamel," *GB* 2 [1974] 80; zustimmend Race [wie Anm. 134] 10 ff., der freilich unser Gedicht kaum als Priamel bezeichnen würde, denn cf. 15 "Not just any list constitutes a priamel; it must lead up to something. For that reason . . . I am excluding from consideration those lists of examples which simply follow a general statement to justify it and do not lead up to anything").

<sup>136</sup> Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 180 im Anschluß an Gigante (wie Anm. 112) 25.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. L. Rissman, *Love as War: Homeric Allusion in the Poetry of Sappho*, Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie 157 (Königstein/Ts. 1983) 31 ff.; W. H. Race, "Sappho, Fr. 16 L-P. and Alkaios, Fr. 42 L-P.: Romantic and Classical Strains in Lesbian Lyric," *CJ* 85 (1989) 18 "the original formulation 'whatever one loves,' . . . is broad enough to include desire even for martial activities" (anders u.a. G. L. Koniaris, "On Sappho, Fr. 16 [L. P.]," *Hermes* 95 [1967] 259; S. des Bouvrie Thorsen, "The Interpretation of Sappho's Fragment 16 L.-P.," *SO* 53 [1978] 11 f. etc.). Fr. 16 wird bekanntlich allgemein überaus kontrovers gedeutet; es ist hier nicht der Ort, darauf näher einzugehen.

<sup>138</sup> Diesen Unterschied betont auch Liviabella Furiani (wie Anm. 125) 191, wobei sie aber davon ausgeht, daß Nossis bewußt von Sappho abweicht. Mag sein, daß Nossis Sappho fr. 16 gekannt hat (völlig auszuschließen ist es nicht); die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Gedichten scheint mir aber auf jeden Fall nicht sehr eng.

Ein weiteres Vorbild hat man in zwei Versen Hesiods gesehen,<sup>139</sup> wo es mit Blick auf Sänger und Könige heißt (*Th.* 96 f.<sup>140</sup> in der Übersetzung von Walter Marg):

Und selig ist, wen die Musen lieben;  
Süß fließt die Stimme ihm vom Munde.<sup>141</sup>

Die Ähnlichkeit mit Nossis ist in diesem Fall rein äußerlicher Art.<sup>142</sup> Hier wie dort wird zwar das Wort ὄλβιος verwendet, allerdings in anderem Sinn: Bei Nossis dient es zur Bezeichnung der materiellen "Glücksgüter," bei Hesiod werden die göttlich inspirierten Sänger und Könige "glücklich" gepriesen. Gemeinsam ist beiden Stellen weiter ein verallgemeinernder Relativsatz mit dem Verb "lieben"—"wen die Musen lieben" bei Hesiod, "wen die Kypris liebt" bei Nossis. Aus diesem zufällig übereinstimmenden Gebrauch eines ganz gewöhnlichen Verbes und einer gängigen Satzstruktur zu schließen, Nossis wandle Hesiods Worte ab und ersetze gezielt die Musen durch Aphrodite (so Degani, Cavallini, Skinner),<sup>143</sup> ist nicht zuletzt deshalb verfehlt, weil sich unsere Dichterin an anderer Stelle ausdrücklich als Freundin der Musen bezeichnet.<sup>144</sup>

In den Hesiodversen ist weiter von der süßen Stimme des von den Musen inspirierten Dichters die Rede. Das hat man sogleich mit Nossis' Worten "Selbst den Honig speie ich aus dem Munde aus" in Verbindung gebracht und von "complex intertextual corrections of Hesiod" durch Nossis gesprochen (Skinner [wie Anm. 6] 93). Unabhängig von Hesiod hat schon Marcello Gigante den Honig als Chiffre für eine Dichtung gedeutet, die Nossis ablehne.<sup>145</sup> Er und die von ihm beeinflussten Interpreten haben insbesondere auf den Chorlyriker Pindar verwiesen (daß auch Kallimachos,

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 180 ff.; Skinner (wie Anm. 6) 91 "in its structure, imagery and actual phrasing, the quatrain patently imitates Hesiod's well-known glorification of the *aoidos* or epic minstrel at *Theog.* 96–97."

<sup>140</sup> Zum Gedankengang cf. M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony*, ed. with prolegomena and commentary (Oxford 1966) 186.

<sup>141</sup> ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὄντινα Μοῦσαι / φίλωνται· γλυκερὴ οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδὴ.

<sup>142</sup> Dies im Unterschied etwa zu Kallimachos *Hymn.* 4. 5 ff., der klar von Hesiod abhängig ist; cf. Reinsch-Werner (wie Anm. 27) 323 ff.

<sup>143</sup> Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 181; Skinner (wie Anm. 6) 92 ("the place of Hesiod's Muses is . . . usurped in the last couplet by *ha Kypris*"), 93 ("for her . . . the goddess of love is the true and proper Muse") 95; cf. auch Degani (wie Anm. 112) 52 (ohne Hinweis auf Hesiod: "I poeti dichiarano di essere ispirati dalle Muse . . . ; Nosside dichiara invece di ispirarsi direttamente ad Afrodite").

<sup>144</sup> *Epigr.* xi. 3 f. Μοῦσαισι φίλαν . . . Λοκρὶς γὰρ τίκτη μ'. Skinner (wie Anm. 6) 80 weiß um diese Tatsache, versucht ihre Bedeutung jedoch herunterzuspielen ("To be sure, each of the two poets [gemeint sind Sappho und Nossis] formally acknowledges the Muses as patrons of her craft; yet her relationship with those divinities remains austere in comparison to her lucid awareness of Aphrodite as a spiritual presence and benefactor" usw.; cf. 90 f.).

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Gigante (wie Anm. 124) 244 "Certamente, la dolcezza del miele era proverbiale . . . , ma nel verso di Nosside essa affiora anche come simbolo di una poesia che le ripugna: poiché l'amore è superiore alle altre gioie, anche il canto dell'amore è superiore al canto di agoni o di battaglie: forse è una poetica, oltre che di contenuti, anche di forma" (ähnlich ders. [wie Anm. 126] 552).

wie erwähnt, sein Dichtungsideal mit "Süßigkeit" umschreibt, blieb unbeachtet). Weil Pindar von süßtönenden Hymnen (*Ol.* 11. 4), von den Musen mit Honigstimmen (*Ol.* 6. 21 μελίφθογγοι . . . Μοῖσαι; cf. *Isthm.* 2. 7) spricht und seinen Gesang (τὸ μέλος) gerne mit Honig (τὸ μέλι) vergleicht (cf. *Ol.* 10. 97 ff. κλυτὸν ἔθνος / Λοκρῶν ἀμφέπεσον, μέλιτι<sup>146</sup> / εὐάνορα πόλιν καταβρέχων etc.),<sup>147</sup> gilt er als Zielscheibe der Nossis.<sup>148</sup>

Doch das Bild von der Süßigkeit der Stimme und damit auch des Gesanges hat eine lange Tradition;<sup>149</sup> schon Homer sagt von dem "süßredenden" Nestor (ἡδυεπής), ihm sei die Stimme süßer als Honig von der Zunge geflossen (*Il.* 1. 247), und selbst für Sappho, die doch Nossis' "primary poetic model" sein soll,<sup>150</sup> gilt die honigsüße Stimme als Auszeichnung: Sie preist junge Frauen als μελίφωνοι (fr. 185 = test. 217 Voigt; cf. bereits Alkman 26. 1 *PMG*). Die Metapher lebt auch zu Nossis' Zeit weiter. Nie wird der Honig dabei ausschließlich mit Pindars Dichtung assoziiert, geschweige denn negativ gedeutet.<sup>151</sup>

Damit kommen wir zum Angelpunkt der poetologischen Deutung des Epigramms, den Blumen und Rosen im letzten Vers, die Nossis' Dichtung symbolisieren sollen.<sup>152</sup> Nun, daß Blumen und Rosen in der Tat metaphorisch für Poesie verwendet werden können, steht außer Zweifel. Sapphos "Rosen aus Pierien," auf die in unserem Zusammenhang verwiesen wird (fr. 55. 2 f.), sind ein Beispiel dafür. Gerade dieses Beispiel zeigt aber auch, daß die Metaphorik doch nicht so selbstverständlich ist, daß das bloße Wort "Rosen" genügen würde. Sappho sagt ausdrücklich: "Rosen aus Pierien," der Heimat der Musen. Auch sonst wird die metaphorische Verwendung von Blumen meist durch einen Zusatz verdeutlicht: Nossis selbst etwa schreibt an anderer Stelle von der "Blüte der Chariten der Sappho"

<sup>146</sup> Vom Scholion mit αὐτῷ τῷ ποιήματι glossiert.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. J. H. Waszink, *Biene und Honig als Symbol des Dichters und der Dichtung in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, Rhein.-Westfälische Akademie der Wiss., Geisteswissenschaften, Vorträge G 196 (Opladen 1974) 8 f.

<sup>148</sup> Eine besondere Bedeutung mißt Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 10 dabei Pindar *N.* 7. 52 f. κόρον δ' ἔχει / καὶ μέλι καὶ τὰ τέρπν' ἄνθε' Ἀφροδίσεια zu: "Nossis' literary manifesto may be read as a studied evocation of that well-known pronouncement, an evocation that expands its neatly packaged triad of poetry, honey and erotic pleasure into a complex web of contraries. Honey, synonymous with the praise-song, forfeits all sweetness when set beside eros itself; meanwhile, through the power of Aphrodite, Pindaric *anthea* are swiftly transformed into Sapphic roses."

<sup>149</sup> Daran erinnert unter Hinweis auf Waszink (wie Anm. 147) auch M. Fantuzzi, "Eros und die Musen: Bion fr. 9 Gow," in: B. Effe (Hg.), *Theokrit und die griechische Bukolik*, WdF 580 (Darmstadt 1986) 373 (in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Cavallini).

<sup>150</sup> Skinner (wie Anm. 125) 7.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. u.a. Theokr. *Epigr.* xx. 11 f. = iv. 11 f. Gow ξουθαὶ δ' ἀδονίδες μινυρίσμασιν ἀνταχεύει / μέλπουσαι στόμασιν τὰν μελίγαρυν ὅπα; dens. *Id.* 8. 82 f., 20. 26 ff. . . . ἐκ στομάτων δέ / ἔρρει μοι φωνὰ γλυκερωτέρα ἢ μέλι κηρῶ. / ἀδὺ δέ μοι τὸ μέλισμα κτλ.; Alkaios von Messene *Epigr.* xii. 3 ff. etc. Für verfehlt halte ich im übrigen auch Skinners Einschätzung von ἀπὸ στόματος δ' ἔκτυσα als "paratragic expression" ([wie Anm. 124] 33); im Unterschied zu den von ihr in Anm. 38 genannten Stellen aus der Tragödie ist ἀποπτύειν hier nicht figurativ, sondern wörtlich gemeint.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. oben Anm. 124.

(*Epigr.* xi. 2), Pindar von der "ergötzenden Blüte" seiner "Hymnen" (*Ol.* 6. 105), Bakchylides von den "Blüten der süßklingenden *Gesänge*" (*fr.* 4. 63 Snell-Mähler) usw. (die Beispielreihe ließe sich beliebig verlängern). Man mag einwenden, daß eine solche Verdeutlichung in unserem Fall wegen des Demonstrativpronomens "jener" in: "der weiß nicht, was für Blüten die Rosen jener sind" überflüssig sei. Doch wie bereits erwähnt, handelt es sich bei diesem Genitiv lediglich um eine Emendation. Überliefert ist der Nominativ τήνα (bzw. κήνα), den zu ändern es letztlich keine Ursache gibt.<sup>153</sup>

Kurzum, so legitim der Ansatz der Verfechter einer poetologischen Deutung dieses Epigramms im Grunde auch ist: Die vorgebrachten Parallelen vermögen weder einzeln noch kumulativ davon zu überzeugen, daß es Nossis in diesen Versen um mehr als ein freimütiges Lob auf Eros ging, daß sie tatsächlich mittels literarischer Anspielungen eine Art poetisches Manifest hätte formulieren wollen.

Eine angemessene Deutung des Gedichtes hätte m.E. von ähnlichen erotischen Epigrammen zeitgenössischer Dichter auszugehen. Vor allem auf Asklepiades wäre hierbei erneut zu verweisen, dessen gelungenes Epigramm auf die Süße der Liebe Nossis möglicherweise bekannt war und sie zur Abfassung ihres Gedichtes angeregt haben könnte (i):<sup>154</sup>

Süß ist in der sommerlichen Glut dem Dürstenden ein eiskaltes Getränk,  
süß ist es für Seeleute,  
nach dem Wintersturm das Frühlingssternbild Corona zu sehen.  
Süßer aber ist es, wenn eine einzige Decke die Liebenden  
verhüllt und Kypris von beiden gepriesen wird.<sup>155</sup>

Als nächstes wäre nach der Bedeutung der Rosen im Schlußvers ihres Epigramms zu fragen, wobei nicht nur Heather Whites Vorschlag, die Rosen seien hier eine verhüllende Bezeichnung der weiblichen Scham,<sup>156</sup>

<sup>153</sup> Cf. oben. Daß Nossis in der überlieferten Fassung ausschließlich von Frauen spricht, braucht nicht zu verwundern; mit Ausnahme von ii und x sind alle Epigramme auf die Welt der Frau ausgerichtet (cf. auch unten zur Deutung der Rosen).

<sup>154</sup> In der *Anthologia Palatina* steht Asklepiades *Epigr.* i unmittelbar vor Nossis *Epigr.* i (5. 169 f.).

<sup>155</sup> ἡδὺ θέρους διψῶντι χιῶν ποτόν, ἡδὺ δὲ ναύταις  
ἐκ χειμῶνος ἰδεῖν εἰαρινὸν Στέφανον·  
ἡδίων δ' ὅποταν κρύψῃ μία τοὺς φιλέοντας  
χλαῖνα, καὶ αἰνῆται Κύπρις ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων.

Das Epigramm beginnt also mit einer echten Priamel; die ersten beiden Verse dürften Aischylos *Ag.* 899 ff. nachgebildet sein; cf. Knauer (wie Anm. 68) 17; Gow-Page (wie Anm. 23) 118.

<sup>156</sup> White (wie Anm. 119) 19 "Nossis is making an obscene pun on the meaning of the word ῥόδον, which in Greek can mean not only 'rose' but also 'pudenda muliebria' like μύρτον"; außer der von ihr aus LSJ zitierten Stelle Pherekrates *fr.* 113. 18 K-A cf. auch Kratinos *fr.* 116 K-A und Hesych *ρ* 403 ῥόδον· Μιτυληναῖοι (Sappho und Alkaios?) τὸ τῆς γυναικός, femer Rufin *Epigr.* xii. 5 f. (= *AP* 5. 36. 5 f.) (mit dieser Bedeutung von ῥόδον spielt wohl auch Dionys. Sophist. *Epigr.* vi ἡ τὰ ῥόδα, ῥοδόεσσαν ἔχεις χάριν· ἀλλὰ τί πωλεῖς; / σαντήν, ἥ τὰ ῥόδα; ἢ ἐ συναμφοτέρα;). Whites Deutung wird abgelehnt von Cavallini (wie Anm. 126) 181



sondern auch die Verwendung von Rosenknospen auf lokrischen Tonreliefs der Aphrodite zu berücksichtigen wäre.<sup>157</sup> Doch das gehört nicht mehr zum Thema dieses Beitrags.

Meine Ausführungen enden also mit einem Nicht-Reflex hellenistischer Dichtungstheorie. Auch ein negativer Befund hat bekanntlich heuristischen Wert—in den Geisteswissenschaften nicht weniger als in den Naturwissenschaften. Im vorliegenden Fall gibt er die Mahnung mit auf den Weg, daß hellenistische Dichtung und insbesondere das Epigramm nicht immer und überall so ausgeklügelte "arte allusiva," so feinsinnige Poetik in Poesieform ist wie bei den Dichterphilologen im Umkreis Alexandriens.

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Anm. 8, Specchia (wie Anm. 127) 50 Anm. 5 und Liviabella Furiani (wie Anm. 125) 188 Anm. 21; zustimmend dagegen McIntosh Snyder (wie Anm. 112) 78 f., unter deren Einfluß Skinner (wie Anm. 6) 92 f. ihre poetologische Deutung modifiziert (cf. oben Anm. 125).

<sup>157</sup> Abbildung des Münchner Fragments (um 460 v. Chr.) bei H. Prückner, *Die lokrischen Tonreliefs: Beitrag zur Kultgeschichte von Lokroi Epizephyrioi* (Mainz 1968) Tafel 1,1 und im *LIMC* s.v. Aphrodite Nr. 1328. Dargestellt sind Aphrodite und Hermes, einander zugewandt; Aphrodite streckt Hermes mit der rechten Hand eine deutlich erkennbare Rosenknospe (cf. auch Prückner a.O., 18 zu Abb. 1 Tafel 1,2 und 47 f. zu Abb. 7 Tafel 6) hin; auf ihrem vorgestreckten Unterarm steht Eros, eine Schildkrötenleier in der Linken und die Rechte gleichsam zum Gruß gegen Hermes gerichtet. Daß hier trotz der hieratischen, an Kultstatuen erinnernden Erscheinung der beiden Götter eine Liebesbeziehung symbolisiert ist, wird von Prückner (anders als im *LIMC* ad loc. vermerkt) nicht in Frage gestellt (16): "Dennoch scheint es mir von Bedeutung, daß das Paar nicht neben- oder hintereinander steht. Zweifellos müssen wir hierin, in aller hieratischen Form, die für den Kult nötig ist, den Ausdruck einer zwischen beiden Gottheiten bestehenden Liebesbeziehung erblicken—einer Liebesbeziehung freilich, die ihrerseits, da unabhängig von Erzählgut des Mythos, Ausdruck einer besonderen Kultsituation sein muß" (cf. auch 19 "Aphrodite und Hermes müssen . . . in Lokroi als Liebende gegolten haben," 27, 87).

## La Ruse de Bacchis et le Chant du Rossignol (Plaute, *Bacchides* 37–38)

HUBERT ZEHNACKER

Nous voudrions offrir au Professeur Miroslav Marcovich, en témoignage d'admiration pour son oeuvre scientifique et son activité d'éditeur des *Illinois Classical Studies*, quelques modestes réflexions sur deux vers des *Bacchides* de Plaute.

Comme on sait, un accident ancien a fait disparaître le début de cette pièce de l'archétype de nos manuscrits. La perte est assez importante; il nous reste du texte disparu quelque 34 vers, entiers ou fragmentaires, transmis par des citations de commentateurs ou de grammairiens anciens. A eux seuls, ces lambeaux ne sont guère susceptibles de nous aider à reconstruire les premières scènes de la comédie. Par chance, la publication en 1968 de quelques morceaux du *Dis Exapaton* de Ménandre,<sup>1</sup> qui est le modèle des *Bacchides*, a permis d'y voir un peu plus clair; les travaux de Bernd Bader et de Konrad Gaiser, entre autres, ont abouti à une reconstruction, sinon certaine, du moins plausible du début de la comédie de Plaute.<sup>2</sup>

Lorsque le texte reprend après la lacune—le premier vers porte donc dans nos éditions le n° 35—les deux soeurs Bacchis sont en grande conversation. On devine qu'elle viennent d'inventer le canevas qui leur permettra de prendre le jeune Pistoclère à la glu de leur séduction. Reste à s'assurer que les dialogues seront de la plus parfaite vraisemblance. A cet effet la plus entreprenante des deux femmes, Bacchis I (sigle BA.), demande à Bacchis II, sa soeur jumelle (sigle SO.), de lui venir en aide au cas où sa mémoire viendrait à défaillir:

- |     |   |
|-----|---|
| BA. | Quid si hoc potis est, ut tu taceas, ego loquar?          |
| SO. | Lepide; licet.  |
| BA. | Vbi me fugiet memoria, ibi tu facito ut subuenias, soror. |

<sup>1</sup> E. W. Handley, *Menander and Plautus: A Study in Comparison* (Londres 1968).

<sup>2</sup> B. Bader, "Der verlorene Anfang der plautinischen 'Bacchides'," *RhM* 113 (1970) 304–23; K. Gaiser, "Die plautinischen 'Bacchides' und Menanders 'Dis Exapaton'," *Philol.* 114 (1970) 51–87 (avec bibliographie).

Ces vers ne font aucune difficulté; il est clair que Bacchis I prendra la direction des opérations; sa soeur, plus effacée qu'elle, est invitée à n'intervenir qu'en cas de nécessité. Le rôle qui lui est attribué s'apparente un peu à celui d'un souffleur qui permet aux acteurs de surmonter leurs trous de mémoire; nous y reviendrons.

Mais voici qu'avant l'entrée effective du jeune homme, les deux Bacchides échangent encore une réplique dont nous comprenons sans doute encore le sens général, mais dont la tradition manuscrite ne nous offre plus le libellé exact. Nous copions le texte d'après l'édition Ernout:<sup>3</sup>

SO. Pol magis metuo, mihi in monendo ne defuerit ꝑoratio.

BA. Pol ego [quoque] metuo lusciniolae ne defuerit cantio.

On voit très bien que Bacchis II est un peu inquiète: "Serai-je à la hauteur de la situation? Je crains qu'au moment où je devrai te suggérer les bonnes répliques, je ne trouve pas les mots qui conviendront." Mais Bacchis I, décidément très en verve, la rassure en un vers qui signifie qu'elle n'a pas à se faire de soucis, puisque le mensonge est aussi naturel aux courtisanes que le chant l'est aux rossignols. L'emploi du terme *monere*, en un sens technique emprunté au monde du spectacle, est caractéristique du comique de Plaute; on assiste, ici comme en d'autres endroits, à un effet de "stage on the stage." Dans la comédie que les deux femmes s'appêtent à jouer à Pistoclère, Bacchis II doit tenir le rôle du *monitor*, qui est le souffleur.<sup>4</sup>

Fort bien; mais la *crux* devant *oratio* nous rappelle que le vers 37 est inscandable dans son état actuel. Jusqu'à *defuerit* les lois du septénaire trochaïque sont respectées; ensuite la prosodie du mot *oratio* rompt le rythme et il est impossible d'admettre que Plaute ait écrit le texte sous cette forme. Ce n'est sans doute pas une raison pour proposer l'athétèse de tout le vers, comme font Ussing et Ritschl: une solution de désespoir qui ressemble plutôt à une démission.

Le vers 38 offre une autre difficulté. Une partie de la tradition manuscrite écrit: *Pol ego quoque metuo*, etc. Il est facile de voir qu'à partir de *metuo* la métrique est correcte; mais au début du vers il y a de la matière en trop. On semble s'en être aperçu depuis longtemps: le manuscrit B, Palatinus Vaticanus 1615, écrit *Pol quoque metuo*, en supprimant *ego*, ce qui rétablit la scansion. Mais d'autres solutions sont possibles, entre lesquelles il nous faudra choisir.

Si nous voulons avoir des chances de corriger ces deux vers en aboutissant à un résultat vraisemblable, nous devons nous soumettre à trois conditions. La première est de respecter le sens général de la conversation, que l'on devine parfaitement malgré l'imprécision du texte. La seconde est

<sup>3</sup> A. Ernout, *Plaute*, tome II (Paris 1933 et rééd.).

<sup>4</sup> Fest. 122-23 L.; *CIL* III 3423.

d'intervenir le moins possible dans les données de la tradition manuscrite: la correction la plus économique sera la meilleure. La troisième condition enfin sera de n'envisager que les corrections qui soient conformes à ce que nous savons des usages linguistiques et stylistiques de Plaute.

\* \* \*

En 1595 l'éditeur Denis Lambin proposait une solution apparemment ingénieuse. Elle consistait à remplacer, dans les vers 37 et 38, la forme *defuerit* par *defuat*: comme par enchantement, les deux vers redevenaient scandables et on pouvait garder tout le reste:

Pol magis metuo, mihi in monendo ne defuat oratio.

Pol ego quoque metuo lusciniolae ne defuat cantio.

A l'exception de Hermann,<sup>5</sup> les éditeurs ultérieurs des *Bacchides* n'ont pas retenu cette suggestion, et on ne peut que les approuver. La principale objection qui s'adresse à la conjecture de Lambin est évidemment que la leçon *defuat* est absente des manuscrits. Mais cette objection n'est pas la seule. On remarque aussi que si l'on acceptait le texte de Lambin, l'accent, d'un vers à l'autre, ne tomberait pas sur la même syllabe, ni pour *metuo*, ni pour *defuat*. A cela s'ajouterait une variation fâcheuse dans la scansion même de *defuat*, dactylique au vers 37, spondaïque avec un -u- consonne au vers 38. Le parallélisme des deux vers se trouverait rompu et l'effet détruit. Des objections analogues peuvent s'adresser à *fugiat*, proposé par Louis Havet;<sup>6</sup> l'idée vient de *fugiet*, au vers précédent; le résultat est très peu satisfaisant, surtout avec *cantio*.

Il nous faut donc garder *defuerit*, et pour ce faire, réglons d'abord le problème du début du vers 38. Plusieurs solutions sont possibles. La première serait de supprimer *Pol*, et Leo y avait songé.<sup>7</sup> Mais l'opération aurait pour effet de faire commencer le vers par un procéleusmatique: *ego quoque*; et d'un point de vue paléographique, on ne voit pas bien comment *Pol* se serait introduit dans le texte. On peut alors songer à supprimer soit *ego*, soit *quoque*. Les deux mots sont prosodiquement interchangeable; à la différence d'*ego*, *quoque* employé seul a pour effet d'allonger la syllabe *pol*, mais cela n'a guère d'incidence sur le rythme du septénaire. L'éditeur Lindsay (Oxford 1903) a choisi d'écrire *Pol quoque* à la suite du manuscrit B. La plupart des autres écrivent *Pol ego*. Le mécanisme qui a abouti au

<sup>5</sup> G. Hermann (Leipzig 1845), cité par C. Questa, *Plauto. Bacchides* (Florence 1965; 2<sup>e</sup> éd. 1975).

<sup>6</sup> L. Havet, *Manuel de critique verbale appliquée aux textes latins* (Paris 1911) § 1111, cité par Questa.

<sup>7</sup> F. Leo (Berlin 1895) ad loc. Cf. encore A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig 1890; rééd. Hildesheim 1964) 201.

libellé *ego quoque* est probablement celui de la dittographie, sans qu'on puisse dire lequel des deux mots était le plus anciennement présent dans le texte. On peut passer par dittographie de *ego* à *ego q°q*, aussi bien que de *q°q* à *ego q°q*.

Faut-il choisir entre ces deux corrections? Pour ce qui est du sens ou, si l'on veut, du mouvement de la conversation, on peut penser que le choix de *ego* ou de *quoque* aboutirait à des nuances opposées. *Pol quoque* signifierait que Bacchis I est inquiète autant que sa soeur, encore que sa crainte se porte sur un objet différent. *Pol ego*, au contraire, introduirait une valeur adversative chargée d'une aimable ironie: "Tu as peur de manquer d'esprit d'à-propos? Eh bien moi, je crains que le rossignol, etc."

Mais en réalité, à examiner quelques textes parallèles que nous offrent les comédies de Plaute, on s'aperçoit que la différence de sens n'est pas aussi tranchée qu'on pourrait le croire de prime abord. Ainsi *Men.* 950–51 offre l'échange de répliques suivant:

- MED.    Elleborum potabis faxo aliquos uiginti dies.  
MEN.    At ego te pendentem fodiam stimulis triginta dies.

Dans des conditions de dialogue comparables, le second interlocuteur emploie *ego*, à l'exclusion de *quoque*; mais on peut objecter qu'à la différence de *Bacch.* 37–38, le verbe principal n'est pas le même ici d'un vers à l'autre, même si l'allitération *faxo* – *fodiam*, renforcée par *potabis* – *pendentem*, contribue à les rapprocher. L'identité du verbe principal, en revanche, est respectée en *Merc.* 141–42, qui offre le texte suivant:

- CH.        Hominem ego iracundiorem quam te noui neminem.  
AC.        At ego maledicentiorum quam te noui neminem.

La valeur démonstrative de cet exemple est toutefois atténuée par l'emploi parallèle de *ego* dans les deux vers à la fois. A l'inverse des cas précédents, un passage du *Rud.* 431–32 présente un bel emploi de *quoque*. Le dialogue s'établit entre l'esclave Scéparnion et la jeune fille Ampélisque qui demande la permission de remplir une cruche d'eau:

- SC.        Quid nunc uis?  
AM.        Sapienti ornatus quid uelim indicium facit.  
SC.        Meus quoque hic sapienti ornatus quid uelim indicium facit.

(L'*ornatus* de la jeune fille, c'est la cruche qu'elle porte; l'*ornatus* de Scéparnion évoque un sous-entendu grivois.)

On a l'impression que les deux solutions sont possibles. En définitive, c'est l'emploi très fréquent de *pol ego* de la part des personnages de Plaute (*Aul.* 426, *Bacch.* 1107, *Merc.* 453, *Most.* 384) qui fera pencher la balance en faveur de la solution retenue par la plupart des éditeurs.

Parvenu à ce point, nous voudrions souligner la parfaite symétrie des deux vers *Bacch.* 37–38, que l'on peut présenter provisoirement comme suit:



Pol	magis metuo	mihi in monendo	ne defuerit	(...).
Pol	ego metuo	lusciniolae	ne defuerit	cantio.

Nous devons en tenir compte pour la restitution de la fin du vers 37.

\* \* \*

La question se concentre donc sur le dernier mot du vers, *oratio*. A tout bien prendre, il pose le même problème que le couple *ego quoque* du vers 38: il y a de la matière en trop. Si l'on pouvait, par exemple, "perdre" une syllabe longue, tout rentrerait dans l'ordre. Et, comme on sait, la bonne vieille recette pour "perdre" une syllabe est de chercher une élision. Par chance, le mot *oratio* commence par une voyelle; on peut donc intervertir l'ordre des deux groupes de mots *mihi in monendo* et *ne defuerit*. Telle est (avec des variantes sur la graphie de *mage, magi*, *magis*, et sur celle de *mi, mihi*) la solution adoptée par Bothe (1821), Leo, Lindsay. Nous citons le texte de Leo:

Pol magis metuo, ne defuerit mi in monendo oratio.

C'est une solution ingénieuse, mais qu'on se gardera d'approuver. Rien dans la tradition manuscrite n'autorise ce bouleversement. L'effet de parallélisme entre les vers 37 et 38 est détruit; et le sens même n'y trouve pas son compte, comme nous le montrerons ultérieurement.

En bonne méthode il convient de respecter toute la partie saine du vers 37. Nous devons nous demander seulement quel est le terme que le mot *oratio* est venu remplacer, et quel a été le mécanisme de la faute. Dans cette optique, plusieurs solutions ont été proposées, qui résultent en fait d'approches différentes.

Friedrich Ritschl et Georg Goetz (Leipzig 1886) proposaient *memoria*. Il n'y a rien à objecter, ni pour le sens, ni pour la scansion. Mais ce mot est aussi banal qu'*oratio*, et on ne voit pas pourquoi il aurait été remplacé. Par ailleurs sa silhouette est complètement différente de celle d'*oratio*, ce qui exclut une erreur mécanique. Tout au plus faudrait-il penser à une perte accidentelle du dernier mot dans l'archétype (un trou, une déchirure), qu'on aurait essayé de réparer tant bien que mal. En fait, il apparaît que Ritschl et Goetz ont repris *memoria* du vers 36, comme Louis Havet, par la suite, a tiré *fugiat* de *fugiet*; mais cet artifice même semble condamner leur tentative.

Avant eux, Fleckeisen (Leipzig 1869) avait proposé de remplacer *oratio* par *optio*. C'est infiniment plus astucieux. Le mécanisme paléographique que supposerait cette faute est limpide: une erreur vénielle peut transformer *optio* en *ortio*, et entraîner la correction *oratio*. Le sens obtenu, sans être excellent, est acceptable, pour peu qu'on interprète *optio* comme signifiant non pas "la liberté de choisir," mais "la faculté," ou "l'intelligence nécessaire pour choisir." On peut objecter, cependant, que

nous ne savons pas du tout si le canevas inventé par les sœurs Bacchis comportait des variantes et s'il pouvait y avoir par conséquent des possibilités de choix. Lorsque Bacchis I dit qu'elle a peur d'avoir des défaillances de mémoire, *ubi me fugiet memoria*, ses paroles semblent impliquer l'existence d'un canevas unique, et compliqué. Ce qu'elle demande à sa sœur, c'est de venir à son secours, *subuenire*, et non de choisir entre diverses versions.

Il nous semble que le défaut des solutions jusqu'ici proposées était de ne pas tenir suffisamment compte du parallélisme étroit entre les vers 37 et 38. Dès le début, les mêmes mots y sont repris et se répondent: *Pol, metuo, ne defuerit*. Il est probable que le dernier mot ne faisait pas exception; bien plus, c'est le dernier mot du vers 37 qui a dû appeler, par similitude phonique et association d'idées, l'idée de la *lusciniolae cantio*. Connaissant les habitudes du latin et son goût pour l'allitération, nous pouvons supposer avec quelque vraisemblance que le mot commençait par *c-* et se terminait en *-tio*.

Plusieurs mots répondent à cette définition. L'un d'eux est *contio*, mentionné—avec la graphie *concio*—dans l'apparat d'Ussing (Copenhague 1878) comme une conjecture de Hugius. En soi, l'idée était excellente. *Contio* ne diffère de *cantio* que par une seule lettre et garantit donc un assez bon écho; il convient évidemment pour la métrique. Il appelle pourtant deux objections. La première concerne le sens de *contio*. Etymologiquement, *contio* désigne une assemblée, une réunion publique, de préférence présidée par un magistrat; de là on passe au sens de "discours prononcé devant cette assemblée," puis de "discours suivi" en général. Quintilien, par exemple, appelle *contiones* les discours insérés dans son oeuvre par l'historien Thucydide.<sup>8</sup> Ce n'est évidemment pas cela qui est demandé à Bacchis II: la pauvre, elle serait bien en peine! La deuxième objection est que l'effet d'écho entre *contio* et *cantio* n'est pas aussi bon qu'on pourrait le croire; l'accent métrique porte sur la première syllabe, dont, justement, la voyelle diffère. Il vaudrait mieux trouver un substantif commençant par *ca-*.

Si nous cherchons à présent des substantifs de deux syllabes commençant par *ca-* et se terminant par *-tio*, nous trouvons *captio* et *cautio*. Leur prosodie convient, leur sens aussi.

Nous avons interprété ci-dessus *optio* comme signifiant "la faculté" ou "la capacité de choisir." Alfred Ernout<sup>9</sup> expliquait de même *oratio* par "la faculté de parler"; et il ajoutait: "Le substantif verbal a ici sa valeur première, comme *cantio* du vers suivant." Il en va de même des deux

<sup>8</sup> A. Ernout, A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, 4e éd. (Paris 1959) s.v. "contio"; Fest. 34 L. *significat conuentum, non tamen alium quam eum qui <a> magistratu uel a sacerdote publico per praeconem publicatur*; Quint. 10. 1. 73.

<sup>9</sup> A. Ernout, *Plaute. Bacchides: Commentaire exégétique et critique* (Paris 1935) 12.

substantifs que nous envisageons; ils signifient, l'un "la faculté de tromper," l'autre "la capacité de se montrer circonspect, la prudence." Comment est-il arrivé qu'ils aient cédé la place à *oratio*? D'une façon assez simple, nous semble-t-il. Dans un premier temps, à l'amont de notre tradition manuscrite, ils ont été confondus avec *cantio*, par un saut du même au même: le phénomène est classique. On a donc eu le même mot à la fin des deux vers; mais au vers 37 ce mot *cantio* n'offrait pas un sens satisfaisant. Il a donc été remplacé, tant bien que mal, par *oratio*, dont l'inventeur ne s'aperçut pas qu'il était incompatible avec la scansion.

Les deux mots, *captio* et *cautio*, sont parfaitement plautiniens.<sup>10</sup> Ils se rencontrent surtout en fin de vers, dans l'expression *captio est* ou *captio est*, trois fois sur six occurrences, et pareillement sous la forme *cautio est* ou *cautio est* dans les trois occurrences connues chez Plaute. Entre ces deux termes, le choix est bien difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible. Du point de vue paléographique, le passage de *cautio* à *cantio* est le plus tentant; mais il est facile aussi en partant de *captio*. Pour ce qui est du sens, on constate que *captio est* est employé de préférence par des personnages qui craignent d'être victimes d'un traquenard (*Most.* 922), ou par ceux qui veulent rassurer d'éventuelles victimes: *nil in ea re captio est*, dit Epidicus au vers 297 de la comédie du même nom, pour répondre à l'inquiétude de Périphane. C'est que le substantif a pris, dans tous ces exemples, le sens de l'action accomplie; il en désigne le résultat. Or, nous l'avons dit, dans le passage des *Bacchides* que nous étudions, c'est plutôt "la faculté" ou "la capacité de tromper" que nous devons envisager. La nuance de sens serait un hapax chez Plaute, mais pour ce terme seulement; elle est présente dans *cantio*, au vers suivant, et parfaitement attestée par ailleurs. Il reste que l'hypothèse *cautio* garde toutes ses chances, elle aussi; certains, peut-être, penseront même qu'elle s'impose comme une évidence.

Et sans doute ne faut-il pas choisir. Notre but était moins de récrire un texte que d'explorer les possibilités qui pouvaient permettre d'avancer des hypothèses de corrections. Dans cette optique nous voudrions nous demander, pour finir, si les propositions que nous avons formulées sont conformes aux habitudes stylistiques de Plaute. John Barsby, qui a soigneusement commenté ce texte des *Bacchides* sans beaucoup chercher à le faire évoluer,<sup>11</sup> trouve dans cette scène, entre autres caractères: "verbal repetitions, puns and other forms of word-play (40, 49, 53, 55, 72 f., 81, 84, 96, 98); repartee, often involving repetition or word-play (37 f., 40 f., 65, 73 f., 78); alliteration and assonance (esp. 35, 41, 56, 64, 66, 67, 96)." Son analyse, globalement juste, nous invite à concentrer notre attention sur l'un

<sup>10</sup> *Captio*: *As.* 790, *Ep.* 297, 701, *Most.* 922, 1144, *Truc.* 627. *Cautio*: *Bacch.* 597, *Poen.* 445, *Ps.* 170. G. Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum* (Leipzig 1904-33).

<sup>11</sup> J. Barsby, *Plautus. Bacchides*, edited with translation and commentary (Warminster 1986).

de ces effets de style, à savoir l'écho produit par deux vers consécutifs ou proches, de formulation analogue, prononcés par deux personnages différents. Le résultat obtenu est, à volonté, celui de la taquinerie, de l'ironie ou de la dérision.

Les effets de ce genre sont nombreux dans le théâtre de Plaute. Ils sont souvent assez discrets et nous pouvons nous contenter alors de donner en note la liste de leurs références.<sup>12</sup> Mais d'autres sont beaucoup plus appuyés; leur ressemblance avec *Bacch.* 37–38 justifie la tentative de restitution que nous avons osé proposer ici.

1) *Aul.* 303–05:

- ANTH. Cur?  
 STR. Ne quid animae forte amittat dormiens.  
 ANTH. Etiamne obturat inferiorem guttorem,  
 \* ne quid animae forte amittat dormiens?

2) *Merc.* 141–42 (cité ci-dessus):

- CH. Hominem ego iracundiorum quam te noui neminem.  
 AC. At ego maledicentiorum quam te noui neminem.

3) *Pers.* 365–68:

- SA. Virgo atque mulier nulla erit quin sit mala,  
 quae praeter sapiet quam placet parentibus.  
 VI. Virgo atque mulier nulla erit quin sit mala,  
 quae reticet, si quid fieri peruorse uidet.

4) *Rud.* 431–32 (cité ci-dessus):

- SC. Quid nunc uis?  
 AM. Sapienti ornatus quid uelim indicium facit.  
 SC. Meus quoque hic sapienti ornatus quid uelim indicium facit.

5) *Rud.* 438–40:

- AM. Cur tu aquam grauare, amabo, quam hostis hosti commodat?  
 SC. Cur tu operam grauare mihi quam ciuis ciui commodat?

Nous avons relevé une vingtaine d'exemples de ces effets d'écho dans le théâtre de Plaute. Ils apparaissent parfois, comme il est naturel, dans des scènes de *diuerbium* en sénaires iambiques. Mais un certain nombre d'autres se trouvent aussi dans des récitatifs, écrits en septénaires trochaïques. C'est le cas, notamment, de l'exemple extrait du *Mercator* et

<sup>12</sup> *Aul.* 210–11, 425–26, *Bacch.* 747–50, 1106–07, *Capt.* 156–58, 549–52, *Cas.* 453–54, *Curc.* 72–73, 307–08, *Ep.* 719–20, *Men.* 950–51, *Mil.* 554–56, 851–52, 1413–21 *passim*, *Most.* 950–51, 1010–11, *Pers.* 221–22, 745–46, *Poen.* 377–78, *Pseud.* 390–92, *Stich.* 490–92, *Trin.* 761–62.

de ceux du *Rudens* que nous venons de citer. Et c'est aussi le cas des deux vers des *Bacchides* que nous avons examinés, un peu longuement peut-être. L'emploi du récitatif devait ajouter beaucoup à l'effet parodique ou comique de ce procédé très particulier de répétition. On imagine le premier acteur chantant le vers A sur la mélodie appropriée, puis le second acteur ajoutant le vers B, presque identique, avec la même ritournelle, et en contrefaisant, peut-être, la voix ou les intonations de son partenaire. Le procédé fait songer à l'opéra bouffe ou à l'opérette; il permet à l'occasion de faire passer avec élégance les plaisanteries plates ou un peu vulgaires d'un livret médiocrement inspiré.

C'est exactement ce qui se passe chez Plaute. Prenons l'exemple 4 ci-dessus. La plaisanterie sur *ornatus* n'est pas d'une extrême finesse; mais avec un bon accompagnement musical et un rythme un peu vif elle "passe" beaucoup mieux. Il en va de même des réflexions de Bacchis. Ce n'est certes pas la première fois—ni la dernière—qu'on nous dit que le mensonge est aussi naturel aux courtisanes (et sans doute aux femmes en général) que le chant l'est au rossignol; mais si la musique s'en mêle, nous serons plus indulgents, et nous croirons presque entendre ce rossignol enjoleur! Que nous lisions *captio* ou *cautio*, ou que nous rejetions ces conjectures dans l'apparat pour nous contenter dans le texte d'un prudent *†oratio*, l'essentiel, avec Plaute, est de ne pas oublier la musique.

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## On the Training of the Agrimensores in Republican Rome and Related Problems: Some Preliminary Observations

C. JOACHIM CLASSEN

In his magisterial *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* H.-I. Marrou does not seem to say anything about the training of the land surveyors (*agrimensores*) in Rome during the Republic.<sup>1</sup> This is rather surprising; for their work was of the greatest importance for Roman society and its very nature was such that it required a considerable amount of very specialized knowledge. While the earliest handbooks which have been preserved were not composed till the first century A.D.,<sup>2</sup> it seems most unlikely that such specialized knowledge could be transmitted through experts practising the art and taught without theoretical instruction, without books, without a school.<sup>3</sup> For it is clearly a very difficult discipline with numerous technical aspects, further developed by the Romans over a long period of time, but not invented by them, but going further back.

<sup>1</sup> H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1976; German transl. Munich 1977, 466) has a brief reference to surveying as a branch of scholarship, especially cultivated by the Romans, but nothing about the way it was taught. Nothing is said about the land surveyors in the accounts of ancient or Roman education by A. Gwynn (1926), F. Kühnert (1961), M. L. Clarke (1971), J. Christes (1975) and S. Bonner (1977). The problems of the training of the land surveyors are dealt with only in the special studies by A. Schulten, *RE VII* (Stuttgart 1912) s.v. "Gromatici," 1886-96, esp. 1894-96; O. A. W. Dilke, *The Roman Land Surveyors* (Newton Abbot 1971) 47-65; F. T. Hinrichs, *Die Geschichte der gromatischen Institutionen* (Wiesbaden 1974) 162-65; U. Schindel, "Nachklassischer Unterricht im Spiegel der gromatischen Schriften," in O. Behrends et al. (edd.), *Die römische Feldmeßkunst*, Abh. Ak. Wiss. Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl., 3. F. 193 (Göttingen 1992) 375-94.

This paper was originally written for a seminar which I held in Göttingen in 1975; the publication of the proceedings of the symposium (*Feldmeßkunst*) made me reread it, reconsider my arguments, rewrite it and give it the present form.

<sup>2</sup> For the texts see F. Blume et al. (edd.), *Die Schriften der römischen Feldmesser I-II* (Berlin 1848-52) and C. Thulin (ed.), *Corpus Agrimensorum I.1: Opuscula Agrimensorum Veterum* (Leipzig 1913); for a brief characterization, see Dilke (previous note) 126-32, 227-30.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. M. Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch* (Göttingen 1960) 181; Schindel (above, note 1) 375.

## I

The art of measuring land was, no doubt, practised by the Babylonians, by the Egyptians, by the Israelites and later by the Greeks. In his chapter on pre-Roman surveying and geodesy<sup>4</sup> O. A. W. Dilke states: "The study of archaic and classical Greece has so far revealed little evidence of systematic land surveying." Yet the administration and taxation of land as well as the construction of cities, especially such patterns of town-planning as designed by Hippodamus of Miletus,<sup>5</sup> required a high degree of skill in surveying, and the same is true of the distribution and allocation of land to colonists. At any rate, in Hellenistic times the Greeks had land registers, and during this period scholars concerned themselves with computing the circumference of the earth and degrees of latitude and longitude, but also with the ways and means of surveying land.<sup>6</sup>

The Romans, too, had to measure land from a very early period onward, not least in order to determine the exact boundaries of certain areas for religious purposes. For the taking of auspices, e.g., an augur had to demarcate a *templum* with the greatest care, and both at the time of Cicero and still at the time of the younger Pliny the precise delimitation of ground dedicated and not dedicated to the gods proved to be of vital importance;<sup>7</sup> also the fixing of a city's boundaries was regarded as a kind of ritual. However, the art of surveying and measuring land was equally important for many non-religious purposes—for the division of farm-land, for the demarcation of plots in cities, for the planning of towns, for the allocation of land to colonists and for the measuring and construction of military camps.

The close connexion between surveying and religious functions, especially the fixing of a *templum* and the discipline of the augurs, raises the problem of possible Etruscan influence, as, indeed, the obviously older practice of the Greeks in the South of the peninsula poses the question to what extent the Romans developed this art themselves. Dilke comes to the conclusion that it "would be wrong to claim that the Romans simply copied the system which they found in the Greek colonies of South Italy and Sicily. . . . What the Romans did was to combine features from Egypt,

<sup>4</sup> Dilke (above, note 1) 22.

<sup>5</sup> Dilke (above, note 1) 23–24; literature on Hippodamus is listed by C. J. Classen, "Bibliographie zur Sophistik," *Elenchos* 6 (1985) 122–23.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dilke (above, note 1) 26–30.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Cicero's speech *De Domo Sua* 100–41 (cf. C. J. Classen, *Recht Rhetorik Politik* [Darmstadt 1985] 218–67, esp. 256–64); Plin. *Epist.* 10. 49, 70, 71. O. Behrends, in *Feldmeßkunst* (above, note 1) 192–280 argues that Roman planning and founding of settlements and defining of boundaries as well as all ideas and concepts relating to land law and property have their roots in the augurs' science and their activities; a religious origin and background of land surveying seems, indeed, more probable than a military one.

Etruria, Greek towns and Greek countryside to make their own distinctive system."<sup>8</sup> How was this passed on from generation to generation?

## II

When we turn to the difficult question of the instruction and training of land surveyors and the transmitting of the relevant technical skill in Rome, we have to determine—and this is not quite so easy as Adolf Rudorff makes it appear to be in the famous edition of the *Landvermesser*<sup>9</sup>—which types of land surveyors the Romans knew, which functions they had to perform, what kind of knowledge was required for each group and in each case and where this knowledge and skill could be acquired, whether by imitating experts who practised the art, by learning from specialists who taught this art theoretically, or by reading books.

The earliest reference to a land surveyor in Roman literature occurs in the prologue of Plautus' *Poenulus* (48–49): "Now I shall determine its (i.e. the play's) areas, limits, boundaries; I have been selected as its surveyor."<sup>10</sup> The next instances are found in Cicero's speeches against Rullus' agrarian law which provides ten decemvirs—as the orator claims—with almost unlimited powers and numerous assistants. The relevant passages together with those from his *Philippics* have often been quoted in this context, but not quite so frequently interpreted carefully and are, therefore, usually misunderstood.<sup>11</sup>

Cicero imputes to Rullus the intention of appointing two hundred surveyors (*finitores*) of equestrian origin, i.e. for each of the *decemviri* twenty "bodyguards, at the same time servants and henchmen of their power" (*Agr.* 2. 32);<sup>12</sup> a little later he adds that the *decemviri* will have the power to send out a land surveyor, and "what the surveyor has reported to the one man by whom he has been sent will be ratified" (34); in a third passage he speaks of the *decemviri* roaming about the whole world, vested with an official *imperium*, furnished with *fasces* and "accompanied by that well-known kind of carefully chosen young surveyor" (45); and where he finally paints a vivid, but totally imaginary picture of his adversary Rullus,

<sup>8</sup> Dilke (above, note 1) 34. On possible Etruscan influence, see W. Hübner in *Feldmeßkunst* (above, note 1) 144–45, 171.

<sup>9</sup> A. Rudorff in *Feldmesser* (above, note 2) II 320.

<sup>10</sup> *Eius nunc regiones, limites, confinia determinabo: ei rei ego sum factus finitor.* O. Zwielerin, *Zur Kritik und Exegese des Plautus I. Poenulus und Curculio*, Abh. Ak. Wiss. Mainz, geistes- u. sozialw. Kl. 1990, 4 (Stuttgart 1990) 206–07, 215 regards these verses as genuine, *pace* H. D. Jocelyn.

<sup>11</sup> Most helpful: C. Nicolet, "Les *finitores ex equestri loco* de la loi Servilia de 63 av. J. C.," *Latomus* 29 (1970) 72–103, esp. 82, 86–87, 99–103.

<sup>12</sup> *Singulorum stipatores corporis constituit, eosdem ministros et satellites potestatis.*

holding an auction of the newly conquered spoils, he goes yet a step further, describing the *finitores* as handsome young men (53).<sup>13</sup>

First Cicero introduces the *finitores* in his attack on Rullus in terms which allow him to make his enemy appear as a tyrant; later he insists on the attractiveness of the *finitores* in order to make his audience associate such vices as the general public would attribute to young members of the wealthy class. Nowhere does he imply that they might have expertise in surveying, nor does he ridicule them for lacking the necessary competence. Obviously, no more specialized knowledge would and could be expected from these young knights than from any other young men who accompanied magistrates or other officials in the provinces. It follows that some other people must have had the expertise required and that they carried out the actual work of surveying.<sup>14</sup>

No less instructive, I think, is the manner in which Cicero considers it appropriate to abuse another of his victims, L. Decidius Saxa, a protégé of Caesar's and later a partisan of M. Antonius. Caesar honours him by mentioning him once in his *Bellum Civile* (1. 66. 3), yet without attributing any particularly meritorious action to him.<sup>15</sup> Cicero vilifies him in the most venomous terms. In his first attack in the eighth *Philippic* he speaks of him together with Cafo as types, disasters, animals rather than human beings, imputing to them the craving for other people's property, villas and land (8. 9). He refers again to the attribution of land to Decidius Saxa a little later where he calls Cafo and him strong centurions, at the same time placing them in the company of actors, gamblers and brothel keepers (8. 26; cf. 10.

<sup>13</sup> 34: *finitorem mittant, ratum sit quod finitor uni illi a quo missus erit, renuntiaverit*; Nicolet (above, note 11) 99 remarks: "Il ne s'agit aucunement de simple ouvriers, ceux qui manœuvrent les *gromae* et les *perticae*, mais d'hommes responsables, qui signent en quelque sort leur *renuntiatio*," thereby making an important distinction; but were those who actually applied the instruments simple workmen? Hinrichs (above, note 1) 76-77 misunderstands the passage completely. 45: *cum illa delecta finitorum iuventute* and 53: *cum suis formosis finitoribus*. For *stipitatores*, cf. *Verr.* 3. 65, *Dom.* 13; for *formosus* see *Verr.* 2. 1. 91, 92, 5. 63, 73, *Pis.* 89; only *Verr.* 2. 4. 136 for ladies.

<sup>14</sup> See previous note. Schindel (above, note 1) 379-80 cites what Frontinus says in introducing (and justifying) his work on aqueducts (*Aq.* 2. 1): *neque enim . . . crediderim . . . alitve tam indecorum tolerabili viro, quam delegatum officium ex adiutorum agere praeceptis, quod fieri necesse est, quotiens imperitia praepositi ad i<ll>orum decurrit usum, quorum etsi necessariae partes sunt ad ministerium, tamen ut manus quaedam et instrumentum agentis*; on the text, see W.-W. Ehlers, "Frontiniana," *Rhein. Mus.* 126 (1983) 76. There can, then, be no doubt that often the people to whom an office was entrusted lacked the necessary knowledge up to the time of Frontinus (about 30-104 A.D.), who was also the first to write a manual on land surveying.

<sup>15</sup> *Postero die Petreius cum paucis equitibus occulte ad exploranda loca profisciscitur. hoc idem fit ex castris Caesaris. mittitur L. Decidius Saxa cum paucis qui loci naturam perspicat. uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passum proxima intercedere itineris campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii*. It should be obvious that this has nothing to do with surveying; cf. Caesar's use of *perspicere*: *Gall.* 4. 21. 9, 7. 36. 1, 44. 1, 68. 13, apart from the parallel with Petreius.



22).<sup>16</sup> Having described them again as coarse and boorish in the tenth *Philippic* (10. 22; cf. 8. 9), in his next assault he not only contrasts Decidius' alleged obscure origin (11. 12; cf. 13. 27)<sup>17</sup> with the office to which Caesar helped him to rise, but also his former activity as "measurer of camps" with the possible future function as "measurer of the city" (11. 12: *castrorum antea metator, nunc, ut sperat, urbis*),<sup>18</sup> and Cicero repeats this allegation in his last speech, claiming that the "experienced and clever measurer with his measuring pole" had already divided up the city anew to satisfy the wishes of Antonius (14. 10).

Throughout Cicero does not merely insult Decidius Saxa in some general terms, he obviously tries to make him—whom he almost always refers to merely as Saxa<sup>19</sup>—appear to be of lower rank and standing than he actually was, vaguely alluding to his origin, the uncertainty of his citizenship, a position as *centurio* and to actors and procurers as his neighbours. These last remarks refer in fact to two members of L. Antonius' commission of seven for the distribution of land, Nucula and Caesennius Lento, whom Cicero mentions several times together with Decidius Saxa (perhaps because he, too, was a member of that commission<sup>20</sup>) and whom he tries to insult in a similar manner.<sup>21</sup> It is part of Cicero's strategy of disparagement, I think, that he assigns to Saxa the profession of a *metator* using a *decempeda* (14. 10), as he does to M. Antonius' brother Lucius, whom he characterizes here with the odd-

<sup>16</sup> 8. 9: *omnes Cafones, omnes Saxae ceteraeque pestes quae sequuntur Antonium aedis sibi optimas, hortos, Tusculana, Albana definiunt. atque etiam homines agrestes, si homines illi ac non pecudes potius, inani spe ad aquas usque et Puteolos pervehuntur.* 8. 26: *cavet mimis, aleatoribus, lenonibus. Cafoni etiam et Saxae cavet, quos centuriones pugnacis et lacertosos inter minorum et mimarum greges conlocavit.* Of Cafo nothing definite is known (other references: 10. 22, 11. 12, 37, 12. 20); T. P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C. – A.D. 14* (Oxford 1971) 219 assumes that he was a member of the land commission of seven in 44 B.C.; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Onomasticon to Cicero's Speeches* (Stuttgart 1988) 28 doubts this. I. Opelt, *Die lateinischen Schimpfwörter und verwandte sprachliche Erscheinungen* (Heidelberg 1965) has general comments on such crude insults as *pecudes* (143–44), without realizing that the words *homines agrestes, si homines illi ac non pecudes potius* and also *rustici* (10. 22) are meant to allude to Cafo's and Saxa's interest in "land."

<sup>17</sup> 11. 12: *accedit Saxa nescio quis, quem nobis Caesar ex ultima Celtiberia tribunum plebis dedit;* cf. 13. 27: *hominem deductum ex ultimis gentibus*—correctly understood as a piece of polemics by R. Syme, *Roman Papers I* (Oxford 1979) 37 (first 1937). Cicero is fond of the derogatory use of *nescio quis*.

<sup>18</sup> Other denigrating remarks: 11. 37 (*ad facinus et praedam nati*), 12. 20, 13. 2.

<sup>19</sup> The full name is given at 13. 27 only. The cognomen *Saxa*, missing in I. Kajanto, *The Latin Cognomina* (Helsinki 1965), also in H. Solin – O. Salomies, *Repertorium nominum gentilium et cognominum Latinorum* (Hildesheim 1988), is very rare; Shackleton Bailey (above, note 16) 100 records one other instance, Voconius Saxa, whom Cicero, however, simply calls Voconius.

<sup>20</sup> *Phil.* 11. 12–13, 12. 20, 13. 2, 26–27; Nucula and Saxa: 8. 26; Syme (above, note 17) 39–40 suggests that Saxa was a member of the land commission of seven like Cafo (see above, note 16); Shackleton Bailey (above, note 16) 28 doubts this.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Phil.* 8. 26, 10. 22, 11. 13: *Nucula et Lento . . . quorum alter commentatus est mimos, alter egit tragoediam;* see Syme (above, note 17) 40.

sounding hapax legomenon *decempedator* (13. 37).<sup>22</sup> Earlier he had insulted Lucius Antonius in general terms as *fax*, *facinus*, *scelus*, *gurgis*, *vorago* (11. 10; see also 14. 9),<sup>23</sup> as *latro Italiae* (12. 20) or *taeterrima belua* (12. 26), but in introducing him in the third *Philippic* he describes him as *ex myrmillone dux*, *ex gladiatore imperator* (31); though Cicero repeats this charge several times (5. 20, 6. 10, 13, 7. 17, 12. 20; see also 5. 30) no one would ever take such remarks seriously and use them as evidence for L. Antonius' origin or rank. Similarly, everything Cicero says here about Nucula, about Lento,<sup>24</sup> and, indeed, about Saxa has to be taken as what it is: polemics. One may conclude, therefore, that Decidius Saxa—whatever his origin, whatever his position in the army—was no more a land surveyor than L. Antonius (a land surveyor or a gladiator); he may, however, well have been a member of L. Antonius' commission charged with the division and distribution of land to veterans, or he must have been responsible for some similar activity; otherwise the particular colouring of Cicero's polemics would be meaningless.<sup>25</sup>

The conclusion we may draw from our observations so far is that our sources seem to say something about (minor) officials responsible for the organization and supervision of the surveying of land, but that they seem to say nothing about the people themselves who actually do the job, their training. This obviously calls for an explanation, and we have to ask (a) what is known about the *agrimensores* during the imperial period, (b) what is known about the surveying itself, (c) what kind of special knowledge and/or technical skill is expected of the *agrimensores*.

### III

Of those who were active as *mensores* (*agrimensores*) in the following decades and centuries a good many were freedmen.<sup>26</sup> Whether they performed the duties which Rullus planned to assign to the *finitores* seems

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Cic. *Mil.* 74, where Cicero uses *decempeda* for the first time in a description of Clodius, which is instructive, as it refers to architects and the surveyor's instruments in connexion with Clodius ignoring the rights of other people and the boundaries of their property. For other references to L. Antonius as being responsible for the allocation of land, see 5. 7, 6. 13–14, 7. 17–18, 11. 10, 13. 37.

<sup>23</sup> For parallels of such general terms of abuse, see Opelt (above, note 16). For other aspects of Cicero's attacks on L. Antonius, see *Phil.* 3. 31, 5. 20, 25, 6. 10–15, 7. 16–18, 10. 4–5, 21–22, 11. 10, 36, 12. 14, 20, 26, 13. 2, 4, 10, 26, 37, 49, 14. 8–9.

<sup>24</sup> The practice of insulting people by ascribing a low-class profession or activity to them or their parents (father) is old; cf. W. Süss, *Ethos: Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik* (Leipzig 1910) 247–49; Opelt (above, note 16) 151, who fails to register *gladiator*, *lanista*, *myrmillo* and, of course, *metator* and *decempedator* in the section "Kriek am Privatleben des Politikers."

<sup>25</sup> This seems to have been overlooked by Shackleton Bailey (above, note 16) 28.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Schulten (above, note 1) 1891; see also Hinrichs' list (above, note 1) 158–62 (158: for C 3, 3343 read 3433); Dilke (above, note 1) 39 with 50.

uncertain;<sup>27</sup> if they did, the question as regards the actual surveyors would still be unanswered (in view of our earlier observations), if they did not, one wonders to what extent the actual surveying was carried out in republican times by freedmen and slaves also, or was considered to be a craftsman's profession.<sup>28</sup> Would and could that be reconciled with the very wide range of knowledge seemingly required for this job? Do our sources offer any help?

Surveying was done for various purposes, military, religious, administrative. Polybius and Caesar both mention *centuriones* charged with such a duty,<sup>29</sup> but neither even hints at any special training they may have had or at any kind of assistance. The list of *nomina agrimensorum* in the first book of the *Liber Coloniarum* is headed by a soldier (*miles*), Satrius Verus.<sup>30</sup> While this passage does not refer to work for the army, it may point to people of low social standing being capable of and responsible for actual surveying. Of the details of surveying for religious purposes too little is said in our sources, and the same applies to the use private individuals made of it. The latter, in particular, may be regarded as an indication that it was a rather ordinary occupation which one did not talk about. However, the practice of surveying for official purposes deserves further attention.

On the one hand we hear of surveying of land being leased on the basis of contracts at the time of the second triumvirate, on the other hand we hear three generations earlier of the demand for arbitration by high officials<sup>31</sup> and at the same time and a little later of extensive redistribution of land, of foundation of colonies and allocation of land to veterans, political measures which made a great deal of surveying of land necessary.<sup>32</sup> Obviously, it was neither possible for the magistrates and officials to do all the field-work

<sup>27</sup> This seems to be the view of Rudorff (above, note 9) II 320–23; more careful: Dilke (above, note 1) 35–37; Schulten (above, note 1) is not clear, compare 1887 with 1889. When Nonius, who is usually quoted in this context, says (p. 11 M) *finitores dicebantur quos nunc agrimensores dicimus: dicti quod finis dividerent*, we can conclude that the area of responsibility of the (*agri*)mensores grew during the Empire, while there was no more room for *finitores* (the term actually disappears).

<sup>28</sup> The uncertainty is most obvious in Rudorff's remark (above, note 9) II 320: "Das Feldmessen war damals gleich der Rechtskunde eine freie Kunst, welche ohne vorherige Prüfung wissenschaftlich von Freien, praktisch auch wohl von Sklaven, umsonst, später gegen ein *honorarium* geübt wurde."

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Polyb. 6. 27–32, 41, 42, Caes. *Gall.* 2. 17. However, it cannot be proved and is, in fact, most unlikely that the art of surveying land originated from and was first developed in the army, as e.g. Hinrichs (above, note 1) 81–84 seems to argue; for the religious foundations, see above (note 7).

<sup>30</sup> *Feldmesser* (above, note 2) I 244; there are also later examples both in the following list and in inscriptions.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Feldmesser* (above, note 2) I 212.4–13.5; *CIL* V 7749 (= I<sup>2</sup> 584 = *ILS* 5946 Dessau); see Dilke (above, note 1) 36–37, 100.

<sup>32</sup> See Dilke (above, note 1) 35–37; H. Galsterer in *Feldmeßkunst* (above, note 1) 412–28.

themselves,<sup>33</sup> nor for the surveyors to be burdened with the responsibility for the solution of all legal questions involved. And when one looks at the lists of particular topics and aspects of the work which Schulten and Dilke assume surveyors must have been familiar with, one wonders whether there was anyone during the time of the Republic whom one could have called an expert in all these fields.<sup>34</sup> A division of labour was the obvious answer, and I wish to argue here that it did in fact originally exist and last for a long time. Only gradually, it seems, the change from the republican to the imperial system of administration with paid officials and the ever-increasing demand for surveying brought the two branches, as it were, together more closely, as is also shown by the collection of writings on land surveying.<sup>35</sup> But during the Republic the work of the actual surveyors of land was clearly quite distinct from that of supervisors or arbitrators, and consequently the training of surveyors was not comparable to that of lawyers.

One has to assume the existence of two different groups of people with different kinds of knowledge: On the one hand there are technical skill, geometrical competence, ability to orientate oneself in the country, to put up one's instruments, to measure distances and to make use of astronomy<sup>36</sup>—this and this kind of thing was not part of the "liberal arts" and a young knight could not be expected to have mastered all of it. When Cicero says, *nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis* (i.e. *geometriae*) *terminavimus modum*, he does not mean to imply that it was customary in his time for well-educated young people to acquire as much geometrical knowledge as an actual surveyor of land was expected to possess. Nor should we allow ourselves to be misled by the account Vitruvius gives of an ideally educated architect, for he does not claim to represent reality, while what Columella says "of the type of mathematics used by a gentleman farmer in the first century A.D." would not have enabled the land surveyors to be as accurate as they actually were.<sup>37</sup>

In acquiring legal knowledge some knights may have paid special attention to the particular aspects and issues raised by disputes over

<sup>33</sup> Note Dilke (above, note 1) 35: "it is reckoned that between the years 200 and 190 BC a million *iugera* of land were distributed to 100,000 families." Scholars do not seem to have considered the question by whom this enormous amount of field-work was carried out.

<sup>34</sup> See Schulten (above, note 1) 1895; Dilke (above, note 1) 47–65, but also the following chapters (esp. 66–81, 82–97) and his contribution in *Feldmeßkunst* (above, note 1) 337–46, as well as the contributions in the same volume by W. Hübner (140–70) and M. Folkerts (311–34).

<sup>35</sup> Some are concerned mainly with the practical aspects, others with legal aspects, others with both; see on the gradual growing together of the major aspects of land surveying Schindel (above, note 1) 389–92, also Dilke (above, note 1) 51.

<sup>36</sup> See Dilke (above, note 1) 51–63 and above (note 34).

<sup>37</sup> Dilke (above, note 1) refers first to Vitruvius (1. 1. 3–10) 48 and 51, then to Columella (5. 1–2) 52–56; but see Schindel (above, note 1) 376–78, 388; in view of the few scholars competent today to understand all the details of surveying I doubt that in Rome the specialized knowledge could be acquired entirely without some kind of instruction, possibly rather informal.



boundaries, the quality of land etc.; thereby, they may have recommended themselves for particular assignments at the beginning of their career. But to have the necessary knowledge of the technical side, obviously, was the business of a different class of people, craftsmen who made their expertise available to others for money, like members of other paid professions. This is the reason we hear so little about their training, about the way they acquired their knowledge and passed it on to others; it lay outside the education of free-born young men. Thus land surveyors, like architects and engineers and others, fall below the level of literature in the narrow sense, and it is due to mere chance, i.e. the particular interest of an individual, that we know as much as we do know about so many details of the work of the *agrimensores*. For one may doubt whether the other works of the *corpus agrimensorum*, mostly meant for practical use, would have been preserved had they not been put together with the work of Frontinus.<sup>38</sup>

However, the fact that Frontinus does not give much information about the training of land surveyors should not be interpreted to mean that there was either little or no training at all. On the contrary, the complexity of the methods of land surveying and the accuracy of the results actually achieved by the *agrimensores* together with some of the treatises in the *corpus agrimensorum*, the nature of which Ulrich Schindel has carefully analysed, not least the illustrations, make it most likely that the practice of land surveying was learned through working with and imitating surveyors actually doing the job and from books with their illustrations.<sup>39</sup>

In summing up we may state that it is somehow misleading to speak of *agrimensores* in general for the period of the Republic. It seems preferable to distinguish between those who did the practical work of surveying and those who had some knowledge of the legal aspects involved and, therefore, appeared to be especially well prepared for arbitration or settlement of disputes over boundaries. The latter acquired their knowledge in the same way as all lawyers did in Rome; the former were trained, like all craftsmen, in a manner about which we are not too well informed, because it was not found worthy of mention, let alone full treatment in literature. But the later handbooks make us realize that a training entirely without theoretical

<sup>38</sup> On Sex. Iulius Frontinus (about 30–104 A.D.), see W. Eck, "Die Gestalt Frontins in ihrer politischen und sozialen Umwelt," in *Iulius Frontinus, Curator aquarum: Wasserversorgung im antiken Rom* (Munich <sup>2</sup>1983) 45–77. The form in which Frontinus' work on land surveying survived—in fragments with a commentary by a later author and combined with other rather heterogeneous, but for a practitioner useful material—beautifully illustrates the nature of this profession and the manner in which expertise was passed on.

<sup>39</sup> Schindel (above, note 1) 378–80 stresses that there was no organized teaching of land surveying and characterizes Frontinus' work as meant "zum Gebrauch und Selbststudium des in der *ars mensoria* Tätigen" (380; see also 392–94); but there is no reason why such writings should be used for "Selbststudium" only and not also for the instruction of an apprentice by the master; this may well be assumed, even though there is no trace of a dialogue between teacher and pupil in the *agrimensores*—which is characteristic for subjects taught in a classroom.



instruction and without some drawings and written *formulae* is highly improbable.

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## Virgil's Danaid Ekphrasis

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There are six ekphraseis of works of art in the *Aeneid*.<sup>1</sup> They are scattered throughout the epic and are varied in their presentation. The longest is the depiction of the shield of Aeneas in Book 8 and we also have the extensive survey of Dido's temple murals in the first book and of the temple doors crafted by Daedalus which open Book 6. Far shorter are the tale of Ganymede, woven on the victor's cloak in Book 5, and the glimpse of the metamorphosis of Io on the shield of Turnus near the end of the seventh. But the briefest is the last. It occurs in Book 10, where the narrator, in a line and a half, depicts the contents of the sword-belt of the dead Pallas which Turnus strips from his body and at some point assumes. I would like to analyze this ekphrasis, for its contents and context, for its poetic inheritance and, finally, for the light it sheds on the poem as a whole and on a larger problem of Augustan intellectual history.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I use the term "ekphrasis" not because it was approved, or perhaps even known, by Virgil but because it is regularly applied to such descriptions in the commentaries. The standard discussion of the term is by P. Friedländer, *Johannes von Gaza und Paulus Silentiarius* (Leipzig 1912) 1–103. Though it occurs twice in the works of Virgil's contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Imitatione* fr. 6. 3. 2 and *Ars Rhetorica* 10. 17), it is not in common usage until the Second Sophistic. The late Republican writers on rhetoric would have used *descriptio*, *evidentia* or the borrowed *enargeia* to describe the phenomenon of bringing an art object (or numerous other types of figures) before the mind's eye. The most recent general discussion of the term is by M. Krieger, *Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign* (Baltimore 1992). Among important recent discussions of particular occurrences of the figure should be noted G. Zanker, "Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry," *RhM* 124 (1981) 297–311; S. Bartsch, *Decoding the Ancient Novel* (Princeton 1989) 7–9; D. Fowler, "Narrate and Describe: The Problem of Ekphrasis," *JRS* 81 (1991) 25–35; A. Vasaly, *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory* (Berkeley 1993) 20 and 90–91 nn. 3–4.

<sup>2</sup> I have learned much from the recent, sensitive treatment of Virgil's Danaids by Sarah Spence ("Cinching the Text: The Danaids and the End of the *Aeneid*," *Vergilius* 37 [1991] 11–19). Other valuable commentary on the ekphrasis and the tangential problems it raises can be found in G. B. Conte, "Il balteo di Pallante," *RFIC* 98 (1970) 292–300, repr. in *Il genere e i suoi confini* (Turin 1980) 96–108 and trans. in *The Rhetoric of Imitation* (Ithaca 1986) 185–95. Conte sees the sons of Aegyptus as primarily emblematic of youths who die unmarried. (He is followed in essence by R. O. A. M. Lyne, *Words and the Poet* [Oxford 1989] 158.) See also A. Barchiesi, *La Traccia del Modello* (Pisa 1984) 33–34 and especially 71–72 on the iconographic content of the *balteus*. P. Hardie (*The Epic Successors of Virgil* [Cambridge 1993] 33) sees in the belt "the symbolism of the ephebe cut down on his wedding night," which Turnus transfers to himself. The following essays also have much of value for a student of the Danaid

First the content and context. Turnus has met and killed in single combat the young protégé of Aeneas. We pick up the narrative after the victor has stood over the corpse, announcing to the followers of Evander that the defeated had gotten what he deserved and that he is sending the body back for burial (10. 495–505):

et laevo pressit pede talia fatus	495
exanimem rapiens immania pondera baltei	
impressumque nefas: una sub nocte iugali	
caesa manus iuvenum foede thalamique cruenti,	
quae Clonus Eurytides multo caelaverat auro;	
quo nunc Turnus ovat spolio gaudetque potitus.	500
nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae	
et servare modum rebus sublata secundis!	
Turno tempus erit magno cum optaverit emptum	
intactum Pallanta, et cum spolia ista diemque	
oderit.	505

And after he had spoken such words he pressed the lifeless (man) with his left foot, snatching the huge weight of the baldric and the imprinted crime: on their single night of marriage the band of youths foully slaughtered and the bloodied wedding chambers, which Clonus son of Eurytus had incised with much gold. In these spoils Turnus now rejoices and takes delight in their possession. Mind of men, ignorant of fate and of future lot, and of holding a moderate course when buoyed by favorable circumstances! The time will come for Turnus when he will wish Pallas ransomed untouched for a great price and when he will hate these spoils and day.

The ekphrasis proper, which the narrator introduces with the phrase *impressum nefas*—we are to learn of a crime given visible shape by engraving—lasts only one and a half lines but demands of the reader an unusual exercise of imagination. The belt tells of the slaughter of forty-nine of the fifty sons of Aegyptus, all at once, by the daughters of Danaus on their wedding-night. We witness one of the most graphic events in Greek myth, whose feverish intensity is visualized as compressed, presumably in a series of vignettes equivalent to the number of murders, in the restricted space of a sword-belt. The limited deployment of words metaphorically reflects the confined enclosure of the tangible object of which it tells.

The ekphrastic mode defines a moment when on-going narrative stops for a period of vivid description, usually of a work of art but often of a landscape or a person or even an animal. It aims for the impossible: to stop the passage of time (as narrative flows, and as we read) and impart to and through words the apparent fixity of space. Virgil here comes close to

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ekphrasis: C. C. Breen, "The Shield of Turnus, the Swordbelt of Pallas and the Wolf," *Vergilius* 32 (1986) 63–71; D. Fowler, "Vergil on Killing Virgins," in *Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble* (Bristol 1987) 185–98; R. N. Mitchell, "The Violence of Virginity in the *Aeneid*," *Arethusa* 24 (1991) 219–37.

accomplishing this goal. From absorbing the intent of a total of ten words stretched over an hexameter and a half we are made to imagine the repetition of forty-nine events happening contemporaneously. The simultaneity of action and the nearly instantaneous depiction of it in words complement each other. Brevity of time and brevity of space are captured in the concision of words which in a flash conjure up for us this exceptional object and its strange tale.

The words themselves are also a form of figuration for what they tell. As we begin an initial reading, with the phrase *una sub nocte iugali* which ends line 497, ignorant of what follows, we expect a happy vision of marriage based on the brisk suggestion of unity which both *una* and *iugali* suggest. Hence as we turn to the next, full line of the ekphrasis and its first word *caesa*, the enjambment becomes particularly telling. From conjoining (and marriage) we turn abruptly to cutting (and murder), and the break between the lines, and the shock it arouses, signals both the violence of the deeds depicted and their sudden, unexpected quality. And because, verbally, cutting reflects the brutality of which it tells, the ekphrasis also subtly partakes in a form of iconicity which we see fully fledged in the figured poems we know most readily from the work of George Herbert but which are exemplified from the Hellenistic period on. Once more poetry and the art and action of which art tells tend succinctly to merge.

Enjambment helps illustrate meaning, but the key word for understanding the moral thrust of the ekphrasis is *foede*.<sup>3</sup> We know that what we are going to see is a *nefas*, but *foede* gives the action of murder its ethical slant.<sup>4</sup> It is the pivotal element of line 498, caught appropriately between two caesurae, with seven syllables on either side. We must therefore attend to the poet's intentions here with particular care. Virgil puts his only other use of the adverb on the lips of Venus who, as part of her indictment of Juno to Neptune in Book 5, speaks of Juno's continuing *ira*, *odium* and *furor* against the Trojans and in particular of how the goddess had burned the Trojan ships, *foede*, after the mothers had been criminally (*per scelus* 5. 794) driven to action. The implication is that such a course is both sly and dishonorable because it played on the infuriate emotions of women to perform a deed unthinkable were they in their right mind.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Both Conte, *Rhetoric* (previous note) 187 and Fowler (previous note) 192 give special emphasis to Virgil's use of *foede* here. Conte quotes Servius ad *Aen.* 2. 55, where he equates *turpe* with *crudele*. Livy has a pertinent instance (6. 22. 4) where *turpe* comes close to being an antonym to *civiliter* (*foede . . . in captis exercere victoriam*). Here, too, in victory no leniency is offered the defeated. The connection with the Iphigeneia-passage in Lucr. 1. 85 (and cf. 1. 62) is clear. See P. Hardie, "The Sacrifice of Iphigeneia," *CQ* 34 (1984) 406-12.

<sup>4</sup> The language describing the *baltius* and Turnus's assumption of it is close to the words Virgil uses to describe sinners in the Underworld (*Aen.* 6. 624): *ausi omnes immane nefas ausoque potiti*.

<sup>5</sup> Iulus describes the action in terms of *furor* at 5. 670.

But both the adjective *foedus* and the verb *foedo* appear in contexts that also help us to comprehend the force of *foede* in Book 10.<sup>6</sup> Most germane is the phrase *foeda ministeria* (7. 619) to describe the task of opening the twin Gates of War which Juno arrogates to herself when Latinus avoids it. The passage takes us in a sweeping bit of etiology from Virgil's imagination of early Italian *mores* down to Augustan Rome. When Rome makes war now, says the narrator speaking of Virgil's present time, it is against the Getae or to demand back the standards from the Parthi. The all too recent past had evinced a more ugly form of martial activity, when brother fought brother in civil conflict.<sup>7</sup> It is to avoid setting this gruesome precedent that Latinus now yields to Juno the "horrible functions" of releasing such antagonism into the world and into future Rome.<sup>8</sup> Jupiter in Book 1 may dream of a time in which *impius Furor*, military madness based on impiety, is enchained behind War's iron doors. The inescapable reality of the *Aeneid*'s second half is of civil fury on the loose, and even Latinus, at the beginning of the last book, can exclaim that he took up *impia arma* when he allowed Turnus to make war against Aeneas.<sup>9</sup>

Virgil's use of *foede* at the center of the Danaid ekphrasis implies, then, that the action which the (unnamed) sons of Aegyptus suffered was treacherous and reprehensible (because the victims were unprepared), merciless and ruthless (because they were defenseless) and has a particularly sinister, immoral slant, verging on an allegory of civil war, because potential wife killed potential husband and cousin killed cousin.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The verb *foedo*, as used by Virgil, means to make black and blue from scratches or blows (*Aen.* 4. 673 = 12. 871, 11. 86) or to blacken or deface, literally, with blood from wounds or filth or dust (2. 286, 502; 3. 227; 7. 575; cf. 2. 55 on the "wounding" of the wooden horse). It also means metaphorically to darken with the sight of death (2. 539). In many of these instances a sense of moral repugnance hangs over the context. The same holds true for Virgil's use of the adjective *foedus*. It twice characterizes the filth of the Harpies (3. 216, 244) and Turnus applies it in the superlative to his antagonist Drances, in allusion more to the underhanded craft of his rhetoric than to any disfigurement of body. Fama in Book 4, one of the *Aeneid*'s less attractive beings, is styled *dea foeda* (4. 195). She is an evil (*mala*) who pursues her dismal work at night, engendered out of anger and sharing traits with Homer's personified strife (4. 174, 178 and 176-77, with which cf. *Il.* 4. 442-43).

<sup>7</sup> One of the ancient etymologies of the noun *foedus* ("treaty") connected it with *foede*. See, e.g., Festus 84: *foedus appellatum ab eo, quod in paciscendo foede hostia necaretur*. (For other examples, see R. Malby, *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*, Arca 25 [Leeds 1991], s.v. *foedus*.) If Virgil means any resonance here it is possibly to suggest the difference between the divisive horror of human murder and victimization and the demand of animal sacrifice as accompaniment to the forging of a treaty which would bring enmity to an end (in the *Aeneid*, cf. 8. 641, 12. 170-71 and 213-15, where the violence is graphically described).

<sup>8</sup> It requires no great leap of the imagination to connect the Gates of Sleep, whose description concludes Book 6, with the Gates of War, one of the most prominent symbols of the subsequent book, or to link Aeneas's escape out of the Underworld (and into the text of the second half of the epic) through the gate of false dreams with the advent of civil war which Juno's opening of the *Belli portae* betokens.

<sup>9</sup> 12. 31, and cf. 6. 612-13, of those tortured in the Underworld who *arma secuti / impia*, as well as *G.* 1. 511 (*Mars impius*).

<sup>10</sup> It is well to remember the many occasions in the poem when night abets scenes of cruelty and violence. Among them we could count the Rhesus episode in the Dido murals (1. 469-73;



But before probing further the pertinence of the ekphrasis to the *Aeneid*'s final books I would like to turn back to Virgil's primary source, which is to say Homer, in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

The scene of which the ekphrasis forms part is a condensed version of action spread over several hundred lines at the end of *Iliad* 16 and the beginning of the subsequent book. Before the actual clash between Pallas and Turnus Virgil, through Jupiter's mention of Sarpedon, reminds us of the tears of blood which the king of the gods sheds for his son in anticipation of his slaying by Hector.<sup>11</sup> From there the parallels leap to the end of the book, where the lengthy dialogue between Hector and the dying Patroclus is replaced by Turnus's speech offering the body of Pallas to the Arcadians. Virgil has Turnus imitate Hector's gesture of putting his foot on the corpse.<sup>12</sup> We then jump to *Iliad* 17. 125, where Hector strips the armor from the body (over which in Homer both sides fight) and thence to lines 186–94 where he dons the armor. This is immediately followed by a soliloquy of Zeus apostrophizing Hector, warning of his imminent death and remarking that he had seized the armor οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (17. 205), a phrase meaning something like "inappropriately."

Zeus's words serve as spark for one of Homer's rare moments of editorializing. Replacing the Olympian himself, the narrator speaks directly to his audience as if he were projecting the inner workings of the author's mind, his deeply felt beliefs voiced as general commentary on human action. Zeus remarks on the unseemly aspect of Hector's behavior not because he despoiled his victim but because of the particular weaponry which he took, called by Zeus ἄμβροτα τεύχεα. In putting on the armor Patroclus had worn Hector aims not only to become the greatest of heroes but to absorb his divine side as well. It will prove to be a fatal form of overreaching. By contrast with Homer, Virgil puts emphasis on the deed of despoliation itself and on the excess of pride such an action exhibits. And with this lack of moderation Turnus acquires not any symbolic parallelism with Pallas, such as Hector might have sought with Achilles, but rather the emblematic essence of the baldric itself. Homer tells of no decoration on the arms of Achilles which Hector wears. The details of Virgil's ekphrasis are therefore pointed when the episode is compared to its Homeric source. The narrator's words chiding Turnus, unlike Zeus's monologue, speak of arrogance followed by retribution. We are familiar with this ethical axis more from tragedy than from epic. It is therefore appropriate that Turnus be associated with a scene used in tragedy. Hector may foolishly strive to

n.b. the phrase *multa . . . caede cruentus* at 471), the descent of night over doomed Troy (2. 250), Palinurus and the lethal combination of *Nox* and *Somnus* at his death, night and Helen's treachery to Deiphobus (6. 513), the murderous nocturnal adventure of Nisus and Euryalus in Book 9. When Aeneas arrives on the scene in Book 10 the gleaming of his shield is compared to the sinister red glow of "bloody comets" (*cometae / sanguinei* 272–73).

<sup>11</sup> *Il.* 16. 459–60; *Aen.* 10. 469–71.

<sup>12</sup> With 10. 495, cf. *Il.* 16. 863.

emulate the half-divine Achilles. Pallas's baldric brings to Turnus, as it had to its earlier wearer, a less obvious signification. He is now in the position of a Danaid (Virgil had given Pallas, too, before his death an *aristeia* with some ugly moments). He will soon take the more passive role of victim, which is the description's primary subject.

Virgil gives Turnus a special relationship to the baldric and its art by repeating, within the space of two lines, the verb *pressit* through the participle of its compound, *impressum*. We are not allowed to leave unacknowledged the relationship between Turnus's gesture of hauteur and the *nefas* inscribed on Pallas's shoulder-belt. To kill Pallas or, better, to tear his armor from him after death and presumably to put it on,<sup>13</sup> is parallel to the act of crafting itself, of preparing the visible insignia of a *nefas* which Turnus himself remakes. But before we probe further the meaning and effect of the ekphrasis we must turn back to Homer, this time to the *Odyssey* and to what would have been Virgil's model for the baldric itself—the only instance in classical literature before Virgil where a sword-belt is described ekphrastically. The occasion is Odysseus's meeting in the Underworld with the wraith of Heracles, which comes upon him like black night, with bow stretched as if he were about to shoot (*Od.* 11. 609–14):

σμερδαλέος δέ οἱ ἀμφὶ περὶ στήθεσσιν ἄορτῃρ  
 χρύσεος ἦν τελαμών, ἵνα θέσκελα ἔργα τέτυκτο,      610  
 ἄρκτοι τ' ἀργότεροί τε σύες χαροποί τελέοντες,  
 ὑσμῖναί τε μάχαι τε φόνοι τ' ἀνδροκτασίαι τε.  
 μὴ τεχνησάμενος μὴδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιο,  
 ὃς κείνον τελαμῶνα ἐπὶ ἐγκάτθετο τέχνη.

And around his chest was a terrifying belt, a golden baldric, on which marvelous deeds were fashioned, bears and wild boars and lions with gleaming eyes, and fights and battles and killings and man-slayings. Now that he has crafted it may he never craft another, he who stored up in his craft that baldric!

The appropriateness of the baldric to Heracles is clear enough. It serves as metonymy for the hero himself, for, in Homer's punning, the belt is σμερδαλέος (609) like theλέοντες (611) which it contains. Heracles cinches himself with the battlings (two types) and the killings (two forms) that typify the life of the warrior as well as with the wild animals whose characteristics a hero so often absorbs and displays as, in simile, he pursues his epic course.

In their way these two lines have as much energy as Virgil's line and a half, and we can be certain that the Latin poet, in creating them, is deliberately accepting the challenge that Homer puts into the mouth of his wandering hero. May he never create another such belt, says Odysseus at

<sup>13</sup> We learn from 11. 91–92 that Turnus has in his possession all the armor of Pallas except spear and helmet. He seems actually to use, that is to wear, only the sword-belt.

its sight, but this is exactly what Virgil, rivaling Homer, or his artist, confronting Homer's unnamed artisan, has accomplished. The changes are noteworthy. We move from an object that is dreadful and whose contents merely magnify the terror its wearer instills to something subjective, the ugliness of a crime whose allegorical association with its possessors only gradually becomes clear. We turn from a plurality of animals and generalized combats to one specific mythic moment which itself concentrates a specific number of ghastly events, a single tale of a singular night harboring a multitude of murders.

Unlike Homer, Virgil gives a name to his artisan, Clonus the son of Eurytus, and this exactitude is also a form of rivalry on Virgil's part because he takes the appellation from Homer and from the din of battle that resounds through the *Iliad*.<sup>14</sup> It is fitting that noise of battle be understood to engender its own emblem. But here also lies Virgil's greatest alteration to his model. What "Battle-Din" creates in the *Aeneid* is not further Herculean conflicts, as obvious compliment to the hero who wears the product of his artistry, but a moment from tragedy. In the person of Clonus and as one epicist rivaling another Virgil offers here a metaphor *in parvo* for one of his major accomplishments—the combination of epic with tragedy or, better, a metaphorical demonstration of the tragic dimension of all epic endeavors, especially those catalogued in the *Aeneid*. Virgil has remade Homer by means of a concentrated look at a particular tragic moment whose repetition within itself is constantly repeated as the epic's tragedy continues to unfold. Before watching this development more closely we must look at the tragedy itself.

The scene on the baldric comes from an event portrayed, or implied, in the trilogy which Aeschylus composed on the myth of the Danaids. We possess the first of the three plays, *Supplices*. Of the next two, plausibly entitled *Aegyptii* and *Danaides*, we have preserved only one assignable fragment, in which Aphrodite proclaims the universal power of *eros*, but their plot can be suggested in outline.<sup>15</sup> In the second play the women, at

<sup>14</sup> Virgil leaves unexplained the patronymic Eurytides. Two candidates for the Eurytus or Eurytion in question seem feasible. First is Eurytus, king of Oechalia and father of Iole, beloved of Heracles. The second, which I consider more apt because of the theme of violence on a wedding night common to his tale and to that of the Danaids, is Eurytion (or Eurytus in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*), the centaur who, according to Homer (*Od.* 21. 285), gets drunk at the wedding feast of Hippodameia and Pirithous. For references to him in Latin literature, see Prop. 2. 33. 31 (and cf. 2. 2. 9–10), Ovid, *Ars* 1. 593 and *Met.* 12. 220–28, where the centaur seizes the bride herself and is slain by Pirithous. For variations on the occasion of Eurytion's (Eurytus's) behavior and his fate, see D.S. 4. 70, Hyg. *Fab.* 33, Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 5. 6.

<sup>15</sup> The evidence is set forth with sobriety by A. F. Garvie, *Aeschylus' Supplices: Play and Trilogy* (Cambridge 1969) 163–233. See also the more concise summary by R. P. Winnington-Ingram, in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature: Greek* (Cambridge 1985) 284–86. For the speech of Aphrodite, see Aesch. fr. 44 Radt. It comes from Athenaeus (13. 600a–b), who tells us that the speaker is Aphrodite. Aeschylus's treatment of the myth is the subject of two valuable recent essays by Froma Zeitlin: "Patterns of Gender in Aeschylean Drama: *Seven Against Thebes* and the Danaid Trilogy," in *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays in honor of T. Rosenmeyer*, ed. by M. Griffith and D. Mastronarde (Atlanta 1990) 103–15, especially 105–06.

the instigation of their father, agreed to marriage only as a means for the treacherous murder of their grooms. Whether the second play showed the actual killings or only some preamble to them we can only conjecture. At some point, whether the incident was seen on stage or implied, Hypermestra spared her husband Lynceus. The last play we can assume to have contained the trial of the Danaids and defense of Hypermestra. The fragment remaining of Aphrodite's speech suggests that Hypermestra's saving disobedience found acceptance and that her sisters, for all their initial repugnance, were ultimately reconciled to the idea of marriage.

In this tale of helpless victims become murderous victimizers, of hatred for and reconciliation to marriage, of the power of *eros* triumphant over *eris*, it is important to notice what Virgil has chosen to emphasize and what to suppress. The belt that the beautiful young Pallas, whose name implies both femininity and virginity, has worn into battle, that the handsome, prideful (and equally virginal) Turnus assumes after he has killed Pallas and the sight of which arouses Aeneas to kill Turnus in a furious rage at the epic's end, has depicted on it one of the most violent scenes in Greek tragedy, the treacherous mass murder of forty-nine (here) nameless husbands by their equally nameless wives inspired by a vendetta of their father against his brother or by their own hatred or by both emotions.<sup>16</sup> Much, even about the deed itself, is left to our imagination.

Equally vital to an understanding of the role of the ekphrasis for the denouement of the epic is what Virgil omits. The story of the Danaids is noteworthy not only for the ferocity at its center but for the two acts of supplication and sparing which frame this focal action. In the first Pelasgus, king of Argos, receives the petitioning maidens into his custody; in the second Hypermestra spares her husband Lynceus (the descendants arising from the consummation of their marriage include among others Heracles himself).<sup>17</sup>

Thus whether the Danaids became resigned to marriage, as Aeschylus may have had it, or suffered among the damned in the Underworld the torture of carrying water in perpetually leaking vessels, as Plato and the Latin tradition generally maintained, Virgil foregoes mention of the two acts

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and 113 n. 8 for further bibliography, and "The Politics of Eros in the Danaid Trilogy of Aeschylus," in *Innovations of Antiquity*, ed. by R. Hexter and D. Selden (New York 1992) 203-53.

<sup>16</sup> The connection of Turnus with Io and hence with her descendants, the Danaids, deserves separate treatment. See Breen (above, note 2) *passim*; Kellum (below, note 29) 174; D. O. Ross, *Virgil's Elements* (Princeton 1987) 160-63; J. J. O'Hara, *Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton 1990) 78-81.

<sup>17</sup> The sparing act of Hypermestra and the ancestry of Heracles form the climax of the Danaid myth as described by Prometheus in Aesch. *PV* 846-73. Pausanias (2. 20. 7) informs us that Hypermestra was brought to judgment by Danaus and (2. 21. 1) that she won the trial. We are also told by Pausanias (2. 19. 3-7) that, to celebrate her victory, Hypermestra dedicated a statue of Aphrodite in the sanctuary of Apollo Lycius and (2. 16. 1) that Lynceus succeeded to the throne of Argos on the death of Danaus.



of supplication followed by what the Romans would have called manifestations of *clementia* which figure so prominently in their tale.<sup>18</sup>

There are two areas of exception to this regular picture of the Danaids undergoing eternal torture. The first centers on the figure of Hypermestra. We find her in C. 3. 11 of Horace portrayed at the moment when she disobeys her father's command and saves Lynceus, anticipating in her thoughts the chains Danaus will load her down with "because in clemency I spared my poor husband" (*quod viro clemens misero peperci* 46). She is also imagined, imprisoned and helpless, at some length by Ovid.

Before turning to the second exceptional aspect in the way the Danaids are treated in Latin poetry, we should note the anomalousness in Virgil's handling of the myth in relation to his contemporaries. Among those tortured in Tartarus, as the Sibyl in the epic's sixth book describes to Aeneas this location of the most offending sinners, we find such regular denizens as Tityus and Ixion.<sup>19</sup> But, though the Danaids figure in such lists, as found in all his other coeval poets, they are absent from *Aeneid* 6. Virgil, as we have been seeing, reserves them for a symbolic, on-going role in the epic proper, for his development of a parallel between their lived experience and events in his epic story, not for relegation to a torture-house of the damned where they might serve as object-lessons for the suitability of punishment to crime.

To have them listed in Book 6, acting out the final, eternal segment of their notorious career, would detract from the immediate power of their presence behind the scene crafted on the baldrick. Nor does Virgil make any mention of Hypermestra, Lynceus and the possibilities of *clementia* which serve as moral compensating factor to the myth's central horror, though the fact that Horace explicitly and Ovid by implication build poems around its force shows that this aspect of the myth was in the Augustan intellectual air, as an allegory for leniency toward the defeated or helpless.

Virgil leaves such construction of the myth to his fellow poets. Through the final underworld scene, where *pietas* finds fruition as son meets

<sup>18</sup> The main reference by Plato is at *Gorg.* 493a (cf. also *Rep.* 363d). The first surviving mention of Danaus in Latin is apparently in fr. 1 (Morel 93) of Varro Atacinus's translation of the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius (cf. 1. 133), followed by Cic. *Par.* 44, where Danaus is mentioned with his daughters. Lucretius (3. 935-37, 1008-11), who leaves them unnamed, finds in them an analogy to those who for whatever reason have not allowed themselves to enjoy their earthly existence to the full and who therefore suffer in life what superstition claims that the Danaids endure in death. The sisters figure in standard lists which Horace (*C.* 2. 14. 18-19, 3. 11. 21-29), Tibullus (1. 3. 80-81) and Propertius (2. 1. 67, 4. 11. 27-28) offer of those who pay for sublunar crimes with perpetual punishment in the afterlife. (At 4. 7. 63-68 Propertius places Hypermestra in the Elysian Fields.) Once in the *Ibis* (177-78) and twice in the *Metamorphoses* (4. 364-65, 10. 43-44) Ovid mentions them, on the second occasion momentarily relieved of their suffering by the song of Orpheus just as they are in Horace, *C.* 3. 11 by the sounds of Mercury's lyre. Cf. also ps.-Ver. *Culex* 245-47 and, in Neronian literature, Seneca, *Med.* 748-49 and *HF* 498-500 and 757 (with the comments of Fitch on 750-59).

<sup>19</sup> On eccentricities in Virgil's treatment of the damned, see M. C. J. Putnam, "Virgil's Lapihs," *CQ* 40 (1990) 562-66.



father, Anchises, of course, offers his own definition of *clementia*, which Virgil means to stay with the reader as ethical touchstone. Father addresses son as *Romane* and therefore grants him authority as standard for Roman behavior now and in the future. His son must remember to impose a custom for peace, which is to say to confirm the permanence of civil tranquillity by making its regularity a force in life. To this he adds his famous concluding demand, *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*, "to spare the subjected and war down the proud." The power of these words reverberates through the epic's second half and especially in the final battle books. Virgil may deliberately suppress any mention of the double manifestations of supplication and clemency that figure in the Danaid myth, just as Aeneas finally squelches any instinct to spare the suppliant Turnus as the epic reaches its violent conclusion. Aeneas does hesitate for a moment, but is moved to kill by sight of the belt of Pallas. As he acts the hero assumes many roles as does his humbled antagonist, but the one most directly etched before us is of Turnus as a youth basely slaughtered and of Aeneas as a type of Danaid enforcing the vendetta of her father. Evander had, in Book 11, stated to Aeneas *in absentia* that the hero's right hand "owed" (*debere*) Turnus to father and dead son (11. 178–79). It is the final role of the ekphrasis to make clear the dubious morality of this suggestion and its implementation. Meanwhile the reader remembers the more reasoned, ethical demands of a different father, demands which the appearance of the baldric have helped expunge from his son's memory. Aeneas sees the baldric as metonymy for Pallas, but the reader has been made to concentrate on the meaning of its figurations as well.

The second area of exception to the general picture in the Augustan poets of the Danaids as water-carrying sinners is one which brings into play a unique aspect of this particular ekphrasis. It is the only one of the six Virgilian ekphraseis that reflects an actual work of art, in this case one of the major monuments of the Augustan era. We know a great deal about the temple to Apollo that Octavian dedicated on October 9, 28 B.C.E., and archaeology is gradually clarifying more for us, especially about its intimate connection with the emperor's own *domus*. Prose sources tell us also that adjacent to the temple was a portico, but only the poets reveal in any detail what its decoration was.<sup>20</sup> Propertius, in a poem published certainly within a few years of the dedication, speaks of the opening of the portico by Caesar and of its throng of women belonging to the old man Danaus set among Phoenician columns (*Poenis columnis*), which is to say made of *giallo antico*.<sup>21</sup> Ovid gives us a still closer look. In *Amores* 2. 2 he mentions the *porticus* with its *Danai agmen*, where he saw a girl walking.<sup>22</sup> In *Ars*

<sup>20</sup> The references to the portico in prose are Aug. *RG* 19; Vell. Pat. 2. 81; Suet. *Aug.* 29. 3; D.C. 53. 1. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Prop. 2. 31. 3–4.

<sup>22</sup> *Am.* 2. 2. 4.

*Amatoria*, in one of his more blatant diminutions of Augustan aesthetic (and propagandistic) pretension, he visits the *porticus* of Livia,

quaque parare necem miseris patrue libus ausae  
Belides et stricto stat ferus ense pater.<sup>23</sup>

and the one where the Danaids dared to prepare death for their poor cousins and their father stands fierce with drawn sword.

This is a perfect place to go hunting for girls. Finally, in the *Tristia*, he combines Propertius with his own characterization when he speaks of the place

siqua peregrinis ubi sunt alterna columnis,  
Belides et stricto barbarus ense pater.<sup>24</sup>

where the statues alternate with columns of foreign (marble), the Danaids and their barbarous father with drawn sword.

Students of Roman art and architecture, as well as those interested in Augustan intellectual history and especially in the emperor's own ideology and its presentation in the tangible monuments of his reign, have long speculated on reasons for Augustus's choice of subject here.<sup>25</sup> Though there is general agreement that the portico, given its proximity to the Apollo temple, is connected with the battle of Actium and therefore with the warring it brought to an end, nevertheless two distinct schools of interpretation remain. One view, proposed most recently by Paul Zanker, argues for the Danaids as exemplifications of sin and repentance.<sup>26</sup> It sees the murderous sisters as equivalent to Romans paying expiation for the guilt that nearly a century of war has brought upon them. The other interpretative approach explains the monument as suggestive of the final

<sup>23</sup> *Ars* 1. 73–74.

<sup>24</sup> *Tr.* 3. 1. 61–62.

<sup>25</sup> For the Danaids in art, see the detailed article by Eva Keuls in *LIMC* III.1 (1986) s.v. "Danaides," 337–43. Her survey offers only one sure example of the Danaids portrayed as murderers before the Palatine statuary, namely on an Apulian bell crater of the fourth century B.C.E. (p. 338). It is important also to note that in late Republican wall painting and on stone reliefs the Danaids are uniformly shown as water-carriers. See also eadem, *The Water Carriers in Hades: A Study of Catharsis through Toil in Antiquity* (Amsterdam 1974) 117–58. A late scholium to Persius (on 2. 56) mentions that there were equestrian statues of the sons of Aegyptus opposite those of the Danaids but the logic of such a portrayal, given the circumstances of the myth, the exigencies of space and the silence of the literary sources, tells against such a possibility.

<sup>26</sup> Zanker's views are set forth in greatest detail in "Der Apollontempel auf dem Palatin: Ausstattung und politische Sinnbezüge nach der Schlacht von Actium," *ARID*, Suppl. 10 (1983) 21–40, especially 27–30 and addendum 2, p. 40 n. 2. They are summarized most recently in *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder* (Munich 1987) 91 = *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor 1988) 85–86 ("guilt and expiation"). His interpretation develops from that of J. Carcopino, *La Basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure* (Paris 1943), esp. 280–85, and J. Gagé, *Apollon romain* (Paris 1955) 529, on the Danaids as non-initiates.

phase of the fighting that Actium and the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra at Alexandria a year later brought to an end.

Beyond this critics diverge. Some perceive the Danaids as emblematic of the Romans triumphing over the Egyptian queen, with Greeks standing in for Augustus and his colleagues repulsing an eastern moral and political threat.<sup>27</sup> This is also the core of the reading of David Quint in his recent fine chapter on the *Aeneid*: The Romans would have seen the portico and statuary as appropriate memorialization of revenge against foreign enemies.<sup>28</sup> Barbara Kellum, by contrast, sees the monument as emblematic of the evils of civil war, a constant reminder of the horrors that Romans had experienced and of what, by implication, the new regime had to put to rest in its final victory.<sup>29</sup>

This interpretation has much to commend it. The literary evidence, in particular that supplied by Ovid, leaves little doubt that the Danaids led by their father are meant to be visualized in a posture of killing, which is to say carrying out the revenge which he asks of them. But the poets are also unanimous in their condemnation of all concerned. For Ovid Danaus is both *ferus* and *barbarus*, heady words to apply to a Roman leading his followers into action unless used in irony (something we should not disallow in Ovid).<sup>30</sup> As for the Danaids themselves, Horace styles them in one poem an *infame genus* and in the Hypermetra ode calls their deed a *scelus* and themselves *impiae*, implying that their duty to marriage and to their husbands-to-be was greater than that to their father.<sup>31</sup> Ovid, in the *Ibis*, labels the group a *turba cruenta* (178), while the passage from *Ars Amatoria* leaves little doubt that his sympathy lies with the victims (*miseris patruelibus* 1. 73), not with the perpetrators of the crime. There is also no hint from any source of the saving presence of Hypermetra, which is to say of evidence for an emblem of *clementia* in the portico and its statuary.

<sup>27</sup> Two exponents of this view are E. Lefèvre, *Das Bild-Programm des Apollo-Tempels auf dem Palatin*, Xenia 24 (Konstanz 1989) 12–16 and E. Simon, *Augustus: Kunst und Leben in Rom am die Zeitenwende* (Munich 1986) 21–24.

<sup>28</sup> D. Quint, *Epic and Empire* (Princeton 1993), chapter 2, “Repetition and Ideology in the *Aeneid*,” 50–96, *passim*. On p. 78 he distinguishes between revenge that posits further vengeance and revenge that brings vendetta to a stop. Perhaps Augustus meant to create the image of revenge mastered by monumentalizing it, but the cyclicity of the *Aeneid* tells another tale.

<sup>29</sup> B. Kellum, “The Temple of Apollo on the Palatine,” in *The Age of Augustus*, ed. by R. Winkes, *Archaeologia Transatlantica* 5 (Louvain and Providence 1985) 169–76, and in particular 173–76.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Virgil’s use of *impius* and *barbarus* to describe a Roman soldier at *Ecl.* 1. 70–71.

<sup>31</sup> C. 2. 14. 18–19; 3. 11. 25, 30–31. Horace’s judgment is an important aid to interpreting the morality of Aeneas’s action at the poem’s end. The *pietas* of vendetta (i.e. that which Aeneas may be construed to owe Evander) must not be allowed to take ethical precedence over the *pietas* of *clementia* (i.e. what Aeneas experienced in the words of his father). The point deserves further development in relation to the end of the *Aeneid*. Because the *pietas* (if such it be) of vengeance rules the poem’s conclusion, no reconciliations are possible nor any type of higher “marriage.”

The elegy of Propertius offers us two further details. The area contained a statue of Apollo playing the lyre, further reminder of the god's temple nearby and of how Apollo is leader of the Muses (and appropriate inspirer of those using the adjacent libraries) as well as god of war. Propertius also tells us of an altar around which were four statues of bulls by the sculptor Myron. The portico therefore suggested that Apollo also gains permanence, at least here, as a god of music and song, and that animal sacrifice, which is to say proper religious offerings, plays as important a role in the enclosure's total iconography as does the human victimization which is prominent in the Danaid myth. As for the Danaid statuary, whatever Augustus may have meant the viewer to experience as he entered the colonnade, the literary evidence sees this critical event in their myth represented by the statuary in unrelievedly bleak moral terms. The criminal vendetta they are carrying out, even at the command of a father, leaves them impious, while the father himself is behaving in a way more bestial than human, more uncivilized than enlightened.

Augustus may have meant the viewer to see the Danaids in positive terms: The Romans were defeating a foreign enemy, Augustus and his supporters pursuing a necessary civil war in order to achieve a moment of future revenge (whether it be against his father's murderers or against Antony and his consort or both) that from its horror would preclude further war and continued need for vengeance. If so, the ethical consensus of his poets is at odds with his intentions. If he means us to imagine what his poets saw, then he is indicting himself and his public image. We lack the visual evidence, which other aspects of the Danaid myth could have equally well exhibited, of the famous *clementia* of which he boasts in the *Res Gestae* and which, along with *virtus*, *iustitia* and *pietas*, was engraved on his famous *clupeus aureus*. This was awarded him by the senate and people and set up in the Curia Iulia probably in 27 B.C.E. and therefore nearly contemporaneous with the opening of the portico.<sup>32</sup>

Horace's ode was published in 23 and the *Aeneid* issued after Virgil's death in 19, so that their implicit criticism of what the Danaid monument said, and did not say, came soon after the opening of the portico. But there is one aspect which Virgil's ekphrasis and the Danaid statuary unquestionably share and which the poet's genius may want us deliberately to contemplate. The brevity of Virgil's line and a half, in which our mind's eye is allowed to contemplate forty-nine slaughtered youths and an equal number of bloodied marriage chambers, is parallel to what must have been the shocking briskness with which a viewer experienced the impact of the portico for the first time. This effect exemplifies what I suggested before was the goal of the ideal ekphrasis, namely to stop time. The direct linkage

<sup>32</sup> RG 3. 1-2 for the boast; 34. 2 for the shield.

in this instance between verbal description and tangible artifact underscores the point and further cements the connection between poem and monument.

If the description itself nearly succeeds in achieving atemporality, the baldric and its message, as utilized by Virgil, take advantage of another means by which ekphrasis aims at suspending time, namely repetition, which claims that any given moment in art or life, by reflecting another moment, prevents those acts of differentiation which time's progression causes. I would like to follow out this notion of repetition from two angles, one particular, the other more general. The first looks to moments where the words of the ekphrasis themselves look backward into the text. Several examples, such as certain details in Dido's preparations for the burning of her pyre<sup>33</sup> or our first look at the wounds of war in Latium, could be adduced where Virgil uses language similar to that which forms the ekphrasis. In the space of two lines, as the battle commences, we hear of those who have been slaughtered (*caesos*) and in particular of the "features of befouled Galaesus" (*foedati . . . ora Galaesi*), where the primary sense of *foedati*, disfigured by blood, is supplemented by the secondary meaning of "treat disgracefully." Galaesus, known for his sense of justice, had been killed while interposing himself between the initial warring factions in the search for peace.<sup>34</sup>

I would like to quote one instance of parallelism in somewhat greater detail. It occurs in Aeneas's presentation to Dido of Troy's fall. He advertises his presence as onlooker at the height of the horror in Priam's palace (2. 499–503):

vidi ipse furem  
caede Neoptolemum geminosque in limine Atridas,      500  
vidi Hecubam centumque nurus Priamumque per aras  
sanguine foedantem quos ipse sacraverat ignis.  
quingenta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum, . . .

I myself saw Neoptolemus raging in slaughter and the twin sons of Atreus on the threshold. I saw Hecuba and the hundred (daughters and) daughters-in-law and Priam amid the altars, befouling with blood the fires he had himself consecrated. Fifty were the wedding chambers, so great the hope of descendants, . . .

We see through Aeneas's eye the murdering son of Achilles (*caede*) and his soon-to-be victim at the spot where he had been priest. (Once more *foedo* both denotes and connotes, with the stain of blood adumbrating a deeper defilement through perversion of sacrifice.) Then there are the marriage chambers (*thalami*) whose number gives an explicit reason to connect this passage with the tale of the slaughtered husbands of the Danaids. If *clementia* is an option in the Danaid myth, it does not figure in Virgil's

<sup>33</sup> *Aen.* 4. 495–97, on which see Spence (above, note 2) 18.

<sup>34</sup> *Aen.* 7. 574–75, 535–36. We note the connection of *foedo* with incipient civil war.



ekphrasis any more than in his portrayal of the end of Priam, of his family and of Troy.

The chief difference between the demise of Troy's royal house and the description on the baldric only serves to underscore their similarity. The one sets forth a series of simultaneous, instantaneous, indiscriminated events. The other leaves us to recollect a history of sadness as the children of Priam are either brutally killed or exiled while Troy comes to an end. But, of course, we do watch Priam closely, the second human sacrifice in the *Aeneid*'s chronological narrative, offering pitiful resistance as he is killed at his altars, slipping in the blood of his son Polites.<sup>35</sup> Before the death-blow the aged king shouts to his youthful killer "you have befouled the features of a father with death" (*patrios foedasti funere vultus* 2. 539). Priam has been made to see the death of his son, but the reader thinks once again of the sons of Aegyptus, bloodied wedding-chambers and treacherous, unsparing killings.

I quote this episode at length because it helps return our thoughts to the final books and to a different form of repetition toward which the ekphrasis points. The "history" of the *balteus* takes us from Pallas, Turnus and Aeneas in Book 10 to the same trio at the epic's end, with Pallas vicariously present in the dramatic reappearance of the baldric and in Aeneas's final words.<sup>36</sup> But Aeneas is playing many roles at the poem's conclusion, as both the plot lines and Virgil's allusions make clear. As such he is repeating a series of past events that we know from within and without the epic. He is reincarnating Achilles killing Hector in the guise of Turnus, but Turnus is also an image of Priam before Achilles save that the conquering hero now shows no mercy to his petitioner. More germane still, as we continue to draw out the Hector-Priam parallel, he is also Pyrrhus-Neoptolemus, killing now both father and son, first Polites, then Priam himself. Virgil's Priam, at the moment before his death, can remind Pyrrhus that (Homer's) Achilles "blushed before the rights and faith of a suppliant" (*iura fidemque / supplicis erubuit* 2. 541-42). During the epic's last scene Aeneas grants his *supplex* Turnus no quarter (12. 930).

The ending looks also to the reiteration of a nearer pattern of violence on Aeneas's part. Virgil, we recall, puts into Aeneas's mouth the verb *immolo* to describe how he, and Pallas vicariously, kill their victim (12. 949). He is to be a form of human sacrifice, body for body, blood for blood. Both the verb, and the subsequent action it describes, are reiterated from Book 10, where the narrator twice has recourse to *immolo* in describing the rampage Aeneas embarks upon after learning of Pallas's death. We find it

<sup>35</sup> Virgil uses *ara* or *altaria* five further times after 501 as the passage unfolds (513, 514, 515, 523, 550). The first human victim is Laocoön, who dies in the stead of the false sacrifice, Sinon.

<sup>36</sup> In one particularity here Virgil may also be following Homer. We are twice reminded during Achilles's killing of Hector that the latter is wearing Patroclus's armor, once by the narrator (*Il.* 22. 323) and once by Achilles (331).

first at 519 in connection with the eight human victims whose blood he will pour on Pallas's pyre. It recurs shortly later in the account of the death of the duly-named priest Haemonides, who is already dressed to suit his double role as sacrificer-sacrifice (10. 541).

These two killings, and the one which intervenes, have something in common which will help us further understand the poem's ending and the continued power of the Danaid ekphrasis throughout the last three books. Haemonides is entitled *Phoebe Triviaeque sacerdos* (10. 537). The only other figure in the epic so characterized is the Sibyl, likewise priest of Apollo and Diana (6. 35). Virgil has also carefully reminded us of Aeneas and the Sibyl as the hero prepares to kill Magus, his preceding victim, who is shown first escaping Aeneas's spear (10. 523-25):

et genua amplexens effatur talia supplex:  
 "per patrios manis et spes surgentis Iuli  
 te precor, hanc animam serves gnatoque patrique."

and embracing his knees, a suppliant, he speaks thus: "Through the spirit of your father and the hope of growing Iulus I pray you, may you preserve this life for a father and a son."

The language is deliberately parallel to that which Virgil allots to Aeneas in Book 6 as he turns to the Sibyl for aid. She has already specified his future posture as *supplex* as he goes searching for aid in Italy (6. 91). It then becomes his turn to so style himself (6. 115-17):

quin, ut te supplex peterem et tua limina adirem,  
 idem orans mandata dabat. gnatique patrisque,  
 alma, precor, miserere.

Indeed [Anchises] himself in prayer gave me orders that as a suppliant I seek you out and approach your threshold. Kindly one, I pray you, take pity on both father and son.

The reversals in fortune as well as in tone that have occurred between these two episodes, and which the parallels highlight, are astonishing. In his rage at Pallas's death Aeneas not only seizes eight human victims for gruesome sacrifice, he symbolically kills both the Sibyl, who receives and abets him as a suppliant, and himself in this very posture, praying for guidance to visit his father. He thus in Book 10 twice over eliminates access to Anchises and his ennobling morality and brings to a violent, abrupt end a posture which had distinguished him until the arrival of his omnipotent weaponry in Book 8. Before that he had been helpless in the face of Juno's storm and at the mercy of Dido. He had had to appeal to the Sibyl, to Latinus and to Evander for aid. But with the advent of Vulcan's arms and especially with the killing of Pallas all is changed. From the first he gains power over his destiny. At the second all thought of what it means

to suffer the role of suppliant or to offer *clementia* in return seems to disappear and remain absent even to the epic's end.

We have seen how the language of the baldric connects Books 2 and 12, as Aeneas's final conduct forces the reader to circle back to Book 2 and to the earliest chronological events of the epic. Aeneas's Danaïdic behavior at the end raises another topic which in turn serves to enforce further the notion of repetition and to complete a grander circle, namely the violence of women, which permeates the epic and its connection, finally, with Aeneas himself. For when Aeneas, after he has seen the baldric, has the memory of his *saevus dolor* rearoused and becomes "set aflame by furies and terrible in his wrath" (*furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* 12. 946-47), his conduct finds analogy not with model male figures such as his father with his ethical prescription combining force and leniency. Rather someone *furiis accensus* is parallel to Amata and her mothers, made *furiis accensas* by Juno and her minion Fury, Allecto (7. 392), to Dido, in her own words *furiis incensa* (4. 376) and above all to Juno herself at the epic's opening, *accensa* by a very similar combination of *irae* and *saevi dolores* to that by which Aeneas is possessed at the poem's conclusion.<sup>37</sup>

Therefore both in theory and in practice, in the topos of ekphrasis and in the tale it tells, the description of the baldric is in certain key senses a synecdoche for the poem as a whole. In the compressed simultaneity with which it feigns the stoppage of time, it echoes those larger poetic tools, repetition and circularity, which, as Murray Krieger has recently taught us, also help poetry mimic the stasis of art and which allow the poem itself, from one angle of vision, to assume the semblance of a large continuous ekphrasis. As for the tale itself, we can also see how it represents the poem as a whole.

The *Aeneid* has two distinct sides, which it is Virgil's genius to have melded together. There is what we might call the historical narrative from Aeneas and Troy to Virgil's contemporary Rome. It couches in idealizing, almost impersonal terms a teleology which leads with apparent inevitability to a golden age of glorious *imperium* under Augustus, with *impius Furor* at last suppressed. And in the story line of the poem there implicitly lies ahead the marriage of Aeneas and Lavinia with all its potential for wide-ranging reconciliations. In counterpoint to this end-directed orientation is what we might call the poem's lyric or tragic dimension. By contrast to the perfectibility which linearity suggests, it postulates a wholeness based on negative intensity. Art freezes time at a moment when victims become victimizers who do not spare. It monumentalizes vengeance and suggests that, when its narrative fully turns to the business of war and pious heroes suffer the empowerment of force, epic, at least in Virgil's hands, takes on the semblance of concentrated tragic action where *eros* and *eris* merge to

<sup>37</sup> 1. 25-29. Cf. also *saeva* and *ira* (4) and *dolens* (9).



tragic stage.<sup>38</sup> Her fury is paradigmatic for repeated exemplifications, indeed reenactments, of victimizations by the Furies, who hold the simile in their embrace. Virgil would see no escaping from them. Orestes goes mad at the end of the *Choephoroi*, pursued by Furies who would avenge his mother. At the beginning of the *Eumenides* he is a suppliant while the play itself, we recall, shows the Furies themselves evolve from vengeful to benign spirits.<sup>39</sup> No such progression happens in the life of Dido, *furiis incensa*, and preparing for suicide.

The same holds true at the conclusion of the epic. No third drama brings resolution or any larger sense of concord. No calming Eumenides arrive to take control of Aeneas and the poem. There is no epiphany of Aphrodite, preaching the power of *eros*, applauding the *clementia* of Hypermestra and turning her sisters toward appreciation of marriage.<sup>40</sup> (Turnus does cede Lavinia to Aeneas as wife in virtually the last words he speaks, but his offer has no final effect.) The only appearance—*apparuit* is Virgil's graphic word—is that of the baldrick, which brings with it another uncompleted, uncompletable tragic plot, stopped yet again, like the poem itself, at a moment of violent, unforgiving action. In this respect, too, poem and ekphrasis share common ground. Ekphrasis breaks the forward thrust of epic and reminds us that, in Virgil's brilliant hands, the plot of Rome has a repetitively tragic dimension. It warns that, even as we advance idealistically toward Augustus's putative golden age, human nature doesn't change.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Virgil could have chosen a figure representing female fury, Agave, for instance, to serve as analogy for Dido, but he did not. Dido, even in her wildness, is deliberately compared to a male figure as if the masculine emblemization of political order, which Virgil regularly adopts, were still hers, but now hopelessly transformed by emotion.

<sup>39</sup> It is possible that Virgil was also thinking of the ugly criminality of the figure of Orestes as conceived by Euripides, but the presence of the Furies makes Aeschylus the paramount model for Virgil.

<sup>40</sup> Another possible allusion to tragedy may lie in the figure of Io, suffering metamorphosis into a cow, as emblem on the shield of Turnus (7. 789–92). We know that Accius wrote a tragedy devoted to her (*SRF* I, pp. 252–53 Klotz). It is a reasonable assumption that the metamorphosis came early in the dramatization, before any acts of forgiveness, return to human shape or apotheosis took place.

<sup>41</sup> The speech that Aeschylus gives to Aphrodite has something in common with many of the utterances of Athena at the end of *Eumenides* (cf., e.g., 903–08), proclaiming the bounteousness of nature. We may likewise be meant to think of the alteration of Furies into Eumenides when we contemplate Juno's apparent renunciation of anger in her speech to Jupiter at 12. 808–28. But it is *furiae*, not Eumenides, who hold Aeneas in their grip at the poem's end.





## How to be Philosophical about the End of the *Aeneid*

KARL GALINSKY

Overemphasized as it has been over the past three decades, the final scene of the *Aeneid* is a useful paradigm both of *Rezeptionsgeschichte* and of Vergil's poetic technique. There is no indication whatever that Vergil's non-Christian, Roman readers viewed it in terms of Aeneas' condemnation, and Vergil certainly had his share of critics.<sup>1</sup> It is writers like Lactantius who criticized Aeneas' *furor* and *ira* even while justifying the *ira Dei* elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> In the course of the following centuries, the issue was obviated by the increasing emphasis on just the first six books of the *Aeneid*, and the vision of Aeneas as a good proto-Christian and textbook Stoic gained a firm hold. Quite anachronistically, he was made out to be totally different from the other heroes of antiquity and to sublimate his every emotion. In two words: *sanctus Aeneas*, the pilgrim progressing from *furor* (bad) to *pietas* (good).

It is understandable, though it still is bad scholarship, that any revision of this distorted characterization would cast his martial and spirited behavior in *Aeneid* 7–12 as a virtual fall from grace. The conceptual framework was not changed, but simply inverted. The Stoic saint was scrutinized by the Inquisition, found wanting, and in the end was demonized; I give interpreters like Michael Putnam credit for doing so forthrightly<sup>3</sup> instead of resorting to the usual muttering—*mussat rex ipse academicus*—about “dark aspects,” “troubling ambivalences,” and the like. The point is that one skewed orthodoxy replaced the other; the only virtue of the inane “optimism vs. pessimism” sobriquet was that it appropriately reflected the parochialism and superficiality of the controversy.

<sup>1</sup> For a collection of some of the evidence—as opposed to circumstantial speculations—see, e.g., H. Georgii, *Die antike Aeneiskritik aus den Scholien und anderen Quellen hergestellt* (Stuttgart 1891; repr. Hildesheim 1971).

<sup>2</sup> *Inst.* 5. 10. 1–11; see A. Wlosok, *Res humanae—res divinae: Kleine Schriften*, ed. by E. Heck and E. A. Schmidt (Heidelberg 1990) 437–44, cf. 412 ff.; W. Suerbaum, *Vergil Aeneis. Beiträge zu ihrer Rezeption: Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Bamberg 1981) 105 ff. In the *Johannis* of Corippus, however, martial fervor, rage, and slaughtering are standard attributes of the Christian protagonists; its ending, though fragmentary, contains echoes of that of the *Aeneid*: *poenas dat* (8. 647), *Romani militis ira* (8. 649), *fervidus* (8. 654).

<sup>3</sup> See, most recently, his “Anger, Blindness and Insight in Virgil's *Aeneid*,” *Apeiron* 23.4 (1990) 7–39.

The resulting reductionisms did little justice to the *Aeneid*, a unique and experimental epic that is highly complex without being diffuse. It was against this background that I discussed, a few years ago, the poem's final scene in terms of ancient views of anger.<sup>4</sup> I wrote the article to open up the debate, and not to close it. I wrote it because the current orthodoxy took a totally reductionist view of a complex human emotion, a one-sidedness that is validated neither in antiquity nor in modern psychology.<sup>5</sup> The timing was fortuitous: A new edition of Philodemus' *De Ira* appeared shortly thereafter, spurring more discussions of the Epicurean view of anger and its relevance to the *Aeneid*.<sup>6</sup> It is useful, therefore, to return to the topic and combine it with some other perspectives.

Before doing so, I want to make another essential point: It is typical of Vergil that he ends his epic on a complex issue that was one of the most intensely debated at his time, as we know from contemporary sources. Vergil's poetry is so great and so existential precisely because he takes on such topics and because he deals with them honestly, and not just to provide happy endings. A further reason for that greatness is the deliberate involvement of the reader. There is a constant dialogue some of which can be usefully accommodated within the hermeneutic of Michael Bakhtin, although there are some specific differences, too.<sup>7</sup> Vergil knows there are different viewpoints on anger and readers may respond differently, but he does not leave things diffuse or ambiguous in the sense of an aporia. Instead, this so-called ambiguity is really a means to have the reader work through a multiplicity, an authorially intended multiplicity, of alternatives and nuances, so that the poet's intentions may be understood all the better. Let me be specific.

The death of Turnus comes as no surprise. It has been assiduously prepared for<sup>8</sup> and it is inevitable: Turnus has violated a sacred treaty—for good reason the whole treaty scene is drawn out the way it is in Book 12—

<sup>4</sup> "The Anger of Aeneas," *AJP* 109 (1988) 321–48.

<sup>5</sup> To the modern works now add J. Horder, *Provocation and Responsibility* (Oxford 1992), a study concerned with the role of anger in legal history; the influence of Aristotle stands out.

<sup>6</sup> G. Indelli (ed.), *Filodemo. L'ira* (Naples 1988); cf. his new edition, with R. Laurenti, of Plutarch's *Sul controllo dell'ira* (Naples 1988). Also, J. Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 145–64; M. Erler, "Orthodoxie und Anpassung," *MH* 49 (1992) 171–200 and "Der Zorn des Helden. Philodems 'De Ira' und Vergils Konzept des Zorns in der 'Aeneis'," *GB* 18 (1992) 103–26; J. Procopé, "Epicureans on Anger," in G. W. Most et al. (eds.), *Philanthropia kai Eusebeia: Festschrift für Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen 1994) 364–86. Cf. R. Rieks, *Affekte und Strukturen: Pathos als Form- und Wirkprinzip von Vergils Aeneis*, *Zetemata* 86 (Munich 1989) passim and esp. 38 f. An annotated English translation of Philodemus' *De Ira* is being prepared by my colleague David Armstrong (as part of the NEH-funded Philodemus Project), to whom I am grateful for several points of advice and for permission to use his translation. There is no detailed discussion of Philodemus' treatise in M. C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton 1994), although "anger is . . . the central topic of this book and its *raison d'être*" (508).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. Farrell, "Which *Aeneid* in Whose Nineties?" *Vergilius* 36 (1990) 78–80.

<sup>8</sup> See, most recently, E. Potz, "Pius furor und der Tod des Turnus," *Gymnasium* 99 (1992) 248–62.

and there was no *clementia* for this kind of transgression in Rome. The usual objection is that Vergil should have made this clear in the final scene; instead, Aeneas kills Turnus in a flash of rage over Pallas. Two quick points: One is the implied reader. Great poems tend to be written not by professors or scholiasts but by poets, and it would be totally pedestrian to spell out again what happened on the day the action of Book 12 takes place. You do not have to be Wolfgang Iser to realize that the readers know all this—it is really quite fresh in their memory—and the facts do not have to be recapitulated. Servius fills that gap for us, as schoolmasters always do: Turnus dies, he says, because of *ultio foederis rupti* (12. 949). Second point: What is the alternative to Vergil's humanization of an ineluctable outcome? To have Aeneas be totally unemotional, read the verdict to Turnus from Mommsen's *Strafrecht*, and then solemnly kill him?

My favorite for this kind of behavior modification is the recent argument that Hercules in Book 8 should not display rage. Instead, he should fight against the monster Cacus like a Stoic hero.<sup>9</sup> One wonders how that would work. Should Hercules go into that cave like a robot reading Zeno, or perhaps a few Stoic paradoxes? I am afraid we do not even find that kind of Stoic orthodoxy in Lucan, who has his good guy Pompey invoke *ultio, poena*, and the *ira vindicis patriae* in Book 2 (531–40). His speech follows an episode which is almost a take-off on the *Aeneid's* final scene; i.e., Caesar grants *clementia* to Domitius, who is angry (*iras*) with him for doing so—he prefers the *furores* of war (2. 507–25). All this—Hercules' angry struggle, Pompey's wrath, Aeneas' *furor* and *ira*—raises another perspective and exemplifies precisely the sort of process of thinking and working things through in which the many layers of Vergil's poetry always involve the reader: Heroes get angry. It is a heroic emotion. Do not expect a martial epic without an angry hero. To apply the many Stoic bromides we find in Cicero—and his mockery of doctrinaire Stoics is clear from his characterization of Cato in *Pro Murena*<sup>10</sup>—to the situation that has been carefully contrived at the end of the *Aeneid* is a dogmatic exercise that ignores non-Stoic views and the notion of appropriateness. What the popular philosophies say is that you should not be irascible over everyday stuff with your wife, kids, and neighbors. All, except for the Stoics, realize there is a rightful place for that emotion and that it can be channelled into righteous actions.

If I have been mimicking the diatribe of Hellenistic and Roman popular philosophers, it is for good reason: The first part of Philodemus' *De Ira* (I–XXXIII) in many ways is a deliberate take-off on Stoic and Cynic

<sup>9</sup> Putnam (above, note 3) 30–32.

<sup>10</sup> *Mur.* 60–66. Even in a more serious vein, Cicero, following Zeno and Chrysippus, denied that an actually existing true Stoic sage had yet been found (*Tusc.* 2. 51); to present Aeneas as such would have been unreal. Cf. *De Or.* 1. 220–24.

diatribes.<sup>11</sup> Philodemus' relevance to Vergil needs no further comment, especially since the publication of a papyrus fragment with Vergil's name which comes from one of Philodemus' ethical treatises directed against a dissident Epicurean, Nicasirates.<sup>12</sup> Nicasirates' views are also one of the main targets of *De Ira*; that very fact, quite relevant to any assessment of anger in the *Aeneid*, shows that it would be wrong to speak even of an Epicurean orthodoxy—not surprisingly, there were divergent views of so cardinal an emotion even within one philosophical school.<sup>13</sup> For these reasons, it is useful to explore the applicability of Philodemus' treatise to the *Aeneid* somewhat further; besides, I would have little to add to what I said about the Stoics and Peripatetics in the earlier article. Several points of relevance stand out.

Anger was viewed as a highly differentiated phenomenon. It is another instance where the blunderbuss approach of defining Vergil's poetry mostly by connecting verbal repetitions falls down because it tends to ignore shifting aspects of the same phenomenon. In plain English, each instance of *furor* is not the same, nor should we insist on the poet's having to use protreptic epithets like *iustus* to designate such shifts. In attempting to stake out some middle ground between the Stoics, who condemned anger, and the Peripatetics, who were very liberal in its defense, the Epicureans engaged in what Julia Annas has aptly called "persuasive redefinition": They do not use new terms for a phenomenon like anger, but they employ the common ones in new, distinctive ways and contexts.<sup>14</sup> It should be noted how congenial this practice is both to Augustan classicism—witness Agrippa's characterization of Vergil as "novae cacozeliae repertorem, non tumidae nec exilis, sed ex communibus verbis, atque ideo latentis"<sup>15</sup>—and to the Roman use of language, where words take on multiple meanings instead of new words being created for each new meaning.<sup>16</sup>

The issue is directly related to the genesis of the Epicurean debate about anger. Epicurus, it seems, had made some broad pronouncements on

<sup>11</sup> A point I owe Professor Armstrong, who will illustrate it more fully in his forthcoming English edition. Cf. Annas (above, note 6) 145 f., with reference to the mention of Bion's *On Anger* at col. I, fr. 17.

<sup>12</sup> M. Gigante and M. Capasso, "Il ritorno di Virgilio a Ercolano," *SIFC* 7 (1989) 3–6. V. Mellinghoff-Bourgerie, *Les incertitudes de Virgile: Contributions épicuriennes à la théologie de l'Énéide*, Collection Latomus 210 (Brussels 1990) is an interesting attempt to explore Vergil's Epicurean sensibilities in the *Aeneid*.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. F. Longo Auricchio and A. Tepido Guerra, "Aspetti e problemi della dissidenza epicurea," *CErc* 11 (1981) 25–40; Annas (above, note 6) 164; Erler, "Orthodoxie" (above, note 6) 178 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Annas (above, note 6) 147, with n. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Donatus, *Vita Verg.* 180–83. Even if uttered in jest, the remark had its share of *verum*; see W. Görler in H. Flashar (ed.), *Le classicisme à Rome aux Iers siècles avant et après J.-C.*, Entretiens Fond. Hardt 25 (Vandoeuvres–Genève 1979) 175–202.

<sup>16</sup> Good discussion by W. Neuhauser, "Ambiguitas als Wesenszug der lateinischen Sprache," *Innsbr. Beitr. zur Kulturwissenschaft* 17 (1972) 237–58. The result is not "ambiguity" in the sense of "indeterminacy"; cf. T. Bahti in *Comp. Lit.* 38 (1986) 9–23.



the subject that occasioned different definitions. "In fact, Epicurus makes clear in his *Anaphoroseis* that the sage will experience θυμός and that he will experience it in moderation" (XLV 5–8; cf. XLIII 41 and XLVI 1). This is different both from "being enraged" (XLV 20 ff.) and from θυμός as an impulse to revenge if revenge is lust for revenge and pleasurable; this latter disposition is μανία (XLIV). "For the merciless man, as Homer (*Il.* 9. 63) says, is 'tribeless and lawless' and genuinely 'is in love with war' and vengeance on mankind, but the wise man is most merciful and most reasonable" (XLIV 22–27). There are different kinds of θυμός, then, and, to an even larger extent, this is true of ὀργή.

About the main issue there was no doubt: The wise man does experience anger (XLVI 12) and "will be liable to certain fits of anger" (XLI 30). Anger is part of human nature: "It cannot be escaped and is called 'natural' for that reason" (XXXIX 29–31). "Fits of rage happen to good men, if someone is wronging their friends" (XLI 17–19). But there is plenty of nuance. The anger of the *sophos*, therefore, is not the same as everybody's anger.

The basic distinction Philodemus makes is that between "natural" (φυσική) and "empty" (κενή) anger (ὀργή). It is bound up with another differentiation (XXXVII 23–XXXVIII 22):

We [Epicureans] do not make any unitary pronouncement, but we teach that the emotion, taken in isolation and per se, is an evil, since it is painful or resembles what is painful, but taken in conjunction with one's character (διάθεσις) as a whole it is something that can even be called a good, as we think; for it results [when good] from an examination of what the nature of states of affairs really is and from a completely true perception in our comparative estimation of the damage done and in our punishments of those who damage us. So that in the same way we call the pointless kind of anger (κενήν ὀργήν) an evil, because it results from a worthless disposition (παμπονήρου διαθέσεως) of character and entails all sorts of further troubles, one must call the natural (φυσικήν) kind of anger a non-evil, but, as it is something painful . . . [just as, when it results from] a good (σπουδαίας) [disposition], it is not an evil thing, but even a good, so also we will call an evil the refusal to accept the natural kind of anger.

The distinction between natural and empty anger is akin to that made by Epicurus between natural and empty desires.<sup>17</sup> An empty desire, for instance, resulting in empty anger is the belief that retaliation should be enjoyable for its own sake (XLII 22–34). In opposition, Philodemus states that (a) anger in general is painful rather than pleasant and (b) retaliation and punishment are not enjoyable (ἡδύ); these are some of the conditions that meet the criterion of the "natural" anger displayed by the *sophos*: "(He is not) impelled to his revenge as to something enjoyable—because it has nothing pleasurable to offer him—but he approaches it as something most

<sup>17</sup> *Ad Men.* 127; see Annas (above, note 6) 147 ff.

necessary and most unpleasurable, as he would the drinking of apsinthion or the doctor's knife" (XLIV 15–22). Anger does not exist so that we may get a "lift, so to speak, from being angry, but merely regards fulfilling the desire to retaliate as something that has to be done."<sup>18</sup> Empty anger, by contrast, leads only to further follies and complications (XXXVIII 1–60; XL 7–19).

The aim of Philodemus is to give practical, common-sense advice. It is wrong or "empty" habitually to engage in anger. Anger should be short and not sweet, and it should serve the purpose of retaliation not for its own sake but because some punishment needs to be transacted. All this is connected with the disposition, the *διάθεσις*, of the individual. Someone with a *παμπόνηρος διάθεσις* will be possessed of habitual anger leading to "a myriad of further troubles" (XXXVIII 5–6). The wise man, by contrast, has *σπουδαία διάθεσις* and will accept and engage in anger for good reason and only for so long. An ironic consequence can be that the person who is not angry by disposition (*δόργητος*) may come across, when angry, as even angrier than the habitually irascible individual (XXXIV 31–XXXV 5):

But generally we may suppose that a person genuinely not irascible will not give a prolonged impression of irascibility, or if he does he will not be profoundly (enraged) but just not the sort of person he seems. At any rate they appear to that extent (irascible) even when their disposition is quite opposite, so that even the wise man, for instance Epicurus even, made this sort of impression on some . . .

The relevance of all this to the role of Aeneas' and, for that matter, Turnus' anger in the *Aeneid* is so obvious that its needs minimal commentary. Before providing it, I want to reemphasize an important point. There was no monolithic dogma about anger in the Hellenistic ethical philosophies taken as a whole. Philodemus' own discussion is heuristic rather than doctrinaire; it reflects an intelligent and searching attempt to come to grips with an important issue without being dogmatic. Hence *De Ira* is sometimes "baffling, and difficult even to construe . . . for it shows us Philodemus adjusting to a changing philosophical climate,"<sup>19</sup> and, specifically, trying to adapt Epicurean thought to the Roman mentality; for good reason, Erler views him as the Epicurean equivalent to Panaetius.<sup>20</sup> When we add to this Vergil's own eclecticism we should not expect the poet of the *Aeneid*, therefore, to provide a mere textbook illustration of every viewpoint expressed in *De Ira*. The salient issue is that the horizon of expectation of Vergil's audience went ever so far beyond simple reliance on Stoicism.

<sup>18</sup> Annas (above, note 6) 162, who points out, in this connection, that the anger of Achilles would not meet that standard.

<sup>19</sup> Annas (above, note 6) 145; Indelli's commentary certainly bears this out. Cf. Procopé (above, note 6) 367 f. on the nature of Philodemus' treatise.

<sup>20</sup> Erler, "Orthodoxie" (above, note 6) *passim*.

What we can expect and must concentrate on, therefore, is not the absence of anger in Aeneas, but its modification. In essence, the methodological principle is no different from that which we use for all things Roman, i.e. the adaptation and modulation especially of Greek forms of culture or of any predecessors in general. We do not expect a Roman temple to look totally different from its Greek predecessors. Rather, the significance lies in the modifications. They are obvious in Aeneas' case. His anger is not habitual and therefore "empty." It does not amount to *mania*; Vergil underlines the distinction by using *insania* only to characterize Turnus and Mezentius.<sup>21</sup> While Aeneas' rage can be absolutely Homeric, as in his killing spree in Book 10,<sup>22</sup> the instances of modification of Aeneas' behavior are unprecedented for the hero of a martial epic: e.g., his reluctance to fight Lausus and his reaction to Lausus' death, both deliberately contrasting with Turnus' treatment of Pallas; his injunction, *o cohibete iras!* after the breach of the *foedus* (12. 314); and his hesitation before killing Turnus, "an extraordinary moment of humanity; for the epic warrior never hesitates."<sup>23</sup> As for Aeneas' display of anger at the end of the epic, it is the "good" anger that "results from an examination of what the nature of states of affairs really is and from a completely true perception in our comparative estimation of the damage done and in our punishments of those who damage us" (XXXVII 32–39). Hence Propertius, in his praise of the virtues of Italy (3. 22), can aptly say that Rome, who is better at forthright warfare than suited for "injurious acts" (it is certainly legitimate to think of the breaking of agreements and treaties), does not have to be ashamed of her history, "because we Romans stand strong as much by the sword as by *pietas*: *Anger* tempers the victorious hands" (19–22):

armis apta magis tellus quam commoda noxae:  
famam, Roma, tuae, non pudet historiae.  
nam quantum ferro, tantum pietate potentes  
stamus: victrices temperat ira manus.

What seems at first sight paradoxical, if we subscribe to one-dimensional notions of *ira*, turns out to make excellent sense in the context of the Epicurean discussion of anger and of the *Aeneid's* final scene: It is not

<sup>21</sup> Turnus: 7. 461; 12. 37, 667. Mezentius: 10. 871. Ignored, with much else, by M. R. Wright, "Ferox Virtus: Anger in the *Aeneid*," in S. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge 1995) chapter 10.

<sup>22</sup> Even here a Roman component is not missing: While Livy suppresses atrocities committed by the Roman army (as in 7. 10. 10 f. and 33. 10. 3; see P. G. Walsh, "Livy's Preface and the Distortion of History," *AJP* 76 [1955] 369–83), Vergil is far too realistic to do the same. To call this "befremdend" (V. Pöschl, in *2000 Jahre Vergil: Ein Symposium*, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 24 [Wiesbaden 1983] 175–88) is the usual application of an anachronistic cultural norm that ignores the alterity of works like the *Aeneid*.

<sup>23</sup> W. Clausen, *Virgil's Aeneid and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry* (Berkeley 1987) 99.

*clementia* that restrains the Romans in victory, but anger—the right kind, of course. Such anger, in fact, is a manifestation of *pietas*.<sup>24</sup>

A central point of agreement even amidst conflicting Epicurean views of anger seems to have been that anger should not be pleasurable for its own sake. It is a painful emotion, and that is very much the way the final scene of the *Aeneid* is cast. Aeneas does not gloat; the contrast is deliberate not only with Achilles' conquest of Hector, but also with Turnus' of Pallas (10. 500): "quo nunc Turnus ovat spolio *gaudetque* potitus," followed, of course, by Vergil's editorializing comments that foreshadow the end of the epic. Nor is there any indication that Aeneas' anger will be long-lived. Since it is so emphatic, however, and precisely because it is not an ingrained characteristic of Aeneas, it can also lead to the perception that Philodemus astutely observed, i.e. "a person genuinely not irascible" appearing as even more irascible than the habitual offenders when he has a fit of anger (XXXIV 31–XXXV 5). It is not Aeneas' usual behavior and therefore it seems all the starker. The Epicurean Philodemus, a good judge of people, made due allowance for it and used the proper perspective. One wishes that Aeneas' modern critics had done likewise.

In sum, the alignment is virtually complete between Aeneas' behavior and Philodemus' postulate that the wise man should approach revenge "as something most necessary"—*Pallas te immolat*—"and unpleasurable"—*saevi monimenta doloris*—and that, in contrast to the "tribeless and lawless" Homeric warrior, "the wise man is most merciful and most reasonable (*ἐπιεικέστατος*)" in carrying it out (XLIV 18–20, 22–27). It is useful to highlight some relevant aspects of this ἐπιείκεια.

Sentimental interpreters of the *Aeneid* tend to forget that the epic is about war: *Arma* is its first word, followed by predictions that *bellum ingens geret Italia* (1. 263) and of *bella, horrida bella* (6. 86). War is the action of Books 7–12, the *maius opus*. It was well recognized, however, that war, besides its own fury, also had its *nomoi*, hence Philodemus' censure of the warrior, full of "empty" rage, who is ἀθέμιστος (XLIV 24). We find more discussion of this, against a considerable background of earlier debate, in authors such as Diodorus and Polybius: "All war," as the former puts it, "having overstepped τὰ νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἀνθρώπων all the same has its own laws, such as not breaking a truce, killing a herald, or exacting vengeance from someone who has placed himself under the protection (πίστιν) of one who has overpowered him."<sup>25</sup> The breaking of truces—and Turnus has broken two—is reasonable and fair grounds for revenge. Connected with it is the concept of *fides*. In contrast to *clementia*,

<sup>24</sup> For previous interpretations of the passage, see P. Fedeli, *Properzio. Il libro terzo delle elegie* (Bari 1985) 643 f.

<sup>25</sup> D.S. 30. 18. 2. See F. Kiechle, "Zur Humanität der Kriegsführung in den griechischen Staaten," *Historia* 7 (1958) 129–56. For a general treatment of the dimensions of war in Vergil, cf. R. F. Gleis, *Der Vater der Dinge: Interpretationen zur politischen, literarischen und kulturellen Dimension des Krieges bei Vergil* (Trier 1991).

it is not just a vague moral standard but, being more normative, entails a specific legal obligation,<sup>26</sup> in this case that of Aeneas towards the Arcadians and, not in the least, towards his son. This is part of the dialogic situation—and I will return to it shortly—into which Vergil places the reader: What if Turnus were spared? What would be Ascanius' potential fate in case Aeneas were soon to die? Vergil raises the issue by an appeal to the "implied reader" at 12. 456 and there can be little doubt about the answer.<sup>27</sup> It is another salutary reminder that we cannot approach the *Aeneid* from a perspective of comfortable hindsight. Instead, we are present at creation and that should be our primary horizon of expectations.

Nor should the expectation be that Vergil simply follows Philodemus. As stated earlier, *De Ira* is an argumentative, heuristic tract; the line, e.g., between the three *epilogismoi* at the end and their refutation (XLVI 16–L 8) is easily blurred.<sup>28</sup> The third of these arguments, to give but one example, states in essence that the degree of one's anger depends on one's acquaintance with, or "mental notions" (ὀπολήψεις) of, the damage that is inflicted. The wise man, therefore, "being injured by someone intentionally, understands correctly that he is harmed, but just to the extent that he has been actually harmed, then of course he will be angered, but briefly, because he never receives an impression of being greatly harmed, as he never takes any external thing to be all that important" (XLVII 32–41). The refutation is that such an argument is inconclusive (ἀπέραντος) because "it does not follow for the person who has established that 'anger follows upon the notion of having been injured and cannot occur otherwise' that 'he who has received an impression of being injured will in every case be angered,' unless someone demonstrates in addition that the notion that one is injured is an (infallibly) efficient cause (δραστικὸν αἴτιον) of anger" (XLIX 39–L 8). The scene in the *Aeneid* agrees more with the stated argument than with its refutation: Aeneas is roused to anger by the acquaintance with a previous hurt, and his anger, based on a true impression,<sup>29</sup> can be expected to be brief. But Vergil parts company with the view shared by both Philodemus and his antagonist that all such matters are external and therefore unimportant.

The *Aeneid* is one of the most nuanced works of ancient literature and the differentiations in the treatment of anger especially in Peripatetic and Epicurean philosophy therefore were most congenial. They enabled the

<sup>26</sup> The most recent discussion is D. Nörr, *Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts: Die Bronzetafel von Alcántara*, ABAW phil-hist. Klasse, N.F. 101 (1989) esp. 102 ff.

<sup>27</sup> See R. J. Rowland, "Ductor Rhoeiteius: Vergil, *Aeneid* 12. 456," in R. M. Wilhelm and H. Jones (eds.), *The Two Worlds of the Poet: New Perspectives on Vergil* (Detroit 1992) 237–43. Cf. Philodemus' argument that the wise man will resort to anger in order to forestall an aggressor or to save a friend from being harmed (XL 26–XLI 8, 17–19).

<sup>28</sup> An imperfect excuse, to be sure, for my earlier misreadings ([above, note 4] 336).

<sup>29</sup> As Prof. Armstrong points out, the phrase δραστικὸν αἴτιον is a unique occurrence in Philodemus and requires more explanation. Cf. R. Philippson, "Philodemus Buch über den Zorn. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung," *RhM* 71 (1916) 460.



poet to recast a standard heroic emotion in a far more subtle way. In the final scene, the process begins with Turnus' plea (12. 931–37). Turnus is not a villain pure and simple—we are meant to empathize with him in the nightmare simile (12. 908–14)—but a believable human character,<sup>30</sup> who will always proclaim one thing, and then do another when the pressure is on. Right to the end: *Equidem merui nec deprecor*, he begins his plea. Pace R. D. Williams, *deprecor* certainly does not mean simply “complain,” but, quite literally, “beg off.” Turnus denies that he does so, but it is of course exactly what he does. In the same vein, he ends his plea by putting words in Aeneas' mouth by suggesting that Aeneas acts out of *odium*. *Odium*, in all the philosophies, is different from *ira* and *furor* in that it is a perpetual inclination.<sup>31</sup> So Turnus remains true to his character until the end. He will not change. We are meant to recall the salient scenes, such as his *caedis insana cupido* (10. 760) driving him on while he was forgetting to open the Trojan camp to his men, thereby prolonging the war, ultimately losing it, and causing hundreds and thousands of unnecessary deaths. What would he do to a future society that is based on a higher degree of social responsibility? *Parcere subiectis*, therefore, does not amount to a blanket amnesty: “*Externas gentes, quibus tuto ignosci potuit, conservare quam excidere malui.*”<sup>32</sup>

The dialogue continues, not only between the two protagonists, but between the text and the reader. It is typical of Vergil's intentions (I use this term unashamedly) that he does not end his epic, in contrast to the *Iliad*, with an “aesthetic resolution.”<sup>33</sup> Instead, life is complex and we see Aeneas once more in the throes of a dilemma. So we are asked to join him and the poet in sorting out the various possibilities and alternatives. Can Turnus be spared? Why not? Would a happy ending make the *Aeneid* more meaningful? Should Aeneas act with or without strong emotions? Is anger appropriate or is it not? Are any of these alternatives better or would they diminish the meaning of the work?

Vergil could have made it easy for himself when he wrote the ending of the *Aeneid*. We can be grateful to him that he did not. I am glad the *Aeneid* was written by him and not by his critics, because it would have been a vastly impoverished, one-dimensional epic. Instead, the final scene is a paradigm of many others and of his *epische Technik* in general: There is a plethora of evocations and associations. There is a constant dialogue with the reader to explore the limits of these associations, including, of course, the relevant Homeric scenes, and to propose, evaluate, and reject possible alternatives. The process involves both our intellects and our emotions. It

<sup>30</sup> See my remarks in *Augustan Age* 7 (1987) 169–72.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 21: *odium ira inveterata*. As such it would be, in Philodemus' terminology, *παμπόνηρος διάθεσις*.

<sup>32</sup> *Res Gestae* 3. 2. Cf. Cic. *Off.* 1. 35.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 218.

is a remarkable polyphony, but it is by no means aimless or open-ended. There is a strong authorial and moral center, which in Ovid yields to the mere bravura of the narrator. The parallels between Vergil's procedure and what Paul Zanker has called "Andachtsbild" in Augustan art are not coincidental.<sup>34</sup>

Let me conclude by giving one more example of an association that may be operative in the context of the final scene of the *Aeneid*. Aeneas now has taken the place of Achilles, avenging his slain comrade. At the same time, and chiefly by a more nuanced presentation of his anger, Vergil portrays Aeneas as being very different from Achilles. There was a contemporary of Vergil who, on a momentous occasion, had invoked Achilles as an exemplar for the revenge he was seeking. That was Octavian, who did so during his first appearance in Rome after Julius Caesar's assassination (Appian, *BC* 3. 46 f.). The monument to this private revenge was to be the Temple of Mars Ultor (Ovid, *Fasti* 5. 569 f.). As time went on, this private aspect of *ultio* was complemented with a public one: the revenge on the Parthians (Ovid, *Fasti* 5. 579-98) that was consummated by their return of the Roman standards in 20 B.C., the year before Vergil's death. Similarly, Aeneas' *ultio* in the final scene is both private and public.<sup>35</sup> It involves the obligation to Evander and Pallas, and it is *ultio foederis rupti*. Now when Ovid describes that temple in the *Fasti*, he characterizes it in Vergilian terms: It is Augustus' *maius opus* (*Fast.* 5. 568). And he deliberately recalls the words Vergil's Aeneas uses before he kills Turnus: *scelerato sanguine*. Octavian, Ovid says, called on Mars, *ades et satia scelerato sanguine ferrum* (5. 575), "help me and satiate my sword with the criminal blood [of Caesar's murderers]." Was this insatiate? Definitely not: Ovid says that Octavian did so with *pia arma* (569) and *milite iusto* (571), with *pietas* and *iustitia*.<sup>36</sup> Ovid, as many of us know who have written on both him and Vergil, was the most astute commentator Vergil ever had, and I think we should consider his words carefully.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. my discussion of "Venus, Polysemy, and the Ara Pacis Augustae," *AJA* 96 (1992) 457 ff., esp. 474 f.

<sup>35</sup> This is one of the few instances where these terms, which have been used far too often and far too schematically in recent writings on Vergil, have some validity; as can be seen, they are complementary rather than dichotomous on such occasions.

<sup>36</sup> For similar reasons, Vergil calls Aeneas *pius* amidst his slaughter of opponents after Pallas' death (10. 591; cf. 783): His war is still *bellum pium et iustum*.

<sup>37</sup> Which does not mean, to comment on yet another horse that should be dead (see now P. White, *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome* [Cambridge, MA 1993]), that Ovid and Vergil followed Augustan "propaganda" or "ideology." It is useful to observe the distinction between these concepts (which, moreover, are rarely defined in Augustan scholarship) and "topicality," a distinction made, e.g., by numismatists; see C. H. V. Sutherland, *The Emperor and the Coinage* (London 1976) 99-101 and W. Hollstein, *Die stadtrömische Münzprägung der Jahre 78-50 v. Chr. zwischen politischer Aktualität und Familienthematik* (diss. Marburg 1991).



Zu Appuleius, *Metamorphosen* 1. 15

REINHOLD MERKELBACH

In diesem Kapitel muß ein ganzer Satz umgestellt werden. Aristomenes hat seinen Freund Sokrates überredet, die Hexe Meroe zu verlassen; die beiden sind in einem Gasthaus eingekehrt. Nachts erscheint Meroe, schneidet dem schlafenden Sokrates den Hals auf und entnimmt sein Herz. Aristomenes muß befürchten, am nächsten Morgen des Mordes an seinem Freund bezichtigt zu werden. Er bricht mitten in der Nacht auf und verlangt von dem Türhüter, ihn herauszulassen.

"Heus tu, ubi es?" inquam; "valvas stabuli absolve, antelucio volo ire."

Ianitor pone stabuli ostium humi cubitans etiam nunc semisomnus: "Quid? tu" inquit "ignoras latronibus infestari vias, qui hoc noctis iter incipis? {nam etsi tu alicuius facinoris tibi conscius scilicet mori cupis, nos cucurbitae caput non habemus, ut pro te moriamur.}"

"Non longe" inquam "lux abest. et praeterea quid viatori de summa pauperie latrones auferre possunt? an ignoras, inepte, nudum nec a decem palaestritis despoliari posse?"

Ad haec ille marcidus et semisopitus in alterum latus revolutus: "Unde autem" inquit "scio an convectore illo tuo, cum quo sero devorteras, iugulato fugae mandes praesidium? <nam etsi tu alicuius facinoris tibi conscius scilicet mori cupis, nos cucurbitae caput non habemus, ut pro te moriamur.>"

Illud horae memini me terra dehiscente ima Tartara inque his canem Cerberum prorsus esurientem mei prospexisse.

In dem Satz, der umgestellt werden muß, vermutet der Türhüter, daß Aristomenes sterben wolle, weil er ein Verbrechen begangen habe. Aber weder von einem Wunsch des Aristomenes zu sterben noch von einem Verbrechen war bisher die Rede. Den Gedanken sterben zu wollen weckt Aristomenes erst in dem Türhüter, als er erklärt, überhaupt keine Angst vor Räubern zu haben; er sei so arm, daß man ihm nichts rauben könne. Jetzt, wo sich zeigt, daß Aristomenes die Gefahr von Räubern erschlagen zu werden nicht scheut, kommt der Türhüter auf den Gedanken, daß Aristomenes vielleicht selbst ein Verbrechen begangen haben könne und deshalb keine Angst vor dem Tod habe; daß er möglicherweise seinen

Weggenossen ermordet habe; und daß dann—wenn Aristomenes abgereist sei—der Mordverdacht auf ihn, den Türhüter, fallen könne.<sup>1</sup>

Erst, wenn der Verdacht geäußert wurde, daß Aristomenes ein Mörder sein könne, kann der Türhüter auf den Gedanken kommen, daß er selbst dieses Mordes verdächtigt werden könne.

Die *Metamorphosen* sind bekanntlich in nur einem einzigen Exemplar auf uns gekommen. In einem solchen Fall muß man ernstlich mit der Möglichkeit rechnen, daß ein Satz von einem Abschreiber ausgelassen und dann am Rand nachgetragen wurde, und daß dann der nächste Abschreiber den Satz am Rand an einer verkehrten Stelle in den Text einordnete.

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<sup>1</sup> A. Scobie berührt die Schwierigkeit in seinem Kommentar (*Apuleius Metamorphoses I: A Commentary*, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 54 [Meisenheim am Glan 1975] 112): "The circumstances under which the doorman might be likely to die for the benefit of/in place of Arist. are not immediately clear." Er diskutiert dann zwei Erklärungsmöglichkeiten und fährt fort: "A third possibility is that in view of the thought expressed by the ianitor below (unde autem scio etc.), he fears that he might be accused of a murder he did not commit."



Babrius, *Fab.* 78: A New MS

JOHN VAIO

Several MSS that contain the tetrasticha of Ignatius Diaconus and his imitators also preserve a fable of Babrius (*Fab.* 12) in abridged form. (Incidentally, this is how Babrius first got into print, via the Aldine Aesop of 1505.) A previously unnoticed MS, Vaticanus Barberinianus graecus 354 (henceforth "Vb"), contains another recension of the tetrasticha, which here yields up a version of Babrius, *Fab.* 78.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the case of *Fab.* 12 and that of another fable (no. 58), separately and uniquely attested in two MSS,<sup>2</sup> Vb offers evidence useful in sorting out the text of its fable.

That fable (no. 78) is also attested by the principal MS (A) and by T, a set of wax tablets dated to the third century A.D.<sup>3</sup> To this is added a version of the paraphrase (*Fabb.* 169c–d Chambry).<sup>4</sup> The texts follow with minor corrections—that of T is partly restored.

κόραξ νοστήσας εἶπε μητρὶ κλαιούσῃ  
 "μὴ κλαῖε, μήτερ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὖχου  
 νόσου με δεινῆς καὶ πόνων ἀνασφῆλαι."  
 "καὶ τίς σε" φησί "τῶν θεῶν, τέκνον, σώσει;  
 τίνας γὰρ ὑπὸ σοῦ βωμὸς οὐκ ἐσυλήθη;"

A

<sup>1</sup> The Aesopica follow a fragment of a Greek grammar copied in 1479. Babr. *Fab.* 78 is in fact inserted between the general title of the tetrasticha and the promythium of the first tetrastichon. This part of the MS (ff. 119<sup>v</sup>–23) may be dated to the last quarter of the 15th cent., not long after 1479; see the authorities cited by P. Canart and V. Peri, *Sussidi bibliografici per i manoscritti greci della Biblioteca Vaticana* (Vatican City 1970) 146. The reports given here and below of MSS A, T and Vb are based on autopsy. On the MSS of the tetrasticha, see C. F. Müller in *Babrii fabulae Aesopeae*, ed. by O. Crusius (Leipzig 1897) 251–63.

<sup>2</sup> On *Fab.* 58 see J. Vaio, *Emerita* 48 (1980) 1–3. The variants of the abridged version of *Fab.* 12 are not reported in *Babrii Mythiambi Aesopei*, ed. by M. J. Luzzatto (*Fabb.* 1–80) and A. La Penna (*Fabb.* 81–144), (Leipzig 1986) 14–16; for these variants see Crusius (previous note) 19 f.

<sup>3</sup> First published by D. C. Hesseling, "On Waxen Tablets with Fables of Babrius," *JHS* 13 (1892–93) 293–314, with plates XIII–XIX.

<sup>4</sup> *Aesopi Fabulae*, ed. by E. Chambry (Paris 1925–26) II 290.

κοραξ νοσησας ελεγε μητρει κλεουση  
 μη κλαε μητερ αλλα τοις θεοις ευχου<sup>5</sup>  
 η δ ειπε τεκνον και τις<sup>6</sup> σε των θεων σωσει  
 ποιος γαρ βω<μοσ><sup>7</sup> υπο σου ουκ εσυληθη

T

κόραξ νοσήσας τῇ μητρὶ κλαιούσῃ εἶπεν· “εὖχου τοῖς  
 θεοῖς, μήτερ, καὶ μὴ κλαῖε.” ἡ δὲ εἶπεν· “τίς σε τῶν  
 θεῶν, τέκνον, ἐλεήσει; τίνος γὰρ αὐτῶν βωμὸς ὑπὸ  
 σοῦ οὐκ ἐσυλήθη;”

paraphr.

Vb's uncorrected text of lines 1–3 reads as follows:

κόραξ νοσήσ(ας) εἶπε μ(η)τρί κλεουση :  
 μὴ κλαῖε μ(η)τερ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὖχου :  
 νοσου με δεινῆς κ(αὶ) πό(νων) ἀνασφηλαι :

In line 1 Vb agrees with A against T (εἶπε: ελεγε).<sup>8</sup> In line 2 all witnesses are in essential agreement. Line 3 is missing in T and the paraphrast, and this omission led Hesseling, who first published T, to consider the line spurious.<sup>9</sup> The evidence of the new MS (Vb) is further vindication of this line, if such be needed, since like A it contains line 3, but agrees substantially with T in line 4. T's version may have been abridged arbitrarily by the schoolmaster who apparently dictated it.<sup>10</sup> That the paraphrase also omits this verse is of little or no value as evidence, since it frequently abbreviates its source.<sup>11</sup>

A more serious textual difficulty occurs in line 4, partly metrical, but mainly due to disagreement among the witnesses, whose texts follow:

“καὶ τίς σε” φησί “τῶν θεῶν, τέκνον, σώσει;

A

η δ ειπε τεκνον και τις<sup>12</sup> σε των θεων σωσει

T

ἡ δὲ εἶπεν· “τίς σε τῶν θεῶν, τέκνον, ἐλεήσει;

paraphr.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The fable is written twice in T, once in uncials (2<sup>v</sup>) and once in cursive (3<sup>v</sup>). The combination of both versions yields a complete text for line 2. Contrast Hesseling (above, note 3) 305 and Luzzatto (above, note 2) ad loc.

<sup>6</sup> Luzzatto (above, note 2) ad loc. reads καισετων for Hesseling's και . . . σετων ([above, note 3] 305). In the uncial version (on 2<sup>v</sup>) και occurs near the end of line 16 and is followed by space enough (9 cm) for, and traces of, three letters. In the cursive version (3<sup>v</sup>, line 4) τις may be clearly read between κ . . and σετων. Thus T reads καιτισετων.

<sup>7</sup> The syllable missing on 2<sup>v</sup> may have been on 3<sup>v</sup>: sc. βωμ . . υ . . σου.

<sup>8</sup> Vb here supports A against T. Luzzatto ([above, note 2] 77) sides with T; contrast La Penna (above, note 2) ad loc.

<sup>9</sup> Hesseling (above, note 3) 305; contrast Crusius, *Philologus* 53 (1894) 235.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Crusius (previous note) 232 ff., esp. 238; idem (above, note 1) xi.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Crusius (above, note 1) xx.

<sup>12</sup> On T's reading, see above (note 6).

<sup>13</sup> On the text of the paraphrast's source, see below (note 23).

Here Vb reads:

ἢ δ' εἶπεν τέκνον, τίς σε τ(ῶν) θεῶν σώσει : (sic)

and goes back to a source common to itself and T, but varying considerably from A.<sup>14</sup> We then have two versions of the line with different word order and narrative style.

Luzzatto<sup>15</sup> following Hesseling<sup>16</sup> adopts T's version (T's καί is deleted) and offers:

ἢ δ' εἶπε· "τέκνον, τίς σε τῶν θεῶν σώσει;

The new Teubner thus offers the reading of our MS (with slight corrections) as the result of independent conjecture.

But what are we to make of this reading in contrast to A's variant, adopted by Crusius and Perry<sup>17</sup> in preference to T? One point in favor of A is its style. The reading based on T/Vb makes the change of subject explicit, but at the cost of the lively and idiomatic καί,<sup>18</sup> whose effect is sharpened by its position at the beginning of the verse. Moreover, the fact that καί is hypermetrically retained in T strongly suggests that the source of A and T/Vb had the particle, and that A is closer to that source.<sup>19</sup> Vb has taken the process one step further and removed the καί.

On the other hand, A presents a metrical difficulty: τέκνον in elements 9–10 of the trimeter, which either yields an impossible long in element 9 or exhibits a form of correction rare for Babrius.<sup>20</sup> This difficulty can be removed by adopting the following transposition, proposed by Nauck<sup>21</sup> and adopted by Crusius and Perry:

καὶ τίς σε, τέκνον, φησί, τῶν θεῶν σώσει;

"transposuit Nck adstipulante FT" (Crusius [above, note 1] ad loc.)

But if A's is the primary reading here, then the position of τέκνον in T (and Vb), i.e., in elements 4–5, could be merely the result of a reviser's wish

<sup>14</sup> The paraphrase agrees with T/Vb in the introductory phrase, but has the vocative like A directly before the verb. The latter is the more telling index of affinity linking the paraphrase with A in this pair of variants, especially if the source of the paraphrase read καὶ τίς σε, as argued below (note 23).

<sup>15</sup> Luzzatto (above, note 2) 77.

<sup>16</sup> Hesseling (above, note 3) 305. Note (*pace* Luzzatto) that Hesseling does not conjecture τίς for καί in T. He reads καὶ [τίς] and deletes the conjunction; see above (note 6).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Crusius (above, note 1) 70; B. E. Perry, *Aesopica* I (Urbana, IL 1952) *Fab.* 324; idem, *Babrius and Phaedrus* (Cambridge, MA and London 1965) 98. Both Crusius and Perry adopt Nauck's transposition of A's text discussed below.

<sup>18</sup> On this use of the particle, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 309 f.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Hesseling (above, note 3) 305. Note that καί may also have been in the source of the paraphrase; see below (note 23).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Luzzatto (above, note 2) c, civ; contrast Crusius (above, note 1) lviii–lvix, and see discussion below.

<sup>21</sup> *Philologus* 6 (1851) 407.

to begin the mother's reply with the vocative. As regards F (= *Fab.* 169b Chambry), the matter is more complex. This version in dodecasyllabic verse derives from the paraphrase (or its source),<sup>22</sup> but has καί before τίς,<sup>23</sup> sc. ἡ δὲ . . . ἔφη· / "καὶ τίς σε, τέκνον, τῶν θεῶν ἐλεήσει;" (3–4). Here the vocative may have been transposed from its position in the paraphrase in order to achieve a regular Byzantine Zwölfsilber (xxx-ο|xxxxx-ο), that is, in order to avoid word-end after the sixth syllable with neither B5 nor B7.<sup>24</sup>

Thus the evidence of T/Vb and the dodecasyllabic fable is neutral regarding Nauck's transposition. Nor is the prosody a certain index of corruption. For if one follows Crusius in keeping A's reading at *Fab.* 70. 6 (μὴ γοῦν ἔθνη που in elements 1–5) and adopting C. E. Schneider's correction at 129. 8 (παρὰ φάτναισι in elements 6–9), then these "correptiones satis singulares . . . altera alteram defendunt neque a Babrio abiudicanda videntur."<sup>25</sup> And with A's version of 78. 4 they add up to three, an even stronger confirmation of this prosody. Nevertheless, one must always reckon with transposition as a type of corruption in the Babrian MSS,<sup>26</sup> and here it could be explained as an attempt effectively to join τῶν θεῶν with τίς. The best procedure would be to print A and record Nauck's conjecture in the apparatus.

In line 5 Vb reads τίνος γ(άρ) δε ὑπό σου βώμος οὐκ ἐσυληθη (sic). Except for the intrusive δε it stands with A against T's ποιοιο γαρ βω<μοσ> υπο σου ουκ εσυληθη.

In sum, the evidence of Vb supports adoption of A against the innovations of Luzzatto, based on T. Here Loeb has the advantage over Teubner.

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<sup>22</sup> On these fables, see F. Fedde, *Ueber eine noch nicht edirte Sammlung Aesopischer Fabeln* . . . (Progr. Breslau 1877) 15 ff., esp. 16 f.; U. Ursing, *Studien zur griechischen Fabel* (diss. Lund 1930) esp. 88–90; B. E. Perry, *Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop* (Haverford, PA 1936) 183 ff., esp. 195 f. (with n. 33), 204; Luzzatto (above, note 2) lxxvii ff.; F. R. Adrados, *Historia de la fábula greco-latina* (Madrid 1985) II 427 ff.; J. Vaio, "Babrius and the Byzantine Fable," in *La fable*, Entretiens Fond. Hardt 30 (Vandœuvres-Geneva 1984) 206 ff.

<sup>23</sup> All the witnesses except Vb and the principal MSS of the paraphrase have καὶ τίς σε, and the conjunction may have been in the latter's source. The dodecasyllabic version and Bd, a lesser MS in the paraphrastic tradition, have καί. True, Bd adds ὦ before τέκνον and could have added καί, but the evidence of the dodecasyllabic fable suggests otherwise.

<sup>24</sup> For theory and notation see P. Maas, *BZ* 12 (1903) 278 ff., esp. 287 ff. (= *Kl. Schr.* 242 ff., esp. 251 ff.); for the meter of these fables, see Ursing (above, note 22) 7–14.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Crusius (above, note 1) lviii–lix; contrast Luzzatto (above, note 2) civ. *Fab.* 29. 5 (ἀκμή in elements 9–10) would be an exact parallel, but the verse is otherwise corrupt, and its text uncertain. Moreover, the authenticity of the epimythium in which it occurs is still in question, as is that of individual epimythia generally, despite Luzzatto's discussion ([above, note 2] xci–xcvi).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. J. Vaio, "Four Notes on the Text of Babrius," *CP* 64 (1969) 158 with n. 49.

## Some Manuscripts of Dionysius the Periegete

MICHAEL REEVE

With admirable dedication, Isavella Tsavari has collated 134 manuscripts of Dionysius the Periegete, analysed their relationships in a monograph of 456 pages, and reported in an edition readings from all 44 manuscripts older than the 15th century.<sup>1</sup> Both works give a full stemma at the end. When I reviewed them, however, I found her method of analysis unsatisfactory and the connexion between her stemma and her text opaque.<sup>2</sup>

Revising Dr. Tsavari's conclusions might seem to require almost as much collation as she carried out herself, less because she made mistakes, though I shall correct some below, than because even in conjunction her two works seldom bring the evidence in particular passages sufficiently into view. Besides reporting no manuscripts later than the 14th century, the edition mostly passes over readings that offend against sense or metre (p. 23); at 147, for instance, it passes over the omission of καὶ πολλὸν by  $\nu\kappa\lambda\varsigma\eta\sigma\tau\mu V_2$ , which she reports at least three times in the monograph (pp. 259, 346, 391). The monograph itself could not have been expected to serve as an apparatus, and indexing passages would have taken a long time; but finding relevant evidence is made harder by her occasional failure to mention things in all the appropriate places, as when she mentions in her analysis (p. 401) but not in her description (pp. 138–39) that  $N_1$  omits 375, or only once that F shares the omission of καὶ πολλὸν in 147 (p. 370). In some manuscripts of the 15th or 16th century, moreover, she collated only 1–100, 550–650, 1000–1100 (p. 22), and she does not indicate which they were.

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire du texte de la Description de la terre de Denys le Périégète* (Ioannina 1990); Διονυσίου Ἀλεξανδρέως Οἰκουμένης περιήγησις (Ioannina 1990).

<sup>2</sup> *CR* 41 (1991) 306–09. In a long rejoinder, Διονυσιακά 1 (1992) 53–75, Dr. Tsavari accuses me of ὑπεροψία, σύγχυση, ἀνακρίβειες, and most unpleasantly of all κακοπιστία. Three errors I apologize for, all on p. 307: as she says (pp. 55, 58, 63), I wrote  $\psi_2$  instead of  $\psi_{22}$ ,  $W_1$  originally had the order of A at 506–12, and “le manuscrit δ” should have been “le manuscrit σ” (the slip occurred in printing, but evidently I failed to spot it in the proofs). None of these, however, affects the substance of my objections, which she has quite failed to answer; and I admit no others, whether of fact or of logic. Rather than defend myself in detail, which I have done by letter without receiving a reply, I will try to break new ground.




Nevertheless, the information that she has provided sometimes allows a different conclusion. For the moment I will confine myself to four areas of her stemma, one early and editorially important, the others late and doubtless unimportant. In the first I use no information of my own; in the second, very little except about printed editions; in the third and fourth, only enough to confirm suspicions already formed.

About the wider context I need only say that apart from A (s. x) and its descendant V<sub>9</sub> she derives all the manuscripts from one lost source, Ω<sub>3</sub>, through four lost descendants, bδφψ, and that she regards the family of Ω<sub>3</sub> as riddled with contamination, not least from A.<sup>3</sup>

b<sub>2</sub>

In the family of b Dr. Tsavari postulates 14 lost intermediaries, from b<sub>1</sub> to b<sub>14</sub>. This is her stemma for the seven extant descendants of b<sub>2</sub> (p. 275):



Three of these manuscripts are the oldest after A: B (Paris gr. 2771, s. x/xi), m<sub>5</sub> (Moscow Syn. gr. 30, s. xi), W<sub>1</sub> (Wolfenbüttel Gud. gr. 46, s. xi).

How well has she defined b<sub>14</sub>, the common source of B and m<sub>5</sub> (pp. 270–71)? In the monograph she cites no separative errors of B where m<sub>5</sub> is present (278–350, 470–524). Though in her apparatus she ascribes to B γάρ for πᾶσαν at 300, she does not mention this reading in the monograph (p.

<sup>3</sup> I take the opportunity of mentioning two things about A, both of them unconnected with my arguments below and the second unconnected even with anything that Dr. Tsavari has written. First, in my review ([previous note] 309) I said “at 576–8 I find it hard to believe that A omitted ἐριβρεμέτη Διονύσωφ,” but Dr. Tsavari declares that it παραλείπει πράγματι these words ([previous note] 73–74). I said “omitted,” not “omits.” I have now inspected A, and 576 ἐρίβρομον Εἰραφιῶτην is *in rasura*. What stood there before if not ἐριβρεμέτη Διονύσωφ? Second and more important, 705–17 in their first appearance, after 664, begin not with κείνων but with ἄφεσων, over which a corrector wrote the κεί of κείνων. In the exemplar of A, therefore, or a remoter ancestor, ἄφες, “drop,” must have been an instruction written above κείνων, and so the scribe of A itself, who mistook it for a correction of κεί, cannot have been responsible for the transposition.


271). In any case, she did not collate  $m_5$  herself: her reports of its readings go back to a rare *Programm* published by Matthaei in 1788.<sup>4</sup>

How well has she defined  $b_2$ , the common source of  $b_{14}$  and  $W_1$  (pp. 242–43)? She says that  $W_1$  abandons  $b$  for  $\psi$  round about line 385 (p. 225 n. 606 and elsewhere), but in her edition she substitutes 350 for 385 (pp. 32–33). Why not 256? Up to that point the only differences between  $B$  and  $W_1$  that I can find either in the monograph or in the edition are the separative errors of  $W_1$  that she lists in the monograph (p. 270); after that, agreements of  $W_1\mu$  against  $B$  are common ( $\mu$  is the oldest manuscript that she derives from  $\psi$  throughout). Where  $W_1$  descends from  $b$ , therefore, I see no reason why it should not do so through  $B$ .

Provisionally, then, I propose the abolition of both  $b_{14}$  and  $b_2$ . That leaves no intermediary between  $B$  and  $b$ .

$\psi_{26}$

In the family of  $\psi$  Dr. Tsavari postulates 32 lost intermediaries, from  $\psi_1$  to  $\psi_{32}$ . This is her stemma for the seven extant descendants of  $\psi_{26}$  (p. 415):



$N_1$  = Naples Naz. III.E.27

$U$  = Paris gr. 2731

$P$  = Paris gr. 3023

$Q$  = Paris Supp. gr. 36

$V_{20}$  = Vat. Ross. 895

$V_{12}$  = Vat. Ottob. gr. 335

$\kappa_4$  = Bodl. Rawl. G.95

$N_1$  she puts in the 15th century,  $UPQV_{20}V_{12}$  in the 16th,  $\kappa_4$  in the 17th. According to her descriptions,  $V_{12}$  bears the date 1527 and  $\kappa_4$  the date 1655–56; she accepts the attribution of  $U$  and  $Q$  to Constantine Palaeocappa and reports Diller's attribution of  $P$  to Iacovos Diassorinos.

The evidence that she cites for her stemma appears adequate except in respect of  $Q$  and  $\kappa_4$ , whose descent from  $\psi_{26}$  and its ancestors  $\psi_{24}$ ,  $\psi_{22}$ , and  $\psi_2$ , she hardly establishes (pp. 406, 405, 401–02, 360). Her excuse that they

<sup>4</sup> According to the *National Union Catalog* CCCLXIX (1975) 575, no. 0339600, there is a copy at Harvard.

are contaminated and often desert  $\psi_{22}$  (p. 401 n. 749) plays down the fact that neither shares any of the 15 readings by which she defines  $\psi_{22}$ . It seems that once she had derived them together with UP from  $\psi_{27}$  she was determined to persevere.

Five of the seven manuscripts reappear in her account of the printed editions (pp. 425–38). There she connects the *editio princeps* (Ferrara 1512) with  $\psi_{26}$  and says that it shares errors now with P, now with  $V_{20}$ , now with  $PV_{20}$ , now with  $PV_{20}N_1V_{12}$ , and “ne semble avoir servi d’antigraphe à aucun manuscrit conservé de la *Périégèse*, ainsi qu’il ressort des fautes séparatives qu’elle présente.”

I have pleaded elsewhere against separating early printed editions from manuscripts.<sup>5</sup> In her introduction Dr. Tsavari promises to treat the *editio princeps* and the Aldine “comme si elles étaient de véritables manuscrits” and remarks that “un intérêt spécial que présentent ces éditions, c’est de voir si l’on peut retrouver en elles les ascendants de certains manuscrits conservés du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle” (p. 21); but in the event she dismisses the possibility too lightly, and her analysis of the earlier editions is quite inadequate. Besides the *editio princeps*, four of these will concern me here: the Aldine (Venice 1513), the edition printed by Tiletanus (Paris 1538), Robertus Stephanus’s edition (Paris 1547), and Henricus Stephanus’s edition in *Poetae Graeci principes heroici carminis* (Geneva 1566).

Dr. Tsavari says that the Aldine corrected some obvious errors of the *editio princeps* and also drew on  $\psi_{26}$  for a reading found in  $V_{20}$ , 1074 Σούτων for Σούσων. Apart from this single agreement with  $V_{20}$ , however, she offers no evidence that it is anything more than a reprint of the *editio princeps*, with some proofreading but with new misprints; and her notion that that reading of  $V_{20}$  already occurred in  $\psi_{26}$  conflicts with her stemma. Surely the reading in question, 1074 Σούτων for Σούσων, originated as a misprint in the Aldine itself.

Whoever prepared the edition printed by Tiletanus (Paris 1538) started from an earlier edition, she says, but claims to have improved the text *innumeris locis* by collating a *codex vetustissimus*. In her edition (pp. 20–21) she describes Robertus Stephanus’s edition as the first after the *editio princeps* to use manuscripts; but if she doubts the claim made by Tiletanus’s editor, she cannot have collated even a few lines. Incidentally, she also seems to have forgotten her own view that the Aldine editor consulted  $\psi_{26}$ .

Robertus Stephanus, she says, followed Tiletanus but “doit avoir utilisé des manuscrits, par ex. le manuscrit Q, qui doit être de quelques années antérieur à son édition et dont celle-ci répète des fautes.” Certainly he often diverges from the *editio princeps* and the Aldine, and so does Tiletanus; but each diverges in his own way. Between them, they drove out many

<sup>5</sup> “Manuscripts Copied from Printed Books,” in *Manuscripts in the Fifty Years after the Invention of Printing*, ed. by J. B. Trapp (London 1983) 3–11. Cf. CR 34 (1984) 43.

readings of  $\psi_{26}$  and its ancestors, but Tiletanus's editor did it by using his *codex vetustissimus*, Stephanus presumably by using the manuscripts from which he compiled his appendix of variants.

Robertus Stephanus's son Henricus overhauled the text by drawing on the appendix of variants. Starred variants in the margin provide a ready way of identifying his interventions. Incidentally, he deserves the credit that I gave Papius for numbering the verses. I mentioned *Poetae Graeci principes heroici carminis* in this connexion, but it had escaped me that that was precisely where he published his text of Dionysius.

These developments in editions are reflected in some of the manuscripts that Dr. Tsavari derives from  $\psi_{26}$ . Nicholas Lloyd (1630–1680) wrote  $\kappa_4$  in 1655–56, first as a scholar of Wadham College, Oxford, and then as a fellow.<sup>6</sup> That he wrote it abroad is neither attested nor likely, and no manuscript at all close to it is known to have been in England, let alone Oxford, at that date. So late a manuscript can be assumed anyway to derive from a printed edition in default of evidence to the contrary. Its source was an edition no older than Henricus Stephanus's, where at 33 εὔνεκα first took the place of οὔνεκα in a printed text. Dr. Tsavari twice implies, correctly, that  $\kappa_4$  reads εὔνεκα (pp. 406, 409).

Q at 33 reads οὔνεκα (ibid.), hardly a separative error, as Dr. Tsavari calls it, if it occurs in UPV<sub>20</sub>N<sub>1</sub>V<sub>12</sub>. In fact Q departs less than  $\kappa_4$  from  $\psi_{26}$ , for the simple reason that it has a close connexion with an earlier edition, Robertus Stephanus's. All her 11 errors of Q $\kappa_4$  (p. 408) occur there. What then is the connexion between Q and Stephanus's edition? Checked against both Stephanus's edition and Tiletanus's, such information as Dr. Tsavari gives about Q suggests that, far from generally following Tiletanus but occasionally Q, Stephanus hardly diverges from Q. Only four of the 11 errors just mentioned had already occurred in Tiletanus's edition, and by comparison with previous editions two of them are not errors anyway: 234 ἐπειρήσαντο, 302 νέμονται. Whether the work of collation seen in Stephanus's edition left its mark independently on Q and the edition, or rather on one by way of the other, I cannot say without collating both. The scribe of Q, Constantine Palaeocappa, wrote it at Paris,<sup>7</sup> and as he arrived there at an undetermined date that may well have been closer to 1552, when he wrote out a catalogue of the royal library at Fontainebleau, than to 1542, when he left Athos,<sup>8</sup> no weight can be put on Dr. Tsavari's assertion that Q must antedate the edition. In the belief that Stephanus's edition of Eustathius's commentary rested on another manuscript written by

<sup>6</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography* XXXIII (1893) 430.

<sup>7</sup> H. Omont, *Annuaire de l'Association pour l'Encouragement des Études Grecques en France* 20 (1886) 267.

<sup>8</sup> E. Gamillscheg and D. Harlfinger, *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800–1600* I A (Vienna 1981) 126, no. 225. I do not know who explained away the evidence on which some older works place his death in 1551.

Palaeocappa (U), Diller once asked, "Was Palaeocappa an editor for Stephanus?," but he later abandoned the belief.<sup>9</sup> I have inspected Q but not had time to collate it, and for the moment I will only say that no reading cited by Dr. Tsavari or noticed by me prevents it from being a copy of Stephanus's edition. Even if it is not, however, it must be a contaminated descendant of the *editio princeps*.

Despite objecting a moment ago, therefore, I have come out accepting Dr. Tsavari's derivation of Q and κ<sub>4</sub> from ψ<sub>26</sub>. They are by no means the only manuscripts, incidentally, that above the lowest levels of descent show few signs of belonging to any of the families in which she places them. V<sub>22</sub> (Vat. gr. 121, s. xiii<sup>2</sup>) provides a striking example, σ (Ambros. G 56 sup., s. xiv<sup>1</sup>) up to about line 450 another. I doubt whether the explanation is always the same.

A word here about A<sub>7</sub> (Athens Nat. 3003) and A<sub>5</sub> (Athens Univ., Seminar of Byz. and Mod. Greek 25), which she excludes from her classification. After calling them copies of editions (p. 225 n. 606), she decides that they are just eclectic (pp. 430–31, 456). Coming from someone who has gritted her teeth through all the contamination and classified everything else, this admission of defeat takes one by surprise, especially when both manuscripts are preserved in the same place. Is that how the Greek provinces stand up to their capital? Be that as it may, A<sub>7</sub> bears the date 1574 and shares errors with Robertus Stephanus's edition, from which Diller derives it in Eustathius's commentary.<sup>10</sup> It will surely turn out to be a copy of an edition after all. A<sub>5</sub> she assigns to the 15th century but otherwise veils in mystery, and so I venture no prediction.

In discussing the Aldine above I argued that 1074 Σούτων for Σούσων originated there as a misprint. If so, V<sub>20</sub>, which has the same reading, should derive from the Aldine. The list of separative errors that she gives for this manuscript includes 1079 ἀλλήλοισι for ἀλλήλοισι (p. 410), and that too, as she mentions in her description of the third edition (Basel 1522), is a reading of the Aldine. I can find in her pages only one reading that prevents V<sub>20</sub> from being a copy of the Aldine: 679 Τάναϊν ποταμὸν in that order (p. 407, by implication). In fact, however, it reads ποταμὸν Τάναϊν.<sup>11</sup> She mentions in her description that one of its watermarks closely resembles one attested in 1524–28 (pp. 191–92). On inspecting the manuscript up to line 460, I found that it has several errors inherited by the Aldine from the *editio princeps*, for instance 33 οὔνεκα, 87 νένευκες, 132 περιβρέεται, 169 κυαναυγέως, 245 ἀμφοτέροισιν, 321 νότου, 328 τε for τις, 343 [τε], 363 ὄσην, 364 κείνο, παραφαίνεται, but not 33 νηκρὸν, 396 αὐχῇ, 404

<sup>9</sup> *AJP* 57 (1936) 127–29 = *Studies in Greek Manuscript Tradition* (Amsterdam 1983) 442–44; *The Textual Tradition of Strabo's Geography* (Amsterdam 1975) 203–04.

<sup>10</sup> *Textual Tradition* (previous note) 204.

<sup>11</sup> Silvia Rizzo very kindly checked for me before I could see the manuscript myself.




πλατάνοι, 443 ἀπειρεσίην, 452 ἀπ', 460 ἐκείναι. A reader of the Aldine could surely have corrected these errors without recourse to a manuscript.

Dr. Tsavari implies that  $N_1$ , like  $V_{20}$ , has Τάναϊν ποταμὸν in 679 and not ποταμὸν Τάναϊν with the *editio princeps* and UPQκ<sub>4</sub>. Again, however, she is wrong.<sup>12</sup> In order, therefore, to derive  $N_1$  and its alleged descendant  $V_{12}$  from the *editio princeps*, one need only move  $N_1$  from the 15th century and suppose that it corrected the misprints of the *editio princeps* that she reports from U, P, or the Aldine. As I have not seen it, however, this breezy assertion should be taken only as a challenge.

U and P cannot derive entirely from an edition, if only because they incorporate in their text the four lines added after 214 by  $V_{16}$  and several relatives (pp. 151–52, 161–62); but the *editio princeps* surely underlies them. P shares with it ὑπὲρ for ὑπὲρ in 598, σεριμήκετος for περιμήκετος in 599,<sup>13</sup> and ἐπίχει for ἐπέχει in 612, and UP share with it ἀλέκοντας for ἀλέγοντας in 210, νῆποι for νῆσοι in 457, and σιδύρω for σιδήρω in 476. Most of these readings look like misprints. I have already mentioned that U, like Q, was written by Constantine Palaeocappa, and no doubt P is equally late, whether or not written by his associate Iacovos Diassorinos. Both appear in the Fontainebleau catalogue of 1550.<sup>14</sup>

A further argument applies equally to all the descendants of  $\psi_{26}$ : the eight readings by which Dr. Tsavari defines  $\psi_{26}$  (p. 406) include two that could well have originated as misprints, 33 νηκρὸν for νεκρὸν and 132 περιβρέεται for περιβρέμεται.

Once  $\psi_{26}$  has been reduced to the *editio princeps*, its relationship to Y and  $\psi_{25}$  must be reassessed. This is the relevant part of her stemma:



She herself, however, describes Y (Paris gr. 2854) as a contaminated descendant of  $\psi_{22}$  (p. 401 n. 749), and it may not be a coincidence that  $\psi_{26}$  and  $\psi_{25}$  both omit 375. In any event, the earliest descendants of  $\psi_{22}$  all descend from  $\psi_{25}$ : one was written in 1468 by Antonios Damilas and two by

<sup>12</sup> Albio Cassio very kindly checked for me.


<sup>13</sup> Dr. Tsavari says that the Aldine corrected this (p. 428), but the copy that I consulted, Cambridge U. L. Sel. 6.36, has σεριμήκετος.

<sup>14</sup> Diller, *Textual Tradition* (above, note 9) 203–04.


Michael Apostolios, whose activity cannot be traced after 1474.<sup>15</sup> Zacharias Callierges wrote Y ἐν γήραος οὐδ᾽ ἐν Ῥώμῃ and so not before 1515;<sup>16</sup> from it in 1523 ἐν Ῥώμῃ (p. 185) he copied V<sub>21</sub> (Vat. Ottob. gr. 193). Though I have collated Y, however, I cannot at the moment see a way through the contamination that lies behind it.

d<sub>3</sub>

In the family of d, much the largest, Dr. Tsavari postulates 42 lost intermediaries, from d<sub>1</sub> to d<sub>42</sub>. These are the upper levels of her stemma:



Whereas the family of d<sub>2</sub> includes V<sub>16</sub> (s. xiii/xiv) and the family of d<sub>4</sub> several manuscripts of similar age, the family of d<sub>3</sub> does not emerge until the end of s. xv. Dr. Tsavari delineates it as follows (p. 289):



<sup>15</sup> *Repertorium* (above, note 8) 149–50, no. 278; cf. M. Vogel and V. Gardthausen, “Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance,” *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* Supp. 33 (1909) 305, and D. J. Geanakoplos, *Greek Scholars in Venice* (Cambridge, MA 1962) 107–08.

<sup>16</sup> E. Mioni, *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* XVI (1973) 750–53; E. Gamillscheg and D. Harlfinger, *JÖB* 27 (1978) 306–07.

I have collated three of these manuscripts:  $\kappa_3$  (Bodl. Auct. F.4.5), I (Cambridge U. L. Kk.6.29), and  $E_1$  (Eton 146).

There are objections to Dr. Tsavari's stemma. First, she has not established the existence of  $d_5$ , because five of the six errors by which she defines it (p. 282) also occur in  $\kappa_3$ , three of them in the text (5, 39, 1024) and two as variants (638, 1033). Second, over half the errors by which she defines  $d_3$  (p. 280) are absent from I. Third,  $\kappa_3$ , I, and  $E_1$  often disagree, and in many such passages both readings are attested elsewhere (I give first the reading that Dr. Tsavari prints in her edition):

- |     |  |
|-----|--|
| 6   | ὄξυτέρη I, $E_1$ : εὐρυτέρη $\kappa_3$         |
| 8   | ἐπ' $E_1$ : ἐν $\kappa_3$ , I                  |
| 45  | μὲν $\kappa_3$ : ὁ μὲν I, $E_1$                |
| 47  | αὐτ' I: αὖ $\kappa_3$ , $E_1$                  |
| 96  | κατὰ $E_1$ : ἐπὶ $\kappa_3$ , I                |
| 186 | ἀναπέπταται $\kappa_3$ : παραπέπταται I, $E_1$ |
| 213 | ἔδος $\kappa_3$ : πέδον I, $E_1$               |
| 216 | ὑπὸ γαῖαν $\kappa_3$ : ὑπὲρ αἶαν I, $E_1$      |

At first sight, these readings suggest that Dr. Tsavari is wrong to connect the three manuscripts. On the other hand, both  $\kappa_3$  and I have numerous variants or corrections, of which those in  $\kappa_3$  tend to agree with I or  $E_1$  and those in I with  $\kappa_3$  or  $E_1$ :

- |     |   |
|-----|---|
| 2   | ἄκριτα $\kappa_3$ , I (v.l.): ἄσπετα I, $E_1$                                 |
| 47  | προφερέστατος $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), $E_1$ : -τερος $\kappa_3$ , I                |
| 83  | μετ' ὠρύεται $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I (v.l.), $E_1$ : μετεκδέχεται $\kappa_3$ , I |
| 85  | αὐτὰρ ἔνερθεν $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), $E_1$ : ὅς τ' ἀπάνευθεν $\kappa_3$ , I       |
| 89  | προπρηνῆς $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I, $E_1$ : -νές $\kappa_3$ , I (v.l.)            |
| 104 | ἐλίσσων $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I, $E_1$ : ὀδεύων $\kappa_3$ , I (v.l.)            |
| 115 | πρώτην $\kappa_3$ : πρώτην μὲν $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I, $E_1$                    |
| 161 | σῆμα I (v.l.), $E_1$ : σχῆμα $\kappa_3$ , I                                   |
| 184 | ὑπὸ $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), $E_1$ : ἀμφὶ $\kappa_3$ , I: ἐπὶ $\kappa_3$ (v.l.)     |
| 196 | πρότερον $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I: πρότερόν γε $\kappa_3$ , $E_1$                 |
| 199 | ἔλκεται $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I, $E_1$ : ἔρχεται $\kappa_3$ , I (v.l.)           |
| 200 | βαρυνομένη I (v.l.), $E_1$ : τιταινομένη $\kappa_3$ , I                       |
| 215 | ἐφύπερθε $\kappa_3$ , I: ἐπὶ τοῖσι $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), $E_1$                   |
| 217 | ἀπείριτοι $\kappa_3$ : ἀπείρονες $\kappa_3$ (v.l.), I, $E_1$                  |

So it continues through the poem. Subsequently I inspected three further manuscripts that Dr. Tsavari assigns to the family of  $d_3$ , namely  $\beta$  (Vat. Pal. gr. 319), K (Paris gr. 1411), and z (Vat. Pal. gr. 154), and found that they too drew variants from the same stock as  $\kappa_3$ , I, and  $E_1$ ; adding their evidence


in detail here would serve little purpose. These variants suggest that if related after all, as Dr. Tsavari holds, the six manuscripts share a corrected ancestor, a possibility that will also account for the disagreements in the first list.

A manuscript that appears to meet the conditions for being that corrected ancestor is lurking in the family of  $d_4$ , namely  $s_2$  (Escorial Σ.II.7, s. xv). One of its ancestors in the family of  $d_4$  was  $d_{11}$ , whose errors included 271 [Λιβύης], 358 ἄγνὸν for ἄγνης, 418 Λυκαίωνων for Λακώνων, 1087 παρ' for πρὸς (pp. 292–93).  $E_1$  omits Λιβύης and  $\kappa_3$  expunges it;  $\kappa_3|E_1$  read ἄγνὸν;  $E_1$  reads Λυκαίωνων; and παρ' appears in the text of I and  $E_1$  and as a correction in  $\kappa_3$ . If one follows  $s_2$  down through the family of  $d_4$  (pp. 290–98), it almost always turns out to have been corrected, and in listing the errors of  $d_3$  Dr. Tsavari reports that several occur in  $s_2$ , usually as variants but twice in the text: 78 <τ> Ἀύσονιῆες, 1019 Ἀτραπατηνοὶ.

Obviously not much would need to be wrong with Dr. Tsavari's collations for my hypothesis to be reversed and the corrections in  $s_2$  to be derived from  $d_3$ . I also know nothing about the date of the corrections, which go unmentioned in her description (p. 110). Nevertheless, my hypothesis not only provides  $\kappa_3|E_1\beta Kz$  with a suitable ancestor but also does away with the implausible independence of so late a family.

$d_{35}$

This is Dr. Tsavari's stemma for the 15 extant descendants of  $d_{35}$ , a manuscript notable for adding after 214 four lines about African rivers (pp. 344, 329):



p = Bodl. Holkham gr. 85  
 H<sub>5</sub> = B. L. Harl. 1814  
 s<sub>3</sub> = Escorial R.I.6

u<sub>2</sub> = Rome Casanat. 424  
 L<sub>1</sub> = Leiden B. P. G. 74F  
 V<sub>16</sub> = Vat. gr. 1910

Apart from V<sub>16</sub>, no member of the family antedates the second half of the 15th century.

Apostolios and Callierges, mentioned above on  $\psi_{26}$ , meet again in the family of d<sub>37</sub>: Apostolios wrote s<sub>3</sub> and most of H<sub>5</sub>, Callierges p, most of L<sub>1</sub>, and the rest of H<sub>5</sub>. Now not only did Callierges according to Dr. Tsavari make two copies of d<sub>37</sub>, namely p and H<sub>5</sub>, but according to Diller he corrected the text of Eustathius's commentary in V<sub>16</sub>.<sup>17</sup> As it seemed to me an unlikely coincidence that in so broad a tradition he should have encountered both V<sub>16</sub> and one of its closest relatives, I decided to test Dr. Tsavari's stemma by inspecting p and H<sub>5</sub>, which both happened to be within reach. I inspected H<sub>5</sub> first.

In H<sub>5</sub> Callierges wrote only the bifolium ff. 1 + 8. When? Another Cretan, George Trivizias, wrote u<sub>2</sub> (pp. 196–97), and his death, mentioned in a papal bull of June 4th 1485,<sup>18</sup> provides a *terminus ante quem* for s<sub>3</sub> and H<sub>5</sub> if that part of Dr. Tsavari's stemma holds. The *terminus ante quem* is earlier if Apostolios himself wrote no manuscripts after 1474. Callierges first appears in 1499.<sup>19</sup> I therefore suggest that the bifolium in H<sub>5</sub> was a later replacement. My attempts at proving or disproving this suggestion by peering through the paper of ff. 1–8 came to nothing.

H<sub>5</sub> has lost before f. 42 the three leaves that contained 1088–1166. Dr. Tsavari does not mention this in her description (p. 121), but she does mention twice the omission of 1088–1166 (p. 333 n. 703, p. 456). Were its descendants copied from it before or after the loss? Surely before: as H<sub>5</sub> has 13 lines to a page and 1088–1166 make 79 lines, it must have omitted a line, and so it cannot be a coincidence that 1091 is missing from the manuscripts that she regards as descendants of it.

On collating H<sub>5</sub>, I found that it shares many of the errors by which she defines d<sub>39</sub> (p. 338): 34 ἄλλα (ante corr.), 92 εὐρυνηθεῖσαν (ante corr.), 140 ἰῶον, 241 ἀγναὰ (ante corr.), 431 ὑπὸ (μετὰ mg.; according to her edition, V<sub>16</sub> also has ὑπὸ), 875 Λυρνησός τε, 1186 εἴη ἀντάξιος. It also omits 1184 μὲν with d<sub>39</sub>, whether or not the error goes back to V<sub>16</sub> as she rightly says it may, and in 518 reads δ' Ἀσίης, an error that she reports from both

<sup>17</sup> *Textual Tradition* (above, note 9) 185, 202. Dr. Tsavari (above, note 2) 68–69 objects that V<sub>16</sub> belongs not to s. xv as Diller said but to s. xiii/xiv. Her logic baffles me, and anyway it was the text of Dionysius, not of Eustathius's commentary, that Diller assigned to s. xv.

<sup>18</sup> G. S. Ploumides, *Θησαυρίσματα* 7 (1970) 236–37; cf. P. D. Mastrodemetres, *Θησαυρίσματα* 8 (1971) 59.

<sup>19</sup> *Repertorium* (above, note 8) 80.



V<sub>16</sub> and d<sub>39</sub> (p. 333). If she is right, therefore, to derive d<sub>39</sub> from V<sub>16</sub>, H<sub>5</sub> too should derive from V<sub>16</sub>, and it should take the whole family of d<sub>37</sub> with it.

As a first test of this conclusion, I collated p. Dr. Tsavari cites only four errors of H<sub>5</sub> that p avoids: 472 εἰνεμόεσσα for ἡνεμόεσσα, 670 ὀπτόταν for ὀπόταν, 842 Διωνύσσοιο for Διωνύσοιο, 1071 ποταμὸν for ποταμοῖ. By implication, a fifth is the omission of 1091, which she does not report from p. I found that before correction p read εἰνεμόεσσα and ποταμὸν and omitted 1091. Its readings in the other two passages, Διωνύσοιο and ὀπόταν, are mere matters of spelling and prove nothing. Of the passages cited in the last paragraph, it agrees with H<sub>5</sub> everywhere but at 34 and 241. Plainly it derives from H<sub>5</sub>. Where H<sub>5</sub> is missing, it shared with d<sub>39</sub> before correction 1140 τῆς for τοῖς. Incidentally, the single letters that she reports as absent from it (p. 334) all begin lines and are present, written in red; they must have failed to show up on microfilm.

Perhaps, then, all the other descendants of d<sub>35</sub> derive from V<sub>16</sub>. Agreement has not been reached about its date, but the view accepted by Dr. Tsavari makes it easily the oldest member of the family (s. xiii/xiv). Many of the errors by which she defines V<sub>16</sub> + d<sub>39</sub> as a family have been corrected in V<sub>16</sub> (pp. 333–34).

Four complications will have to be taken into account when my hypothesis is put through further tests. First, as I have said, ff. 1 + 8 of H<sub>5</sub> seem to be a replacement, and so the original text of H<sub>5</sub> in 1–25 and 182–207 may need to be reconstructed. Second, it certainly needs to be reconstructed in 1088–1166. Third, V<sub>16</sub> has lost everything after 1056, and manuscripts that derive from it up to that point may not derive from it after that point. Fourth, the descendants of d<sub>39</sub> omit 1082–1113.

My provisional conclusions about these four areas of Dr. Tsavari's stemma lead me to suspect that anyone who did all her work again might achieve very different results. How such results might affect the editing of Dionysius I do not know, because apart from expressing trust in A (Paris Supp. gr. 388, s. x) she does not explain how her own results affect it.

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Notes on the Second Sophistic in Palestine<sup>1</sup>

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The Second Sophistic has got its fair share of attention in the last twenty-five years or so.<sup>2</sup> The present paper aims at reporting its impact on a part of the Empire removed from the centres of the movement. Furthermore, it is hoped that incidentally this will shed some light on a question of important cultural implications not normally associated with the Second Sophistic.

## I

The travels of the sophists are a well-known subject, effortlessly noticed even by the most inattentive reader of Philostratus. While much of this action took place in the central domains of the movement, it is only to be expected that the peripheral lands had their due share. In fact, we possess some evidence for visits of important sophists in Palestine.

Most notable is the visit of Aelius Aristides to Palestine. It is correctly connected with his sojourn in Egypt 141–42, on his way there or back:

I heard it myself at Scythopolis, the city of Palaestina-Syria, that in the place which brings forth the famous dates and the juice [i.e. of balsam], there is a lake which indicates whenever the Nile rises. That was said by my hosts, who maintained that it happened during the increase of the lake.<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately, we do not know who Aelius Aristides' hosts were, nor do we possess any further information regarding their conversations; even less are we able to tell whether the great orator's visit passed without some display of his art. However, we get a glimpse of the sort of people Aelius Aristides' hosts may have been from an accidental detail regarding a contemporary

<sup>1</sup> An earlier, and very different version of this paper was delivered at the 21st Annual Meeting of the Israel Society for Classical Studies, Jerusalem, 29 May 1992. The Hebrew text of that lecture was published in *Cathedra* 66 (1993) 47–56. I was privileged to give the paper in its present form while enjoying the hospitality of the German Archaeological Institute in Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Regrettably, G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London 1993) was not yet available to me.

<sup>3</sup> Ael. Ar. 36 (Aeg.). 82; cf. M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism II* (Jerusalem 1980) 217 ff.

citizen of the town; the Stoic Basilides, the teacher of Marcus Aurelius, hailed from Scythopolis.<sup>4</sup> With such hosts and such learned conversations it is difficult to imagine that no rhetorical fireworks were displayed in a city which took great pride in its Hellenic character.<sup>5</sup>

Another visit of a famous sophist may be less well known, doubly buried, as it were, in the learned obscurity of an ancient Hebrew text and a modern Hebrew article.<sup>6</sup> In a famous story concerning a leading Palestinian sage we are told (*mAZ* 3. 4, transl. Danby):

Proklos the son of Philosophos asked Rabban Gamaliel in Acre while he was bathing in the Bath of Aphrodite, and said to him, "It is written in your Law, *And there shall cleave nought of the devoted thing to thine hand.* Why [then] dost thou bathe in the Bath of Aphrodite?" He answered, "One may not make answer in the bath." And when he came out he said, "I came not within her limits: she came within mine! They do not say, 'Let us make a bath for Aphrodite,' but 'Let us make an Aphrodite as an adornment for the bath.'" etc.

Abraham Wasserstein has argued, convincingly to my mind, that the text has to be emended to "Proklos the Philosophos" and that the persons in question were the famous sophist Proclus of Naucratis and Rabban Gamaliel (III), the son of the Patriarch R. Judah, who lived in the first half of the third century, rather than Rabban Gamaliel (II), commonly referred to as "of Yabneh," more than a century earlier.

His suggestion may be supported by some circumstantial evidence. Proclus of Naucratis, a teacher of Philostratus himself (*VS* 2. 21, pp. 602, 604), came from an important centre of the movement: We know of five sophists from Naucratis in the age of Commodus.<sup>7</sup> Akko-Ptolemais was certainly an appropriate venue for him. Flavius Boethus,<sup>8</sup> the only consular of Palestinian provenance known to us, was a native of the city; he was interested in medicine and in Peripatetic philosophy. Hadrian of Tyre—about whom more anon—was the teacher of Proclus and the guest of Flavius Boethus in Rome. It will perhaps be not too far-fetched to associate these connexions with Proclus' visit to Akko.

The cultural implications of the anecdote are not without interest. From the Jewish point of view it is not the retort of the sage that need concern us, but rather the tacit assumption that there was nothing wrong with a leading

<sup>4</sup> Jerome, *Chron.* p. 203 Helm, a. Abr. 2163 (*PL* XXVII 263); Sync. I 663 Dindorf; H. von Arnim, *RE* III (1897) 46, no. 8.

<sup>5</sup> For Scythopolis priding itself on its Hellenic character, see G. Foerster and Y. Tsafir, "Nysa-Scythopolis: A New Inscription and the Titles of the City on its Coins," *Isr. Num. J.* 9 (1986-87) 53-58.

<sup>6</sup> A. Wasserstein, "Rabban Gamaliel and Proclus the Philosopher (*Mishna Aboda Zara* 3,4)," *Zion* 45 (1980) 257-67 (in Hebrew).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1969) 20.

<sup>8</sup> *PIR*<sup>2</sup> F 229; cf. Bowersock (previous note) 62 f.; all our evidence comes from Galen. For Galen's visit to Palestine, see Stern (above, note 3) nos. 382, 384, 385, 390.

Jewish sage to bathe—presumably in the nude—together with gentiles. As far as the sophist is concerned, it is just possible that not only was his visit remembered, but perhaps also some discussions or displays of his craft (these perforce with a slant only to be expected in a Jewish source).

Pupils touring the centres of learning where the great sophists taught were a natural counterpart to the travels of the sophists themselves. Thus we hear incidentally of Phoenicians among the pupils of Scopelian (Philostr. *VS* 1. 21, p. 518): As we shall presently see, elsewhere in Philostratus "Phoenician" may designate a rhetor from Gadara in Palestine (*VS* 2. 33, p. 628, on Apsines).

## II

One did not have to rely exclusively on the visits of sophists from Asia or Egypt, since famous representatives of the movement were natives of Palestine or of its immediate vicinity. A well-known luminary, Hadrian of Tyre,<sup>9</sup> was the teacher of Proclus of Naucratis, a friend of Flavius Boethus and an acquaintance of Galen. He taught in Ephesus, then held the chair of rhetoric at Athens.<sup>10</sup> After some two years he was appointed to the "upper" chair, Rome. From Marcus Aurelius, with whose son-in-law he had close relations, he received the privilege of tax immunity and in the event he was appointed on his death-bed *ab epistulis Graecis* by Commodus. We know nothing of his education in his town of birth, though the famous opening of his inaugural speech in Athens—*πάλιν ἐκ Φοινίκης γράμματα*—is testimony to his local patriotism and to the education he must have received at Tyre. His compatriot was Paul of Tyre, who acquired the title of metropolis for his city from Hadrian.<sup>11</sup> In the *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* Paul appears arguing a case against the Jews.<sup>12</sup>

Gadara, to the south-east of Lake Gennesareth, was an important cultural centre and the home of a number of notable Greek intellectuals,<sup>13</sup> among them two eminent figures in the history of rhetoric under the Empire. Theodorus, the teacher of Tiberius, was head of one of the two schools of

<sup>9</sup> *VS* 2. 10, pp. 585–90; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> H 4; cf. Bowersock (above, note 7) 55, 83 f., 91 f.

<sup>10</sup> I. Avotins, "The Holders of the Chairs of Rhetoric at Athens," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 313–24 thinks that at this time there was an Imperial chair of rhetoric with a stipend of HS 40,000 and one of the city with a stipend of HS 24,000, and that Hadrian held the first.

<sup>11</sup> W. Stegemann, *RE* XVIII.2 (1949) 2373, no. 17.

<sup>12</sup> *CPJ* II 157 (*acta Hermaisci*) line 9, and see comm. ad loc.

<sup>13</sup> Strabo 16. 758 enumerates Menippus, Meleager, Philodemus and Theodorus. Oenomaus and Apsines are known from later evidence. To this often repeated list one should add the mathematician Philo, who, according to Eutocius of Ascalon (see Archimedes III 258, ed. Heiberg), calculated the circumference of the circle—viz., the value of  $\pi$ —with greater accuracy than Sporus of Nicaea; for the possible dates, see F. Kliem, *RE* III A (1929) 1883 s.v. "Sporos"; T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* I (Oxford 1921) 226.

rhetoric in his time.<sup>14</sup> He may have been not devoid of a healthy dose of local patriotism.<sup>15</sup> The other, Apsines,<sup>16</sup> dubbed "the Phoenician" by Philostratus (*VS* 2. 33, p. 628), is despite some chronological difficulties apparently identical with the Athenian rhetor of that name, whose son Onasimus and grandson Apsines were also rhetors: Apsines the Younger was active under Constantine.<sup>17</sup> Apsines is the author of our last extant *techne* (L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* I 329 ff.) and of some fragments. Though we do not possess evidence for rhetorical activity in Gadara in the two hundred years between our two celebrities, it is difficult to imagine that the city gave birth twice to important teachers of rhetoric in a professional void. Moreover, though most of the career of both Theodorus and Apsines seems to have taken its course far from Gadara, it is hardly conceivable that they never declaimed or had pupils in the town and that their success did not encourage talented youth to follow in their wake.

Such are the meagre facts about the Second Sophistic within the time limits of Philostratus in a province far from his concern and notoriously poor in epigraphic finds. However, there exists ample circumstantial evidence to suggest that we are inadequately served by our sources. I propose to draw attention to two sets of sources: first, very briefly, to the relatively abundant evidence for sophists in adjacent areas, for which we have little reason to suppose radically different conditions from Palestine, and, second, to the large number of sophists and rhetors from Palestine known to us from the period subsequent to Philostratus. Indeed, the period of Julian and his successors has been rightly dubbed<sup>18</sup> a second blossoming of the Second Sophistic.

### III

It will not be inopportune, nor unnecessarily repetitive of material easily accessible elsewhere, briefly to survey the sophists from an area adjacent to Palestine: The recently published Greek part of the archive of Babatha and

<sup>14</sup> G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World 300 B.C.–A.D. 300* (Princeton 1972) 340–41 and see index s.vv. "Theodoreans" and "Theodorus of Gadara." Note that the *Suda* s.v. asserts that his son Antonius was a συγκαλητικός under Hadrian; cf. Bowersock (above, note 7) 28 n. 6 on consular sons of sophists.

<sup>15</sup> He wrote a work on Coele Syria: *Suda* s.v. = *FGrH* 850 T 1.

<sup>16</sup> *PIR*<sup>2</sup> A 978; *PLRE* I, no. 1 is sceptical about the identification; see also Bowersock (above, note 7) 5 f.; *Kl. Pauly* s.v.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. also I. Avotins, "Prosopographical and Chronological Notes on some Greek Sophists of the Empire," *CSCA* 4 (1971) 67 ff.; B. Baldwin, "Nero and his Mother's Corpse," *Mnem.* 32 (1979) 380–81; under Maximinus Thrax he received the consular insignia (*Suda* s.v.); cf. also F. Millar, "P. Herennius Dexippus and the Third-Century Invasions," *JRS* 59 (1969) 16, with more bibliography on the family. See also the suggestion by R. J. Penella, *Greek Philosophers and Sophists in the Fourth Century A.D.: Studies in Eunapius of Sardis*, ARCA Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs 28 (Leeds 1990) 95, that a grandson of the Arabian Diophantus—on whom see below—may have been named after him.

<sup>18</sup> K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 731, speaks of "Blütenzeiten" and "Glanzzeit."



other documents from the shores of the Dead Sea demonstrate clearly the nearness of Judaea/Palaestina and Arabia in more than the strictly geographical sense.<sup>19</sup>

It is impossible to ascertain the exact provenance of Heliodorus of Arabia, the famous sophist of Severan times: He may have been from Palmyra.<sup>20</sup> However, two sophistic centres in Arabia are not difficult to identify. Petra seems to have given birth to two rival sophistic dynasties, whose controversies were eventually fought out in Athens. Genethlius, the son of Genethlius, was active in Athens in the third century. Conceivably he is the author of an extant Διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν.<sup>21</sup> There existed a notorious rivalry between him and Callinicus of Petra, whose father, Gaius, was also a sophist.<sup>22</sup> Though we have no clear indication of the fact in our meagre sources, one is tempted to set the origin of their competition in their native city.<sup>23</sup>

It is not quite clear how many sophists are concealed under the name of Epiphanius.<sup>24</sup> Epiphanius, the famous sophist who was judged worthy to be a rival of the brilliant Prohaeresius in Athens, and to whom Libanius failed to attach himself when he arrived to study there, was according to the *Suda* the son of Ulpian<sup>25</sup> and a native of Petra, and he taught in that city and at Athens; according to Eunapius he was a Syrian. He died long before the arrival in Athens of Eunapius in 362. Nothing is left of his many rhetorical writings listed in the *Suda*.<sup>26</sup> Penella in his recent study of Eunapius<sup>27</sup> has proposed either to reject the identification of the person in the *Suda* and the one in Eunapius, or to assume an error in the *Suda*'s contention that Epiphanius was a Petran (he deems an interlude at Petra admissible) or to

<sup>19</sup> See N. Lewis, Y. Yadin and J. C. Greenfield, *The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters: Greek Papyri* (Jerusalem 1989), and the forthcoming Aramaic and Nabataean texts from the same archive; H. Cotton, "The Guardianship of Jesus Son of Babatha: Roman and Local Law in the Province of Arabia," *JRS* 83 (1993) 94–108; for a Greek ostrakon on Masada referring to a Nabataean woman, see H. Cotton, J. Geiger and E. Netzer, "A Greek Ostrakon from Masada," *IEJ* (forthcoming); see also H. Cotton, "A Cancelled Marriage Contract from the Judean Desert (*XHew/Se Gr. 2*)," *JRS* (forthcoming).

<sup>20</sup> K. Münscher, *RE* VIII (1913) 19–20, no. 14; mentioned by G. W. Bowersock, *Roman Arabia* (Cambridge, MA 1983) 135 in the sole paragraph devoted to Arabian sophists in that book. F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London 1977) 232, 234, puts the story of Heliodorus' appearance before Caracalla in its historical context.

<sup>21</sup> W. Schmid, *RE* VII (1910) 1134–35, no. 2; *PLRE* I, s.v.; D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford 1981) xxxvi f., 226.

<sup>22</sup> F. Jacoby, *RE* X (1917) 1649–50, no. 1; A. Stein, "Kallinikos von Petrai," *Hermes* 58 (1923) 448–56.

<sup>23</sup> On rivalries of the sophists, see Bowersock (above, note 7) 100.

<sup>24</sup> W. Schmid, *RE* VI (1907) 195–96, no. 8; J. Brzoska, *RE* VI 196, no. 10; T. Thalheim, *RE* VI 195, no. 7; *PLRE* I, no. 1. One suspects that the confusion is due in part, at least, to the allocation of entries in the *RE*.

<sup>25</sup> Penella (above, note 17) 95: "the sophist who taught Prohaeresius at Antioch?" (alluding to the remark at Eunapius, *VS* 487). With Ulpian the uncertainty and confusion are even greater than with Epiphanius; see *PLRE* I, nos. 1, 4.

<sup>26</sup> A hymn to Bacchus is mentioned at *Soz.* 6. 25. 9–10.

<sup>27</sup> Penella (above, note 17) 95 f.

assume a conflation in the *Suda* of "Epiphanius and the Arabian Diophantus, assigning what we would infer to be the latter's native city to the former." This last proposal obviously derives from Penella's own conflation of the *Suda* and Eunapius, since only the latter mentions together the two sophists. Nor is Penella's unconditional faith in every detail of Eunapius easy to adopt with regard to a man not personally known to the author. Occam's Razor should be applied to the proposal to relate the entries in the *Suda* and in Eunapius to two different persons. The question of the *patria* of Epiphanius may be left open, though perhaps in this case the much more detailed article in the *Suda* deserves more credence than is usually accorded that source. Nor is it clear whether our sophist is identical with the author of the long extant fragment on *staseis* or with the Epiphanius mentioned in the commentaries on Demosthenes, *Or.* 8 and 18. It would be convenient, but perhaps not prudent, to assume that all our information concerns one man, active in the mid-fourth century.

This brings us to Diophantus the Arabian,<sup>28</sup> pupil of Julian and teacher of the coerced student Libanius. Eunapius had little regard for him and quoted from his funeral oration for Prohaeresius only in order to honour the latter. There is no knowing his exact *patria* in Arabia. Again from Petra hailed the iatrosophist Gessius, active in the fifth century. He was a pupil of the Jew Domnus, and perhaps a descendant of the Gessius who was a pupil and correspondent of Libanius and active in Egypt.<sup>29</sup> Gaudentius from Nabataea is known to us from his metrical epitaph, which describes him as a rhetor.<sup>30</sup> If the inscription indeed dates from the second century, he cannot be identical with the Gaudentius mentioned by Libanius,<sup>31</sup> though the latter may have been a descendant. In this connexion one may refer to an inscription from Gerasa dated 447 mentioning a σχολαστικός and ἑκδικός Flavius Gaudentius, perhaps also a descendant.<sup>32</sup> Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. "Gerasa," lists three orators from the city: the rhetor Ariston, the rhetor νομικός Plato<sup>33</sup> and the sophist Cerycus. The appreciation of Ariston as ἀστέιος is attributed to (Herennius) Philo, and it seems highly probable that

<sup>28</sup> W. Schmid, *RE* V (1903) 1051, no. 16; *PLRE* I, no. 1; Penella (above, note 17) 94 ff.

<sup>29</sup> W. Schmid, *RE* VII (1910) 1324 s.v. "Gessios"; O. Seeck, *RE* VII 1325 s.v. "Gessius," nos. 2, 3; *PLRE* II, no. 3. B. Baldwin, "Beyond the House Call: Doctors in Early Byzantine History and Politics," in J. Scarborough (ed.), *Symposium on Byzantine Medicine* (= *DOP* 38 [1984]) 16 draws attention to the rarity of iatrosophists. On Gessius mocking his baptism (parody of *Od.* 4. 509, 511) see *ibid.* 18 and K. Holum, *Theodosian Emperresses* (Berkeley 1982) 175 n. 1.

<sup>30</sup> W. H. Waddington, *IGLS* (Paris 1870) 2031; W. Kaibel, *Epigr. gr. ex lapidibus conlecta* (Berlin 1878) 442; *IGRR* 1217.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. O. Seeck, *RE* VII (1910) 859, no. 2; *PLRE* I, no. 2.

<sup>32</sup> C. H. Kraeling, *Gerasa, City of the Decapolis* (New Haven 1938) p. 469, no. 275.

<sup>33</sup> W. Kunkel, *Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen* (Weimar 1952) 263 ff., lists those jurists attested only in inscriptions and papyri; some listing for persons like Plato would be in order.

the entire item is derived from him;<sup>34</sup> if so the terminus ante quem for these orators would be Hadrianic—well within the period of Philostratus.

This short detour to a neighbouring province may have been worth while for its own sake. Certainly the study of the more outlying regions of Hellenism enables us the better to appreciate the confines and the depth of the expansion of the great cultural movements of the time.

#### IV

The fourth, fifth and sixth centuries are infinitely richer in source material about Palestinian Hellenism than the entire preceding period starting with the conquest of Alexander. One may be reminded of the School of Gaza,<sup>35</sup> or of the wealth of extant Greek texts—it might be appropriate to single out the Gazaeans Aeneas, Procopius, Choricus and John as well as Procopius of Caesarea and the mathematician Eutocius of Ascalon, whose commentaries were a major factor in the survival of the writings of Archimedes—and, of course, this is not taking into account the abundance of ecclesiastical literature ensuing from this country. As is well known, the subject of rhetoric is especially well served in the fourth century, above all with the material provided by Eunapius and Libanius. As a sample of the sophistic and rhetorical activity, I shall single out two cities, one renowned as the political and cultural capital of the province and a rather more humble one. I shall start with the latter.

As so often, we are at the mercy of the accidental survival of our evidence. It is only by chance that we possess knowledge about two rhetors of some consequence from Neapolis. The *Suda* (A no. 2185 = I 197 Adler) tells us about Andromachus son of Zonas or Sabinus from Neapolis in Syria, who taught in Nicomedia under Diocletian. He is no doubt identical with the Syrian rhetor of that name mentioned by Eunapius (VS 457) as a contemporary of Porphyry and, along with Paul of Lycopolis, the most distinguished rhetor of his day.<sup>36</sup> The *Suda* (Σ no. 475 = IV 365 Adler)<sup>37</sup> also mentions a sophist Siricius from Palestine, a pupil of Andromachus, who taught in Athens and composed *meletai* and *progymnasmata*. We may

<sup>34</sup> E. Honigman, *RE* III A (1929) 2382 ff., no. 12.

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., K. B. Stark, *Gaza und die philistäische Küste* (Jena 1852) 631 ff.; K. Seitz, *Die Schule von Gaza* (diss. Heidelberg 1892); G. Downey, *Gaza in the Early Sixth Century* (Norman, OK 1963).

<sup>36</sup> L. Cohn, *RE* I (1894) 2154, no. 20; *PLRE* I, no. 2; he is missing from Gerth's useful list in *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 737.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. M. Fluss, *RE* III A (1927) 309; K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 767–68, no. 249; *PLRE* I, s.v.

assume that the association took place at Neapolis,<sup>38</sup> thus presumably the venue of considerable rhetorical activity.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, we shall direct our attention to a well-known centre of Greek culture, and inspect it from the point of view of rhetorical studies. Caesarea, refounded by Herod on the site of Strato's Tower, could boast of a Latin orator at the end of the first century.<sup>40</sup> To what use were his rhetorical accomplishments put? Was it to impress the governor, whose seat was in Caesarea, or else did the city think it due to its status of *colonia* to send Latin-speaking ambassadors to Rome?<sup>41</sup> But obviously the bulk of our evidence for Caesarean rhetors dates from the fourth century and issues from Libanius. He envisions (*Or.* 31. 42 = III 144 Foerster) Caesarea as a rival of Antioch, which could attract from it a famous sophist. I reserve a thorough discussion of intellectual life in Caesarea for a later occasion, and shall content myself with listing the better known personalities.

Acacius of Caesarea<sup>42</sup> taught in Phoenicia, at Antioch and in Palestine, presumably in Caesarea, about 361–65. In addition to his rhetorical activity he composed epic poetry and an *Okypous*—not clear whether the one preserved in the Lucianic corpus. His relations and rivalry with Libanius are well known from the latter's correspondence; his adherence to the old religion did not interfere with his career under Constantius II. Both his sons and his son-in-law studied under Libanius, and his nephew Eutropius is in my opinion certainly identical with the historian.<sup>43</sup> It seems safe to identify Acacius as the unnamed rival of Libanius.<sup>44</sup> The rhetor Thespesius taught at Caesarea Gregory Nazianzen and Euzoius, future bishop of the town.<sup>45</sup> A

<sup>38</sup> See *PLRE* I, s.v. "Siricius" and O. Schissel, "La définition de la στάσις par Σιρίκιος," *Byzantion* 3 (1926) 205–07.

<sup>39</sup> The best-known celebrities from the town are Justin Martyr in the second and the Neoplatonic Marinus in the fifth centuries. The suggestion of J. Rougé (ed.), *Expositio totius mundi et gentium*, Sources chrétiennes 124 (Paris 1966) 27 ff., to make the anonymous author of the *Descriptio totius mundi et gentium* a resident of the city is rather fanciful.

<sup>40</sup> *CIL* III 12082 = *ILS* 7206: M. Flavius Agrippa pontif. Iviral. Col. I Fl. Aug. Caesareae oratorem, ex dec. dec. pec. publ. I would find it difficult to believe that the Latin inscription was set up in order to honour a Greek orator. N.b. the suggestion that he may have been a renegade son of the historian Josephus: K. Zangemeister, "Inscription der Vespasianischen Colonie Caesarea in Palästina," *ZDPV* 13 (1890) 25–30. K. G. Holum et al., *King Herod's Dream: Caesarea on the Sea* (New York and London 1988) 118 think it "a good guess that the family of Marcus Flavius Agrippa numbered among the Romanized Jewish or Greek families that made the grade when Vespasian and Titus first founded the Roman colony of Caesarea"; see *ibid.* 115 for a good photo of the squeeze of the inscription.

<sup>41</sup> On the topic of Latin in Palestine, see J. Geiger, "How Much Latin in Greek Palestine?" in *Acts of the VII Colloquium on Latin Linguistics* (forthcoming).

<sup>42</sup> O. Seeck, *RE* (1894) 1140–41, no. 3; K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 734, no. 8; *PLRE* I, no. 6.

<sup>43</sup> I argue the point in my forthcoming paper (above, note 41) at n. 75.

<sup>44</sup> See the convincing arguments of P. Wolf, *Vom Schulwesen der Spätantike: Studien zu Libanius* (Baden-Baden 1952) 93–94, Beilage I: "Der Konkurrent des Libanius: Acacius oder Eubulus?"

<sup>45</sup> Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 113; W. Stegemann, *RE* VI A (1936) 60, no. 1; *PLRE* I, no. 2 removes him to Cappadocian Caesarea, although Jerome expressly speaks of the library of Origen and Pamphilus in the town. See also G. Downey, "Caesarea and the Christian Church," in C. T.

younger contemporary sophist of importance was Priscio.<sup>46</sup> Panegyrius,<sup>47</sup> a sophist attested in 390, is with great probability assigned to Caesarea, since he was the rival of Priscio. The important fifth-century *grammaticus* and rhetor Orion,<sup>48</sup> the author of an extant *Etymologicon*, was born in Thebes and taught in Alexandria and later Constantinople, where he lectured before the empress Eudocia, the wife of Theodosius II. In the event he settled in Caesarea: The controversy whether this was the Cappadocian or Palestinian city will have to be settled elsewhere.

Some visitors attest to the prominence of the city as a sophistic centre. Procopius of Gaza was tempted to settle in the city, but in the event returned to Gaza.<sup>49</sup> Gregory Nazianzen's studies have been referred to above. It is hoped that this far from comprehensive list<sup>50</sup> will give an idea of the opulence of one facet at least of the Greek culture of one city in Palestine—a city with a mixed population.<sup>51</sup>

## V

The encounter of Judaism with classical civilization is one of the great topics of the ancient world still in need of a careful evaluation. Hitherto all too often the question has been asked from the point of view of Judaism: What are the classical influences, patent or hidden, that can be discerned in the great bodies of Jewish texts transmitted from antiquity? (In parentheses, the investigation is, of course twofold: The texts of so-called Hellenistic Judaism cease with the generation of Josephus and the destruction of the

Fritsch (ed.), *The Joint Expedition to Caesarea Maritima I: Studies in the History of Caesarea Maritima*, BASOR Suppl. 19 (1975) 32.

<sup>46</sup> *PLRE* I, s.v.; W. Enßlin, *RE* XXIII (1957) 2–3; K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 765, no. 225. On the question of whether he is to be identified with the unnamed sophist who preferred Caesarea to Antioch (Lib. *Or.* 31. 42 = III 144 Foerster), see Wolf (above, note 44) 94–96, Beilage II: "Zur Datierung von or. 31," with discussion of earlier opinions.

<sup>47</sup> W. Enßlin, *RE* XVIII.3 (1949) 581; K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII (1956) 764, no. 201; *PLRE* I, s.v.

<sup>48</sup> C. Wendel, *RE* XVIII.1 (1939) 1083–87, no. 3; *PLRE* II, no. 1. See also Christ-Stählin II.2 (1924) 1081; F. Schemmel, "Die Schule von Caesarea in Palästina," *Phil. Wochschr.* (1925) 1277–80; G. Downey, "The Christian Schools of Palestine: A Chapter in Literary History," *Harv. Libr. Bull.* 12 (1958) 301–02; L. I. Levine, *Caesarea under Roman Rule* (Leiden 1975) 59.

<sup>49</sup> Schemmel (previous note) 1279–80; Downey (previous note) 310; Levine (previous note) 59.

<sup>50</sup> Mention could be made of the rhetor Euangelus, *Procop. Arc.* 30. 18–20; *PLRE* III, s.v. Heliadius (O. Seeck, *RE* VIII [1913] 208, no. 4; K. Gerth, *RE Suppl.* VIII [1956] 754, no. 119; *PLRE* I, no. 3) is attested in Palestine, but not expressly connected with Caesarea. By far the most complicated question pertaining to Caesarean rhetors is the authorship of an anonymous commentary on Hermogenes. B. Keil, "Pro Hermogene," *GGN* (1907) 176–221 postulated as author John of Caesarea, c. 450, pupil of Paul ó πάλυ (c. 420), who was head of a Hermogenean school in Caesarea; for later opinions see W. Stegemann, *RE* XVIII.4 (1949) 2374–76, no. 20; G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton 1983) 116.

<sup>51</sup> Note *jDemai* 2. 1 folio 22c, according to which Jews and Gentiles together could form a majority against the Samaritans in the city; on the different communities see Levine (above, note 48) 57 ff.



Temple, while the Hebrew and Aramaic texts of Rabbinic Judaism start more or less with the termination of the former, and yield far less easily the indications of Greco-Roman influence. It is with these last that we are here mainly concerned.) The efforts here have been most intense—though by necessity not entirely satisfactory—on the linguistic plane, while the traces of Greek philosophy and science have been investigated to a much lesser degree. However, even here the point of departure seems to be always the Rabbinic texts and the Greco-Roman vestige in them. A diametrically opposed procedure should be advocated. What was the Greco-Roman cultural background against which the Rabbis studied and taught? It is not fifth-century Athens, but rather first- to fourth-century C.E.<sup>52</sup> Caesarea, that provides the Greco-Roman source from which they drew for their oeuvre.<sup>53</sup> It is in this light that the specific significance of some of the information presented here should be seen. The sophistic movement, and the work of the sophists, could never exist in a void. Without an audience—and, need one say, a fairly appreciative audience—their fanfares would lack the indispensable echo. Admittedly, many of the finer points may have been lost on parts of the audience—as they are on parts of most audiences; but a large portion must have, at the very least, understood fluent literary Greek. We know that often sophists declaimed in the theatres,<sup>54</sup> though of course we are ignorant of the composition of their public; in a mixed city like Caesarea, where apparently none of the sections of the population could command a majority (see above, note 51), inevitably Jews would provide their share of the audience.<sup>55</sup> This, then, is part of the backdrop one should keep in sight in any discussion of the relations between the Rabbinic and the gentile world.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The Palestinian Talmud was redacted towards the end of the fourth century; for Midrash literature the entire period down to the Muslim conquest is relevant.

<sup>53</sup> N.b. that an important part of the Palestinian Talmud was redacted in Caesarea: see S. Lieberman, *The Talmud of Caesarea: Jerushalmi Tractate Nezikin, Tarbiz Suppl. II.4* (1931) (in Hebrew).

<sup>54</sup> See, e.g., Philostr. *VS* 2. 5, pp. 571–72.

<sup>55</sup> In fact, we happen to possess evidence that Jews in Caesarea did visit the theatre for performances much less harmless—from the Jewish point of view—than rhetorical presentations. See *jTaaniṯ* 1. 4 folio 64b, with S. Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine* (New York 1942) 32 f. and *Lamentations Rabba*, prol. 17, ed. Buber 7b, with L. I. Levine, *Roman Caesarea: An Archaeological–Topographical Study*, Qedem 2 (Jerusalem 1975) 24 f.; idem (above, note 48) 69.

<sup>56</sup> Two inevitable questions will be briefly dealt with: (1) Do we possess evidence for Jewish sophists? Most NT commentators seem to assume that the rhetor Tertullus, who represented Paul's accusers in Caesarea (Acts 24. 1 ff.), was a Jew. Sopatros of Antiochia, who defended the Jews before Trajan, may have been one; see *CPJ* II 157 line 15 and comm. ad loc. (2) What is the evidence for sophists in Talmudic sources? No sophists are mentioned by name, but the word "sophist" occurs a fair number of times in a variety of transcriptions. One instance may be singled out to demonstrate the standing of the sophists as reflected in the view of the sages. At *jShebiit* 9. 2 folio 38d, in a discussion with the people of Paneas, a "sophist" is represented as advising Diocletian; on the status of the sophists see E. L. Bowie, "The Importance of the Sophists," *YCS* 27 (1982) 29 ff.

Singing Without an Instrument: Plotinus on Suicide<sup>1</sup>

JOHN DILLON

The attitude to suicide of the philosopher Plotinus was made the subject of discussion, some time ago now, by John Rist in *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*,<sup>2</sup> but I am not sure that his position has ever been adequately countered.<sup>3</sup> He takes Dean Inge to task for expressing the opinion, in his lectures on Plotinus,<sup>4</sup> that Plotinus, like the Stoics, was prepared to endorse suicide in certain circumstances. Despite Rist's forceful arguments, I feel that this vexed question deserves further examination, as the topic is not only interesting in itself, but serves to illustrate rather well both other aspects of Plotinus' ethical position and his methods of dialectical argumentation.

Let us first consider the arguments advanced by each of these scholars and then see how well they square with the utterances of Plotinus himself. Inge says: "On this side [*sc.* the advocacy of freedom from bodily and mental disturbance], the influence of Stoicism is very strong in all the later Greek thought. Even suicide, the logical corollary of this system (since there are some troubles to which the sage cannot be indifferent), is not wholly condemned by Plotinus, though he has the credit of dissuading Porphyry from taking his own life." He then continues, in a note: "The authoritative passage on suicide for the school of Plato is *Phaedo*, p. 62, where Socrates says that a soldier must not desert his post. Plotinus argues that the suicide can hardly leave this life with a mind free and passionless; if he had vanquished fear and passion he would, almost always, be content to

<sup>1</sup> This may seem a somewhat gloomy subject to include in a Festschrift, but I would prefer to see it as a suitable tribute (through an attempt at emulation) to a master of the close analysis of philosophical texts, such as is our honorand. I am much indebted, in composing this, to the recent unpublished thesis of K. McGroarty, *Plotinus, Ennead I 4: A Commentary* (St. Patrick's College, Maynooth 1992), who discusses the issue of suicide well in his commentary on chapters 8. 5–9 and 16. 17–20.

<sup>2</sup> *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge 1967) 174–77.

<sup>3</sup> It is followed by R. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London 1972) 84, and, while commentators on *Enn.* 1. 4, such as Beutler and Theiler in Harder's edition (*Plotins Schriften* [Hamburg 1960] Band Vb) and A. H. Armstrong in the Loeb ed. (as had Bréhier already in 1924 in his Budé edition), have recognised that Plotinus envisages the justification of suicide in that work, no refutation of Rist's position, so far as I can see, has yet found its way into any recent general work on Plotinus.

<sup>4</sup> *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London 1929) II 173.

live. But in 1. 4. 16 he says that the Soul is 'not prevented from leaving the body, and is always master to decide in regard to it'."

Inge is quite right to make allusion to the last chapter of *Enn.* 1. 4, to which I will turn in due course, but it is strangely inapposite of him to allude to *Phaedo* 62b, since it is notable that Plotinus does *not* appeal to this Platonic proof-text in this connection, either in *Enn.* 1. 9 or in 1. 4. 16, and that fact is actually significant evidence in favour of Inge's interpretation of his doctrine.<sup>5</sup>

Rist, however, will have none of this. He begins (175) by mentioning, as does Inge, Porphyry's account of how Plotinus dissuaded him from suicide (*V. Plot.* 11), but rightly accepts that that is irrelevant to the question of whether Plotinus accepted the Stoic doctrine of "rational withdrawal" (εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή), because the basis of Plotinus' position in this case, as Porphyry freely admits, was that the balance of Porphyry's mind was disturbed—he was suffering from depression, and simply needed a holiday in Sicily (from which he subsequently returned to do thirty years of his best work).

Rist, however, goes on: "Inge is wrong to imply that a passage of 1. 4. 16 means that Plotinus thought that suicide was ever in practice justifiable. Plotinus simply says in this passage that the soul is not prevented from abandoning the body and always has the authority to decide whether to abandon it or not. But this is the kind of decision readers of Plotinus should understand very well. The soul can choose for or against suicide, but the good soul will always in practice choose against. It merely remains to see why it will choose against."

And Rist now turns to an examination of the curious fragment or note, placed by Porphyry at the end of the first *Ennead* (1. 9), and identified by him as an "early" work, composed before his own arrival in Rome to join Plotinus' circle in 264, entitled *On Withdrawal* (sc. from the body), with which must be taken the equally curious report of the later Aristotelian commentator Elias,<sup>6</sup> referring to another work of Plotinus', not included in

<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, as Harder remarks in his introduction to the comments on this text ([above, note 3] Band Ib 546), this *Phaedo* passage is not Plato's last word on suicide. At *Rep.* 3. 406de (Harder wrongly refers to 407de), he commends an honest carpenter or other artisan for not endeavouring to keep himself alive by sophisticated medical practices, but being prepared to die if he cannot live a normal life. This is admittedly not quite the same as deliberately freeing oneself from the body, but at *Laws* 9. 854c he actually exhorts anyone who finds himself irremediably addicted to criminal tendencies to "consider death the more noble course, and remove yourself from life (ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου)." Again, this is not advice relevant to the wise man, but it is an indication that Plato was not wholly averse to the idea of removing oneself from life. It is interesting that these texts are adduced in an argument produced by Olympiodorus, in *Phaed.* 1. 8, pp. 5–7 Norvin (pp. 46–51 Westerink), to air the case for suicide in a Platonist context. More interestingly still, Olympiodorus also adduces Plotinus, Περὶ εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς, in support of this argument (p. 49, 16–17 Westerink). Whether this is identical with the text in Porphyry's edition, however, or rather with that quoted later by Elias (see below), is not clear.

<sup>6</sup> In his *Prolegomena Philosophiae* 6. 15, 23–16, 2 Busse (CAG XVIII).

the *Enneads*, entitled *On Rational Withdrawal*, using exactly the Stoic terminology.<sup>7</sup>

First let us try to sort out the different nuances of doctrine exhibited in either of these two texts. In 1. 9, Plotinus, interestingly, starts from what appears to be his sole reference to the *Chaldaean Oracles*, given by Michael Psellus in his commentary on the *Oracles* (1125D Migne) as Μὴ ἔξῃης, ἵνα μὴ τι ἔχουσα / ἐξίη—"Do not take out (your soul), that it may not go out bringing something with it (*sc.* of earthly concerns)."<sup>8</sup> The tone of Plotinus' comments on this tag is naturally very much in keeping with its general purport, which is that there are *virtually* no circumstances in which it is proper for one to commit suicide, since it is extremely difficult to conceive of this being achieved without some element of passion being present, which would constitute a burden on the disembodied soul, such as would tend to drag it down into a body again.<sup>9</sup> Rather, one should wait calmly for the body to take its departure from the soul. It will do this when it is unable to hold the soul together any longer, since its harmony has gone from it (1. 9. 5–8)—that is to say, at natural death.

Plotinus then (1. 9. 11 ff.) raises what he sees as the most difficult situation that a wise man might be faced with—worse than the problem of physical pain (*trans.* Armstrong, *my italics*):

But suppose he is aware that he is beginning to go mad (ληρεῖν)?<sup>10</sup> This is not likely to happen to a really good man (σπουδαῖος); but if it does happen, he will consider it as one of the inevitable things, to be accepted

<sup>7</sup> The provenance of this *monobiblon* to which Elias refers is quite mysterious. Its contents are plainly divergent from what is contained in the note published by Porphyry. It may emanate from the lost edition of Plotinus' personal doctor Eustochius, as was originally suggested by Creuzer. But in this case, are we to assume that Eustochius is presenting another, fuller (or interpolated?) version of the same document that Porphyry is presenting here? We should note, by the way, as regards the title of 1. 9, that in the *Life* (4. 54) Porphyry lists the tractate as Περὶ εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς, whereas the title prefixed to the piece in the mss. is simply Περὶ ἐξαγωγῆς.

<sup>8</sup> It remains a mystery why Plotinus should have chosen to quote, or refer to, the *Oracles* here, especially in a passage composed (as it seems) before Porphyry (who might be suspected of shoving them under his nose) joined his circle. But in fact, I think, this Chaldaean reference in Plotinus is not as uncharacteristic as has been made out. I have discussed the question in an article, "Plotinus and the Chaldaean Oracles," in *Platonism in Late Antiquity*, ed. by S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser (Notre Dame 1992) 131–40. In this case, I would suggest, the catchy form of the Chaldaean phrase stuck in Plotinus' mind.

<sup>9</sup> F. Heinemann, in his *Plotin* (Leipzig 1921) 40–45, has some pertinent remarks to make on 1. 9, despite his basically unpersuasive thesis (*viz.* that this is not a genuine work of Plotinus at all). He argues that the notion of a soul departing from the body dragging something with it is not consistent with the developed Plotinian concept of the utter impossibility of the true soul, as set out, for instance, in 3. 6. 1–5, or indeed in 1. 4 (see below). This is a valid point, though it is true that Plotinus continues to avail himself of the language of contamination of the soul by the body, and of the purification of the soul, derived from the *Phaedo*, even after he has developed his distinctive theory. On the other hand, he may very well not have done so by the time he composed 1. 9, and conversely, the fact that he has done so by the time of writing 1. 4 may make it easier for him to endorse a theory of suicide.

<sup>10</sup> This was in fact one of the five Stoic conditions for "rational withdrawal" (*cf.* note 12 below).

because of the circumstances, though not in themselves acceptable. And after all, taking drugs to give the soul a way out is not likely to be good for the soul. And if each man has a destined time (εἰμαρμένος χρόνος) allotted to him, it is not a good thing to go out before it, *unless, as we maintain, it is necessary* (εἰ μὴ, ὥσπερ φαμέν, ἀναγκαῖον).

All this is consistent and perspicuous, up to the last phrase. What does Plotinus mean by that? Does he mean, perhaps, simply that one may meet with an accident before one's "destined time"? But that would surely be an illogical remark. It really sounds as if, quite against the run of the play so far, Plotinus is recognising here some kind of "necessity" that might constrain the wise man to take himself out of this life.<sup>11</sup>

If he is, however, he certainly is not inclined to expand on it here. And the report which Elias gives of the treatise available to him does not encourage one either to think that Plotinus left any room for suicide. Elias declares (*Proleg.* 6. 15. 23 ff.) that in his *monobiblon* about "rational withdrawal" Plotinus rejects all of the five reasons for suicide offered by the Stoics,<sup>12</sup> maintaining that the philosopher must await the natural dissolution of the body: "It is wrong to take oneself out before the right time (πρὸ καιροῦ), when he who bound (body and soul together) looses (the bond)."

This last remark introduces a consideration very proper to the Platonic tradition, going back to the *Phaedo*, but one conspicuously absent from the little treatise 1. 9, as we have seen. It is really hard to know what to make of Elias' report. Its pedigree is not very good.<sup>13</sup> Let us turn instead to see what we can derive from Plotinus' remarks at the end of *Ennead* 1. 4.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Of course, he may only, after all, be referring to the remark of Socrates in *Phaedo* 62c that "a man must not kill himself until God sends some necessity upon him (πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκη τινα θεὸς ἐπιπέμῃ), such as just now has come upon me." This seems to relate, however, only to the curious Athenian habit of making condemned persons in effect execute themselves by drinking hemlock. This was not a necessity that anyone in the Roman Empire would have to face. However, Plotinus, while alluding to the *anankê* of *Phaedo* 62c, may be generalizing its application, as Olympiodorus certainly does later (*In Phaed.* 1. 8. 3-8, p. 49 Westerink).

<sup>12</sup> *SVF* III 768. The five were: (1) dying for one's country; (2) to prevent being compelled by a tyrant to betray secrets; (3) the onset of madness or senility; (4) incurable disease, such as makes the body unfit to minister to the soul; (5) irredeemable poverty. Plotinus makes no reference to any of these in 1. 9.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. note 7 above. It is, in this connection, very odd that Olympiodorus (cf. note 4 above), when discussing *Phaedo* 61c ff., should give as one of a set of arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) in favour of suicide that "Plotinus has written about 'rational withdrawal' (περὶ εὐλόγου ἑξαγωγῆς); consequently it is sometimes right to take one's own life." This is on the face of it an absurd conclusion to draw, since Plotinus' argument is entirely directed *against* this Stoic concept. Westerink is no doubt right in suggesting that Olympiodorus "remembered only the title and had no clear notion of the content of the treatise." However, it remains interesting that Olympiodorus should have felt it possible to produce this argument at all, and it is possible that he is reflecting a view of Plotinus' doctrine on suicide derived rather from *Enn.* 1. 4 (see below) than from either this tractate or the one that Elias is summarizing. Olympiodorus' own view, one may add, as a Platonist of the later sixth century, is that "one should not 'withdraw oneself' in so far as concerns the body, since this is an evil to the body, but it is reasonable to 'withdraw oneself' because of a greater good accruing to the soul, as when the soul is being



1. 4 is a relatively late treatise,<sup>15</sup> and it is possible that Plotinus has come to modify any earlier absolute objection to suicide he may have had under the influence of what was to prove to be his final illness, but it is to be noted that he did not in fact see fit to take his own life, despite his sufferings.<sup>16</sup> If his position has changed, it is more probably, as I have suggested (above, note 9), because his doctrine of the impassibility of the soul has developed in interesting ways. In this treatise he is primarily concerned with the nature of *eudaimonia*, and of possible threats to it. A number of the arguments against the permanence of *eudaimonia* in the face of various kinds of misfortune are of a very similar nature to those that were employed by the Stoics in favour of suicide, so that it is perhaps natural enough that this latter question should be touched on in this context.

And so it is. In chapter 7, first of all, arising out of Plotinus' point that not even the greatest of evils should be of concern to the wise man, so as to shatter his *eudaimonia*, we find the following (7. 27 ff.):

If he himself is offered in sacrifice, will he think his death an evil, if he dies by the altars?

*But if he is not buried?*

His body will rot anyhow, on the earth or under it. If he is distressed because he does not have an expensive funeral but is buried without a name and not thought worth a lofty monument—the pettiness of it!

*But if he is taken away as a war-slave?*

Well, "the way lies open"<sup>17</sup> to depart, if there is no further possibility of happiness.

This is plainly a reference to the option of the "rational withdrawal," in circumstances of which the Stoics would *probably* have approved, though it is somewhat strange that Plotinus chooses the *relatively* non-hopeless

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harmful by the body. Anyone who has to make a decision chooses that course of action which involves the lesser evils and the greater goods" (1. 9. 2–6, p. 51 Westerink).

<sup>14</sup> There is also, I think, a significant passage in the middle-period treatise 2. 9 [33], *Against the Gnostics*, but it could be dismissed as polemic, so I will place no great weight on it. Plotinus there says (chapter 8. 43 ff.) that if the Gnostics believe that souls came willingly into the universe, "why do you blame that into which you came of your own free will, when it gives you leave, too, to get out of it, if any of you dislike it?" and (chapter 9. 17): "But if you have come by now to dislike the world, you are not compelled to remain a citizen of it." This does certainly seem to imply an assumption by Plotinus that there is no bar to suicide, but he might perhaps be held to be making a dialectical point. Rist, at any rate, seems to regard it as such ([above, note 2] 262 n. 17).

<sup>15</sup> No. 46 in Porphyry's list, composed during Porphyry's absence in Sicily just three years before Plotinus' death, and sent to him there (*V. Plot.* 6).

<sup>16</sup> For an account of Plotinus' final illness and death, see Porph. *V. Plot.* 2. It is the view of McGroarty ([above, note 1] 105 and 197) that it was his final illness that was the decisive factor in changing Plotinus' views on suicide. I would prefer, as I say, to hold that it was rather his changing view of the nature of the soul, which is expounded in 1. 4, though his illness may indeed have been a factor.

<sup>17</sup> We may note this (slightly coy?) use of a tag from Homer; *πάρ τοι ὁδός* is taken from the speech of Diomedes to Agamemnon at the beginning of *Iliad* 9 (43), where he is reproaching him for his proposal that they should abandon the siege and go home.

misfortune of being enslaved as a result of war as his paradigm case for rational withdrawal. One would have thought that one of the standard situations cited by the Stoics (cf. above, note 12), such as an incurable illness or the conviction that one is going mad (both of which he mentions later, in chapters 8 and 9, but dismisses as insufficient to disturb true happiness), would have been more suitable, especially as he remarks just below (7. 42–43) that, after all, many people will actually do better through being enslaved in war.<sup>18</sup> However, it is not our business to criticise Plotinus' choice of example (being taken prisoner in war may just have been his favourite private nightmare); all we need to note is that he (quite casually) mentions this possibility of "withdrawal" in the midst of dismissing the seriousness of all sublunary miseries.

Again, in the next chapter (8. 5–9), a propos the bearing of great pain (and just following on his notable image of the true self as a light enclosed within a lantern when a storm is blowing hard outside), he remarks: "But suppose the pain brings delirium, or goes on to such a height that, though it is extreme, it does not kill? If it goes on, *he will consider what he ought to do* (τί χρὴ ποιεῖν βουλευσεται); for the pain has not taken away his power of decision-making (τὸ ἀντεξούσιον)." This again seems a fairly plain reference to the possibility of "withdrawal," though Rist could argue that it is less than explicit exactly what Plotinus is advocating. He adds, after all, immediately after this: "One must understand that things do not look to the good man (σπουδαῖος) as they look to others; none of his experiences penetrate to the inner self, pleasures and pains no more than any of the others."

However that may be, Plotinus seems certainly to return to the possibility of suicide at the end of the tractate, again in the context of the triviality of all bodily existence. A major aspect of his argument throughout the essay has been that the true self resides in the soul, and that soul in the strict sense is not affected by bodily or external influences, so that the true self, once we (that is to say, our *vulgar* selves) connect up with it, is impervious to the vicissitudes of physical existence. It is a remarkable theory, strongly counter-intuitive but obstinately maintained, and it colours his whole approach to ethics. It is behind this final passage from 1. 4 (chapter 16. 18 ff., trans. Armstrong, my italics):

He must give to this bodily life as much as it needs and he can, but he is himself other than it and free to abandon it, and he will abandon it in nature's good time, *and, besides, has the right to decide about this for himself*. So some of his activities will tend towards well-being (*eudaimonia*); others will not be directed to the goal and will really not

<sup>18</sup> Looking back in history, one could cite the case of the historian Polybius, and even, stretching a point, Diogenes the Cynic—as well as innumerable slaves who did well in the service of generous and enlightened masters; but these latter, at least, would not generally be sages (Epictetus, however, being a counter-example).

belong to him but to that which is joined to him,<sup>19</sup> which he will care for and bear with as long as he can, like a musician with his lyre, as long as he can use it; *if he cannot use it he will change to another, or give up using the lyre and abandon the activities directed to it.* Then he will have something else to do which does not need the lyre, and will let it lie unregarded beside him *while he sings without an instrument.* Yet the instrument was not given him at the beginning without good reason. He has used it often up till now.

Now of course John Rist could not ignore a passage like this, nor indeed the earlier one from chapter 7 (which he mentions in a footnote), but he has persuaded himself, as we have seen above (p. 232), that they do not add up to an endorsement of suicide. "The soul can choose for or against suicide," says Rist ([above, note 2] 175), "but the good soul will always in practice choose against."

I am afraid that I do not see why he comes to this conclusion. He goes on (175–76) to adduce *Enn.* 1. 9, as if that were Plotinus' last word on the subject, which seems rash. If anything, 1. 4 [46] should be Plotinus' last word. But it is the logic of Plotinus' argument that should be decisive. What can he have meant by "giving up using the lyre" and "singing on without an instrument"? The point being driven home in this final chapter of the tractate is that the *eudaimonia* of the *spoudaios* resides in his true self, which is the pure soul, and that soul is fixed in the noetic world. His happiness is assured, and cannot be affected by the vicissitudes of material existence. However, Plotinus recognizes that those vicissitudes can in certain circumstances come to constitute an intolerable distraction, disrupting the link in consciousness between a man and his true self, and, if such a situation shows no sign of a possibility of improvement, he sees no problem about rationally discontinuing the connection. He no longer seems bothered about problems of "contamination" or of "one's rank in the other world," such as exercised him in 1. 9, since his doctrine of the impassibility of the soul has made such concerns meaningless. The only important thing is to establish conscious contact with one's true self, which is the key to *eudaimonia*, and which, once truly gained, cannot be lost. If the physical instrument, the "lyre," becomes permanently and seriously dysfunctional, to the extent of disrupting one's intellectual communion with one's self<sup>20</sup> and with the noetic world, then it may be set aside, and one can sing on without it.

<sup>19</sup> Τὸ προσεξευγμένον, that is, the animate body, or "composite" (elsewhere termed by Plotinus τὸ συναμφότερον) of lower soul (which is not really soul, but a sort of illumination from it) and body.

<sup>20</sup> The cautionary note sounded in the last two lines of the chapter should not be ignored. Our instrument was given to us initially "not without good reason (οὐ μάτην)," and should not be cast aside for any trivial reason.

We may see, I think, from all this that, on the subject of suicide, as of so much else,<sup>21</sup> Plotinus' position is more immediately affected by Stoicism than by what we might take to be strict Platonism. He is certainly not an enthusiastic advocate of suicide—any more than were the Stoics, after all—but, like them, he held that there was no absolute reason why the soul, especially that of the sage, should be bound in the trammels of bodily existence if no further degree of enlightenment could be derived from that, or if the enlightenment already attained was in danger of being obscured (for it could not be *lost*) by obstacles set up by the body or external circumstances. The argument produced by Socrates in the *Phaedo* about our being placed here on guard-duty by the gods, and our not being free to leave without their permission, does not, it seems, particularly impress him, though he was earlier (in 1. 9) concerned by the problem of the psychic disruption and consequent "contamination" which seems inextricably associated with the process of doing away with oneself. Once, however, his doctrine of the impassibility of the soul became fully developed, this concern ceased to be a serious one, though suicide remained a step not to be taken lightly. Indeed, in the remark that one's instrument is not given to one "without good reason (μᾶτην)" one might discern a residual recognition that we are assigned a role to play in the world, and that, as long as one can make some attempt to play it, one should not abandon one's post. But this does not for Plotinus preclude the option of rational withdrawal, of playing on without the lyre. It is a decision entirely within the competence of the achieved sage, though it was not a decision that he ever felt called upon to take himself.

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<sup>21</sup> I think in particular of his position on free will and determinism, as set out in *Enn.* 3. 2–3, but also of his Logos doctrine, and much of his ethics, as set out, for example, in 1. 4 (though here he criticizes the Stoic materialist doctrine of the soul; cf. e.g. chapter 13).

## Quintilian, Tyconius and Augustine

CHARLES KANNENGIESSER

That Augustine was an original thinker and a gifted writer was readily acknowledged by his contemporaries, Christian and pagan alike. His boyhood teacher in Madaura, the grammarian Maximus, writing to Augustine in 391 shortly after his appointment as assistant to bishop Valerius of Hippo, celebrated "that vigorous eloquence which has brought you to universal fame."<sup>1</sup> At the core of this eloquence Maximus could have identified Cicero's paradigmatic legacy. Even sacred scripture when recommended to the convert from Africa by the learned bishop Ambrose of Milan had to comply with the undisputed authority of Cicero in Augustine's mind. The reading of scripture appeared "to be unworthy if compared with the dignity of Cicero," the bishop of Hippo recollected a decade later in his *Confessions*.<sup>2</sup>

No such cult of literary devotees ever developed around Quintilian in Latin Christian literature. "After two centuries of oblivion, . . . Quintilian regained recognition during the fourth century, mainly among grammarians like Diomedus. In the period of the third through the fifth century he was imitated and quoted by Christian authors, such as Lactantius, Hilary of Poitiers, Rufinus and Sidonius Apollinaris."<sup>3</sup> Among his contemporaries, Juvenal mentions him three times in his *Satires* (6. 75, 280, 7. 185–96) and Martial invokes him in one of his *Epigrams* (2. 90). He was also known to the author of the *Historia Augusta*, as well as to Ausonius.<sup>4</sup> So much for a rather discreet *Nachleben* in late antiquity.<sup>5</sup> Therefore it is the more intriguing to find a replica of the Roman rhetor's notion of *regula* in the

<sup>1</sup> "Facundiae robore atque exploso, qua cunctis clarus es," *Saint Augustine. Select Letters*, ed. by J. H. Baxter, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, MA 1930) 18–19 (no. 5 = *Ep.* 16).

<sup>2</sup> *Conf.* 3. 5. 9 ("illa scriptura) uisa est mihi indigna, quam Tullianae dignitati compararem."

<sup>3</sup> E. Bolaffi, *La critica filosofica e letteraria in Quintiliano*, Collection Latomus 30 (Brussels 1958) 8.

<sup>4</sup> The latter mentions Quintilian in the opening of his *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium* (1. 2, 16) and in the poem *Mosella* (404); O. Seel, *Quintilian, oder Die Kunst des Redens und Schweigens* (Stuttgart 1977) 231–40.

<sup>5</sup> For Hilary, see also F. Barone, "Quintilianus et Hilarius," *Vita Latina* 78 (1980) 10–15 (in Latin).



central rhetorical notion with which Tyconius operated in the late fourth century.

Tyconius<sup>6</sup> was the author of the earliest systematic attempt known to us of a scriptural hermeneutics inside Christian traditions.<sup>7</sup> Augustine disliked that schismatic fellow Christian from Africa, but he admired his work, in particular *The Book of Rules*, which he quoted extensively in his essay *On Christian Doctrine*. Hence the three parts of my paper. First, I must establish the proper status and meaning of *regula* in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, I should outline the use of *regula* in the work of Tyconius. Thirdly, it would be my contention that the Ciceronian genius of the former rhetor Augustine did not allow the elderly bishop Augustine to acknowledge the proper value of *regula*, as taken over by Tyconius from Quintilian. My conclusion would be that we have to deal here with a failed opportunity in the otherwise very fertile history of biblical interpretation in Roman Africa.<sup>9</sup>

### I. Quintilian's *Regula Loquendi*

In Book 1 of the *Institutio* the three main qualities of a speech, considered as a whole, are said to be "correctness, lucidity and elegance" (*ut emendata, ut dilucida, ut ornata sit* 1. 5. 1). Quintilian adds the following advice: "The teacher of literature therefore must study the rule for correctness of speech (*loquendi regula*), this constituting the first part of his art." *Loquendi regula*, in the singular, repeats partially the parallel statement by which the previous chapter of Book 1 had been introduced: "Haec igitur professio, cum breuissime in duas partes diuidatur, recte loquendi scientiam et poetarum enarrationem, plus habet in recessu quam fronte promittit" (1. 4. 2). Both phrases, *loquendi scientia* and *loquendi regula*, belong to initial statements introducing a presentation of what grammar is all about. They function as formal definitions of the whole matter under scrutiny.

In chapter 6 of Book 1 Quintilian pleads in favor of correctness of style in spoken as much as in written language. He starts, in 1. 6. 1, by a general statement, comparable with the one which we noted above in 1. 4. 2, and in

<sup>6</sup> P. Bright, "Tyconius," in *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* (New York and London 1990) 917-18; E. Romero Pose, "Tichonius," in *Encyclopedia of the Early Church* (Cambridge 1992) (= *Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane* [1983-88]) II 838-39; M. Dulaey, "Tyconius," in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* XV (Paris 1991) 1349-56.

<sup>7</sup> P. Bright's *The Book of Rules of Tyconius: Its Purpose and Inner Logic* (Notre Dame 1988) presents a first comprehensive analysis of the *Book of Rules*, a critical edition of which had been secured by F. C. Burkett as early as 1894.

<sup>8</sup> J. Cousin, *Etudes sur Quintilien* (Paris 1936); G. Kennedy, *Quintilian* (New York 1969); J. J. Murphy, *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, transl. from Books 1, 2 and 10 of the *Institutio Oratoria* (Carbondale, IL 1987).

<sup>9</sup> C. Kannengiesser and P. Bright, *A Conflict of Christian Hermeneutics in Roman Africa: Tyconius and Augustine*, Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, Colloquy 58 (Berkeley 1989). In what follows, Quintilian is quoted in the translation of H. E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library (London and Cambridge, MA 1920-22).

any case significant of his love for correct speech: *Sermo constat ratione, uetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine*, "Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority and usage." By "reason" (*ratio*), as he adds at once, correct speech rests mainly on the appropriate treatment of "analogy" and sometimes of "etymology." He examines the role of etymologies from 1. 6. 28 on, first in a more general way (28–31), secondly in specific cases (32–38). In 1. 6. 33 he observes that etymology can help sometimes to identify the proper meaning of words, even when words differ only by a single letter, as in the case of "*tegula, regula*, and the like." Small matters of that sort make sense, ponders Quintilian, if only one keeps being interested in the logic behind the play of words. For etymology helps to catch precisely the *ratio* of a name, or of a given spelling. Once more, *regula*, in the singular, seems to cross Quintilian's mind at the precise moment when he discusses some fundamental procedure of language.

Still in 1. 6, where "usage" is pondered in common language, after the discussion of etymologies and archaic words, Quintilian becomes candidly exhortative when he remarks that "here the critical faculty is necessary, and we must make up our minds what we mean by usage" (1. 6. 43). With professional fervor he concludes: "So too in speech we must not accept as a rule of language (*pro regula sermonis accipiendum*) words and phrases that have become a vicious habit with a number of persons" (1. 6. 44). The lovers of amended language do not conform to the practice of the common people. That would be "a very dangerous prescription" (*periculosissimum praeceptum*). "I will therefore define usage in speech as the agreed practice of educated men": *Ergo consuetudinem sermonis uocabo consensum eruditorum* (1. 6. 45). In other words, consistent correctness of speech (*ratio*) rests on education, and education calls for a tradition of learning: It presupposes the *consensus eruditorum*.<sup>10</sup>

1. 7. 1 follows immediately 1. 6. 45, completing by some complementary remarks on faultless spelling what has just been stated for oral speech: "Having stated the rule which we must follow in speaking, I will now proceed to lay down the rule which we must observe when we write; let us style it the science of writing correctly" ("Nunc, quoniam diximus, quae sit loquendi regula, dicendum, quae scribentibus custodienda, quod Graeci ὀρθογραφίαν uocant; hoc nos recte scribendi scientiam nominemus"). The perfect equivalence between *regula* (always recurring in the singular) and *scientia* in such statements is highly significant. In 1. 5. 1, *loquendi regula* had paralleled *loquendi scientia* from the initial sentence of 1. 4. 2. Here, *loquendi regula* and *scribendi scientia* impose a similar normativity on the oral and the written level of communication. Finally, when recapitulating chapters 5 to 8 on grammar, Quintilian chooses again in

<sup>10</sup> V. Bonmati Sanchez, "Norma y uso segun Quintiliano," *Revista Española de Linguística* 18 (1988) 343–45, shows that *usus* means *consensus eruditorum* based on the authority of books.

1. 9. 1 the phrase *ratio loquendi*, which echoes his use of *ratio* in 1. 6. 1: *Et finitae quidem sunt partes duae, quas haec professio pollicetur, id est ratio loquendi et enarratio auctorum, quarum illam methodicen hanc historicen uocant*, "I have now finished with two of the departments, with which teachers of literature profess to deal, namely the art of speaking correctly and the interpretation of authors; the former they call *methodice*, the latter *historice*."

The *ratio loquendi*, "correctness of speech," is as much an objective reality as the *enarratio auctorum*, the "interpretation of authors," when one considers both of them in their social dimension. Both activities aim at a well-defined allegiance to the normative tradition by which a language, oral or written, remains integrally secured in a given society. *Regula*, in any case, does not mean a "grammatical rule" in the modern sense. It has a completely different extension, bound as it is to the cultural institution of human speech in an educated society. In fact, it means that very institution of educated language in its most immediate and vital exercise, namely the correct spelling of words and the sound formation of sentences.

In the final section of his immense work, when Quintilian starts using again the concept of *regula*, the ample and fundamental significance of "rule," as understood by him, becomes even more obvious. In 9. 4. 1-2, the study of *compositio*, which includes at once *ordo*, *iunctura*, *numerus*, "order, connexion and rhythm" (9. 4. 22), places the author in a vicinity closer than ever to the overpowering figure of Cicero. Therefore a critical caveat seems appropriate: "I shall deal more briefly with those points which admit of no dispute, while there will be certain subjects on which I shall express a certain amount of disagreement." In short, "I intend to make my own views clear" (9. 4. 2). What Quintilian does *not* observe is that his notion of *regula* is one of the most significant features of his independent thinking in the final part of the *Institutio*.

First, he launches a vibrant protest against those "who would absolutely bar all study of artistic structure (*curam omnem compositionis*) and contend that language as it chances to present itself in the rough is more natural and even more manly" (9. 4. 3). Against such a contestation of all cultural traditions, Quintilian underlines the fact that the adverse opinion, if ever admitted as true, would mean the end of "the whole art of oratory." And he gives his main reason: "For the first men did not speak with the care demanded by that art nor in accordance with the rule that it lays down" (*Neque enim locuti sunt ad hanc regulam et diligentiam primi homines* 9. 4. 4). Civilization, with rhetorical culture at its core, did not yet exist. The *regula*, or human communication normed by *compositio*, in other words the social institution of civilized language, was missing in the proto-history of humankind. That *ars loquendi* developed only much later, when the birth of civilized language became possible. Therefore, going back to the original human beings, *primi homines*, would necessarily mean a collapse of all cultural values.

In Book 10, dealing with "imitation," Quintilian states that the use of chosen words is normally determined by the perception of their traditional value, "the one sure standard being contemporary usage" (*ut quorum certissima sit regula in consuetudine* 10. 2. 13). A living tradition in its present shape rules all educated language, and the creative process which underlies the latter is said to be a *certissima regula*. Quintilian himself illustrates the process of creating one's own language in conformity with tradition. When distinguishing between "what is expedient" and "what is becoming," he notes: "I have followed rather the usage of common speech than the strict law of truth" (*Et nos secundum communem potius loquendi consuetudinem quam ipsam ueritatis regulam diuisione hac utimur* 11. 1. 12). During the fourth century C.E., an anonymous contemporary of Tyconius would pick up the phrase *ueritatis regula* and give it creedal relevance in his Latin translation of Irenaeus of Lyons's *Aduersus haereses*.<sup>11</sup> Tyconius himself used it as equivalent to *regula fidei*.

Finally, Book 12 includes a last mention of Quintilian's *regula*: "On the other hand, the written speech which is published as a model of style must be polished and filed and brought into conformity with the accepted rule and standard of artistic construction (*ad legem et regulam compositum esse oportere*), since it will come into the hands of learned men" (12. 10. 50).

Thus, throughout the *Institutio*, Quintilian witnesses a consistent usage of *regula*: The "rule" is always in one way or another the logical foundation and intrinsic principle of educated speech, oral or written. The author of the *Institutio* refers to that "rule" always in the singular. He acknowledges it as a source of discernment and distinctive correctness, which transcends the actual speaker or writer. He states that it is universally available all through the centuries, being one of those categories without which no educated communication between people would ever happen.

It should not be seen as fortuitous that Quintilian recurs to the notion of *regula* only in Books 1 and 9–12. Without making a proper statement about it, his very usage of the notion shows that he gives it the value of a basic hermeneutical concept, capable of enriching the logical frame of his whole work.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> S. Lundström, *Studien zur lateinischen Irenäusübersetzung* (Lund 1943) and "Textkritische Beiträge zur lateinischen Irenäusübersetzung," *Eranos* 43 (1945) 285–300. According to H. Jordan and A. Souter, as quoted by J. Quasten, *Patrology* I (1986; 1st ed. 1950) 290–91, the Latin translation of Irenaeus was made in Roman Africa between 370 and 420.

<sup>12</sup> *Regula* is not registered in E. Zundel, *Clavis Quintilianeae: Quintilians "Institutio oratoria" aufgeschlüsselt nach rhetorischen Begriffen* (Darmstadt 1989), but *ratio* is noted (p. 83). G. Kennedy (above, note 8) 58 traces *scientia* (in Quintilian's basic definition of rhetoric: "the science of speaking well" 2. 15. 34) back to the Stoics Cleanthes and Chrysippus, but neglects the semantic constellation *ratio, regula, scientia*, in Quintilian himself.



II. Tyconius's *Regulae Mysticae*

A "lay theologian and biblical commentator of the Donatist church of Roman Africa,"<sup>13</sup> Tyconius flourished between 370 and 390. His intellectual endeavor concentrated on the riches of the local Christianity in Carthage. In line with Tertullian and Cyprian he deepened the properly African self-definition of the Christian church, with the paradoxical aim to free his church from sectarian isolation.<sup>14</sup> A Donatist by family status and social conformity, he fought an endless battle in order to reintegrate the schismatic African tradition into mainstream Christianity, with the only result that he was severely censured by his own bishop, Parmenian of Carthage, in 378,<sup>15</sup> and ridiculed about fifty years later, by Augustine, in Book 3, chapter 42 of *De doctrina christiana*. His works, despite the *damnatio memoriae* engineered by Augustine and his friends, exercised a long-lasting influence through the Western Middle Ages.<sup>16</sup> A commentary on the Apocalypse by Tyconius survives only in fragments and quotations from later authors.<sup>17</sup> Tyconius's most striking work, *The Book of Rules*, handed down to us, it seems, in its integrality, was deliberately neutralized by the elderly Augustine, when quoting it in the final part of *De doctrina christiana* 3. Thus deliberately taken out of Christian hands through its biased quotation by this vigilant guardian of church orthodoxy, and de facto reduced to a forgotten relic, Tyconius's *Book of Rules* offers the oldest systematic essay on biblical hermeneutics ever written by a Christian theologian.<sup>18</sup>

Tyconius himself introduces it as a *libellus regularis*. Such a use of *regularis* was apparently unknown before him. It announces in any case that "rules" are the central, I should say, the unique issue at stake in the book. There are seven "mystic rules," the author explains, which determine a sound understanding of the divine revelation contained in the bible. Like the seven "seals," which kept the heavenly book closed in Revelation 5. 1, the seven "rules," according to Tyconius, hide and preserve from profane reading the biblical message about God's deeds in the history of Israel and

<sup>13</sup> P. Bright (above, note 6) 917.

<sup>14</sup> The reception and interpretation of the bible in Roman Africa is currently subjected to intense research. Between studies on the so-called *Vetus Latina*, the Latin text of the bible older than Jerome's Vulgate, and work accomplished on Donatism (mainly in the field of literary history by P. Monceaux and in a socio-political perspective by W. H. C. Frend), the hermeneutical tradition which culminated in Tyconius still represents a *terra incognita*.

<sup>15</sup> Bishop of Carthage 362-391/2. See W. H. C. Frend's entry on Parmenian in *Encyclopedia of the Early Church* (above, note 6) II 651.

<sup>16</sup> P. Cazier, "Le Livre des Règles de Tyconius. Sa transmission du 'De doctrina christiana' aux 'Sentences' d'Isidore de Seville," *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 19 (1973) 241-61 and "Cassien auteur présumé de l'épitomé des Règles de Tyconius," 21 (1975) 261-97.

<sup>17</sup> K. Steinhauser, *The Apocalypse Commentary of Tyconius: A History of its Reception and Influence* (Frankfurt a.M., Bern and New York 1987).

<sup>18</sup> Origen, *On First Principles*, Book 4, with which the *Book of Rules* is sometimes compared, shows no intention of producing such a systematic hermeneutics.



in view of universal human salvation. Only in applying the sort of initiatory logic thought out by Tyconius would someone be able to interpret correctly the divine message. I quote the preamble of *The Book of Rules*:<sup>19</sup>

Necessarium duxi ante omnia quae mihi uidentur libellum regularem scribere, et secretorum legis ueluti clauēs et luminaria fabricare. sunt enim quaedam regulae mysticae quae uniuersae legis recessus obtinent et ueritatis thesauros aliquibus inuisibiles faciunt; quarum si ratio regularum sine inuidia ut communicamus accepta fuerit, clausa quaeque patefient et obscura dilucidabuntur, ut quis prophetiae immensam siluam perambulans his regulis quodam modo lucis tramitibus deductus ab errore defendatur.

The seven "rules" are then enumerated as seven titles provided by Tyconius for the different sections of his compact pamphlet: 1. *De domino et corpore eius*, 2. *De domini corpore bipartito*, 3. *De promissis et lege*, 4. *De specie et genere*, 5. *De temporibus*, 6. *De recapitulatione*, 7. *De diabolo et eius corpore*. One may note at first glance that 1 and 7 secure a perfect framing in being symmetrical. A closer look would admit the same for 2 and 6, as well as for 3 and 5, 4 being central, with the most explicit reference to grammatical and logical categories, *species* and *genus*.

The whole work reflects the skills of a trained rhetor. Rules 1 and 2 display the author's *inuentio*; Tyconius explores the complex reality of the church at large. In the light of the social body of the church he introduces his main categories: *scriptura*, *regula*, *transitus*, *recessus*. It may be worth remembering that the first part of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was filled with statements about society at large, past and present. Statements used for forensic communication were conveniently elaborated on the basis of the social context. Rule 3 completes the *inuentio* of 1 and 2 in an argumentative way. The moral institutions of *repromissio* and *lex*, as found throughout scripture, turn Tyconius's analysis into a more psychological study. Hence Rule 3 deals with the inner experience of church people, namely their passions, memories and expectations, along the centuries of biblical and ecclesiastical history. A similar turn had happened in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where the psychological behavior of people was constantly mentioned in order to explain and legitimate juridical procedures. Thus Rule 3 intends to prove the legitimacy of the social body of the church in the history of salvation.

<sup>19</sup> "Above everything else that came to mind, I considered it necessary to write a book of rules and so to fashion keys and lamps, as it were, to the secrets of the law. For there are certain mystic rules which obtain in the inner recesses of the entire law and keep the rich treasures of the truth hidden from some people. But if the sense of these rules is accepted without ill will, as we impart it, whatever is closed will be opened and whatever is dark will be illumined; and anyone who walks the vast forest of prophecy guided by these rules, as by pathways of light, will be kept from straying into error" (W. S. Babcock, *Tyconius. The Book of Rules*, translated, with an introduction and notes, SBL Texts and Translations 31, Early Christian Literature Series 7 [Atlanta 1989] 3).

Rule 4 could well be entitled separately "On Style." It belongs to a genre of rhetorical essays popular in late antiquity. Here the way of writing under consideration is attributed to the divine Spirit, the sole author of sacred scripture admitted by Tyconius. The Spirit hides genus in species when speaking of old and new Jerusalem, of old Israel and universal church: *in speciem genus abscondens*. As an additional insight Quintilian had also recommended that one observe carefully in a narrative the shifts between specific and generic notions. Both, the Roman rhetor of the first century C.E. and the African Donatist of the fourth century, underline the "subtlety" of such procedures.<sup>20</sup>

Rule 5, "On Times," adds a classical chapter on ornamentation of style, with a rhetorical definition as its introductory statement: "Temporis quantitas in scripturis frequenter mystica est tropo synecdoche, aut legitimis numeris, qui multis modis positi sunt et pro loco intelligendi; synecdoche uero est aut a parte totum, aut a toto pars."<sup>21</sup> Rule 6, in direct continuity with 5, tracks down another "subtlety" of the Spirit, when speaking of "then" and "now": "The seal of recapitulation guards some things with such subtlety that it seems more a continuation than a recapitulation of the narrative."<sup>22</sup> Additional remarks on analogy and allegory complete Rule 6. Rule 7, aiming at a deliberate inclusion, parallels Rule 1: "The relation of the devil and his body can be conceived in short order, if we keep in mind here also what we have said about the Lord and his body."<sup>23</sup> This final chapter has more than twice the length of the preceding one, and it is longer than 1, 2 or 5. It adds to 6 and 7 a few more remarks on allegorical and symbolic forms of speech in scripture. In short, the last three "rules" enjoy a continuity of their own.

When Tyconius announced an "essay on rules" in his carefully crafted preamble, he had in mind what he called "mystic rules," *regulae mysticae*. But "mystic" did not imply any subjective experience due to those rules; it referred to the objective and proper nature of the "rules" themselves. They were in Tyconius's view divine revelation instituted and made available in a given literary way, exclusively characteristic of scripture. They were constitutive of the grammar assumed by the Spirit, when articulating divine truth in sacred scripture; or, in borrowing Quintilian's terms, they were the seven-fold *ratio*, or *regula loquendi*, exclusively proper to the biblical message. Their affinity with Quintilian's *regula* rests essentially on their

<sup>20</sup> In 4. 5. 25 (*quo subtilius et copiosius diuississe uideantur*), Quintilian links "subtlety" with the use of the distinction between *genus* and *species*. In 7. 1. 59 (*qui subtiliter quaeret*), "subtlety" is recommended for a correct perception of the *ordo* between *genus* and *species*.

<sup>21</sup> "Temporal quantity, in scripture, often has mystic significance through the rhetorical figure of synecdoche, or through the specific numbers involved. The latter are used in a variety of ways and must be understood according to the context. In synecdoche, however, either a part represents the whole or the whole represents a part" (Babcock [above, note 19] 89).

<sup>22</sup> Babcock (above, note 19) 109.

<sup>23</sup> Babcock (above, note 19) 115.

objectivity. Just as human language keeps being established in its own "correctness, lucidity and elegance" throughout ages and cultures in constant change, so does sacred scripture keep the integral truth of its message, from David's day in biblical antiquity to "now" in Roman Africa, thanks to "mystic rules" which regulate its ageless relevance.

No literal dependency, not even a literary resemblance, could be claimed as linking Quintilian's work and the *libellus* of Tyconius. But the latter's approach to scripture, conditioned as it was by the cultural consensus in fourth-century Roman Africa, was thought out entirely in terms of rhetoric. Tyconius needed to elaborate a theoretical construct regulating scriptural interpretation in the light of burning issues proper to the African tradition. He conceived his *libellus regularis* with such a concern in mind.

The Tyconian "rules" are allegedly fixed by the Spirit of scriptural inspiration for the very composition of scripture as handed down to the churches, scripture being entirely conceived and even written out by the Spirit in Tyconius's hermeneutics. In other words, the "rules" are inner, structural principles, which belong to the very core of scriptural literature. Well understood, those principles make the whole of scripture become intelligible. They are *objective* criteria, bound to the letter of scripture itself. The interpreter discovers them there. He or she would never invent them as a subjective method of interpreting, because they originate only from the Spirit's own initiative as the divine author of sacred scripture. The interpreter perceives and unfolds the "rules" in the best of cases, thanks to appropriate hermeneutical tools, like those furnished by Tyconius's *libellus*. Those tools are essentially notions taken over from the traditional curriculum of rhetoric. In the metaphorical announcement of his preamble quoted above, Tyconius needed *ueluti clauas et luminaria fabricare*, "to fashion keys and lamps," in order to explore "the secrets of the law."<sup>24</sup> What sort of rhetorical notions were those "keys and lamps" in fact?

For catching the proper significance of Rule 1, Tyconius uses as "keys" the notions of *persona* and *transitus*. For Rule 2, "Concerning the Bipartite Character of the Lord's Body," he recommends another *transitus*, no longer vertical, but "the transition (*transitus*) and return (*reditus*) from one part of the body to the other, from the right-hand part to the left, or from the left to the right." The second rule by itself signifies that the church is bipartite, but in order to find this truth in scripture one must apply systematically the bilateral *transitus* exemplified here. Rule 3 opens the clear understanding of "the promises and the law," if only one applies correctly the handbook notion of "the matter" under scrutiny, or as Tyconius calls it insistently, the

<sup>24</sup> Babcock's translation, "so to fashion keys and lamps," suggests an equivalency of "rules" and "keys": "I considered it necessary to write a book of rules and so . . ." Nothing in the Latin calls for "so," whereas *ueluti*, which qualifies properly *clauas et luminaria*, is well rendered by Babcock's "as it were."

*opus: Omne opus nostrum fides est.*<sup>25</sup> In using now properly that notion of the narrative *matter*, one may read correctly, with the assistance of the Spirit, what mattered for God on the distinctive levels of the law and of the promises.

The chapter entitled "Rule 4" is introduced by the significant observation: "De specie et genere loquimur, non secundum artem rhetoricam humanae sapientiae . . . sed loquimur secundum mysteria caelestis sapientiae magisterio Spiritus Sancti."<sup>26</sup> Thus the grammatical notions of *species* and *genus* serve here for the enlightening exercise of Rule 4, which reveals how the Spirit is "concealing the general in the particular" (*in speciem genus abscondens*) or, vice versa, "how he passes from the particular to the general"<sup>27</sup> (*ab specie in genus*), "thanks to a variety of transition and order" (*uarietas translationis et ordinis*). Tyconius calls expressly "spiritual" the secret realities revealed in Rule 4 (*omnia spiritualiter*). Again Rule 5 is introduced by a technical remark, already mentioned above: "Temporis quantitas in scripturis frequenter mystica est tropo synecdoche." In applying the notion of "synecdoche," which means that "either a part represents the whole or the whole represents a part," Tyconius uses another "key," able to deliver the *ratio* of what he calls the "mystical significance" of "temporal quantity" which would otherwise be kept secret by Rule 5.

Finally, the *ratio* of Rule 5, cleared up by the appropriate key-notion of synecdoche, develops into a brilliant and rather complex arithmology, by which one may try to compute and analyse the "mystical quantity" of many periods of time in the Old Testament. It looks as if Tyconius anticipated here Augustine's numerological arguments. But the backgrounds of both men are very different; in the case of Augustine it is philosophical, in the case of Tyconius it is properly theological with a symbolic ecclesiology as its focus.

Rule 6 calls for the rhetorical notion of "recapitulation" as its proper key, being a rule "by which the Spirit has sealed the law so as to guard the pathway of light,"<sup>28</sup> especially on the level of biblical narratives. The subtlety (*subtilitas*) of the Spirit<sup>29</sup> uses grammatical means (*tunc, illa hora, illo die*) or, in Tyconius's words, *futuræ similitudines*, which one would hardly notice, so that the narrative seems simply to continue instead of

<sup>25</sup> Babcock (above, note 19) 34.

<sup>26</sup> "I am not referring to the particular and the general as they are used in the rhetorical art devised by human wisdom. Rather I am speaking with reference to the mysteries of heavenly wisdom in relation to the teaching of the Holy Spirit" (Babcock [above, note 19] 55). As "rhetorical art devised by human wisdom" Babcock recalls in note 12 "Quintilian *Institutio Oratorica* [sic] 7. 1. 23–28." The translator in the Loeb Library could have suggested to him that he keep *species* and *genus*, instead of using "particular" and "general," which lose Tyconius's express reference to defined notions of grammar.

<sup>27</sup> In Babcock's unfortunate translation.

<sup>28</sup> Babcock (above, note 19) 109.

<sup>29</sup> See above, note 19.

being "recapitulation." By this term "recapitulation" Tyconius introduces an interpretive key, which opens the correct meaning, prophetic and "spiritual" as it was, of many biblical narratives. Indeed, by the very fact of telling stories about the patriarchs or other figures in the Old Testament, those narratives announce secretly the present truth of the church. The key proper to Rule 6 "recapitulates" the narratives in "actualizing" them explicitly in the light of current church experience: "What Daniel mentioned is happening now in Africa."<sup>30</sup>

Rule 7 concerns the teaching of the bible about Antichrist. More than the other six rules it is eschatological. Its mysteries are brought into daylight by the same key used already for Rule 1: *Transitus namque a capite ad corpus eadem ratione dinoscitur*, "The transition<sup>31</sup> from head to body is recognized by the same kind of reasoning." Precisely there is an Antichrist because the "devil's body" signifies the reality of evil inside the "body of Christ," and in proportion with it. This last rule in Tyconian hermeneutics keeps hidden the true nature of the "bipartite" church: It is "in the midst" of Christianity, spread over the world, that evil culminates.

In summary, the seven *regulae*, described by Tyconius in his *libellus regularis*, are as objective and essential in regard to God's biblical discourse as seemed to be for human speech the *regula loquendi* identified by Quintilian. They are declared *mysticae* precisely because they command the very nature of the divine discourse in scripture. More needs to be said about the "mystic" nature of the Tyconian rules.<sup>32</sup> Here the analogy with Quintilian's *regula* called only for a precision about their objective structuring inside scripture. A final clarification about them is unwillingly given by Augustine, to whom we owe in fact the miraculous preservation of Tyconius's amazing *libellus regularis*.

### III. Augustine's *Regulae uel Clauae*

Augustine's journey, from the day when he left Carthage for Rome until the day of his return to Roman Africa as a Christian convert, tells us the story of a fascinating quest for the truth and the very nature of human language, a quest determined mainly by the sort of Neoplatonic philosophy absorbed by Augustine in Milanese circles, and foremost by his inveterate need to trust in divine transcendence for solving his personal problems. As a professional rhetor he could have reached true enjoyment and security in cultivating a critical pursuit of what human language represents. He chose to give priority to the disrupting trends of his religious quest. His whole

<sup>30</sup> Babcock (above, note 19) 111.

<sup>31</sup> *Transitus*, with an active sense, implies in Tyconius a deliberate transfer of meaning from one reality to another. If one translates it by "transition," one may well miss the proper sense of the term in the *Book of Rules*. Quintilian used it in the more common way (*unde etiam uenusti transitus fiunt* 9. 2. 61) when commenting on Cicero's oratorical style.

<sup>32</sup> I hope to fulfill this task in a *Handbook of Patristic Exegesis*, in preparation for Brill.



awareness about the vital gift of language turned into what he called "confessions." It also called for a more theoretical assessment which he entitled *De doctrina christiana*, the "doctrine" in question focusing on the divine message of scripture as it takes on the form of human language and as it calls for a critical understanding articulated in one's own culture.

When quoting Tyconius and his *Book of Rules* in a later section of his own hermeneutical essay, Augustine relies on an experience thirty years before, still vivid in his memory and most probably well retraceable for him on the basis of his notebooks. In 396 he had apologized in a letter to Bishop Aurelius of Carthage (*Ep.* 41. 2): "On my part, I am not forgetting what you asked about the seven rules or keys of Tyconius, and as I have written many times, I am waiting to hear what you think of it." Indeed, during one of the earliest encounters between Augustine and Aurelius, after Augustine's return to Africa, most probably after 395, when the famous rhetor had become the assistant of Bishop Valerius in Hippo Regia, the primate of Carthage found it very convenient to lend a copy of Tyconius's *libellus* to his newly appointed and subordinate colleague, who was indeed more qualified than anyone else to give him a competent opinion.

To his surprise Aurelius found the learned Augustine at a loss after having read the *libellus regularis* of the Donatist lay theologian. He never received the easy information which he had expected, but when he heard that the newly appointed bishop of Hippo intended to write a complete essay on rules for interpreting scripture, entitled *De doctrina christiana*, he hoped that Augustine's response to Tyconius's essay on the same issue would finally come out. His disappointment must have been real when he realized that the zealous and passionate new pastor of Hippo had interrupted his hermeneutical tractate and postponed its completion *ad kalendas graecas*. Finally, when getting a hand on a copy of what had in fact been written out of that tractate, he suspected more than by a simple guess that the unfortunate interruption was precisely due to Augustine's puzzlement about the Tyconian "rules." Indeed, thirty years later, in 426, almost a decade after Aurelius's death, the old bishop of Hippo decided to review as many as a hundred or so of his literary works, and to add to them a list of *retractationes*. In the unique case of *De doctrina christiana* he went so far as to decide to complete the essay according to its original plan, as announced at the start of its first book. He wrote out the missing section at the end of Book 3, the one which had caused his literary inhibition in 396; then he felt free to secure the composition of Book 4.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See my remarks on the "Local Setting and Motivation of *De doctrina christiana*," in *Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine, Presbyter Factus Sum*, ed. by J. T. Lienhard, E. C. Muller and R. J. Teske (New York 1993) 331-39, and on "The Interrupted *De doctrina christiana*," in *Augustine of Hippo. De doctrina christiana: A Classic of Western Culture*, ed. by D. W.-H. Arnold and P. Bright (Notre Dame 1995).

In 3. 25. 36 through 29. 41, the seventy-two year old bishop succeeded in completing the discussion of "figurative locutions" with variable significations. He also added some remarks about tropes. Any reader would be aware of a certain change of style and vocabulary, even a deeper richness in the references to scripture, in comparing that final section of Book 3 with its former parts. One would be right in attributing the change to the author's more profound experience of scripture after three decades of intense studying and preaching. But a more specific explanation becomes possible from 3. 30. 42 on, where Augustine introduces his quotation of Tyconius. One needs only to read the work of Tyconius, which completely occupies the final section of *De doctrina christiana* 3, from 30. 42 through 37. 56, in order to see that the changed tone and the more technical argumentation from 25. 36 through 29. 41 anticipate in all details the subsequent statements about Tyconius in the rest of Book 3. To state it bluntly, it is with the Tyconian *Book of Rules* in mind that the old bishop engaged the completion of *De doctrina christiana* in 426.

Does it mean that Augustine had at last overcome the initial inhibition which had prevented him from discussing Tyconius in his hermeneutical tractate thirty years earlier? One can hardly doubt it, in observing the magisterial tone with which Augustine not only quotes the *Book of Rules*, but even celebrates its merits, and insists that students of scripture should learn from it. A positive treatment given to the work of a schismatic teacher, who deserves only to be despised or at least ignored by anyone who cares for ecclesiastic orthodoxy, remains unparalleled in the whole of patristic literature.

In fact, Augustine's behavior is far from simple. At the time of his *Retractationes*, he no longer hesitated to introduce Tyconius in the frame of his incomplete *De doctrina christiana*, to quote him and to summarize his whole *libellus*. For Augustine was now armed with his own arsenal of biblical proof-texts, the result of manifold and exacting exercises in scriptural exegesis. In his summarizing paraphrase of each of Tyconius's rules, he found it normal and legitimate to replace the Tyconian apparatus of scriptural references by his own. In doing so he projected into that paraphrase his own understanding of scripture, church and Christian identity. As a result, the same Augustine, who contributed more than anyone else to preserving the very text and memory of Tyconius's *libellus* for centuries to come, "failed to understand the very purpose of the *Book of Rules* as well as the hermeneutical theory that lay behind it."<sup>34</sup>

In 396, writing to Aurelius of Carthage, the young bishop of Hippo complained about his own failure to catch the meaning of Tyconius's "seven rules or keys" (*septem regulis uel clauibus*). In 426, the same

<sup>34</sup> For a thorough analysis of Augustine's quotation, see P. Bright, "Tyconius and his Interpreters: A Study of the Epitomes of the *Book of Rules*," in Kannengiesser and Bright (above, note 9) 23-39, esp. 37.

bishop, in the final stage of his prodigious career, introduced at last the adversary whom he could not help but acclaim as a master, by the words: "A certain Tyconius . . . wrote a book which he called *of Rules*, since in it he explained *seven rules with which as with keys* (emphasis mine) the obscurities of the divine scriptures might be opened." The quoted preamble of the *liber regularum*<sup>35</sup> follows almost immediately, with the explicit mention of the "regulae mysticae quae universae legis recessus obtinent et ueritatis thesauros aliquibus inuisibilis faciunt." Following Augustine's introductory remarks in 3. 30. 42 ("rules with which, as with keys, the obscurities of the divine scriptures might be opened"), the manuscript tradition manipulated the wording of Tyconius's prooemium, and all modern translations until very recently agreed with D. W. Robertson, Jr., who translated: "For there are certain mystic rules which *reveal* (for *obtain*!) what is hidden in the whole Law and *make visible* (for *invisibilis faciunt*!) the treasures of truth which are invisible to some."

Thus, from Tyconius's "rules," considered as the vital structure of scriptural discourse, in analogy with Quintilian's "rule" which was the establishing principle of educated language, the focus has shifted over, in *De doctrina christiana*, to Augustinian hermeneutics determined by Ciceronian *praecepta*.

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<sup>35</sup> Augustine cites Tyconius's essay as *liber regularum*, whereas the latter introduced it as *libellus regularis*. The translators render *libellus regularis* by "Book of Rules."

## Verkannte Genitive bei Prudentius

CH. GNILKA

## I

Neuere Prudentiusbücher stützen sich gerne auf die zweisprachigen Handausgaben, besonders auf die Budé-Ausgabe, die M. Lavarenne besorgte. Bisweilen werden dadurch Fehler weitergegeben. Mit einem solchen Fall setze ich hier ein, in der Hoffnung, der Jubilar werde kleine Gaben nicht verschmähen.

Am Ostertag des Jahres 402 siegte Stilicho über die Goten Alarichs bei Pollentia. Von dieser Schlacht sagt Prudentius *C. Symm.* 2. 715 f.:

Illic ter denis gens exitiabilis annis  
Pannoniae poenas tandem deleta pendit.

Die beiden Verse wurden neuerdings so übersetzt:<sup>1</sup> "Jetzt endlich liegt das pannonische Volk, das dreißig Jahre lang uns zu verderben drohte, am Boden zerstört darnieder und zahlt seine Strafe." Pannonien war für viele Jahre an die Goten verloren, und die Bevölkerung konnte die festen Städte nicht verlassen (Claudian, *In Ruf.* 2. 45 ff.; *Stil.* 2. 191 ff.), aber deswegen wird doch nicht etwa aus den Goten "das pannonische Volk"! Man wußte natürlich, wann sie über die Donau gekommen waren; eben darauf bezieht sich ja hier die (runde) Zahl der dreißig Jahre (vgl. Claudian, *Bell. Get.* 488 ff.). Bei Claudian (*Stil.* loc. cit.) tritt der pannonische Bauer—*Pannonius potorque Savi*—als der Befreite zu den Feinden gerade in Gegensatz: er kann endlich wieder in seine Hütten zurückkehren, sein verrostetes Feldgerät schleifen und die Landarbeit aufnehmen. Die Übersetzerin ist einem Beziehungsfehler aufgesessen, den sich Lavarenne leistet: "ce peuple de la Pannonie" (*Prudence* III [Paris 1963<sup>2</sup>] 182; vgl. auch seine *Étude sur la langue de-poète Prudence* [Paris 1933] 392, §1125); seinerseits mag er F. Arevalo gefolgt sein: "intelligitur gens Pannoniae" (Migne, *PL* LX 237 B–C). Noch ältere Editoren—J. Weitz (Hanau 1613, S. 304) und N. Heinsius (S. 909 in der späteren Ausgabe Köln 1701)—interpungieren zwar nach *Pannoniae*, dürften aber den Namen als Dativ zu *exitibilis* gezogen haben,

<sup>1</sup> M. Kah, "Die Welt der Römer mit der Seele suchend . . .", *Hereditas* 3 (Bonn 1990) 186. Über dieses Buch s. *Historische Zeitschrift* 258 (1994) 397–415.

wie das auch die englische Übersetzung von H. J. Thomson (*Prudentius* II [Loeb Library 1949] 63) erkennen läßt: "There the race that for thirty years had plagued Pannonia was at last wiped out and paid the penalty." Damit ist die Sache gerettet, der Ausdruck allerdings hat noch nicht die volle Kraft. Sie erhält er erst, wenn man die durch Alliteration geschlossenen Wörter: *Pannoniae poenas (pependit)*, die den Vers 716 bis zur Hauptcaesur füllen, auch syntaktisch zusammenzieht. *Pannoniae* gehört als Genitivus obiectivus zu *poenas pependit*; endlich mußte das Volk, das dreißig Jahre lang Unheil gebracht hatte, "für Pannonien," d.h. für die Verheerung Pannoniens, büßen.<sup>2</sup> Wir haben es mit einer prägnanten Ausdrucksweise zu tun, die gut zur Tonlage der Stelle stimmt. Der Grund der Strafe ist in semantischer Verdichtung<sup>3</sup> durch den bloßen Ländernamen angegeben. Ähnlich heißt es bei Cicero *Red. Sen.* 32: *dixerat ... consul (sc. A. Gabinius) se clivi Capitolini poenas ab equitibus Romanis repetiturum*, wo *clivus Capitolinus* prägnant für die Besetzung des *clivus* durch die Ritter steht. An der Parallelstelle *Red. Sen.* 12 sind gleich zwei Genitive so gebraucht: (*consul dixit*) *se nonarum Decembrium ... clivique Capitolini poenas ab equitibus Romanis esse repetiturum*. Mit den Nonen des Dezember werden in starker Verknappung die Ereignisse des 5. Dezember 63 angedeutet. A. Caecina, wegen eines Pamphlets von Caesar verbannt, schreibt an Cicero (*Fam.* 6. 7. 1), bezüglich einer weiteren Veröffentlichung<sup>4</sup> sei Zurückhaltung angebracht, *cum praesertim adhuc stili poenas dem*: für den Griffel, d.h. "für die Sünden meiner Feder" (Kasten). Auch in die Dichtersprache ist dieser Prägnanztyp eingegangen. Vergil sagt (*Georg.* 1. 404 f.) über den Seeadler (gleich Nisus) und den Vogel Ciris (gleich Scylla):

apparet liquido sublimis in aere Nisus  
et pro purpureo poenas dat Scylla capillo.

Der Fall ist dem unseren besonders ähnlich: *pro capillo* statt etwa *pro capillo caeso, detonso* (vgl. Ps.-Verg. *Ciris* 185 f.), *absciso* (vgl. Anonym. in Verg. *Georg.* 1. 405 p. 267 Hagen). Und so auch bei Prudentius: *Pannoniae* statt *Pannoniae vastatae* (vgl. C. Symm. 2. 701). In der *Ciris* 51 f. wird die prägnante Ausdrucksweise Vergils zunächst wörtlich nachgeahmt, im darauffolgenden Vers aber eine vollere Wendung mit Partizip gewählt:

hanc pro purpureo poenam scelerata capillo

<sup>2</sup> Die spanische Übertragung verbindet richtig *Pannoniae poenas*, scheint freilich einen subjektiven Genitiv vorauszusetzen und wird überdies durch einen seltsamen Lapsus verunziert: "Allí pagó, aquella gente trashumante [= *exitiabilis*?] desde hacía treinta años el castigo de la Panonia" (J. Guillén – I. Rodríguez, *Obras completas de Aurelio Prudencio* [Madrid 1950] 449).

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. Leumann–Hofmann–Szantyr, *Lat. Gramn.* II 825 (unten).

<sup>4</sup> Zur Sache s. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero. Epistulae ad Familiares* II (Cambridge 1977) 404 zu Nr. 237. 1.



pro patris solvens *excisa* et funditus *urbe*.

Die allgemeine psychologische Voraussetzung solcher Prägnanz—die Möglichkeit, die besondere Bedeutung aus der Situation und aus dem Zusammenhang zu ergänzen<sup>5</sup>—ist im Falle der Verheerung Pannoniens durch die Goten ebenso erfüllt wie im Falle des Mythos von der abgeschnittenen Purpurlocke des Nisus.

## II

In dem großen Christushymnus *Cath.* 9 widmet Prudentius eine Strophe der Erweckung des Jünglings von Naim (*Lc.* 7. 11–17):

*Exitu dulcis iuventae* raptum ephebum viderat,  
orba quem mater supremis funerabat fletibus;  
'surge' dixit, ille surgit, matri et adstans redditur. 45

Die erste Zeile leidet unter einem Mißverständnis der Konstruktion. Pellegrino sträubt sich dagegen, die Wendung *dulcis iuventae* als Genitivus qualitatis zu *ephebum* zu ziehen<sup>6</sup>—mit Recht; denn *exitu* stünde so allein, ohne Attribut: *exitu* . . . *raptum* wäre unschön, die Wortstellung überdies gekünstelt. Die Diärese nach dem zweiten Metrum des trochäischen Tetrameters drückt sich bei Prudentius stets auch syntaktisch aus:<sup>7</sup> meist markiert sie Satz- oder Kolonende, ist dies nicht der Fall, wie oben in Zeile 44, sorgen deutliche Sperrungsfiguren für den nötigen Zusammenhalt.<sup>8</sup> Man wird also schon durch den Versbau darauf geführt, den ganzen Ausdruck: *exitu dulcis iuventae* zusammenzunehmen. Pellegrino übersetzt: "rapito sul termine della dolce giovinezza," faßt also *iuventae* als Genitivus subiectivus, zu *exitu* gehörig, und *exitu* als Ablativus temporis, wofür er sich auf Thomson und Colombo beruft.<sup>9</sup> Aber dem Sinne nach ist das Ergebnis ein Curiosum. *Νεανίσκος*, *adulescens* (VL, Vulg.), *iuvenis* (VL) redet der Herr den Jüngling an (*Lc.* 7. 14), und wenn hier etwas zu betonen war, dann natürlich die Tatsache, daß der Sohn der Witwe in voller Jugendblüte stand, nicht etwa der seltsame Umstand, daß die Blüte gerade

<sup>5</sup> Leumann–Hofmann–Szantyr, *Lat. Gramn.* II 826 (unten). Zum entsprechenden Gebrauch eines Ländernamens vgl. Cic. *Mur.* 11: *obiecta est enim Asia*, statt etwa: *delicatus vitae genus in Asia* (Halm). Nichts ergibt für unsere Frage R. Lamacchia, "Sull'evoluzione semantica di 'poena'," *Studia Florentina Alexandro Ronconi* . . . *oblata* (Roma 1971) 135–54.

<sup>6</sup> M. Pellegrino, *Innologia Cristiana Latina, Parte Prima. Commento a Prudentio, Cathemerinon VII–XII* (Torino 1965) 93.

<sup>7</sup> Daher kann aus Gründen der Raumersparnis die Langzeile auch aufgelöst werden, so daß eine sechszeilige Strophe entsteht, in der zweimal ein akatalektischer trochäischer Dimeter mit einem katalektischen wechselt. Diese Anordnung, bekannt aus den Gebetbüchern, wird später, etwa im *Pange lingua* des Hl. Thomas v. Aquin, auch durch Reime erleichtert.

<sup>8</sup> Attribut und Substantiv vor der Diärese bzw. am Versende, wie in V. 44, auch V. 9, 18, 25, 30, 48, 51, 53, 55, u.ö.

<sup>9</sup> Thomson, *Prudentius* II 79: "He saw a young man cut off just at the passing of sweet youth . . ." etc. Die Ausgabe von S. Colombo, *Aurelio Prudentio Clemente. Le odi quotidiane (Cathemerinon liber)* (Torino 1932), war mir nicht zugänglich.

welte—so als sei sein Tod gar nicht im rechten Sinne eine *mors immatura* gewesen, als sei er verstorben *vergente iam iuventate*.<sup>10</sup> Dann wäre er eher *πάρηβος* zu nennen, kaum *ἔφηβος*, und der Eindruck der Wundertat wäre nicht gesteigert, sondern gemindert. Pellegrino blieb eine Erklärung schuldig, aber längst vor ihm schien sie B. Rehm im *Thesaurus* V.2 1535,50 s.v. *exitus* liefern zu wollen, indem er den Prudentiusvers mit Sen. *Epist.* 12. 4 zusammenstellte:

conplectamur illam (sc. senectutem) et amemus: plena <est> voluptatis, si illa scias uti. gratissima sunt poma cum fugiunt; *pueritiae maximus in exitu decor est*; deditos vino potio extrema delectat, illa quae mergit, quae ebrietati summam manum inponit; quod in se iucundissimum omnis voluptas habet, in finem sui differt. iucundissima est aetas devexa iam, non tamen praeceps, et illam quoque in extrema tegula stantem iudico habere suas voluptates eqs.

Aber es mutet mehr als fraglich an, ob das, was hier über die *pueritia* gesagt wird, ohne weiteres über die *iuventas* sich sagen ließe; ob man behaupten dürfte, daß sich der Reiz der Jugend zum Ende hin ebenso steigern wie die Schönheit der Knaben! Zwar ist Seneca selbst auf Verallgemeinerung aus, aber er hat die Beispiele, die seine Maxime (*quod in se iucundissimum omnis voluptas habet, in finem sui differt*) stützen sollen, sorgfältig gewählt. Es kommt ihm auf die Verteidigung des Greisenalters an: gerade diejenige Phase des Lebens, die dem Ende zuneige, biete vollen, ja höchsten Genuß, wie denn überhaupt jedwede Annehmlichkeit am meisten erfreue, kurz bevor sie zu Ende gehe: die reifsten Früchte schmecken am besten; die Knaben, die schon fast keine Knaben mehr sind, besitzen den größten Reiz;<sup>11</sup> der Becher Wein, den man als letzten leert, bevor der Genuß in der Trunkenheit vergeht, mündet am meisten. Wie gesagt: es erscheint zweifelhaft, ob Seneca einen ebenso einleuchtenden Beweis seines Satzes lieferte, wenn er uns an das Ende der Jugend erinnerte. Er tat es jedenfalls nicht. Aber selbst wenn man darüber hinwegsehen und annehmen wollte, Senecas Reflexion schließe eine entsprechende Folgerung auch für die *iuventas* (*adulescentia*) ein, so bliebe noch immer die weitere Frage, ob solche Anschauung derart verbreitet war, daß Prudentius sie einfach als bekannt voraussetzen konnte, also sicher sein durfte, daß man verstehe, warum er die Altersangabe des Evangeliums gerade mit solcher Pointe versah. Diese Frage wird sich kaum bejahen lassen, zumal dann nicht, wenn man den speziellen Zusammenhang bei Seneca bedenkt. Im Grunde

<sup>10</sup> Porphy. *Hor. Carm.* 2. 5. 13–15.

<sup>11</sup> Seneca hat Tatsachen im Sinn, wie sie auch Horaz vorschweben, wenn er, an Sestius gewandt (*Carm.* 1. 4. 19 f.), über einen schönen Knaben sagt: *Nec tenerum Lycidan mirabere, quo calet iuventus Nunc omnis et mox virgines tepebunt*. Ungefähr in die gleiche Richtung weist die erotische Altersskala in dem Epigramm *Anthol. Pal.* 12. 4 (Hinweis E. Eyben), ohne daß man doch bei Seneca ein derart derbes Motiv erkennen dürfte; vgl. E. Eyben, *De jonge Romein*, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren 39, nr. 81 (Brüssel 1977) 475, Anm. 19.

widerrät ja schon das Attribut *dulcis*, sc. *iuventae* solche Auffassung.<sup>12</sup> Es gilt der Jugendzeit schlechthin: wie kann also Tod am Ende "der süßen Jugend" etwas besonders Schlimmes sein? Etwas Schlimmeres als in der Mitte "der süßen Jugend"—oder am Anfang "der süßen Jugend"? Der ganze Ausdruck wäre verquer, Enallage adiectivi (*exitu dulci iuventae*) pure Künstelei, ja unverständlich.

Rehm hat die Stellen zu Unrecht zusammengedrückt. *Iuventae* ist Genitivus obiectivus zum Ablativus instr. (causae) *exitu* (sc. *raptum*) und steht nach dem Muster *excessus (discessus) vitae, corporis* etc., "Scheiden aus dem Leben, aus dem Körper" usw., wie sonst *excessus e vita, e corpore*: der Sprachgebrauch deutet sich schon bei Cicero an: *Tusc.* 1. 27: *neque excessu vitae sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret*; vgl. *Tert. Res.* 22. 1, Z. 3 f. (CCL II 947): (*scripturae non sinunt resurrectionem*) *ab excessu statim vitae vindicari*; *Prob. Verg. Georg.* 1. 14 (III.2 351, Z. 18 Thilo-Hagen): (*Aristaeus*) *post excessum vitae . . . relatus in numerum deorum*; *Vulg. II Macc.* 4. 7: *sed post Seleuci vitae excessum*; deutlicher *Ruf. Hist.* 4. 15. 5 (GCS IX.1: Euseb. II.1 339, Z. 2): (*Germanicum martyrem*) *iniquae huius vitae ultro velocem expetisse discessum*; *Cassian. Conl.* 1. 14. 7 (CSEL XIII 23, Z. 24 ff.): *nec . . . in nihilum eas (sc. animas defunctorum) resolvi post huius commorationis excessum*; *Verecundus In Cant.* 5. 4 (CCL XCIII 120, Z. 1 f.): *nec enim nos possunt post excessum corporis ultra defuncti videre*; in anderem Zusammenhang etwa *Ruf. Hist.* 3. 6. 11 (GCS IX.1: Euseb. II.1 203, Z. 20): *Iudaeis vero cum egressu urbis omnis pariter spes excludebatur* und wohl auch *Paulin. Nol. Epist.* 5. 19 (CSEL XXIX 37, Z. 18 f.): *quod si forte proficiscens cogitata carorum hominum vel adsuetorum locorum divulsione lacrimaveris* eqs. "Nach den Verbalsubstantiven der Bewegung ist der Gen. obi. leicht begreiflich dort, wo das zugrundeliegende Verbum die entsprechende Akk.-Konstruktion kennt."<sup>13</sup> Das trifft auf *exire/exitus* ebenso zu wie auf *excedere/excessus, discedere/discessus, egredire/egressus*. Beispiele für transitives *exire* finden sich seit Terenz; man sagt *exire limen, fores, fines senectae* und (im gleichen Sinne) *exire iuventutem*, und daher verbindet sich der Genitivus obi. auch mit *exitus*, bei *Prudentius* ebenso wie bei *Filastrius* 26. 6, Z. 41 (CCL IX 228): (*ut homines*) *diversis . . . post exitum corporis poenis et cruciatibus pessumdentur*. *Prudentius* gebraucht dieselbe Ausdrucksweise, nur in einer besonderen, den Umständen angepaßten Variation: *exitu dulcis iuventae* (statt: *exitu e dulci iuventae*) *raptum ephebum viderat*, "Er hatte einen Jüngling erblickt, durch Abscheiden aus der süßen Jugend hingerafft." Daß das Verbalsubstantiv *exitu* so zum Passiv *raptum* tritt, mag vielleicht etwas überraschen, muß aber hingenommen werden. Es herrscht schon der Gedanke, daß der Tote durch sein Fortgehen der Mutter genommen ist. Die

<sup>12</sup> Die Junktur ist horazisch: *Carm.* 1. 16. 23: *in dulci iuventa*.

<sup>13</sup> Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lat. Gramm.* II 67. Hier auch die meisten der angeführten Beispiele außerhalb des *Prudentius*.

nächste Zeile macht das vollends klar. Der sterbende Germanicus sagt bei Tacitus *Ann.* 2. 71: *si fato concederem, iustus mihi dolor etiam adversus deos esset, quod me parentibus, liberis, patriae intra iuventam praemature exitu raperent* eqs. In der kühneren Konstruktion unseres Dichters lautete der Vorwurf: *quod me parentibus . . . praemature exitu iuventae raperent*. Der Prudentiusvers bereichert die Beispielsammlungen der Handbücher um einen bemerkenswerten Fall. Er fehlt ebenso bei Lavarenne in der *Étude*.<sup>14</sup>

## III

Prudentius hat diesen Genitiv bei den Verbalsubstantiven *exeundi* (*introeundi*) auch sonst. In den Versen *Ham.* 600 ff. schildert er die schreckliche Geburt der Schlangen, die sich durch den Leib der Mutter hindurchfressen:

nam quia nascendi nullus patet exitus, alvus	600
fetibus in lucem nitentibus excruciat	
carpitur atque viam lacerata per ilia pandit.	
tandem obitu altricis prodit grex illa dolorum	
<i>ingressum vitae</i> vix eluctatus et ortum	
per scelus exculpens eqs.	605

*Nascendi (exitus)* in V. 600 hält Lavarenne fälschlich für einen Genitivus obi.—der Genitiv des Gerundiums hat finale Bedeutung<sup>15</sup>—aber *ingressum vitae* liefert ein passendes Beispiel, nicht vermerkt bei Lavarenne und nicht beachtet von den Kommentatoren Stam und Palla:<sup>16</sup> die Schar der jungen Schlangen erkämpft sich "den Eintritt ins Leben." Vgl. etwa Cic. *Phil.* 5. 9: *ingressio fori*; *De Or.* 1. 98: *rerum aditus*; Liv. 27. 30. 7: *litorum adpulsus*. Hierher gehört auch Prud. *Psych.* 665 f.:

ventum erat ad fauces portae castrensis, ubi artum  
liminis introitum biferi dant cardine claustra.

Denn wie *limen intrare* (z.B. Cic. *Phil.* 2. 45), *limen exire* (Ter. *Hec.* 378) sagt man auch *limen (domum, portam) introire* (Salv. *Gub.* 8. 11, ferner Hugenschmidt: *ThLL* VII.2 74, Z. 66 ff.; 76, Z. 30 ff.), so daß der objektive Genitiv neben *introitus* nichts Auffälliges an sich hat, vgl. besonders Sen. *Benef.* 6. 34. 1: *proprium (sc. est) superbiae magno aestimare introitum ac tactum sui liminis*; ferner: Plin. *Nat.* 33. 56 *primo introitu urbis*; Mela 3. 82:

<sup>14</sup> M. Lavarenne, *Étude* 120–22, §§ 269–71.

<sup>15</sup> Lavarenne, *Étude* 122, § 271. Richtig gestellt von J. Stam, *Prudentius. Hamartigenia* (Amsterdam 1940) 215 zu *Ham.* 600. Nichts dazu bei R. Palla, *Prudenzio. Hamartigenia* (Pisa 1981).

<sup>16</sup> Aber bei beiden in der Übersetzung richtig wiedergegeben: "having cleared a way towards life" (Stam [wie vorige Anm.] 95); "aprendosi a fatica l'ingresso nella vita" (Palla [wie vorige Anm.] 85).

*in ipso introitu finium*; Filastr. 107. 3, Z. 15 (CCL IX 270): *usque ad terrae promissae introitum*.<sup>17</sup>

Unzweifelhaft ist die Art des Genitivs auch in folgendem Falle (Prud. C. Symm. 2. 289 ff.):

non aliter nostri corruptus corporis usus  
in vitium plerumque cadit nec in ordine recto 990  
perstat et excessu moderaminis adficit artus.

“Durch Hinausgehen über das Maß,” “durch Abweichen vom Maß.” Sinngemäß übersetzt Thomson:<sup>18</sup> “by getting out of control,” ganz falsch Lavarenne:<sup>19</sup> “par suite du péché de l’élément directeur.” Der Ausdruck *excessus moderaminis*, gebildet nach den üblichen Junktoren *excedere modum, mensuram* etc., nimmt auf, was zuvor in V. 973 f. über die Elemente gesagt war: (*elementa*) *de legitimo discussa modo plerumque feruntur* eqs., und er variiert die unmittelbar vorhergehende Wendung (990 f.): *nec in ordine recto Perstat* (sc. *nostri corporis usus*). Richtig erklärt M. Leumann im *Thesaurus* (V.2 1230, Z. 23 f.): “*excessu moderaminis* (i. a modo),” und auch bei Georges s.v. *excessus* steht das Richtige: “Das Abgehen, Abweichen von einer Sache” (gleichfalls mit Bezug auf unsere Stelle).

Lavarenne, der dieses Beispiel für bemerkenswerten Gebrauch des Genitivus obi. verkannt hat, zieht eine andere Stelle hierher (Prud. C. Symm. 2. 902 ff.):

discedite longe  
et vestrum penetrate chaos, quo vos vocat ille  
*praeuius infernae* perplexa per avia noctis.

Lavarenne:<sup>20</sup> “celui qui guide vers la nuit de l’enfers.” In der Tat stünde *praeuius* (sc. *diabolus*) nicht gut allein—im Falle, daß man den Genitiv *infernae noctis* zu *avia* zöge. Und noch wandeln ja Symmachus und die anderen obstinaten Heiden nicht in der Hölle. Der Teufel geht ihnen vielmehr voran über die verschlungenen Pfade des Götzendienstes, über die unwegsamen Gefilde abseits der Wahrheit (dies alles meint: *perplexa per avia*): “in die höllische Nacht.” Die Worte: *praeuius infernae . . . noctis* gehören jedenfalls zusammen.<sup>21</sup> Genitivus subi. wäre hier vielleicht möglich, aber weniger sinnvoll. Vgl. Ambros. Off. 1. 18. 70 über Paulus: *primam hanc* (sc. *modestiam*) *et quasi praeuiam vult esse orationis futurae*.

<sup>17</sup> Alle diese Stellen im *Thesaurus* VII.2 78 s.v. *introitus* (Hugenschmidt), wo aber der Beleg aus Prudentius fehlt.

<sup>18</sup> Thomson, *Prudentius* II 85.

<sup>19</sup> Lavarenne, *Prudence* III 191.

<sup>20</sup> Lavarenne, *Étude* 121, § 271.

<sup>21</sup> In diesem Punkte muß ich meine eigene Übersetzung verbessern: Ch. Gnilka, XPHIΣ: *Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur II: Kultur und Conversion* (Basel 1993) 44.



Hier heißt die Bescheidenheit *praevia*, weil sie Vorläuferin der späteren Rede (*orationis futurae*: Gen. subi.) sein, ihr im zeitlichen Sinne vorausgehen soll. Auf die Aussage der Prudentiusverse läßt sich dieses Verhältnis kaum übertragen. Lavarenne wird also wohl Recht haben. Man darf sich hier auch an gewisse Verbindungen erinnern, die schon in klassischer Prosa gelegentlich auftauchen: Caes. *Bell. Civ.* 1. 4. 5: (*legiones*) *ab itinere Asiae Syriaeque ad suam potentiam . . . converterat* (sc. *Pompeius*), "vom Marsch nach Asien und Syrien"; Cic. *Ad Quint.* 1. 1. 15: *vias pecuniae*, "Wege zum Geld"; Tib. 1. 3. 50: *leti viae*, "Wege in den Tod."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Diese Fälle bei A. C. Juret, *Système de la syntaxe latine*<sup>2</sup> (Paris 1933) 311.

## Das Schrifttum des Oriens Christianus als Bestandteil der spätantiken Literatur

JOHANNES IRMSCHER

Die klassische Philologie und die Philologie des Oriens Christianus haben lange Zeit ziemlich beziehungslos nebeneinander gestanden. Im Ensemble der Wissenschaften nahm die klassische Philologie, wie schon ihre Benennung "klassisch" zum Ausdruck brachte, eine Vorzugsstellung ein, die begründet war einerseits durch die allgemein anerkannte Vorbildlichkeit der antiken Kultur und zum zweiten durch die Funktion des Lateins als internationaler Gelehrtensprache, die noch lange in Geltung blieb, auch als jene Voraussetzungen nicht mehr oder nur noch eingeschränkt gegeben waren. Ebenjene Sonderstellung führte ein Geschichtsbild herauf, in dem die Antike durchaus dominierte, ja zuzeiten sogar allein das Griechentum und womöglich auch dieses nur in seiner klassischen Ausprägung Relevanz besaß. Die Randkulturen des Orbis antiquus wurden von dieser Sicht her als Barbarenkulturen betrachtet, die nur im Hinblick auf die antike Kultur Beachtung verdienten.

Die Philologie des Oriens Christianus hat ihre Wurzeln in den seit dem Florentiner Konzil (1438–1445) verstärkten Unionsbestrebungen der römischen Kirche, und es genügt hier, an die maronitische Familie der Assemani zu erinnern, die im 18. Jahrhundert vier bedeutende Orientalisten hervorbrachte, welche mit einiger Berechtigung als die Begründer der Studien über den christlichen Orient bezeichnet werden. So waren jedenfalls jene Studien sowohl personell wie auch von ihren Inhalten her von Anfang an eng mit der Theologie und deren Wissenschaftsorganismen verbunden, ja sie konnten bisweilen überhaupt als eine theologische Disziplin gelten. Ihr Konnex zu der klassischen Philologie und deren Fragestellungen war aus allen solchen Gründen niemals sonderlich eng, und so konnte in den Kreisen der mit der Antike Befassten die an der Wirklichkeit vorübergehende Auffassung artikuliert werden, daß das Schrifttum des Oriens Christianus allein "biblisch-kirchlich-mönchisch" gewesen sei. Die Byzantinistik konstituierte sich im Verlaufe des 19. Jahrhunderts als auf dem theoretischen Fundament von Historismus und Positivismus wirkende philologisch-historische Wissenschaft. Von der klassischen Philologie übernahm sie auf lange Zeit hin die dezidierte

Orientierung auf die beiden klassischen Sprachen und die in der mediävalen byzantinischen Gesellschaft fortlebenden antiken Elemente, während der orientalische Part des Vielvölkerstaates Byzanz allein schon wegen der für den Forscher notwendigen speziellen Sprachkenntnisse vielfach unterbewertet, wenn nicht gar unbeachtet blieb.

In unserer Zeit, deren ökonomische, soziale und politische Prozesse nur unter globalem Gesichtspunkt behandelt werden können, muß mit notwendiger Konsequenz auch die Vergangenheit, die Geschichte der Urzeit, des Altertums und des Mittelalters, unter solch globalem, d.h. welthistorischem, Aspekt erfaßt werden. Und noch ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt ist zu beachten. Für die Geschichtsforschung unserer Gegenwart sind nicht so sehr die Inhaber der Macht, die Herrschenden, von Interesse als vielmehr die Beherrschten, die außerhalb der Macht Stehenden, die Outsider, die Randsiedler, welche die bisherige Historiographie vernachlässigte; nur unter Einbeziehung beider sozialer Gruppen, nur unter Berücksichtigung ihrer differenten Interessen und der daraus resultierenden (Klassen)kämpfe sind zuverlässige Einsichten in die objektiven historischen Prozesse möglich. Auf die uns hier interessierenden Zeiträume angewandt, besagen diese Überlegungen: Sowohl das Imperium Romanum als auch das Reich von Byzanz waren Vielvölkerstaaten, die sich auf eine mannigfach gestaltete ethnische Basis gründeten. In bedingtem Ausmaße waren sie auch ökonomische Einheiten, wobei jedoch die wirtschaftliche Integration niemals und nirgends Ausmaße erreichte, die zu modernen Gegebenheiten in Vergleich gebracht werden könnten. Weit stärker beförderte die Integration eine bewußt und in differenten Formen betriebene, erwiesenermaßen effektive Staatspropaganda und eine skrupellose Politik des *Divide et impera*! Aber trotz aller integrativen Bestrebungen und Aktivitäten war doch zu keiner Zeit eine totale Gräzisierung beziehungsweise Latinisierung des Imperiums möglich, vielmehr förderten im Gegenteil solche Tendenzen vielerorts das Bewußtwerden der eigenen Identität. Wenn in Gallien, Hispanien, auf der Balkanhalbinsel und weithin in Kleinasien die epichorischen Sprachen nicht literarisch zu werden vermochten und nur in fragmentarischen Resten auf uns gekommen sind, so steht dem die Tatsache gegenüber, daß im Bereiche des *Oriens Christianus*—in Syrien und Palästina, in der Arabia, in Ägypten und Äthiopien einerseits und im Kaukasusgebiet andererseits—die einheimischen Sprachen eigene Schriften entwickelten und in unterschiedlichen Formen Literaturen herausbildeten, die zum Teil in ungebrochener, unmittelbarer Kontinuität bis zur Gegenwart hinführen. Die geistige Leistung, welche diesen emanzipatorischen Akt ermöglichte, kann nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden, und es steht außer Zweifel, daß das sendungsbewußte und darum auf Expansion drängende Christentum diesen Emanzipationsprozeß recht erheblich beschleunigte, und das ganz besonders in solchen Territorien, wo sich, durch dogmatische Sonderungen begünstigt, nationalkirchliche Strukturen herauszubilden

begannen. Aber in allen Fällen gehört zur Literatur des Oriens Christianus, was niemals übersehen werden darf, auch die Behandlung profaner Themen.

Eine wirkliche Geschichte der spätantiken Literatur ist noch nicht geschrieben, und sie ist nicht leicht zu schreiben. Denn die vorhandenen Darstellungen bieten Längsschnitte, auf jeweils eine Sprache bezogen, wie es von den Möglichkeiten des einzelnen Forschers her nicht anders sein kann. Was aber darüber hinaus not tut, ist der Querschnitt, der jeweils für einen bestimmten Zeitraum und für das gesamte Reichsgebiet die sprachlichen und literarischen Phänomene in ihrer Vielgestaltigkeit aufweist und, wo immer möglich, ihre Interdependenz sichtbar macht. Sicher ist es leichter, ein solches Anliegen zu postulieren als es zu realisieren. Doch bleibt das wissenschaftliche Erfordernis, auch wenn seine volle Verwirklichung heute und wohl auch in naher Zukunft noch nicht möglich ist.

Es war zweifellos das vierte Jahrhundert, in dem die Vielfalt selbständiger Literaturen besonders augenfällig wurde. Das Imperium reichte in jenem Säkulum im Westen von Britannien über Gallien und Lusitanien bis zu den Säulen des Herkules, im Süden dem Saum des Mittelmeeres entlang von Mauretanien bis nach Ägypten, und im Osten war die Küstenstrecke von einem beträchtlichen Hinterland begleitet. Das Schwarze Meer, die Donaulinie, der Limes und der Rhein bildeten die Grenze gen Norden. Es ist, soweit ich sehe, noch nie der Versuch unternommen worden, einmal die Sprachen festzuhalten, die durch überlieferte Denkmäler faßbaren und die nur dem Namen nach bekannten, welche in diesem auch nach heutigen Vorstellungen immensen Staatsgebiet gesprochen wurden. Der Sprachenkampf, den man in vorhandenem Fachschrifttum vornehmlich auf die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Griechischem und Lateinischem bezog, würde dabei an Kolorit und Kontur gewinnen.

Daß von jenen Sprachen nur ein Bruchteil zu Literatursprachen wurde, ist bereits erörtert worden. Das Lateinische vermochte dank der Diokletianischen Reformen seine Stellung im Osten zu festigen. Juristen bedienten sich dieser Sprache, in Rom ebenso wie in Athen oder in der neu ins Leben gerufenen Rechtsschule von Berytos, weil das Lateinische eine juristische Fachsprache von äußerster Prägnanz herausgebildet hatte. Aber auch in der Rhetorik hatte das Lateinische neben der griechischen Tradition eine beachtliche Stellung zu gewinnen vermocht. So begann der aus Nordafrika stammende, nachmalige Kirchenlehrer Lactantius, den die Humanisten als christlichen Cicero rühmten, seine Karriere als Lehrer der Beredsamkeit in Nikomedeia und wurde, Christ geworden, von Konstantin dem Großen zum Erzieher seines Sohnes Crispus in Trier bestimmt. Ungeachtet solcher Fakta blieb natürlich die Position der griechischen Sprache und Literatur im Osten unerschüttert, während im Westen ein gewisser Rückgang griechischer Kenntnisse und griechischen Einflusses zu verzeichnen war, womit gewiegte Latinisten ein Absinken des lateinischen Stilgefühls begründen zu können glaubten. Immerhin blieb der Westen noch attraktiv

genug, um den zunächst griechisch dichtenden Claudius Claudianus aus Ägypten als Hofpoeten des allmächtigen Reichsfeldherrn Stilicho zu bedeutenden Leistungen vielfältiger Couleur zu beflügeln.

Vor allem aber zeigt jenes vierte Jahrhundert auch die Literaturen des christlichen Orients in kräftiger Entfaltung, und dieser Orient war eben sehr wesentlich Teil des Imperiums, wie wir es vorhin darstellten. Der werdenden ägyptischen Nationalkirche wurden in koptischer Sprache—oder muß man besser sagen: in den koptischen Dialekten?—nahezu alle Formen des altchristlichen Schrifttums vermittelt, neben denen gnostisches und manichäisches Gedankengut konkurrierend überliefert wurde und sich in der Mönchsliteratur ein Genus eigenartiger Prägung vorbereitete. Dabei ist es für die Würdigung solcher Leistungen nur wenig von Belang, daß die koptische Literatur in starkem Maße auf Übersetzungen—jedoch keineswegs nur aus dem Griechischen—beruhte. Übersetzungen hatten auch bei der Herausbildung der syrischen Literatur Pate gestanden, sogar mit einem breiteren Spektrum als bei der koptischen, und die mit dem Christentum rivalisierenden Strömungen hatten in Bardesanes eine vielseitige Verkörperung gefunden. Im vierten Jahrhundert aber wirkte Ephräm der Syrer als Kirchendichter ebenso wie als Kommentator biblischer Bücher. Auch in der Arabia, scheint es, begann sich literarisches Leben zu regen; jedenfalls fängt das arabische Schrifttum nicht erst mit der Islamisierung an. Außerhalb des Territoriums des Reiches, aber dennoch in dessen kulturellem Einzugsgebiet, wird in Äthiopien im vierten Jahrhundert Literatur faßbar—mit eigenständigen heidnischen Leistungen und Übersetzungen biblischer Texte. Zu erblühen begann das Schrifttum der Armenier, dessen goldenes Zeitalter im fünften Jahrhundert bevorstand. Die georgische Literatur sollte sich ihm anschließen.

Zu nennen wären noch die 369 begonnene Übersetzung der Bibel durch den gotischen Bischof Wulfila, die intensive rabbinische Literatur, die sich um den Talmud gruppierte, oder die mittelpersische Rezeption griechischer Werke; auf jeden Fall tritt ein vielgestaltiges geistiges Leben vor unser Auge, das voll nur in der Synopse erfaßt werden kann. Und wer würde bei der Betrachtung dieser Szene nicht an die Vorstellungen von Weltliteratur erinnert werden, wie sie in mehrfachen Äußerungen des alten Goethe zutage traten? Weltliteratur sollte mehr sein als bloße Addition von Nationalliteraturen. Als eine Art von allgemeiner Durchbildung, fern jedes Partikularismus, als eine Art höhere Weltbildung, die mit allem In- und Ausländischen vertraut macht, wollte der Weise von Weimar Weltliteratur verstanden wissen. Ich meine, bereits unser in Andeutungen verbleibender Abriß hat sichtbar gemacht, daß unter den Bedingungen ihrer Zeit und mit den Mitteln ihrer Zeit die Literatur der Spätantike eine solche Form sich herausbildender Weltliteratur gewesen ist.



## Der Humanist und das Buch: Heinrich Rantzaus Liebeserklärung an seine Bücher

WALTHER LUDWIG

Die Humanisten liebten—und lieben—ihre Bibliotheken.<sup>1</sup> Vielleicht das schönste Bekenntnis zur Bibliophilie stammt aus der Feder des holsteinischen Humanisten und langjährigen Statthalters des dänischen Königs in den Herzogtümern Schleswig und Holstein Heinrich Rantzau (1526–1598).<sup>2</sup> Er hatte sich 1538–1548 zum Studium in Wittenberg aufgehalten und dann mehrere Jahre am Hof Kaiser Karls V., bevor er nach Holstein zurückkehrte. Dort errichtete er nach dem Tod seines Vaters (1565) auf seinem Schloß Breitenburg bei Itzehoe, das damals Bredenberg hieß, eine große Bibliothek, die 1568 von dem Präzeptor seines Sohnes Friedrich (1557–1587), dem Hannoveraner Georg Kruse bzw. Crusius

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. allgemein A. Buck, *Studien zu Humanismus und Renaissance* (Wiesbaden 1991) 120 ff. (zuerst: "Das gelehrte Buch im Humanismus," in: *Gelehrte Bücher vom Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart*, hrsg. von B. Fabian und P. Raabe [Wiesbaden 1983] 1 ff.), dens., *Humanismus* (Freiburg/München 1987) 138 ff., und F. Krafft und D. Wuttke (Hrsg.), *Das Verhältnis der Humanisten zum Buch* (Boppard 1977).

<sup>2</sup> Sein deutscher Titel Statthalter (zeitgenössisch: Stathalter, Stadtholder) wird lateinisch mit *Vicarius regis* oder *Produx regis* wiedergegeben, weshalb er auch als dänischer Vizekönig bezeichnet wird. Vgl. zu ihm J. Møller, *Cimbria Literata*, T. III (Kopenhagen 1744) 567 ff. (ausführlichste Materialsammlung), *ADB* 27 (1888) 278 f., F. Bertheau, "Heinrich Rantzau als Humanist," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Schleswig-Holsteinisch-Lauenburgische Geschichte* 18 (1888) 131 ff., K. Jordan, "Heinrich Rantzau als Wegbereiter des Humanismus in Schleswig-Holstein," in: J. Immscher (Hrsg.), *Renaissance und Humanismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa*, Bd. 1 (Berlin 1962) 235 ff. (eine allgemeine Orientierung), D. Lohmeier, "Heinrich Rantzau und die Adelskultur der frühen Neuzeit," in: D. Lohmeier (Hrsg.), *Arte et Marte: Studien zur Adelskultur des Barockzeitalters in Schweden, Dänemark und Schleswig-Holstein* (Neumünster 1978) 67 ff. (dort auch weitere Literatur), und zuletzt W. Steinmetz, *Heinrich Rantzau (1526–1598), ein Vertreter des Humanismus in Nordeuropa und seine Wirkungen als Förderer der Künste* (Frankfurt/Bern/New York/Paris 1991) 2 Bde. Die Verfasserin geht auf die von Rantzau verfaßten poetischen Texte nicht näher ein und konzentriert ihre Darstellung nach seiner Biographie auf seine Beziehungen zu den bildenden Künsten und zur Architektur. Die Gedichte Rantzaus haben insgesamt bis jetzt keine Interpretation, sondern nur kurze Erwähnungen erhalten. Eine Ausnahme bildet nur R. Haupt, "Zur Erinnerung an Heinrich Rantzau mit Übersetzungen aus seinen Gedichten," *Schleswig-Holsteiner Jahrbücher* (1884) 372 ff., und "Heinrich Ranzau und die Künste," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Schleswig-Holsteinische Geschichte* 56 (1927) 1 ff., der auf etwa zweihundert verstreut überlieferte lateinische Gedichte von Rantzau hinwies, ihre—bisher nicht erfolgte—philologische Behandlung wünschte und einige von ihnen—ohne literarische Interpretation—mit einer deutschen Versübersetzung veröffentlicht hat.

erstmalig beschrieben<sup>3</sup> und 1590 von seinem Hofdichter Peter Lindenberg aus Rostock (1562–1596) erneut dargestellt wurde.<sup>4</sup> Die Bibliothek enthielt 1590 über 6300 Bücher, die systematisch aufgestellt waren (1568 werden die Klassen Logik, *Mathesis*, *Physica*, Medizin, Jurisprudenz, Theologie und Historiographie genannt, 1590 außerdem die Philosophie und die Poesie).<sup>5</sup> Im Bibliotheksraum befanden sich astronomische Instrumente sowie Erd- und Himmelsgloben. An seine Wände waren Karten der vier Kontinente, auf die Glasfenster Figuren der sieben Künste gemalt. Außerdem hatte Rantzau an die Wände von ihm selbst verfaßte lateinische Gedichte und Zitate aus klassischen Autoren schreiben lassen. Eines dieser von ihm selbst vermutlich in den Jahren 1566–1568 verfaßten Gedichte lautete (die Interpunktion wurde hier modernisiert; in der anschließenden Übersetzung ist die Gliederung in fünf symmetrische Abschnitte durch || angegeben):

Salvete, aureoli mei libelli,  
meae deliciae, mei lepores!  
Quam vos saepe oculis iuvat videre  
et tritos manibus tenere nostris!  
Tot vos eximii, tot eruditi,  
prisci lumina saeculi et recentis,

5

<sup>3</sup> S. G. Crusius, *Descriptio Bredenbergae Holsaticae vel Cimbricae in Stormaria arcis, conditae primum a magnanimo Heroe D. Ioanne Rantzovio, nunc ab eius filio Henrico, regis Danorum consiliario et in ducatibus Holsaticae, Slesvicensi atque Ditmarsiae vicario, novis aedificiis plurimisque versibus et sententiis lectu cum frugiferis tum iucundis sic expositae, ut Martem cum Minerva in hac ornanda amice coniurasse lector deprendere possit . . .*, zuerst o.O. 1569, danach Wittenberg 1570, Straßburg 1573 und 1574 (letzte Auflage nachgewiesen in J. D. Michaelis, *Catalogus praestantissimi Thesauri librorum typis vulgatorum et manuscriptorum Joannis Petri de Ludewig* [Halle 1744] Nr. 9592). Der Widmungsbrief an Heinrich Rantzau ist datiert Bredenberga, 10. November 1568. Im folgenden wird zitiert die Ausgabe Wittenberg 1570 aus der Bibliothek des Gymnasiums in Altona in der Staatsbibliothek Hamburg (A 1952/2242). Vgl. dazu W. Steinmetz (wie Anm. 2) 319 ff. Nach der Widmung seines Buches erhielt G. Crusius von Heinrich Rantzau 1569 ein Studium in Wittenberg finanziert (imm. 14. Februar 1569), das er mit dem Magistergrad abschloß, und darauf ein jährliches Stipendium von 70 Talem als *Vicarius* eines *Canonicus* in Schleswig; s. *Schleswig-Holsteinische Regesten und Urkunden* 9: Herrschaft Breitenburg 1256–1598, bearbeitet von K. Hector und W. Prange (Neumünster 1988) Nr. 593 vom 4. November 1569. Vgl. allgemein zu Schloß Breitenburg (heute im Besitz der Grafen Rantzau und nicht öffentlich zugänglich) O. Klose (Hrsg.), *Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg*, Handbuch der historischen Stätten Deutschlands 1, 2. Aufl. (Stuttgart 1964) 23 ff., R. Haupt, *Die Bau- und Kunstdenkmäler der Provinz Schleswig-Holstein*, 2. Bd. (Kiel 1888) 445 ff., und I. Habich, "Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein," in: G. Dehio, *Handbuch der Deutschen Kunstdenkmäler* (Darmstadt 1971) 130 ff., zu der Bibliothek zuletzt W. Steinmetz, a.O., S. 185.

<sup>4</sup> P. Lindebergius, *Hypotyposis arcium, palatiorum, librorum, pyramidorum, obeliscorum, cipporum, molarum, fontium, monumentorum et epitaphiorum ab Henrico Rantzovio conditorum*, Rostock 1590, danach erweitert Hamburg 1590 und 1591, Frankfurt 1592. Im folgenden wird, wenn nicht anders angegeben, zitiert die Ausgabe Hamburg 1591 im Landesarchiv Schleswig (E I 1053). Vgl. dazu W. Steinmetz (wie Anm. 2) 322 ff. und zu P. Lindenberg allgemein auch H. Wiegand, *Hodoeporica* (Baden-Baden 1584) 318 f., 502 f., und W. Steinmetz, S. 124 ff.

<sup>5</sup> S. G. Crusius (wie Anm. 3) Bl. Mi ff., P. Lindebergius (wie Anm. 4) 10 ff. Zum Inhalt der Begriffe vgl. Chr. Meinel, *Die Bibliothek des Joachim Jungius* (Göttingen 1992) 67 f.

confecere viri suasque vobis  
 ausi credere lucubrationes  
 et sperare decus perenne scriptis.  
 Nec haec irrita spes fefellit illos: 10  
 vestro praesidio per universum  
 aevo perpetuo leguntur orbem  
 doctorumque volant per ora clari.  
 Vos estis requies honesta mentis,  
 iucunda ingeniis bonis voluptas, 15  
 rebus perfugium minus secundis,  
 in laetis decus et nitor refulgens.  
 Vos aetate puer virente magno  
 sum complexus amore, nunc vir autem  
 multo prosequor impotentiore 20  
 et, quam fata diu sinent amare,  
 vobis immoriar, mei libelli.  
 Ac cum rege lubens fatebor illo  
 Alphonso egregio esse cariores  
 vestras divitias mihi, benigna 25  
 quam sors quas mihi contulit caducas.  
 Salvete, aureoli mei libelli,  
 salvete, ex quibus haec mihi voluptas  
 aevum percipitur per omne grata!  
 Quam vos intueor libenter et quam 30  
 lubens colloquor! Ecquid aestimandum est  
 curis esse beatius solutis?

("Seid mir begrüßt, meine geliebten goldenen Bücher, mein Vergnügen, meine Lust! Wie sehr freut es mich, euch mit meinen Augen oft zu sehen und euch abgenutzt in meinen Händen zu halten! || Euch haben so viele herausragende, so viele gelehrte Männer, Leuchten der alten und modernen Zeit, verfaßt und es gewagt, euch ihre Gedankenarbeit anzuvertrauen und für ihre Schriften eine beständige Zier zu erhoffen. Und diese Hoffnung hat sie auch nicht getrogen. Unter eurem Schutz werden sie in der ganzen Welt immerdar gelesen und sie 'fliegen' berühmt 'durch die Mündel' der Gelehrten. || Ihr seid eine ehrenvolle Erholung und eine süße Lust für einen guten Geist, eine Zuflucht, wenn die Dinge weniger günstig, und in frohen Zeiten Zier und strahlend leuchtender Glanz. || Euch habe ich als Knabe in jungem Alter mit großer Liebe umfassen, und jetzt verfolge und begleite ich euch als Mann mit noch unbändigerer Leidenschaft und, solange das Schicksal mich lieben lassen wird, werde ich vor Liebe zu euch vergehen, meine Bücher. Und ich werde gerne mit jenem weisen König Alfonso bekennen, daß eure Reichtümer mir lieber sind als die vergänglichen, die ein wohlwollendes Geschick mir brachte. || Seid mir begrüßt, meine geliebten goldenen Bücher, aus denen ich immerdar diese willkommene Lust gewinne! Wie gern betrachte ich euch und wie gern spreche ich mit

euch! Gibt es, wenn wir so von Sorgen befreit sind, etwas Beglückenderes?“)

Dieses Gedicht wird zuerst von Crusius zitiert.<sup>6</sup> Allerdings hat er in einer merkwürdigen Verwirrung zwischen V. 26 und 27 ein anderes gleichfalls hendekasyllabisches Gedicht, das offenbar auf der gleichen Bibliothekswand stand, eingeschachtelt:

Haec est vera beatitudo vitae,	
in casto thalamo pia bonaque,	
quae sit nupta viro comes laborum,	
iunctum coniuge functione certa	
inservire Deo brevisque vitae	5
semper munia sedulum subire	
et caram sobolem sibi educantem	
lectis moribus aemulam parare	
multis commoda, nemini nocere,	
tum si quando graves premunt dolores	10
et curae subeunt laboriosae,	
iucunda recreatione mentis	
tristes pellere cogitationes,	
aut evolvere plurima refertos	
priscorum sapientia libellos	15
et sic tam bene colloqui disertis	
aeternoque viris honore claris,	
quamvis saecula multa iam sepultis,	
aut pernicis equi subire tergum	
venarique feras et in dolosos	20
nunc parvum leporem fugare casses	
et cervum cane persequi sagaci,	
nunc ursum truculentum aprumve torvum	
ferro sternere transeunte corpus.	
Haec post difficiles gravesque curas	25
optata ingenii quies honesti,	
hic vitae tenor est beatioris.	

(“Das ist die wahre Glückseligkeit des Lebens: In treuer ehelicher Liebe mit einer frommen und guten Gattin, die dem Manne als Begleiterin in seinen Mühen angetraut ist, verbunden sein und in sicherer Stellung Gott dienen und die Aufgaben der kurzen Lebens immer gewissenhaft ausführen und eine liebe Nachkommenschaft aufziehen, die in ihren guten Sitten einem nacheifert, und vielen Gutes tun und niemandem schaden und dann, wenn einmal schwere Schmerzen drücken und sich mühevollen Sorgen einstellen, mit einer angenehmen geistigen Erholung die traurigen Gedanken vertreiben, entweder die mit sehr viel Weisheit gefüllten Bücher der Alten aufschlagen und so so gut mit den beredten und durch ewige Ehre

<sup>6</sup> G. Crusius (wie Anm. 3) Bl. Miii f., unter der Überschrift *Ad libros Bibliothecae suae versiculi Heinrici Rantzovii ad imitationem Flaminii*.

berühmten Männern sprechen, auch wenn sie schon viele Jahrhunderte begraben sind, oder den Rücken eines schnellen Pferdes besteigen und Wild jagen und bald den kleinen Hasen in trickreiche Fangnetze scheuchen und den Hirsch mit dem Spürhund verfolgen, bald den trotzigem Bär oder den wilden Eber mit dem ihren Körper durchbohrenden Eisen erlegen. || Das ist nach schwierigen und schweren Sorgen die erwünschte Ruhe und Erholung eines ehrenhaften Geistes, dies ist der Lauf eines glückseligen Lebens.”)

Dies ist zweifellos ein ebenso selbständiges Gedicht wie das vorige. Rantzau hat in ihm in poetologischem Anschluß an ein damals viel beachtetes Epigramm Martials (10. 47: *Vitam quae faciant beatiorem . . .*)<sup>7</sup> die ihm optimal scheinende Lebensform dargestellt.<sup>8</sup> Rantzau hat die Bücherlektüre dem adligen Jagdvergnügen gleichgestellt. In den Versen 10–18 erscheinen Gedanken, die in dem Gedicht *Salvete, aureoli mei libelli* eine breitere und auch durch ihre Isolierung verstärkte Ausführung erhalten haben. Insofern könnte die Abfassung dieses Gedichts jenem vorausgegangen sein.

Bei Lindenberg, der das Gedicht *Haec est vera beatitudo vitae* nicht überliefert, erscheint das Gedicht *Salvete, aureoli mei libelli* in seiner richtigen Gestalt.<sup>9</sup> In einem weiteren humanistischen Leserkreis hat Nathan Chytraeus dieses Gedicht in seinen 1594, 1599 und 1606 gedruckten *Variorum in Europa itinerum Deliciae* bekannt gemacht.<sup>10</sup> Er hatte es von Rantzau selbst in Lindenberg's Ausgabe erhalten, denn er schreibt in seiner *Praefatio*:<sup>11</sup> “Cimbrica, et quidem ut plurimum in arcibus, palatiis, structuris et monumentis viri illustris et magnifici D. Heinrici Ranzovii vicarii regii obvia et per Georgium Crusium Petrumque Lindebergium collecta, ipse herus ad me misit.” Aus dem Werk des Chytraeus übernahm dann

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. zu der Rezeption dieses Martial-Gedichtes W. Ludwig, “Ficino in Württemberg—ein Gedicht von Nicolaus Reusner,” *Humanistica Lovaniensia* 41 (1992) 332 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Zu dem neulateinischen Gebrauch von *functione* (V. 4) im Sinn von “Amt” vgl. J. Ph. Krebs – J. H. Schmalz, *Antibarbarus der lateinischen Sprache*, 7. Aufl. (Basel 1905) Bd. 1, S. 614; zum Infinitiv als expegetische Apposition zu einem Substantiv mit Demonstrativpronomen s. R. Kühner – C. Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre*, T. 1, 3. Aufl. (Hannover 1955) 665. Zusammen mit V. 1 bildet die appositionelle Infinitivreihe in V. 2–24 eine einzige Periode. Daß Rantzau als erstes Element der *beatitudo vitae* die Ehefrau nennt, ist keineswegs konventionell und bestätigt die Beurteilung seiner Beziehung zu seiner Frau durch W. Steinmetz (wie Anm. 2) 108.

<sup>9</sup> P. Lindebergius (wie Anm. 4) 11 f., nach den Worten: “Quin etiam ipse variis et immensis occupationibus plerumque districtus, in hanc (sc. bibliothecam) sese abdidit cumque tot virorum illustrium monumentis pedem confert et nunc a philosophorum familiis ad theologos, ab his ad medicos etc. una aut altera hora deficit, quod testantur sequentes ad libros huius Bibliothecae ab ipso ad Flaminii imitationem scripti versiculi.” Das Gedicht *Haec est vera beatitudo vitae* erscheint in der späteren Überlieferung nicht mehr.

<sup>10</sup> S. N. Chytraeus, *Variorum in Europa itinerum Deliciae . . .* (Herborn 1594, 1599, 1606), hier zitiert nach der dritten Auflage, S. 470 f., unter der Überschrift *Libros bibliothecae suae amplius ad imitationem Flaminii sic alloquitur D. Heinr. Ranzovius*. Zum Herausgeber vgl. Th. Elsmann (Hrsg.), *Nathan Chytraeus 1543–1598: Ein Humanist in Rostock und Bremen* (Bremen 1991) und K. H. Glaser (Hrsg.), *David und Nathan Chytraeus: Humanismus im konfessionellen Zeitalter* (Ubstadt-Weiher 1993).

<sup>11</sup> N. Chytraeus (wie Anm. 10) Bl. ): (iii)ʳ.



Franciscus Sweertius das Gedicht in seine verbreiteten 1608 und 1625 gedruckten *Selectae Christiani orbis Deliciae*.<sup>12</sup>

Die bei Crusius, Lindenbergh und Chytraeus wiederkehrende Angabe, Heinrich Rantzau habe hier seine Bücher *ad imitationem Flaminii* angedreht, ist mißverständlich. Marc-Antonio Flaminios Gedichte waren Rantzau sicher aus den 1548, 1549, 1552 und 1558 gedruckten *Carmina quinque illustrium poetarum* bekannt.<sup>13</sup> Er hatte sich an Flaminios Gedicht *Ad agellum suum*, beginnend *Venuste agelle, tuque pulchra villula*,<sup>14</sup> in seinem nur von Crusius zitierten Gedicht *Ad fundos suos* äußerst eng angeschlossen.<sup>15</sup> Viele Verse und Versteile Flaminios hatte er identisch und in ihrer originalen Reihenfolge wiederholt und zwischen sie entweder erweiternde Zusätze eingefügt oder statt Versen von Flaminio sachliche Alternativen eingesetzt. So sind V. 2–7 eine die Lokalität ausführende Erweiterung zwischen Flaminios V. 1 und 2, V. 11–12 eine zur Ehrung seines Vaters vorgenommene Erweiterung zwischen Flaminios V. 4 und 5, V. 15–18 ein sachlicher Ersatz für Flaminios V. 7–12, in dem dieser Verlust und Wiedergewinn seines Gutes beschrieb. V. 25–31 erweitern den Anruf Flaminios in V. 12, der in V. 29 übernommen ist, durch eine abermalige Schilderung der nun durch Tiere belebten Lokalität und jetzt auch der sich auf ihr abspielenden Handlungen, und V. 33–38 ersetzen die abschließende bukolische und heidnisch-mythologische Szenerie in Flaminios V. 21–26 durch einen familienbewußten und christlichen Schluß. Der Gedichttyp nähert sich also der *Parodia*, wie sie in der Poetik Julius Caesar Scaligers und dann vor allem in der 1575 gedruckten Schrift von Henricus Stephanus über die *Parodia* theoretisch und praktisch demonstriert und wie sie danach im sechzehnten Jahrhundert gerne auch als *Parodia seria* geübt wurde.<sup>16</sup> Er unterscheidet sich aber dadurch von ihr, daß die Verszahl des Originals nicht eingehalten wird, also neben Ersetzungen auch Erweiterungen stattfinden, und daß auch mehrere Verse ohne Bedenken und ohne den Versuch, sie etwas zu variieren, übernommen werden. In der folgenden Wiedergabe des aus iambischen Trimetern und Dimetern, also dem Metrum

<sup>12</sup> S. F. Sweertius, *Selectae Christiani orbis Deliciae* (Köln 1608, 1625), hier zitiert nach der zweiten Auflage, S. 761 f. Sweertius nennt S. 10 N. Chytraeus in der Liste seiner Quellen. Weitere Druckorte verzeichnet J. Moller (wie Anm. 2) 577.

<sup>13</sup> Die Druckorte der Gedichte von P. Bembo, A. Naugerius, B. Castilionius, I. Cotta und M.-A. Flaminio enthaltenden Sammlung waren Venedig (1548, 1558) und Florenz (1549, 1552). Zitiert wird hier nach der zweiten florentinischen Ausgabe. Verglichen wurde außerdem F. M. Mancurtus (Hrsg.), *M. Antonii Flaminii Forocorneliensis poetae celeberrimi Carminum libri VIII* ... (Padua 1727).

<sup>14</sup> *Carmina* (wie Anm. 13) 138 f. (*Carm. lb. I* 17).

<sup>15</sup> G. Crusius (wie Anm. 3) Bl. Ki<sup>v</sup>-Li, unter der Überschrift *Ad Fundos suos Heinricus Rantzovius sumtis ex Flaminio plerisque versibus*. Das Gedicht ist zwischen dem Tod von Heinrich Rantzaus Vater Johann (12. Dezember 1565) bzw. März 1566 (vgl. Anm. 17) und dem 10. November 1568 (vgl. Anm. 3) entstanden.

<sup>16</sup> Vgl. hierzu E. Schäfer, *Deutscher Horaz: Conrad Celtis, Georg Fabricius, Paul Melissus, Jacob Balde* (Wiesbaden 1976) 29 ff.

horazischer Epoden bestehenden Gedichts sind die identisch übernommenen Worte bzw. Buchstaben kursiv gesetzt:<sup>17</sup>

<i>Venuste agelle tuque pulcra villula</i>	
saltusque et amnes uberes,	
salicta et umbra sibilantium arborum	
et uda rivis pascua	
tuque arx, honos soli decusque Cimbrici,	5
Storae propinqua flumini,	
dignis satis quis efferet vos laudibus?	
<i>Mei parentis optimi</i>	
<i>olim voluptas et quies gratissima</i>	
<i>fuistis; at postquam senex</i>	10
laboribus domesticis et bellicis	
perfunctus et periculis	
<i>terras reliquit et beatus coelitum</i>	
<i>petivit oras incola,</i>	
<i>vos alter appetivit usque plurimum</i>	15
fundum daturus alterum;	
rogatus et quidem saepissime	
mutare sic decreveram.	
Nunc non relinquam. <i>Iam iuvabit arbores</i>	
<i>manu paterna consitas</i>	20
<i>videre, iam libebit in cubiculo</i>	
<i>dulces inire somnulos,</i>	
<i>ubi senex solebat artus languidos</i>	
<i>molli fovere lectulo.</i>	
In Vellula capreas iuvabit sternere	25
cervisque rete tendere	
et glandibus sues agrestes pascere.	
Quid esse dulcius potest?	
<i>Gaudete prata rivulique lympidi,</i>	
Stora atque culta Vellula,	30
laetique ruminantium boum greges!	
<i>Heri vetusti filius</i>	
<i>vos possidet Deo volente maximo</i>	
<i>suisque tradet posteris.</i>	

<sup>17</sup> In V. 19 ist bei Crusius *reliquam* Druckfehler. Mit *arx* (V. 5) ist das befestigte Schloß Breitenburg gemeint. Mit *Stora* (V. 6, 30) wird die nahe an Schloß Breitenburg vorbeifließende Stör, ein kleiner Nebenfluß der Elbe, bezeichnet. *Vellula* (V. 25, 30) ist die anscheinend sonst nicht bezeugte, von Rantzau geprägte lateinische Bezeichnung für einen heute abgegangenen Ortsnamen, der die "Welle" lautete und ein zum Kirchspiel Itzehoe gehörendes, westlich von Breitenburg gelegenes jagdbares Gebiet bezeichnete, das jetzt zum großen Teil von dem "Golf-Club Schloß Breitenburg" genützt wird (Näheres s. K. Hector – W. Prange [wie Anm. 3] 606, und W. Laur, *Historisches Ortsnamenlexikon von Schleswig-Holstein* [Schleswig 1967] 210). Der in V. 15 genannte *alter*, der die Herrschaft Breitenburg gerne im Tausch erworben hätte, dürfte Heinrich Rantzaus Bruder Paul gewesen sein, für den Johann Rantzau in seinem Testament das Gut Bothkamp bestimmt hatte und der am 20. März 1566 seinem Bruder Heinrich Vorschläge wegen der Teilung der väterlichen Hinterlassenschaft machte (vgl. K. Hector – W. Prange, a.O., Nr. 442, 498, 504, 510).

Tibi ergo laus perennis et sit gloria,  
 inseparata Trinitas,  
 verbum paterque, spiritus sanctissime,  
 qui condidistis omnia.

35

(“Liebliches Gut und du schönes Haus, und Wälder und reichliche Flüsse, Weidengebüsch und Schatten zwitschernder Bäume und von Bächen feuchte Weiden und du Burg, Ehre und Zier des cimbrischen Bodens, nahe dem Fluß Stör, wer wird euch angemessen loben? || Einst ward ihr meines besten Vaters Lust und angenehmster Ruheplatz; doch nachdem der Alte nach all seinen Mühen zu Haus und seinen Gefahren im Krieg die Erde verlassen und die Gefilde der Himmlischen selig zu bewohnen erstrebt hatte, wollte euch ein anderer unbedingt bekommen—er war bereit, ein anderes Gut dafür zu geben; und sehr oft gebeten, war ich schon entschlossen, so zu tauschen. || Jetzt will ich euch nicht mehr verlassen. Es macht mir jetzt schon und auch künftig Freude, die von väterlicher Hand gepflanzten Bäume zu sehen und in dem Zimmer in süße Träume zu verfallen, wo der Alte seine müden Glieder im weichem Bette wärmte. Es wird mir Freude machen, auf der Welle die Rehe zu erlegen und für die Hirsche Netze zu spannen und die Wildschweine mit Eicheln zu mästen. Was kann hübscher sein? || Freut euch, ihr Wiesen und ihr klaren Bäche, Stör und schönes Wellenland und auch ihr satten Herden der wiederkäuenden Kühe! Des alten Herren Sohn besitzt euch mit des höchsten Gottes Willen und wird euch auch seinen Nachfahren überliefern. || Dir also sei ewig Lob und Ruhm, ungeteilte Dreiheit, Sohn und Vater, Heiliger Geist, da ihr dies alles erschaffen habt!”)

Eine solche Imitation, die Flaminios Anrede an sein zurückgewonnenes väterliches Gut in Serravalle am Fuß der Venezianer Alpen auf Rantzaus von seinem Vater ererbtes Schloßgut Breitenburg überträgt, erkennt das humanistische Gedicht aus Italien uneingeschränkt als klassisches Vorbild an. Die vielen von Rantzaus frei komponierten lateinischen Gedichte zeigen, daß die Übernahme der Verse Flaminios hier nicht aus Versnot geschah, sondern seine freie Entscheidung war. Rantzaus hat später einen anderen humanistischen Text aus Italien in analoger Weise bearbeitet und sich angeeignet. Das in Neapel befindliche Prosa-Epitaph Giovanni Pontanos für sich selbst (*Vivus domum hanc mihi paravi . . .*), das Rantzaus vermutlich in einer der Kupferstiche von italienischen Grabmonumenten enthaltenden Ausgaben von Tobias Fendts Tafelwerk gesehen und gelesen hatte,<sup>18</sup> benützte er zur Komposition seines nur wenig variierten, aber in iambischen Trimetern und Dimetern gehaltenen eigenen Epitaphs (*Vivus lapideum hunc*

<sup>18</sup> T. Fendt, *Monumenta clarorum doctrina praecipue toto orbe terrarum virorum collecta . . .* (Breslau 1574, Frankfurt 1585, 1589), neue Auflage und Bearbeitung durch M. Z. Boxhorn (Amsterdam 1638), das Epitaph von Pontano dort im Stich S. 81. Lesen konnte Rantzaus den Text des Epitaphs bereits in N. Chytraeus, *Hodoeporicon . . .* (Rostock 1568) Bl. E2.

*mihi paravi lectulum . . .*), das er auf seinem für die St. Laurentius-Kirche in Itzehoe bestimmten Steinsarkophag anbringen ließ.<sup>19</sup>

Ein ähnlich nahes Vorbild für Rantzaus Gedicht *Salvete, aureoli mei libelli* existiert unter Flaminios Gedichten nicht. Nur mit der Verwendung der Junktur *aureoli libelli*, dem Gedanken, daß die "goldenen Bücher" ständig "leben" und immer gelesen werden und generell mit dem catullisierenden Gedichtstil war Flaminio in mehreren Gedichten vorausgegangen. In einem hendekasyllabischen Gedicht *De libellis Andreae Naugerii* sagt er, daß die *libelli* Naugerios, und das heißt hier: seine Gedichte, so viele Jahre leben werden, wie es Sandkörner am Meer oder Sterne am Himmel oder Küsse bei Catull gibt, und er schließt nach zehn derartigen Vergleichen mit V. 13: *Vivent aureoli tui libelli*.<sup>20</sup> Rantzaus erster Vers kann in seiner Wortverteilung als *imitatio* dieses Verses bezeichnet werden. Den Sinn von *libelli* hat Rantzau verändert: es sind jetzt alle seine Bücher, die die Schriften der hervorragenden Geister der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart enthalten, gemeint, darunter auch die großen. Das Deminutiv drückt nur im catullischen Stil die Gefühlsbeziehung aus. Flaminio hat die Junktur im Schlußvers seines hendekasyllabischen Gedichts *Ad Alexandrum Farnesium Cardinalem* wieder benützt. Er widmet dort dem Kardinal ein eigenes Gedichtbuch und versichert ihm am Ende: *manebit / aeterno aureolus libellus aevo*.<sup>21</sup> Entsprechend sagt Rantzau, daß seine "goldenen" Bücher *aevo perpetuo leguntur* (V. 12). Die *aureoli libelli* sind hier in humanistischem Optimismus unvergänglich. Dabei ist die antike Vorstellung von der Unvergänglichkeit großer Dichtung aufgegriffen und erweitert. Ein drittes Mal benützte Flaminio die Junktur in dem hendekasyllabischen Gedicht *Ad Ioannem Casam* und zwar abermals im Schlußvers: *saeculumque / nostrum orna aureolis tuis libellis*.<sup>22</sup> Die Junktur als solche wirkt catullisierend. Sie variiert gewissermaßen *lepidum . . . libellum* aus Catulls C. 1. 1 mit einem weiteren Deminutiv, das Catull auch verwendet hat.<sup>23</sup> Die Junktur selbst aber—und das wußten sowohl Flaminio als auch Rantzau—stammte aus Ciceros *Acad. Quaest.* 2. 44. 135, wo von einer Schrift des Akademikers Krantor "Über die Trauer" gesagt

<sup>19</sup> S. N. Chytraeus (wie Anm. 10) 527, unter der Überschrift *Henricus Ranzovius Vicarius regius ad imitationem Pontani de suo sarcophago*. Der Text auch in P. Lindebergius, *Iuvenilium partes tres* (Frankfurt 1595) 169 f. Weitere Druckorte bei J. Moller (wie Anm. 2) 581, der als Ort der Erstveröffentlichung nennt: H. Rantzau, *De Somniis eorumque eventibus* (Leipzig 1584). Der Sandsteinsarkophag, jetzt in der Schloßkapelle Breitenburg, ist erhalten; s. W. Steinmetz (wie Anm. 2) 702 f., Nr. 156.

<sup>20</sup> *Carmina* (wie Anm. 13) 158 f. (*Carm. lb.* I 38).

<sup>21</sup> *Carmina* (wie Anm. 13) 182 f. (*Carm. lb.* II 1). Im gleichen Gedicht geht anläßlich einer Lobpreisung der modernen lateinischen Dichter Italiens die Anrufung *Salvete o decus, o perennis aevi / nostri gloria candidi poetae* voraus.

<sup>22</sup> *Carmina* (wie Anm. 13) 195 (*Carm. lb.* II 11).

<sup>23</sup> S. Cat. C. 2a. 2 und 61. 167. (H. P. Syndikus, *Catull: Eine Interpretation*, zweiter Teil [Darmstadt 1990] 39, faßt *aureolos* bei *pedes* gegen frühere Erklärer nicht metaphorisch sondern als Farbbezeichnung für die Sandalen auf.)

wird: *non magnus, verum aureolus et . . . ad verbum ediscendus libellus*.<sup>24</sup> Das Deminutiv wählte Cicero wohl in Hinsicht auf *libellus*. Das Adjektiv *aureolus* statt *aureus* wird gerne bei kleinen Gegenständen, die selbst mit einem Deminutiv bezeichnet werden, benützt (Plautus stellte es zu *anellus* und *ensiculus*). Für ein Buch hat Cicero die Bezeichnung "golden" nach unserer Überlieferung als erster verwendet. Vorausgegangen war, sie für Worte und Äußerungen zu benützen. Lukrez sprach von den *aurea dicta* Epikurs.<sup>25</sup>

In Anspielung auf Rantzaus Gedicht *Salvete, aureoli mei libelli* wird dann später Peter Lindenberg in einem Epigramm die von Rantzaus selbst verfaßten—historischen, geographischen, kriegswissenschaftlichen, medizinischen und astrologischen—Werke als "goldene" Schriften und Bücher bezeichnen:<sup>26</sup>

Pergito, Ranzoi, toti innotescere mundo  
aureolis scriptis aureolisque libris.

Rantzaus hat sein Gedicht im übrigen insgesamt in dem catullisierenden Stil verfaßt, wie er von der Mitte des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts an von Pontano vor allem im erotischen Bereich aufgebracht worden war<sup>27</sup> und wie er sich im sechzehnten Jahrhundert dann—auch durch Flaminio—weit verbreitet hatte.<sup>28</sup> Es scheint, daß das Catullisieren Rantzaus durch die catullisierenden Gedichte Flaminios angeregt worden ist.

Als catullischen Stilzug empfand man es, wenn man die Anfangsverse am Ende gleich oder leicht abgewandelt wiederholte.<sup>29</sup> Flaminio befolgte dieses Prinzip in seinem Gedicht *Ad agellum suum: Formosa silva vosque lucidi fontes*.<sup>30</sup> Ein späteres Poetiklehrbuch schreibt zum *carmen phaleucium*:<sup>31</sup> "Non indecora est in fine repetitio unius vel plurium primorum versuum, quae Epanalepteos speciem quandam habet." Rantzaus

<sup>24</sup> Erasmus zitiert diese Stelle in seinen *Adagia* mit der Erklärung: *quod eximium videri volumus aureum dicimus* (*Opera* [Leiden 1703] 2. Bd., Sp. 705).

<sup>25</sup> *De rer. nat.* 4. 12. Vgl. im übrigen *TLL* II Sp. 1488, 53 ff., und Sp. 1491, 61 ff. Im Griechischen gibt es zwar bei Pindar eine "goldene" Muse als Abwandlung der "goldenen" Aphrodite Homers, aber die "goldenen" Worte von (Ps.-)Pythagoras werden erst in der römischen Kaiserzeit so bezeichnet.

<sup>26</sup> P. Lindebergius (wie Anm. 18) 182 (*In Enchiridion bellicum Henrici Ranzovii*, V. 13 f.).

<sup>27</sup> Vgl. W. Ludwig, *Litterae Neolatinae: Schriften zur Neulateinischen Literatur*, hrsg. von L. Braun u.a. (München 1989) 162 ff., und dens., "The Origin and Development of the Catullan Style in Neo-Latin Poetry," in: *Latin Poetry and the Classical Tradition*, ed. by P. Godman and O. Murray (Oxford 1990) 183 ff.

<sup>28</sup> Vgl. W. Ludwig, *Litterae Neolatinae* (wie Anm. 27) 260 ff., und dens., "Joachim Münsinger und der Humanismus in Stuttgart," *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte* 52 (1993) 91 ff., hier S. 111 f. und 122 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Vgl. Catullus C. 16, 36, 52 und 57.

<sup>30</sup> *Carmina* (wie Anm. 13) 130 (*Carm. lb.* I 10).

<sup>31</sup> (Chr. Helwig und C. Bachmann), *Poetica, praeceptis, commentariis, observationibus, exemplis ex veteribus et recentibus poetis studiose conscripta per Academiae Gissenae nonnullos Professores* (Gießen 1608, 1692, 1617, 1657), hier zitiert nach der dritten Auflage, S. 247 f.



folgte dieser Anschauung. Die Anrede und der Ausruf des Anfangs (V. 1–4) werden in den sechs Schlußversen 27–32 in zunächst identischer, dann erweiterter Form zusammen mit einer zusätzlichen Frage wieder aufgenommen. Der Ausdruck schließt sich dem Sirmio-Gedicht Catulls an, das auch Flaminio in dem eben erwähnten Gedicht zum Vorbild genommen hatte, wobei der Anschluß am Ende enger und deutlicher ausfällt. Vgl. aus C. 31 V. 12 *Salve, o venusta Sirmio* mit V. 1 und 27 f., V. 4 *quam te libenter quamque laetus in viso* mit V. 3 und V. 30 f., sowie V. 7 *o quid solutis est beatius curis* mit V. 32. Die Übernahme der Ausdrucksweise, mit der Catull seine Beziehung zu dem heimatlichen Sirmio am Gardasee charakterisiert hat, und ihre Verwendung für die Beziehung Rantzau zu seinen Büchern läßt diese Beziehung gefühlsmäßig der Catulls zu Sirmio entsprechen.

Rantzau hat zudem seine Gefühle für seine Bücher mit dem catullischen Liebesvokabular ausgedrückt, wodurch die Bücher auch an die Stelle einer Geliebten treten. V. 2 stammt wörtlich aus Cat. C. 32. 2 *meae deliciae, mei lepores*, ein Vers, der auch an den dortigen Kontext, die Einladung an Ipsitilla, denken läßt. Die geliebten *libelli* sind ein Kontrast zu ihr, aber auch eine Analogie. Rantzau freut sich, sie mit seinen Augen zu sehen (V. 3), freut sich, sie in seinen Händen zu halten (V. 4, zum Ausdruck vgl. auch Cat. C. 2. 2 *quem in sinu tenere*) und mit ihnen zu sprechen (V. 31).<sup>32</sup> Die Bücher sind bereits "berieben" (*tritots*) durch den häufigen Umgang mit ihnen.

Die Liebesbeziehung wird im Innenteil des Gedichts weiter ausgeführt. In V. 18–26 stellt Rantzau sein persönliches Verhältnis zu ihnen dar. Schon als Knabe "umarmte" er sie *magno amore* (V. 18 *aetate puer virēte* im Ausdruck nach Apul. *Met.* 10. 29 *puelli puellaeque virente florentes aetatula*), und als erwachsener Mann "verfolgt und begleitet" er sie *impotentiore* (sc. *amore*)—der Ausdruck folgt Cat. C. 35. 12 *illum deperit impotente amore*. Solange das Schicksal ihn lieben läßt, das heißt: solange er lebt, wird er in Liebe für seine Bücher vergehen (*immori*, in der Konstruktion nach Horaz, *Ep.* 1. 7. 85, ist hier dem Sinne nach wie *deperire* "vor Liebe sterben" verwendet—die Verbindung von *amor* und *mors* war gerade in der neulateinischen Liebesdichtung des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, z.B. bei Janus Secundus, ein beliebtes Motiv). Rantzau endet diesen Abschnitt mit einem historischen Exempel: Wie König Alfonso dem Weisen von Neapel, dessen Bücherliebe das Geschichtswerk des Antonius Panormita bekannt gemacht hatte und von der auch Apophthegmensammlungen wie die des Erasmus und Facietien kündeten,<sup>33</sup> waren ihm seine

<sup>32</sup> Zum Motiv des "Sprechens" der Bücher mit dem Leser vgl. Chr. Bec, "De Pétrarque a Machiavel: à propos d'un Topós humaniste (Le dialogue lecteur/livre)," *Rinascimento* 2 S. 16 (1976) 3 ff., und die spätere Erörterung unten.

<sup>33</sup> Die von Antonius Beccadelli genannt Panormita als Sekretär des Königs verfaßten *Libri quatuor de dictis et factis Alphonsi regis*, die Paulus Iovius in seinen *Elogia virorum litteris illustrium* ein *aureum libellum* nennt, wurden 1538 in Basel gedruckt. Die Aussprüche des

Bücher lieber als alle seine anderen nicht geringen Reichtümer—und es ist zu bemerken, daß es auch ein beliebter Schlußtopos von Liebesdichtungen war, den Wert der Geliebten über alle Reichtümer zu setzen.

Der erste Abschnitt des Innenteils, V. 5–13, gibt die Begründung für diese große Liebe: In den Büchern sind die Gedanken der großen Autoren des Altertums und der Neuzeit aufbewahrt, so daß diese überall und immer gelesen werden können und—so endet Rantzaus in V. 13 mit dem von ihm abgewandelten, von Cicero überlieferten Enniusvers (*Tusc.* 1. 15 *volito vivus per ora virum*)—*doctorum . . . volant per ora clari*.

Zwischen diesen beiden je neun Verse umfassenden Abschnitten des Innenteils stehen vier Verse, in denen Rantzaus die Wirkung seiner Bücher in einer fast hymnischen Anrede an sie definiert und in denen diese Bücher nun beinahe zu einer Gottheit werden. Sie sind *requies* und *voluptas*, womit in V. 14–15 auf die Bücher übertragen worden ist, was Lukrez von der Muse Calliope ausgesagt hatte (*De rer. nat.* 6. 94: *Calliope, requies hominum divumque voluptas*). Und sie sind darüber hinaus seine Zuflucht in der Not, sowie Zier und Glanz im Glück. In V. 16–17 wird auf die Bücher übertragen, was Cicero, *Pro Archia* 7, von den *studia litterarum* allgemein ausgesagt hatte: *secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium praebent*. Auch Horaz dürfte eine kleine Formulierungshilfe geleistet haben (*C.* 2. 10. 21 ff. *rebus angustis . . . vento nimium secundo*). V. 16 wirkt zudem wie eine humanistische Umformulierung des nun auf die Bücher bezogenen Bibelwortes *Jer.* 16. 19 *Domine, . . . refugium meum in die tribulationis*, das Luther mit "Herr, du bist meine Zuflucht in der Not" übersetzt hatte. In *laetis* (sc. *rebus*) strahlen die Bücher dann geradezu in göttlichem Glanz (*nitor refulgens*, V. 17).

Diese vergöttlichende Sprechweise war eine poetische Lizenz. Die Bücher erfreuten ihn wie die Heimat, in die man zurückkehrt. Er liebte sie wie eine Geliebte. Er verehrte sie wie eine wohlthätige Gottheit, und er hat diesen letzten Aspekt seiner Bedeutung entsprechend in den mittleren Abschnitt des deutlich symmetrisch strukturierten Gedichts gesetzt.

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Königs gingen in Anekdotensammlungen ein. Die zahlreichen Ausgaben der *Facetiae* Heinrichs Bebelis enthielten seit 1542 auch die *Facetiae Alphonsi Arragonum regis*. Vgl. auch die *Apophthegmata* des Erasmus (wie Anm. 23) Bd. 4, Sp. 377 ff. Über die Bücherliebe des Königs findet sich noch in: *Centi-Folium Stultorum in Quarto. Oder Hundert Ausbündige Narren in Folio . . .* (1709, Nachdruck Dortmund 1978) 54, im Kapitel über den "Bücher-Narr": ". . . von dem weisen König Alphonso in Arragonien, Sicilien und Neapolis meldet Antonius Panormita, daß er gesagt, wie er aus den Büchern die Waffen und Kriegs-Recht erlehret habe und daß man bei solchen als den besten Räten die Wahrheit suchen könne und daß er lieber Edel-Gestein und seine köstlichen Perlen als einige Bücher verlieren wolle; wie er dann ein offenes Buch in seinem *Symbolo* und Merckzeichen gebraucht und ihm die Soldaten, wann sie in Eroberung der Städte Bücher bekommen, dieselben häufig zugetragen haben; *Julii Caesaris Commentarios* hat er allenthalben in seinen Kriegen mit sich herum geführt, und da er auf ein Zeit den *Livium* lese und die Musicanten in sein Zimmer kommen, hat er sie abgeschafft, weil er viel ein bessere Music in seinen Ohren aus diesen Schriften klingen hörte; den *Curtium* hat er sonderlich in Ehren gehabt, weil er auf Ablesung dessen von einer Krankheit zu Capua genesen ist; auch den *Ovidium* höher als das Land Abruzzo, darauß dieser Poet gebürtig gewest, geachtet."

Rantzau hatte sicherlich auch die verbreitete Basler Ausgabe der *Opera omnia* Petrarcas von 1554 in seiner Bibliothek, und Petrarcas berühmtes Lob der Bücher in seinem Brief an seinen Bruder Gerardus (*Fam. Ep. III 18 Scripta veterum indaganda esse*) dürfte ihm nicht unbekannt gewesen sein: "Aurum, argentum, gemmae, purpurea vestis, marmorea domus, cultus ager, pictae tabulae, phaleratus sonipes caeteraque id genus mutam habe(n)t et superficiariam voluptatem; libri medullitus delectant, colloquuntur, consulunt et viva quadam nobis atque arguta familiaritate iunguntur." Diese Gedanken waren unterdessen beinahe ein humanistischer *locus communis* geworden.<sup>34</sup> Das hinderte nicht, daß ihre Formulierung durch Petrarca am bekanntesten blieb. Rantzaus Gedicht läßt sich als eine poetische Verarbeitung dieser Gedanken auffassen. Das Gold hat sich jetzt metaphorisch mit den Büchern verbunden. Auch Petrarca setzt alle anderen Reichtümer hinten. Petrarca und Rantzau vermitteln ihre Bücher tiefste Freude, ja sogar *voluptas*. Sie sprechen mit ihnen, wofür immer das Verbum *colloqui* gebraucht wird, und sie werden zu vertrauten Freunden. Rantzau ist über diese Vorstellung emotional noch hinausgegangen, wenn er die Bücher die Rolle einer Geliebten spielen läßt und nicht so sehr ihre beratende Funktion betont, als sie vielmehr als Helfer und Retter in geradezu göttlichem Glanz sieht.

Mit der im Gedicht gesteigerten Emotionalität ist die ständige Anrede an die Bücher wie an lebende Wesen verbunden. Die Hinwendung zu ihnen wird durch die artistisch bewußte Plazierung von *vos* in allen fünf Abschnitten des Gedichts betont.<sup>35</sup> Rantzau hat den humanistischen Grundgedanken Petrarcas nicht nur in die catullisierende poetische Form umgesetzt, sondern mit und in ihr die Möglichkeit gefunden, diesen Gedanken zu einem intim wirkenden persönlichen Bekenntnis auszugestalten, das seinerseits das humanistische Verhältnis zum Buch formvollendet und modellhaft darzustellen geeignet ist.

Mit einer Mischung aus Ernst und Scherz hat Rantzau in einem weiteren an der Wand seiner Bibliothek angebrachten Text auch seinem Wunsch Ausdruck gegeben, daß seine Bücher auf immer unversehrt und ungeteilt im Besitz seiner Familie bleiben. Er hat dafür den von Catull denkbar weit entfernten Stil der altrömischen Gesetzessprache gewählt, wie ihn bereits Cicero in seinem Dialog *De legibus* (2. 8. 18 ff.) beim Entwurf eines Sakralgesetzes imitiert hatte. Daß er diese Imitation imitierte, wird durch die Übernahme der in der antiken Literatur singulären Wortfolge

<sup>34</sup> Vgl. die Nachweise in dem in Anm. 32 zitierten Aufsatz von Chr. Bec.

<sup>35</sup> Zu beachten ist die Stellung von *vos* in V. 3, 5, 14, 18, 30 jeweils in der Mitte der äußeren bzw. am Anfang der inneren Abschnitte des Gedichts. Die Formen *vobis* (V. 7, 22) und *vestro/vestras* (V. 11, 25) finden sich außerdem nur im zweiten und vierten Abschnitt in der gleichen Reihenfolge. Der symmetrische Aufbau des Gedichts wird dadurch verstärkt.

*clepserit, rapserit* erwiesen. Der Text, der zwischen 1569 und 1584 verfaßt worden sein dürfte, lautet:<sup>36</sup>

*Henrici Rantzovii perpetuum de bibliotheca sua decretum:*

Quae infra scripta sunt, hunc in modum sancita sunt inviolateque observantor:

Rantzovii nec quisquam alius hanc possidento, haeredes eam non dividunto.

Nemini libros, codices, volumina, picturas ex ea auferendi, extrahendi aliove asportandi nisi licentia possessoris facultas esto. Si quis secus fecerit, libros partemve aliquam abstulerit, extraxerit, clepserit, rapserit, concerperit, corruperit dolo malo, illico maledictus, perpetuo execrabilis, semper detestabilis esto, maneto.

(“Was unten geschrieben ist, soll in dieser Weise festgelegt sein und unverletzt beachtet werden: || Die Rantzau und kein anderer sollen die Bibliothek besitzen, die Erben sollen sie nicht teilen. || Niemanden soll es gestattet sein ohne Erlaubnis des Besitzers Bücher, Handschriften, Rollen, Bilder aus ihr wegzutragen, herauszunehmen oder anderswohin wegzuschaffen. Wenn einer anders gehandelt haben wird, Bücher oder irgendeinen Teil weggetragen, herausgenommen, gestohlen, geraubt, verwendet, in böser Absicht beschädigt haben wird, so soll er alsbald verdammt, beständig verflucht und immer verwünscht sein und bleiben.”)

Der Titel *perpetuum decretum* parodiert das *edictum perpetuum* des römischen Stadtprätors. Freilich ist zu bemerken, daß alle Details der alten Gesetzessprache doch nicht dazu geführt haben, daß für Bücherdiebe über die Verfluchung hinaus eine Strafe festgelegt worden wäre.<sup>37</sup> Als Bibliotheksordnung ist das Dekret nur bedingt praktikabel. Es bringt auf seine Weise aber auch wieder Rantzaus Liebe zu seinen Büchern zum Ausdruck, deren Konsequenz verbunden mit seinem starken Familienbewußtsein sein Wunsch war, daß sie unverseht und vereint im Besitz der Rantzau die Zeiten überdauern mögen.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> G. Crusius (wie Anm. 3) kennt den Text noch nicht. Er ist zuerst (nach J. Moller [wie Anm. 2] 576) veröffentlicht in H. Rantzau (wie Anm. 19); danach s. P. Lindebergius (wie Anm. 4, Frankfurt 1592) 26, dens. (wie Anm. 19) 168 f. (mit der vorhergehenden Zeile: *Pateo Minervae, non Murciae*), N. Chytraeus (wie Anm. 10) 509, F. Sweertius (wie Anm. 12) 765; weitere Druckorte bei J. Moller a.O.

<sup>37</sup> Zu anderen Abwehrreaktionen gegen den Diebstahl von Büchern vgl. W. Ludwig, “Bücherdiebstahl im 16. Jahrhundert—zwei Dokumente,” *Zeitschrift für Bibliothekswesen und Bibliographie* 39 (1992) 348 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Vgl. dazu auch die entsprechenden Bestimmungen über die Bibliothek in Heinrich Rantzaus deutschsprachigem Testament vom 18. Oktober 1594 bei K. Hector – W. Prange (wie Anm. 3) Nr. 1027, 95. Heinrich Rantzau legt dort fest, daß die Bibliothek im gleichen Raum ungeteilt bei den Rantzauschen Erben von Bredenberg bleiben soll; der Pastor und Kaplan von Bredenberg sollen von einem Kapital von 200 bzw. 150 Mark eine jährliche Rente (10 bzw. 7,50 Mark) für die Wartung der Bibliothek erhalten—sie sollen den Bücherkatalog führen, die Bücher “wischen und rein machen” und zweimal jährlich (zur Verhütung der Schimmelbildung) austrocknen, im Winter vor dem Kaminfeuer, im Sommer in der Sonne (der Bibliotheksraum selbst war nicht heizbar); die Rantzau, auch Schwäger und Schwiegersöhne,



Die Texte, mit denen Rantzaus seine Bibliothek schmückte, spiegelten ihre Spannweite, die von der leichten Poesie eines Catull bis zu der schweren Prosa des römischen Rechts alle *prisci lumina saeculi et recentis* vereinigen sollte und im Urteil der Zeit vereinigte.

Entgegen dem Wunsch ihres Besitzers überdauerte die Bibliothek ihn aber nur etwa dreißig Jahre: 1627 belagerte, eroberte und zerstörte der kaiserliche Generalissimus Wallenstein mit seinen Truppen das befestigte Schloß Breitenburg, das von den Truppen des dänischen Königs vierzehn Tage lang verteidigt worden war. Auch die berühmte Bibliothek wurde geplündert und zerstört.<sup>39</sup> Die Handschriften und Bücher wurden teilweise weit verschleppt. Einzelne wurden in öffentlichen Bibliotheken in Prag, wohin sie durch Wallenstein gekommen waren, aber auch in vielen deutschen Städten (Augsburg, Breslau, Darmstadt, Göttingen, Gotha, Jena, Marburg und Rostock), in Dänemark (Kopenhagen, Aarhus, Herlufsholm, Odense, Roshilde), ja sogar in Schweden (Stockholm, Uppsala, Skokloster) und Finnland (Helsingfors) nachgewiesen. Die letzteren stammten zu einem Teil aus der schwedischen Kriegsbeute im Dreißigjährigem Krieg. Andere Bücher waren einer zeitgenössischen Chronik zufolge über Wallensteins Soldaten in den Besitz von Bürgern aus Itzehoe und von da nach Hamburg gekommen. Ein paar Bände gelangten vielleicht dadurch auch in die Stadtbibliothek Hamburg und nach Kiel.

Es wurde kürzlich festgestellt, daß sich "unter den erhaltenen Resten der Rantzaus-Bibliothek im Vergleich zu anderen Disziplinen (Astronomie, Medizin, Geschichte, Jura) auffällig wenig literarische und kunsthistorische Werke" befinden.<sup>40</sup> Dieser Befund läßt sich vielleicht so erklären, daß er keine Rückschlüsse auf den ursprünglichen Bibliotheksbestand erlaubt. Die Bücher der verglichenen Disziplinen sind relativ häufig große Folio- oder Oktavbände, während literarische Werke umgekehrt häufig im Oktav- und Duodezformat gedruckt wurden—solche kleineren Bände gehen leichter zugrunde und bleiben in den öffentlichen Bibliotheken auch eher unbemerkt.

Manche Bände der Rantzaus-Bibliothek dürften noch unerkannt in öffentlichen und privaten Bibliotheken liegen. Ohne es zu ahnen, erwarb ich kürzlich einen Band aus dieser Bibliothek im Antiquariatshandel, wo ein Exemplar von P. Lindebergius, *Juvenilium partes tres* (Frankfurt 1595) im Oktavformat (16,5 × 10 cm), "mit starken Gebrauchsspuren" zum Kauf angeboten wurde. Lindenbergs hatte dieses Buch veröffentlicht, als er 1595 von Paul Schede Melissus in Heidelberg zum *Poeta laureatus* gekrönt worden war, und dafür seine 1592 in Hamburg veröffentlichten *Hedysmaton*

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sind berechtigt gegen eigenhändige Unterschrift im Leihbuch einzelne Bücher bis zu einem halben Jahr zu entleihen.

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. M. Posselt, "Die Bibliothek Heinrich Rantzaus," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Schleswig-Holsteinisch-Lauenburgische Geschichte* 11 (1881) 69 ff.; weitere Literatur über die Forschungen nach dem Verbleib der Bücher und Handschriften hat D. Lohmeier (wie Anm. 2) 68, Anm. 5, zusammengestellt.

<sup>40</sup> S. D. Lohmeier (wie Anm. 2) 69, Anm. 6, und W. Steinmetz (wie Anm. 2) 132 ff.



*partes tres* überarbeitet und durch Stücke, die auf die Dichterkrönung Bezug nahmen, erweitert.<sup>41</sup> Der Pergamenteinband des vorliegenden Exemplars war in der Tat stark lädiert: verschmutzt, verfärbt, wellig und etwas eingerissen. Die Schließbänder und das Vorsatzblatt fehlen. Die Seiten sind oft wasserfleckig. Aber auf dem durch vier ursprünglich offenbar schwarz geprägte rechteckige Linien am Rand und kleine Rosetten in den Ecken geschmückten Vorderdeckel befindet sich in der Mitte ein mit schwarzem Prägestempel gesetztes, wenn auch verblaßtes ovales Supralibros (55 × 45 mm), das ein Wappen mit längs geteiltem Schild in verschiedenen Farben und mit Büffelhörnern auf dem Helm und eine Umschrift zeigte, deren Zeichen sich bei näherer Betrachtung zu meiner Überraschung in folgender Weise entziffern ließen:

HINRIC \* o \* RANZAW \* o \* STADTHOLDER \* o \*

Auf dem hinteren Deckel ist außen das gleiche Prägemuster, in der Mitte eine schwarz eingeprägte stilisierte Lilie zu sehen. Das gleiche Supralibros ist durch die Forschungen von I. Collijn für ein aus dem Besitz von Heinrich Rantzau stammendes, 1588 oder bald danach gebundenes Buch in der National- und Universitätsbibliothek Prag belegt.<sup>42</sup> Das Exemplar scheint Lindenbergs Widmungsexemplar an Heinrich Rantzau gewesen zu sein, das dieser auf seine Weise binden ließ. Das fehlende Vorsatzblatt dürfte die handschriftliche Widmung getragen haben. Die vermeintlichen "starken Gebrauchsspuren" sind in erster Linie vermutlich als Spuren der Kriegsergebnisse des Jahres 1627 aufzufassen.

Auf der Innenseite des Vorderdeckels ist auf den oberen Pergamenteinschlag mit alter Tinte geschrieben: "ex auctione Lackmanniana Hmb. 1755." Über diese Hamburger Auktion ließ sich nichts mehr in Erfahrung bringen, aber ihren Anlaß kann man erschließen: es handelte sich offenbar um den Büchernachlaß des Kieler Professors Adam Heinrich Lackmann (1694–1753).<sup>43</sup> Geboren in Lauenburg, war er 1708 unter dem Rektorat von Johann Albert Fabricius im Hamburger Johanneum immatrikuliert worden, studierte 1718 in Gießen, dann in Kiel, hielt sich 1719–1721 wieder in Hamburg auf, war danach Rektor in Eutin, 1727–1729 im Dienst des Grafen Christian Rantzau auf Rasdorf und ab 1733 Professor der Geschichte an der Universität Kiel. Seine zahlreichen veröffentlichten Arbeiten betreffen unter anderem die Geschichte des norddeutschen Humanismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert. Er hat das Exemplar von Lindenbergs *Juvenilia*—wohl noch im Wissen um seine

<sup>41</sup> S. die genauen Titelangaben bei H. Wiegand (wie Anm. 4) 503.

<sup>42</sup> S. I. Collijn, "Rester av Heinrich Rantzaus Bibliotek på Breitenburg i National- och Universitetsbiblioteket i Prag," *Nordisk Tidskrift för Bok- och Biblioteksväsen* 26 (1939) 126 ff., 27 (1940) 179 ff., 28 (1941) 1 ff., hier 27, S. 229 (Nr. 178), und 28, S. 3 mit Abb. 3.

<sup>43</sup> Vgl. zu ihm H. Schröder – F. A. Cropp – C. R. W. Klose, *Lexikon der hamburgischen Schriftsteller bis zur Gegenwart*, 4. Bd. (Hamburg 1866) 268 f.

Herkunft—in Hamburg oder im holsteinischen Raum erwerben können, wo es sich seit 1627 befunden haben dürfte. *Habent sua fata libelli.*

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